

1 BEFORE THE LAND USE BOARD OF APPEALS
2 OF THE STATE OF OREGON

3
4 CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT
5 IN THE DALLES, LUISE LANGHEINRICH,
6 JOHN NELSON and MICHAEL LEASH,
7 *Petitioners,*

8
9 vs.

10
11 CITY OF THE DALLES,
12 *Respondent,*

13
14 and

15
16 WAL-MART STORES, INC. and WM3 INC.,
17 *Intervenors-Respondents.*

18
19 LUBA No. 2009-040

20
21 FINAL OPINION
22 AND ORDER

23
24 Appeal from City of The Dalles.

25
26 Kenneth D. Helm, Beaverton, filed the petition for review and argued on behalf of
27 petitioners.

28
29 Gene E. Parker, City Attorney, The Dalles, filed a response brief and argued on
30 behalf of respondent.

31
32 Gregory S. Hathaway, Portland, filed a response brief and argued on behalf of
33 intervenor-respondent Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. With him on the brief were Jeff N. Evans and
34 Davis Wright Tremaine LLP.

35
36 James Foster, The Dalles, represented intervenor-respondent WM3 Inc.

37
38 RYAN, Board Member; HOLSTUN, Board Member, participated in the decision.

39
40 BASSHAM, Board Chair, did not participate in the decision.

41
42 AFFIRMED

08/11/2009

43
44 You are entitled to judicial review of this Order. Judicial review is governed by the
45 provisions of ORS 197.850.

NATURE OF THE DECISION

Petitioners appeal a decision by the city approving a subdivision.

REPLY BRIEF

Petitioners move for permission to file a reply brief “responding to the city and Wal-mart’s waiver arguments.” Motion to File A Reply Brief 1. The reply brief was filed on July 14, 2009. The city objects to the reply brief in part because it was not filed “as soon as possible” after the response briefs were filed as required by OAR 660-010-0039.¹ The response briefs were filed on June 25, 2009 (city) and June 29, 2009 (intervenor-respondent Wal-Mart) and oral argument was held on July 23, 2009. Petitioners’ motion explains that petitioners’ attorney was on vacation and the earliest the reply brief could be filed was on July 13, 2009. We do not think that filing a reply brief approximately 10 days before oral argument is scheduled is a violation of our rules.

Turning to the reply brief itself, the city council adopted findings in which it purported to adopt “a comprehensive list of the issues considered on appeal.” Record 10. Petitioners did not assign error to those findings in their petition for review. We therefore do not consider petitioners’ arguments in the reply brief concerning whether the city correctly limited the issues it considered on appeal. In response to petitioners’ first assignment of error, respondent and intervenor-respondent (respondents) argue that petitioners waived the issue presented in that assignment of error by failing to raise the issue before the planning commission, as required by ORS 197.763(1). We deny the first assignment of error on the

¹ OAR 661-010-0039 provides in relevant part:

“* * * A request to file a reply brief shall be filed with the proposed reply brief together with four copies as soon as possible after respondent's brief is filed. A reply brief shall be confined solely to new matters raised in the respondent’s brief. * * *”

1 merits, and do not consider respondents' waiver argument. Because the reply brief has no
2 bearing on the dispositive issues in this appeal, we do not consider the reply brief further.

3 The motion to allow a reply brief is denied.

4 **MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE**

5 On July 24, 2009, petitioners moved to consolidate the present appeal with LUBA
6 No. 2009-048. LUBA No. 2009-048 is an appeal of the city's decision approving a site plan
7 for a proposed Wal-Mart store on one of the subdivision lots that were approved in the
8 challenged decision.

9 Consolidation is for the administrative convenience of the parties and the Board.
10 Where consolidation will not facilitate timely resolution of the appeal or will complicate the
11 appeal, consolidation will be denied. Given that petitioners filed their motion to consolidate
12 one day after oral argument was held in LUBA No, 2009-040 and after their petition for
13 review had been filed in LUBA No. 2009-048, we do not think consolidation would facilitate
14 resolution of the appeal. Petitioners' motion to consolidate LUBA Nos. 2008-040 and 2008-
15 048 is denied.

16 **FACTS**

17 Intervenor-respondent Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (intervenor) applied to subdivide a 67-
18 acre parcel into five lots. The subject property contains wetlands, and is located near
19 Chenowith Creek, a tributary to the Columbia River. The stormwater discharge system for
20 the subdivision is proposed to be piped from on-site locations to a city stormwater system
21 located in River Road, adjacent to the subdivision. The city's stormwater system located in
22 River Road flows into Chenowith Creek.

23 The planning commission approved the subdivision, and petitioners appealed the
24 approval to the city council. The city council held a hearing on the appeal, and voted to
25 affirm the planning commission's approval. This appeal followed.

1 **THIRD THROUGH SIXTH ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR**

2 Petitioners’ third through sixth assignments of error allege that the city’s decision
3 fails to comply with various provisions of The Dalles Land Use and Development Ordinance
4 (LUDO) and the city’s comprehensive plan relating to erosion control measures, traffic, and
5 protection of archaeological sites.² Respondents respond to those assignments of error by
6 first arguing that petitioners are precluded from raising the issues presented in those
7 assignments of error on appeal to LUBA. A brief explanation of relevant LUDO criteria
8 governing appeals and the events leading up to the challenged decision is necessary before
9 we resolve these assignments of error.

10 LUDO 3.020.080(D)(3) requires that in an appeal of a planning commission decision,
11 the notice of appeal must state “[t]he specific grounds why the decision should be reversed or
12 modified, based on the applicable criteria or procedural error.” Petitioners’ notice of appeal
13 contained the following description of the grounds for appeal:

14 “The decision should be reversed for failure to comply or be consistent with
15 the city’s comprehensive plan, specifically Goals 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and
16 14. The decision fails to comply with the city’s land use development
17 ordinance Sections 5, 6, 8, 9 and 10. The Planning Commission’s decision is
18 not based on substantial evidence to demonstrate compliance with the above
19 noted provisions of the comprehensive plan and LUDO. The Planning
20 Commission’s conditions of approval related to traffic, stormwater
21 management and wetlands are a substitute for evidence of compliance and are
22 legally insufficient to ensure compliance with the LUDO.” Record 290.

23 LUDO 3.020.080(E)(2) provides:

24 “The failure to comply with any other provision of [LUDO 3.020.080(D)]
25 shall constitute a jurisdictional defect. A jurisdictional defect means the
26 appeal is invalid and no appeal hearing will be held. Determination of a

² In the third assignment of error, petitioners argue that the city improperly deferred identification of required erosion control measures to the site design process. In the fourth assignment of error, petitioners argue that the city erred in concluding that LUDO 8.050.040, which contains standards for cuts, fills and grading, does not apply to a subdivision. In the fifth assignment of error, petitioners argue that the city erred in determining that LUDO 10.060(A), which requires a traffic study for certain developments, does not apply to the subdivision. In the sixth assignment of error, petitioners argue that the city failed to comply with comprehensive plan provisions that require significant archaeological sites to be protected.

1 jurisdictional defect shall be made by the Director, with the advice of the City
2 Attorney, after the expiration of the 10 day appeal period described in
3 Subsection (C)(2) above. The Director’s determination may be subject to
4 appeal to the State Land Use Board of Appeals (LUBA).”

5 During the proceedings below, and prior to the city council hearing on February 9,
6 2009, intervenor challenged petitioners’ notice of appeal as being inadequate to comply with
7 LUDO 3.020.080(D)(3) and argued that the city council should dismiss the appeal.
8 Notwithstanding that challenge and the provisions of LUDO 3.020.080(E)(2), the city
9 council declined to dismiss the appeal and proceeded to hold a hearing on the appeal. At the
10 hearing, the city council indicated that it would consider only issues that had been raised
11 before the planning commission and identified at the hearing or in written materials
12 submitted by petitioners on February 5 and 6, 2009. As noted earlier, the city council
13 specifically identified the five issues it considered to have been preserved for appeal. Record
14 10.

15 Respondents argue that petitioners are precluded under ORS 197.825(2)(a) from
16 raising the issues identified in the third through sixth assignments of error before LUBA
17 because petitioners failed to specify those issues in their notice of appeal under LUDO
18 3.020.080(D)(3).³ *Miles v. City of Florence*, 190 Or App 500, 79 P3d 382 (2003) (ORS
19 197.825(2)(a) requires parties to present their substantive claims to the local appeal body,
20 and their failure to do so is a waiver of those claims). While we might agree with
21 respondents if the city council had proceeded according to LUDO 3.020.080(E) and declined
22 to hold an appeal hearing, the fact that the city council held an appeal hearing and apparently
23 considered issues in addition to those specified in petitioners’ notice of appeal makes the

³ ORS 197.825(2)(a) provides that LUBA’s jurisdiction:

“Is limited to those cases in which the petitioner has exhausted all remedies available by right before petitioning the board for review[.]”

1 issue less clearly a violation of ORS 197.825(2)(a) and *Miles*.⁴ However, we need not
2 decide whether petitioners failed to exhaust their remedies under ORS 197.825(2)(a) and
3 *Miles*. In the challenged decision, the city adopted findings that included a city decision
4 regarding the five issues that were preserved for review by the city council:

5 **“2.2 Issues on Appeal**

6 “* * *City Council recognized that the notice of appeal was extraordinarily
7 broad, but chose not to invalidate the appeal on the basis of a jurisdictional
8 defect. Instead, City staff recommended that the Council consider the merits
9 of those issues presented by [petitioners] that had been adequately presented
10 to the Planning Commission, *and which were specifically identified either at*
11 *the hearing,*⁵ or in the written materials submitted on February 5th and 6th.
12 City Council adopted the recommendation and determined that the following
13 is a comprehensive list of the issues considered on appeal:

- 14 1. The Applicant failed to provide sufficient information regarding
15 wetlands and stormwater for the Planning Commission to have
16 determined compliance with applicable provisions of the
17 Comprehensive Plan.
- 18 2. The Planning Commission improperly relied on state and federal
19 agencies to demonstrate compliance with Comprehensive Plan
20 provisions related to the potential impacts on wetlands.
- 21 3. The Planning Commission improperly relied on state and federal
22 agencies to demonstrate compliance with the Comprehensive Plan
23 provisions related to the potential impacts on the water quality of
24 Chenowith Creek.
- 25 4. The Planning Commission erred in determining that certain provisions
26 of the Comprehensive Plan were aspirational, and thus not applicable
27 approval criteria.
- 28 5. The Planning Commission erred in concluding that the Application
29 satisfies Comprehensive Plan Goal #9 – Economic Development.

⁴ *Miles* specifically left open the question of whether a governing body has the authority to reach issues not specified in a notice of appeal as required by the local ordinance. *Id.* at 509 (citing *Johns v. City of Lincoln City*, 146 Or App at 602 n 1).

⁵ It is not clear to us whether this is a reference to the planning commission hearing or to the city council hearing.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

“ * * * * *

“2.4 Issues Waived

“The issues considered by the City Council on appeal are limited to those issues that were properly raised before the Planning Commission and which were specifically identified either at the hearing, or in the written materials submitted on February 5th and 6th. The city council is an appellate body designed to review the Planning Commission decision. The Planning Commission must be given an opportunity to undertake an initial review of each issue and reach a decision based on the issues presented. Although an appeal to the City Council is ‘de novo’ that term is intended to allow new evidence and arguments, but is not intended to allow the introduction of new issues not previously raised before the Planning Commission. As a result, any issue not raised before the Planning Commission cannot be raised for the first time on appeal to the City Council.

“[Petitioners] attempted to raise the following two issues for the first time before the City Council, and thus those issues are waived:

- “1. The assertion that the traffic study was flawed[.]* * *” Record 10-11 (Emphasis added.)

Petitioners do not assign error to those findings, or otherwise argue that any of the city’s actions constitute a procedural error that prejudiced their substantial rights. Because petitioners do not assign error to the above-quoted findings, those unchallenged findings mean that any assignments of error presented in the petition for review that are outside of the scope of issues that the city found were properly raised or that the city found were waived provide no basis for reversal or remand of the decision. The issues presented in the third, fourth, fifth and sixth assignments of error are unrelated to any of the issues that the city found were properly considered on appeal to the city council. *See* n 2.

Accordingly, the third, fourth, fifth and sixth assignments of error are denied.

FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

In the first assignment of error, petitioners argue that the city erred in imposing a condition of approval that requires the applicant to secure approval from other agencies for its stormwater disposal plan. We understand petitioners to argue that the city’s deferral to those state and federal agencies resulted in a violation of several provisions of the city’s

1 comprehensive plan.⁶ Because stormwater is proposed to be deposited into Chenowith
2 Creek, the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) must issue National
3 Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits (discharge permits) for
4 construction and for operations. In addition, Chenowith Creek is designated as a “water
5 quality limited” stream under the federal Clean Water Act Section 303(d), because it fails to
6 meet water quality standards. Due to the water quality limited status of the creek, the city
7 has adopted and the DEQ and the federal Environmental Protection Agency have approved
8 Total Maximum Daily Load (TDML) standards for the creek. The next step in the process of
9 protecting the creek’s water quality is for the city and other designated management agencies
10 to formulate an Implementation Plan that sets forth timelines and monitoring strategies to
11 ensure that the TMDL standards are met. Because Chenowith Creek is water quality
12 limited, discharge permits cannot be issued until an Implementation Plan has been approved
13 to bring the creek into compliance with the Clean Water Act.

14 In approving the application, the city found:

15 “[T]he city council concludes that the Planning Commission properly
16 determined that criteria related to the protection of Chenowith Creek were
17 satisfied through the imposition of conditions requiring the Applicant to
18 obtain the necessary stormwater permits from the appropriate state and federal
19 agencies. This agency oversight is sufficient to ensure that pollutants are
20 removed from the stormwater prior to discharge into Chenowith Creek.
21 Based on the analysis provided by DEQ in the TMDL, there is no validity to
22 [petitioners’] assertion that stormwater pollution will create thermal pollution
23 in Chenowith Creek. Thus, there is no legal impediment to the Applicant
24 obtaining the necessary discharge permits.”⁷ Record 16.

⁶ The city disputes that all of the comprehensive plan provisions cited in the petition for review are applicable approval criteria, but generally agrees that Comprehensive Plan Goal 6, Policy 5 requires the city to protect Chenowith Creek.

⁷ The city imposed Condition 9, which provides:

“On site storm water can be retained on site or piped to an approved disposal point. Applicant will need approval from all agencies with jurisdiction for disposing of storm water. Applicant will need to provide written approval from these agencies prior to approval of construction plans or building permits. Applicant will need to safely dispose of storm water

1 The crux of petitioners’ argument is that the city erred in imposing condition 9,
2 requiring the applicant to secure approvals from agencies having jurisdiction over the creek,
3 because an Implementation Plan had not been formulated or approved at the time the
4 subdivision was approved. Petitioners argue that the lack of an Implementation Plan at the
5 time the subdivision was approved precluded issuance of the necessary discharge permits as
6 a matter of law, and that the city’s ability to secure the permits in the future is too speculative
7 a basis on which to rely:

8 “At the time the city approved [Wal-Mart’s] subdivision application DEQ was
9 legally prohibited from issuing the [discharge] permits that the applicant will
10 need to discharge stormwater into Chenowith Creek. Furthermore, it is
11 unreasonable to speculate that obtaining these permits is likely because at
12 least four unknowns exist, each of which will bar any [discharge permit]
13 request. First, will The Dalles develop an Implementation Plan? Second if so,
14 when will it be complete? Third, will DEQ approve the Implementation Plan?
15 Fourth, under the constraints of the Implementation Plan, will DEQ be legally
16 allowed to issue [discharge] permits for the subdivision? It would be pure
17 speculation to assume that at least ‘someday’ the applicants could comply
18 with condition 9 and obtain their [discharge] permits.” Petition for Review 12.

19 Intervenor responds to petitioners’ argument by explaining that there is no legal
20 barrier to intervenor obtaining the necessary permits and that the city correctly imposed the
21 condition requiring the permits before any building permits could issue. In *Bouman v.*
22 *Jackson County*, 23 Or LUBA 628 (1992), a conceptual plan approval criterion required that
23 the proposed development have an adequate water supply. The county found the approval
24 criterion could be met if required state agency permits were obtained and the county imposed
25 a condition of approval requiring that the state agency permit be secured. We held that such
26 a condition of approval was an appropriate way to ensure compliance with the water supply
27 criterion, unless it was shown that obtaining the required permits is ”precluded * * * as a
28 matter of law.” 23 Or LUBA at 647; *see also Wal-Mart v. City of Bend*, 52 Or LUBA 261,
29 286-87 (2006) (so holding). We agree with intervenor that petitioners do not point to any

from improvements on River Road and coordinate storm water drainage on River Road with
City Engineer and County Roadmaster.” Record 6.

1 legal impediment to obtaining the necessary permits, and that the city properly imposed
2 condition 9. Imposition of such a condition did not amount to an unlawful deferral of the
3 city’s obligation to determine whether the applicable approval criteria were satisfied.

4 The first assignment of error is denied.⁸

5 **SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR**

6 In the second assignment of error, petitioners argue that the city erred in approving
7 the subdivision without a tentative plat showing the exact location of wetlands on the subject
8 property. Petitioners argue that the city could not approve the lot configuration and road and
9 utility locations proposed on the tentative plat in the absence of information regarding the
10 exact location of the wetlands.

11 In support of their argument, petitioners cite LUDO 9.040.030(B)(2), which identifies
12 the information that must be shown on a tentative subdivision plat. LUDO
13 9.040.030(B)(2)(k) requires the plat to show “the approximate location of any potential
14 physical and environmental constraints * * *,” and LUDO 9.040.030(B)(2)(l) requires the
15 plat to contain “identification of significant natural features,” including “riparian areas.”
16 Although petitioners agree that the tentative subdivision plat submitted by intervenor shows
17 wetland areas, they argue that the city should have required intervenor to submit a “full
18 wetland delineation.” Intervenor responds that the approved tentative plat complies with the
19 application requirements of LUDO 9.040.030(B)(2)(k) because it identifies and shows the
20 “approximate” location of wetlands on the property.

21 We agree with intervenor. First, LUDO 9.040.030(B)(2) sets forth the requirements
22 for information to be included on a tentative plat. One of those requirements is to show the
23 “approximate” location of wetlands and other physical and environmental constraints. It
24 appears to be undisputed that the tentative plat identifies and shows the approximate

⁸ Because we deny the first assignment of error, we need not address intervenor’s argument that petitioners are precluded from raising the issue under ORS 197.763(1).

1 locations of wetlands on the property, and therefore it complies with LUDO
2 9.040.030(B)(2)(k) and (l). In addition, even if application requirements may not have been
3 satisfied, absent a showing that the failure to satisfy the requirements resulted in
4 noncompliance with at least one mandatory approval criterion, there is no basis for reversal
5 or remand of the decision. Aside from citing LUDO 9.040.030(B)(2)(k) and (l), petitioners
6 do not argue that the application fails to comply with an applicable approval criterion
7 requiring wetlands. Accordingly, petitioners' arguments provide no basis for reversal or
8 remand.

9 Petitioners also argue that the city impermissibly imposed a condition of approval
10 requiring development of the property to meet the requirements of LUDO 8.050.⁹ However,
11 as explained above, petitioners do not point to any approval criterion requiring protection of
12 wetlands that the city impermissibly deferred to a condition of approval, or explain how the
13 decision fails to satisfy any relevant approval criterion regarding wetlands. Absent such an
14 argument, petitioners' argument does not provide a basis for reversal or remand of the
15 decision.

16 The second assignment of error is denied.

17 The city's decision is affirmed.

⁹ The city imposed condition 11, which provides:

“All development must meet the provisions of Section 8.050. Cuts and/or fills over 50 cubic yards require a physical constraints permit. Cuts and/or fills over 250 cubic yards require engineered plans. Ground disturbance of one acre or more require a 1200-c permit from DEQ. Disturbed topsoil must be revegetated according to the provisions of 8.050.030A.” Record 6.