

2.1.1 Constitutional Law – Oregon Constitution – Procedural Issues. Code procedures that distinguish between “Type II” permit decisions that can be made without an initial hearing, with an opportunity for affected persons to appeal to a *de novo* hearing, and “Type III” permit decisions that require an initial hearing, do not violate the privileges and immunities clause by granting “privileges” to participants of Type III proceedings that are denied Type II participants. *Kane v. City of Beaverton*, 56 Or LUBA 240 (2008).

2.1.1 Constitutional Law – Oregon Constitution – Procedural Issues. A challenge to a city decision denying building permits under the city’s sign ordinance is necessarily viewed as an “as-applied” challenge rather than a facial challenge, because the challenged decision is not the enactment of an ordinance by lawmakers, but rather the enforcement of the ordinance by executive officials. *West Coast Media v. City of Gladstone*, 44 Or LUBA 503 (2003).

2.1.1 Constitutional Law – Oregon Constitution – Procedural Issues. Even in the context of an “as-applied” constitutional challenge, LUBA’s scope of review is not limited to the code provisions directly applied to the petitioner. Depending on the type of constitutional challenge, petitioner may cite to portions of legislation not directly applied to petitioner and argue that the government’s action is unconstitutional, because the legislative scheme under which the government acted includes impermissible distinctions. *West Coast Media v. City of Gladstone*, 44 Or LUBA 503 (2003).

2.1.1 Constitutional Law – Oregon Constitution – Procedural Issues. Incremental impacts on a transportation facility attributable to a proposed development may support an exaction. *McClure v. City of Springfield*, 39 Or LUBA 329 (2001).

2.1.1 Constitutional Law – Oregon Constitution – Procedural Issues. LUBA will uphold an exaction requiring the dedication of right-of-way where the city’s findings demonstrate that the exaction is roughly proportional to the impacts caused by the development, including any benefits the development receives by virtue of the exaction. *McClure v. City of Springfield*, 39 Or LUBA 329 (2001).

2.1.1 Constitutional Law – Oregon Constitution – Procedural Issues. Where a city fails to establish a relationship between vehicular and nonvehicular impacts of a proposed development and a required dedication for sidewalks, the exaction is not supportable under *Dolan v. City of Tigard*, 512 US 374, 114 S Ct 2309, 129 L Ed 2d 304 (1994). *McClure v. City of Springfield*, 39 Or LUBA 329 (2001).

2.1.1 Constitutional Law – Oregon Constitution – Procedural Issues. A waiver of remonstrance to the formation of a local improvement district is not subject to the analysis required by *Dolan v. City of Tigard*, 512 US 374, 114 S Ct 2309, 129 L Ed 2d 304 (1994) because it, by itself, does not result in the loss of property. *McClure v. City of Springfield*, 39 Or LUBA 329 (2001).

2.1.1 Constitutional Law – Oregon Constitution – Procedural Issues. A city does not violate an applicant’s right to due process by denying its request to cross-examine

witnesses, where the local code provides no right of cross-examination and the applicant fails to explain why an alternative process offered by the city in place of cross-examination would be insufficient to protect the applicant's right to due process. *Oregon Entertainment Corp. v. City of Beaverton*, 38 Or LUBA 440 (2000).

2.1.1 Constitutional Law – Oregon Constitution – Procedural Issues. Where a city allows one party more time to present oral testimony during a land use hearing than is allowed another party, the unequal allocation of time will not constitute error so long as the city's decision explains the reason for the differentiation, there is an unlimited opportunity to submit written testimony, and the unequal allocation of time does not cause substantial prejudice. *Kane v. City of Beaverton*, 38 Or LUBA 183 (2000).

2.1.1 Constitutional Law - Oregon Constitution - Procedural Issues. An enumeration of alleged procedural irregularities, without analysis, does not amount to a reviewable claim of a constitutional violation. *Fechtig v. City of Albany*, 31 Or LUBA 410 (1996).

2.1.1 Constitutional Law - Oregon Constitution - Procedural Issues. Where petitioner makes no distinction in his brief between state and federal constitutional issues, LUBA cannot consider his constitutional arguments. *Fence v. Jackson County*, 30 Or LUBA 265 (1995).

2.1.1 Constitutional Law - Oregon Constitution - Procedural Issues. Under Article IV, section 20, of the Oregon Constitution, a legislative act is limited to one subject, and that subject must be expressed in the act's title. *O'Mara v. Douglas County*, 25 Or LUBA 25 (1993).

2.1.1 Constitutional Law - Oregon Constitution - Procedural Issues. There is nothing unconstitutional about providing only published notice of legislative rezoning. *Sabin v. Clackamas County*, 20 Or LUBA 23 (1990).

2.1.1 Constitutional Law - Oregon Constitution - Procedural Issues. It is reasonable for a county to adopt special procedures for application of new criteria to amended permit applications already reviewed by a county decision maker, in order to avoid undue delay in processing the amended applications while providing notice and a *de novo* hearing on the new criteria. Because such procedures have a rational basis, they do not violate Article I, section 20, of the Oregon Constitution (Equal Privileges and Immunities). *Eckis v. Linn County*, 19 Or LUBA 15 (1990).