HIGH CASCADES COMPLEX

OSFM Red Team

Incident Report

HIGH CASCADE COMPLEX FIRE
BROWNSVILLE E64 - INCIDENT INVESTIGATION

PREPARED BY MARK S. MATTHEWS, RED TEAM INCIDENT SAFETY OFFICER

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High Cascades Complex
Engine 64 Incident – Safety and Fire Behavior Review

Executive Summary

This summary has been prepared in a few hours to meet a request for our input. We were not involved with the Red Team deployment to the High Cascades Complex. Other fire assignments and personal travel have not allowed us an opportunity to previously review the materials regarding this incident. To meet a request to submit our findings today, this document was prepared in a few hours.

This summary was prepared after review of the many documents prepared by Red Team Safety Officer Mark Matthews. A Safenet document was anonymously filed regarding this event and was part of the materials reviewed. The authors were asked by the Incident Commander, Doug Koellermeier, to review the documents and prepare this summary based on their combined experience in wildland fire operations, safety and fire behavior (75 combined years of wildland fire experience).

On August 29, 2011, at approximately 1500 hours, the three personnel working on Brownsville Fire Department Engine 64 took precautionary safety from wildland fire as it burned in the surface and canopy fuels in the vicinity of their work site (a stationary draft site). The personnel donned SCBA gear and entered the water of Mill Creek. They had previously determined this area was safe to remain in as a safety zone.

Findings

- We did not find indications of gross negligence or inappropriate actions.
- Statements in the Safenet document were mostly unfounded. The event date was incorrect. It is not apparent that the author possessed first-hand knowledge of the event.
- A complete chain-of-command was in place and instructions were articulated.
- No injuries occurred. Communication equipment sustained water damage.
- The fire behavior was as expected for the time of season, current weather and fuel conditions. The peak burning conditions of the day were present. Grasses and shrubs were combusting and contributing to single and group-tree torching. There was not a "fire storm" as frequently mentioned in narrative documents.
- The resources (E63/B11) assigned to the RIT operation had worked the previous night shift. They were not familiar with the draft site and the access road.
- Concerns about OSFM IMT overhead qualifications were expressed by subordinate incident overhead.
- Several personnel with structural task forces indicated that the fire behavior exceeded their expectation/experience. This contributed significantly to an increased level of excitement and anxiety.
- The personnel of E64 and overhead had determined that remaining at the draft site as a safety zone was appropriate. As a result, no individual was assigned Lookout responsibilities for E64.
- Some confusion existed due to use of home unit titles/identifiers.

Recommendations

- Resources assigned to RIT operations should be familiar with the assignment area and conditions.
- OSFM IMT overhead should be fully qualified for their position. It is highly recommended that they complete more than one assignment on a wildland incident as a shadow/trainee working with a qualified person. This experience should include wildland fire air operations (protocols, communications and resource capabilities).
- Opportunities to train personnel in fuels, weather and topography unlike their home jurisdiction should be actively pursued.
- A trigger point should have been established for E64 to vacate the draft site.
- Protection of communication equipment is critical for personnel safety.
- Unit identifiers assigned by the IMT should be used. These should be clearly listed in the IAP.

Prepared on October 5, 2011 by

Gene Rogers, FBAN, DPSC on OSFM Red Team
Marv Strom, SOF2 on OSFM Red Team

HIGH CASCADE COMPLEX FIRE
BROWNSVILLE E64 - INCIDENT INVESTIGATION

Introduction

On August 27, 2011, an Oregon State Fire Marshal (OSFM) Incident Management Team (IMT) "short team" consisting of an Incident Commander (IC), Planning Section Chief (PSC), Finance Section Chief (FSC), Operations Section Chief (OSC), and two Division/Group Supervisors (GS), and four Task Forces (TF) were activated and sent to work with the unified command at the High Cascade Complex fires. They would be working within the established unified command of the Oregon/California (ORCA) Incident Command, Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) Incident Command, and Warm Springs Fire Department (WSFD) Incident Command. On August 28, 2011, fire activities increased along with several other fire starts from an electrical storm in and on the Warm Springs Indian Reservation. Additional resources, consisting of an Incident Safety Officer (ISO), Deputy Operations Section Chief (DOSC), Logistics Section Chief (LSC), Public Information Officer (PIO) and a GS, were added to the command staff as well as two additional TFs.

On August 29, 2011, the OSFM Team was directed to support several ORCA, BIA, and WSFD burnout operations, hand crews, air operations, and structural protection within these activities. Two Task Forces and a Group Supervisor were assigned to the West Hills fire. Two Task Forces and a Group Supervisor were assigned to the Powerline fire. During the day's fire activity and the increase threat to structures, additional resources were ordered from the OSFM Office. The Fire Marshal's Office activated two additional TFs; however, they would not arrive until later in the day or early evening.

Later in the afternoon at the Powerline fire, it was apparent to the ORCA GS that the fire conditions were rapidly increasing and that several homes were going to be overrun by fire. He notified the OSFM OSC, who in turn relayed this to the OSFM GS assigned to the Powerline fire. Two TFs who had worked the previous night operation period were pulled from fire camp and were directed to respond to assist the OSFM GS on Division Q of the Powerline fire.

At about 1500 hours, two TFs were actively engaging the fire and protecting structures in the area of B100 Road and B140 Road. A third TF was nearby supporting structures in the area of the Warm Springs Fire Station at Mill Creek Road. A TF from fire camp arrived at the staging area of B100 and B140, when an engine at a predestinated draft site stated they would be taking shelter in the creek and that the fire had blocked their egress.

A "RIT" or rescue team was quickly organized by the OSC who was at the staging area. He assigned the OSFM Division Q GS an engine and brush rig that just arrived from camp to drive down the road that led to the engine in distress and get them out of the area. The rescue team slowly made access down the road to the engine in distress. Seeing that the crew was already safe and out of the river, they helped secure the crew and exited the area. No injuries occurred to crew members or damage to fire apparatus. Water damage occurred to two portable radios and two cell phones, and a firefighter's head lamp received heat damage as well.

The engine that took refuge was taken off line for about one hour and was later returned to its TF and suppression activities. The crews that were assigned to the rescue were returned to their TF or current

assignments. OSFM IC contacted OSFM Deputy Chief (DC) Jim Walker and informed him of the situation. I concluded a preliminary investigation the next day and presented it, along with a PowerPoint presentation, to the ORCA ISO, OSFM IC and staff, and task forces involved. They were told that this is just a preliminary report and further investigation was ongoing. In addition, the TF county chiefs and department directors of the agencies involved were contacted. State Fire Marshal Mark Wallace and staff were presented with the preliminary investigation upon their arrival at the Incident Command Post (ICP).

On August 30, 2011, at about 0700 hours, I was directed as the ISO by OSFM IC Koellermeier to do a preliminary review, investigation, and report on an incident that occurred with Brownsville Engine 64. I was asked to complete the preliminary investigation with the goal of presenting it to the crews before their next operational period. OSFM IC advised me that this would only be a preliminary report and that a full investigation and report would be required when time and resources permitted.

The preliminary investigation did not reveal any gross negligence, but noted concerns and suggestions to utilize when operating and communicating. It was explained to the crews that the concerns would require further investigation.

During the presentation of the preliminary report to crews, it was brought up that there were concerns and rumors regarding the activation of a rescue team and the investigation. This was brought to the attention of the OSFM IC. As the ISO, the IC directed me to investigate the crews' concerns, and the following is the investigation that ensued.

HIGH CASCADE COMPLEX FIRE
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SafeNet Complaint

SAFENET ID: 8LKU5HSAFE
REPORT DATE: 09/10/2011
AGENCY: State
STATE AGENCY: OR

EVENT INFORMATION
EVENT DATE: 09/01/2011
EVENT TIME: 1500
INCIDENT NAME: HIGH CASCADES COMPLEX
INCIDENT #:
EVENT STATE: OR
JURISDICTION: BIA
LOCAL UNIT:
EVENT TYPE: Wildland
EVENT ACTIVITY: Line
EVENT STAGE: Extended Attack
POSITION TITLE: Ff
TASK: Structural Protection
MANAGEMENT LEVEL: 2
RESOURCES INVOLVED: Iverhead

CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: Fire Behavior, Communications, Human Factors
HUMAN FACTORS: Decision Making, Leadership, Performance, Risk Assessment, Situational Awareness

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NARRATIVE:
state structural resources working in a division, while supporting a burning operation transmitted a MAYDAY and had fire cut them off from their escape route. adjoining structural resources heard the MAYDAY and entered a fire front to make it to the crew per the order of the Div Sup/ (county vol dept.). The issues revolve around no comms with natural resource firing crew in same division - Grp Sup trainee working by himself (municipal dept.) lack of SA related to fire behavior and wildland tactics. Noone was injuried - crew was fearfull enough to enter the water source and put on their structural breathing apparatus! AA Safety review minimized the incident(conducted by municipal imt) stating that the crew was never in danger . "Rescue" crew(s), 2 t6 engines felt that the crew was in danger-

if not rescue crew(s) wonders why they were ordered to "respond into a fire front" to "rescue" the crew?? Total lack of responsibility by the municipal overhead- possibly limting the knowledge of this event to the T2 agency IMT on the complex?? NEAR HIT not a NEAR MISS!

SUGGESTED CORRECTIVE ACTION:

reports were given to municipal IMT - feeling was (is) that they minimized the event to support their issues.

CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN:

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PRELIMINARY BRIEF ON E64 INCIDENT AT THE DRAFT SITE

Subject:	E64 Sheltering Incident
Location:	B100 X B140 Warm Springs Reservation Powerline Fire (High Cascade Complex)
Date:	08/29/11
Time of Occurrence:	1515 hours
Team Leader:	Tim Frost (Linn County Task Force One)
Chief Investigator:	Mark Matthews, ISO Red

Summary:

On August 29, 2011, at about 1515 hours, E64 from the Linn County Task Force was set up for drafting operations in support of two structural task forces that were defending several residential structures from a dynamic and fast-moving wildland fire. The location is a local Warm Springs Fire Department pre-designated draft site. It is located 460 yards south at 160 degrees from the intersection of B100 Road at B140 Road out of Mill Creek.

E64's pre-designated entry and exit was compromised by the fast-moving fire (fire storm). Since they only had one way in, E64 was forced to abandon their operations; declare an emergency; move E64 down to the creek; and with the intentions of protecting the crew, don SCBA and take refuge in the river.
No injuries or damage occurred to the crew or apparatus. However, two cell phones and two portable radios sustained water damage.

Narrative:

On August 30, 2011, I was assigned by OSFM High Cascade Complex IC Doug Koellermeier to investigate a mishap with a Linn County Task Force engine (E64 Brownsville).

E64 was working as a Type II engine assigned from Brownsville Fire Department to the Linn County Task Force (Task Force One). The following personnel were assigned to E64:

- Engine Boss, Chief Kevin Rogers (49 years of age; 20 years of fire experience)
- Driver, Lt./EMT Joe Kirk (30 years of age; 9 years of fire experience)
- Firefighter, FF Alex Parker (21 years of age; 2 years of fire experience)

E64 is a 1989 Western States Type II engine with 1000 gpm pump and 500 gallon tank 4x4 front mount.

Linn County Task Force Team Leader was Tim Frost, and Ron Sipe was the Assistant Task Force Leader. The task force was comprised of five apparatus companies of Type II to Type VI units from Linn County.

Linn County Task Force One was assigned to Division Q Structural Protection Team Lead by Group Supervisor Chris Barney. Division Q had four task forces assigned at the initial start of the morning operational period. Early into the day's fire activity, two additional task forces were assigned to the

Division before 1200 hours due to the erratic fire behavior and the immediate threat to a large number of structures in a large geographical area.

Fire conditions as of 1500 hours were:

- Wind out of the northwest from 7 to 15 mph with erratic changes and direction changes
- Humidity below 10%
- Temperature 88 to 90 degrees
- Fuels: cured grass, patchy sagebrush, juniper, timber understory, and upper elevation timber.
- Fine Fuels: 4 to 6% grass/sage; 6 to 8-foot flame lengths with an estimated spread of 150+ chains/hour; timber litter flame length exceeded 10 feet with an estimated spread of 25+ chains/hour; and slope and terrain areas were influenced by changing wind directions and speeds, influencing and accelerating the spread rates. Spotting occurred at least 100 feet in various directions of the flame fronts.

Immediate Structure Threat: Estimated at 20 to 30 structures at 1500 hours.

Secondary Structure Threat (once fire passed road B100 and B140): Estimated an additional 20 to 30 structures at 1500 hours.

Structures Lost During Operational Period: One 10' x 10' outbuilding.

Early into the operational period task forces were in a transitional battle moving from structures and residential areas in an attempt to protect structures from the fast-moving, erratic fire.

At about 1400 hours E64 was assigned to a predetermined draft site area in Mill Creek, located 460 yards south, 160 degrees of the intersection of B100 and B140.

Trigger points were discussed prior to deployment to this area, but it is uncertain if a true trigger point area was defined or established. No lookout was posted, but the engine boss from E64 thought the apparatus at the entrance to the draft site was there to look out for them; that was not confirmed with the task force leader (TFL) or that apparatus. E64 engine boss discussed emergency procedures with his crew prior to drafting operations.

At about 1500 hours crews noticed a rapid buildup of smoke and fire activity in the area just northwest of the draft site. They were aware that fire had rapidly spread past the junction of B140 at B100 and that crews were actively trying to protect structures in the immediate area. It appeared to the E64 crew that fire was beginning to spread in various directions.

At that time Linn and Marion County Task Forces were in an aggressive transitional mode of defending structures and moving to the next.

At about 1505 hours E64 was actively drafting out of the river with a portable pump and trying to troubleshoot some drafting problems. The crew noticed that fire had spotted to their northeast and noticed a rapid spread of large burning embers, dense smoke, and heat throughout their immediate area.

The engine boss made several attempts to contact his TFL on a non-tactical frequency (Linn County Frequency 4). Being unable, he then attempted to make contact on the State Fire Net (operational frequency). During this time (a minute or two) the egress was compromised; fire conditions rapidly deteriorated; and fire was spotting all around the immediate area. The engine boss directed his crew to cease drafting operations; move E64 down to the river (positioning it as a heat shield); and prepare to don SCBA (smoke conditions made breathing difficult and their vision was compromised). They are going to shelter in the river. The engine boss continued trying to make contact on State Fire Net, announcing that they were being taken over by fire and smoke and that they were sheltering in place. The engine boss directed his crew to mask up, enter the river, and lay down in two to three feet of water.

Operations Chief Ketchum copied this traffic and declared emergency traffic. E64 clarified the situation, stating that they were currently sheltering themselves in the middle of the river. Chief Ketchum rapidly organized a RIT team and within a few minutes they began to advance to E64's location.

At about 1515 hours the fire had consumed most of the area surrounding E64, making it okay for E64 to exit the river and await apparatus from the RIT team. E64 crew was able to escape without injury. No damage occurred to the apparatus. Fire shelters were on each member and prepared to deploy if needed, but they did not have to deploy them.

The river and apparatus shielded them from the heat and SCBA protected their airway. While laying in the river, water damage occurred to the engine boss' department cell phone and radio, the firefighter's personal cell phone, and a department portable radio.

Preliminary Factual Findings:

E64 was assigned to a designated draft site prior to the rapid and erratic fire behavior in the immediate area. Trigger points were discussed, but not clearly understood or defined. Lookouts were not established and communication was limited. Although the draft site was a local fire department's pre-designated draft area, it does not mean it is a predetermined safe area. When the crews determined that egress and safety was compromised, a mayday/emergency traffic announcement on the pre-designated State Fire Net frequency might have cleared the radio traffic sooner, allowing task force leaders to better understand the dire needs of E64 sooner.

After the fire had compromised the crew's egress, the crew's composure and direction from the experienced engine boss was exemplary. They worked efficiently as a team and made accurate pre-discussed decisions, limiting their direct exposure to smoke, heat, and flame. Although electrical devices were damaged, the decision to rapidly don SCBA, remain in full wildland PPE, and seek shelter in the river with the apparatus as a shield, limited the crew's exposure to the erratic fire behavior and resulted in no injuries. A RIT team was established and safely made their way to E64 and assisted with their safety.

Although other crews' tactical decision matrix may have differed, it is my opinion as Safety Officer that the E64 crew reacted appropriately and reached a positive outcome.

ISO Mark S. Matthews
Signature: _____
Date: _____

HIGH CASCADE COMPLEX FIRE
BROWNSVILLE E64 - INCIDENT INVESTIGATION

Supplemental Information Report
Prepared August 31, 2011

On August 30, 2011, at about 0700 hours, I was directed by IC Koellermeier to do a preliminary review, investigation, and report on an incident that occurred with Brownsville Engine 64 during their operational period at a draft site. He asked me to complete a brief summary so it could be distributed to the crews involved (TFL, GS, OSC, DOSC, IC, and ORCA ISO and IC). He further added that the report would be given to the OSFM staff and that Jim Walker had been notified.

Direction from IC Koellermeier was to investigate any gross negligence, safety concerns, and /or operational concerns that needed direct correction or attention. IC Koellermeier wanted me to obtain and deliver the most up-to-date facts to the command staff. We had already received unsubstantiated stories via the "social network" by 0600 hours that morning.

Command staff expressed a concern that it might upset or disrupt the operational activities if incorrect stories were passing through fire camp with crews. I was asked to complete the preliminary investigation with the goal of presenting it to the crews before their next operational period. IC Koellermeier recognized my limitations (only one ISO) and told me this would only be a preliminary report and that he would allow me the required time to complete my investigation once time and resources permitted.

I completed my preliminary investigation along with a short PowerPoint presentation that evening. I presented it to crews as time permitted before, during, and after operational periods. I gave a presentation to ORCA ISO, OSFM Wallace, and his staff (Jim Walker and Mariana Ruiz-Temple). When I presented the report, they were told it was just a preliminary report and further investigation was ongoing.

In my preliminary investigation, I did not discover any gross negligence, but noted concerns and suggestions to utilize when operating and communicating. I suggested a mayday over the radio might have cleared the radio traffic better. When asked by the crews if it was a true mayday situation, I told them I was uncertain at this time. It, along with other concerns, would require further investigation. I stated the purpose of utilizing the mayday over the radio might have cleared the radio traffic since "emergency traffic" was not as effective as it needed to be. I learned from the ORCA ISO and GS that they use "priority traffic" in similar situations.

ICP personnel and I read OSFM Standard Operating Guideline IMT-I-1102 (Medical/Accident Incident within an Incident Plan). Since there were no injuries, treatment, or medical transportation of personnel, the IMT-I-1102 did not apply.

HIGH CASCADE COMPLEX FIRE
BROWNSVILLE E64 - INCIDENT INVESTIGATION

Supplemental Summary
Prepared August 31, 2011

Location:	B-100 X B 140 Warm Springs Reservation Powerline fire (High Cascade Complex)
Date:	08.29.11
Time of Occurrence:	1515 hours
Team Leader:	Operations Chief Ketchum/Deputy Ops LaBelle/Division Group Sup Barney
Chief Investigator:	Matthews ISO

On August 29, 2011, at about 1515 hours E64 from the Linn County Task Force was set up for drafting operations in support of two structural task forces that were defending several residential structures from a dynamic and fast-moving wildland fire. The location is a local Warm Springs Fire Department pre-designated draft site. It is located 460 yards south at 160 degrees from the intersection of B100 at B140 roads out of Mill Creek.

E64's pre-designated entry and exit was compromised by the fast-moving fire (fire storm). Since they only had one way in, E64 was forced to abandon their operations, declare an emergency, move E64 down to the creek and with the intentions of protecting the crew, don SCBA and take refuge in the river.

No injuries or damage occurred to the crew or apparatus. However, two cell phones and two portable radios sustained water damage.

RIT/Rescue Team deployment during the incident (Canby E63 and Clackamas County B11) was assigned by Chief Ketchum to make their way to E64 to assist in a possible rescue. The RIT team was joined by Division Group Supervisor Barney as they made their way down a long, heavy-timbered roadway. This team encountered erratic and higher risk fire situations. After pushing forward through the fire, E63 and B11 were able to find E64 and assist in the extrication and removal of the entire crew. Once E64 was moved to a safety zone, the RIT crew joined up with their task force. There were no injuries or damage to apparatus; one helmet sustained light heat damage.

HIGH CASCADE COMPLEX FIRE
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History

I was unable to locate any major fire history for the past 15 to 20 years in the area of the Powerline fire. I was told there have been several fire less than 1,000 acres in these areas, but no significant fires near the magnitude of the Powerline fire. Local fire personnel and residents told me they had not seen a fire of this size move this quickly before.

The High Cascade Complex is a complex with three active large fires confined to the Warm Springs Reservation. ORCA, BIA, and Warm Springs Reservation Fire Agency were all working a combined unified command structure.

On August 27, 2011, a "short" OSFM IMT team (IC, PSC, OSC & FSC), two Group Supervisors and four Task Forces (Hood River, Clackamas, Washington, and Marion Counties) were activated and assigned to support structural protection and work within the unified command structure of the High Cascade Complex.

On August 28, 11, additional resources were added to the OSFM IMT team (ISO, DOSC, PIO, and LSC, as well as one additional Group Supervisor and two more Task Forces from Linn and Lane Counties). Early in the day and afternoon a lightning storm blew over the area, adding to the increasing fire behavior. The fires doubled in size and began to threaten several residential areas.

On August 29, 2011, two additional Task Forces from Yamhill and Columbia Counties were requested and enroute to the High Cascade Complex fire camp.

The following is a list of active participants as it relates to the incident:

- IC: Doug Koellermeier (Activated 8-27-11)
- Public Information Officer: Elaine Parrott (Activated 8-29-11)
- Operations Chief: John Ketchum (Activated 8-27-11)
- Deputy Operations Chief: Richard LaBelle (Activated 8-28-11)
- ISO: Mark Matthews (Activated 8-28-11)
- Planning Section Chief: Lance Lighty (Activated 8-27-11)
- Logistic Section Chief: Joe Raade (Activated 8-29-11)
- Finance Section Chief: Bill Brauer (Activated 8-27-11)/Replaced with Clair Mc Grew (8-29-11)
- Group Supervisor: Chris Barney (Activated 8-28-11)
- Group Supervisor: Scott Stutzman (Activated 8-27-11)

- Group Supervisor: Jason Blount (Activated 8-27-11)
- Division Q Wildland ORCA GS: Chris Orr (Original response from ORCA team)
- TFL Linn County: Tim Frost (Activated 8-28-11)
- TFL Marion County: Jack Carrigan (Activated 8-27-11)
- TFL Clackamas County: Jamie Karn (Activated 8-27-11)
- TFL Hood River County: Devon Wells (Activated 8-27-11)
- Assistant TFL Clackamas County: Mark Corless (Activated 8-27-11)

E64 Brownsville Fire Department Type II Engine

- Engine Boss Kevin Rogers (Fire Chief, Brownsville Fire, 49 years old, 20 years career/volunteer fire experience)
- Driver Joe Kirk (LT/EMT, Brownsville Fire, 30 years old, 9 years volunteer fire experience)
- FF Alex Parker (FF, Brownsville Fire, 21 years old, 2 years volunteer fire experience)

E63 Canby Fire Department Type II Engine

- Engine Boss Val Codino (Captain/P, Canby Fire, 54 years old, 30 years combined fire experience)
- Driver Matt Dale (FF/P, Canby Fire, 40 years old, 19 years combined fire experience)
- FF Duane Stoner (FF/EMT, 45 years old, 24 years volunteer fire experience)

B11 Clackamas Fire Department Type V/VI Brush/Engine

- Engine Boss Brian Burke (Captain, Clackamas Fire, 41 years old, 21 years career fire experience)
- Driver Jim Donahue (AO, Clackamas Fire, 50 years old, 19 years career fire experience)
- FF Bob Atiyah (FF, Clackamas Fire, 56 years old, 24 years career fire experience)

As of August 28, 2011, at about 2200 hours, the following OSFM IMT Red Team positions were active:

- Incident Command
- Public Information
- Planning Section Chief
- Safety Officer
- Finance Section Chief
- Logistic Section Chief
- Operations Section Chief
- Deputy Operations Chief

- Three Division/Group Supervisors
- Six Task Forces (Linn, Lane, Clackamas, Marion, Hood River, and Washington Counties)

HIGH CASCADE COMPLEX FIRE
BROWNSVILLE E64 - INCIDENT INVESTIGATION

Overview

On August 29, 2011, crews from Linn County Task Force were assigned to protect homes and structures in the area of Division Q (B100 Road and B140 Road, Mill Creek Drainage, Mill Creek Road north to B160 Road to the south at County road). Crews pre-triaged homes early in the day, discussed trigger points, and established safe zones. At about 1230 hours, Division Q GS Orr and his crews were working with Division Q Structural GS Barney with his TF protecting homes along B100 near the fire station. At about 1300 hours the burnout operations that Orr's crew were working on had a fire whirl slop over about three-quarters to one mile away from the fire station, onto the east side of B100. It began to move towards homes on the east side of B100. OSFM task force crews where moving south down B100 (Mill Creek Rd.) protecting homes/structures while the fire was moving quickly toward the homes at the intersection of B100 and B140. GS Barney and GS Orr had several face-to-face and radio contacts. Each plan Orr had developed was overran by the speed and intensity of the fire.

At about 1330 to 1400 hours, task forces began to set up and protect structures in the area of B100 and B140. Several units were deployed at homes along with crews from Linn TF and Hood River TF. ORCA Division Q crews were attempting to slow the fire progress by setting back burns along B100. Linn TFL determined they needed a more adequate water supply, so the TFL placed E64 from Brownsville at a predetermined draft site on Mill Creek (Refer to Exhibit 1 - map). Previously all the crews from Linn TF scouted the area and a trigger point was discussed; however, nothing was formally decided (ORCA GS thought trigger points would not be effective, as discussed in each of the previous briefings). E64 and their TFL discussed and established a safety zone at the site in case fire blocked their exit. It was determined by the TFL and E64 crew boss that the area was large enough (Refer to Exhibit 2, Photo) and that they could seek shelter in the creek if it became too warm. E64 set up nose forward towards the creek for drafting operations and developed main pump issues. They then set up a portable pump into the creek to help support if the main pump on the apparatus continued to fail (Refer to Exhibits 3 & 4, Photos). The crew boss on E64 discussed with his crew what they would do if their exit was blocked and if they got too warm. The crew understood their first goal would be to exit if told by the TFL, and if their egress was blocked they would use the apparatus as a shield and sit in the creek.

At about 1500 hours, fire conditions in the area of B100 and B140 became erratic. Crews were committed to protecting structures and homes while trying to keep the fire on the west side of B100. Linn TFL was with crews at the house, west of B100 and B140 (Refer to Exhibits 5 & 6, Map & Photo), when he noticed the fire had passed his trigger point for E64. It was previously coming at the structure when it split and went two different directions. The fire was now moving rapidly up the Mill Creek drainage towards E64 egress and behind the TFL, setting spot fires 100 to 300 feet ahead of the main fire. Linn TFL tried calling E64 on multiple frequencies. They could hear E64 Rogers on the Linn County radio frequency saying they were experiencing dense smoke and their way out was being overrun by the fire. The Linn County TFL could not establish two-way communication with E64.

E64 crew was previously watching the smoke plume and it appeared to be far enough away (Refer to Exhibit 7, Photo), but in a short period it seemed to come down on them quickly. Rogers noticed spotting fires to his east on a knob and by the time he turned around, he noticed spot fires across the creek. Then he looked up the road and could see fires spotting and beginning to burn all around the

road. E64 continued to try to make radio contact with the TFL on the Linn County frequency while directing his crew to disconnect; they were going to leave. Both the TFL and E64 tried to make radio contact with one another, but were unable to communicate due to a large volume of radio traffic on the State Fire Net and their identified Linn County working frequency. E64 could not hear the Linn County TFL responding.

At this point E64 Rogers elected to stay and wait the fire out in their safety zone. He directed his crew to prepare their backup plan. He then called over State Fire Net asking for a helicopter drop. He heard someone respond, stating they could not see them due to poor visibility. Rogers did not know who responded back. Rogers was unable to relay his exact position, so he stopped requesting a helicopter drop.

Rogers announced over State Fire Net that they were going to "shelter-in-place." Rogers heard a response back asking if they were deploying fire shelters. Rogers replied back saying, "No, we're getting in the river, our safety zone." E64 crew positioned their engine nose down into the creek (intent was to use the engine for a heat shield), donned SCBA, and laid down in the creek behind the engine. They noticed the fire coming at them from the northwest and northeast at the same time. It appeared that the entire area was on fire at once, but the green vegetation near the creek was not burning. Rogers again tried asking for a helicopter drop. This was unsuccessful since they were unable to relay their exact location. After the fire had blown through, Rogers heard someone over the radio asking if they were okay. He replied, "we are alright and still in the river." At that time a division/group supervisor and a Canby engine arrived to lead them out.

During the time prior to when E64 announced they were "sheltering-in-place," at about 1500 hours, OSC Ketchum and GS Barney were parked at the staging area of B100 and B140 about 80 to 100 feet away from the entrance of the road leading to the draft site (Refer to Exhibit 1, Map). Also located in the staging area were crews from Clackamas TF. Ketchum was trying to get the intersection cleared so a dozer convoy and lowboy with a dozer on it could get through. After clearing the intersection, he returned to his vehicle, took a few pictures (Refer to Exhibits 8, 9, 10 & 11, Photos Time Stamped 1508.28 to 1511.56), then he heard the Brownville engine say they were sheltering-in-place in the river. He then heard DOSC LaBelle over the radio ask if they were deploying shelters. Rogers relayed that they were not deploying shelters and were getting into the river. Hearing the urgency in Rogers's voice and due to the busy radio traffic, Ketchum cleared the air for emergency traffic and asked Rogers to clarify their position. Ketchum heard them ask for a helicopter drop. Knowing that the smoke was too dense, he directed GS Barney to take the Canby engine and Clackamas brush rig and get them out of there, establishing a RIT/rescue team over the radio.

Barney ran up to the Clackamas brush rig (B11) and told Crew Boss Burke he needed his crew to help rescue firefighters at the draft site. B11 attempted to contact their TFL on Simplex 1. They told Barney they would be delayed while their firefighter moved PPE from a staff vehicle. Then Barney went over to the Canby engine (E63) telling them he needed their help to rescue firefighters who were trapped, pointing down to the entrance of the draft site (Exhibit 12). Crew boss Codino asked Barney who he was. Barney identified himself as a division/group supervisor. Codino attempted to contact his TFL, but was unable to. Understanding the urgency and concern for the firefighters, Codino directed his crew to prepare to pump and roll and get ready to go. He confirmed that B11 was backing them up and ready to go. (Refer to Exhibits 1, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, &12, Maps and Photos). Codino and E63 progressed slowly down the road and stated that he had not experienced fire conditions like this before. Codino was under the impression that the crew was only 20 yards down the road (that's what Barney told him). Codino

indicated that Barney caught up to him indicating that we need to, "get to those guys." Codino felt Barney was pressing him to be more aggressive. Then Barney said to retreat to the cab of the engine. Codino agreed with Barney and directed his AO to back the rig up a short distance and they all returned to the cab. Barney called for an emergency helicopter drop, but was told the smoke was too dense. As the smoke cleared and some heat dissipated, E63 continued down the road with caution. B11 was backing them up at a distance and had retreated to the cab of B11 after seeing E63 get in their cab. Due to the smoke and fire conditions, E63 had to stop several times to gain their bearings on the road. As the wind blew smoke off the roadway, they continued to move down the road. After a short period, E63 located the crew of E64 at the draft site. E64 crew was found near their engine. E63 and B11 crews suppressed fire around the safety zone and draft site. E63 and Barney helped E64 get out of their SCBA and determined they were uninjured. Barney contacted OSC Ketchum and told them they were all okay and that they would be coming out. E64 was escorted out with E63 leading and B11 following (Refer to Exhibit 1 and 6, Map and Diagram).

About a minute later, all the crews returned to the staging area. E63 and B11 were thanked by GS Barney and directed to regroup with their TF and TFL. Ketchum directed Barney to have E64 sit out for an hour and then check with their TFL to see if they were okay to return to suppression activities. There were no reported injuries or damage to apparatus.

Ketchum and Barney resumed their operational activities; the fire was still moving towards homes and structures. Barney stayed in Division Q (B100 and B140), while DOSC LaBelle assumed responsibility for the homes on the County Line Road. E64 returned to normal activities around 1600 hours and was asked several times by Ketchum, LaBelle, and TFL Frost if they were okay. E64 returned to the draft site at about 1545 hours to retrieve their hoses and took pictures (Refer to Exhibits 13, 14, 15, and 16, Photos).

Ketchum and LaBelle were in contact with Clackamas TFL several times during that operational period and night. They did not receive any concerns and were of the understanding that both rescue crews were okay, no apparatus was damaged, and no one was injured.

HIGH CASCADE COMPLEX FIRE
BROWNSVILLE E64 - INCIDENT INVESTIGATION

Chronological Order of Events

The following list of events was derived from each of the involved crews. The time periods are approximate because there was no dispatch, time-stamping device, or equipment in use at this event.

0600	ORCA/BIA team briefing and 24-hour IAP assignments and goals.
0630	OSFM team briefing with Operations, Deputy Operations, Group Supervisors, and TFLs. (Ketchum/LaBelle/Barney/Stutzman & Linn/Marion/Lane/Washington Counties)
0700/0730	OSFM TF Linn & Marion to Powerline Fire/Washington TF to West Hills Fire.
0730/0800	OSFM TF Hood & Clackamas to Rehab/Refuel/Meal and down time (Fire Camp). Note: TF were bedding down at fire camp and fire station near Powerline.
0900	OSFM TF Day Operations in place triaging and supporting ORCA crew operations.
1000	OSFM TFL/GS notice increase in fire activities at both Powerline fire and West Hills fire; contact Deputy Operations.
1000/1100	Warm Springs Police doing evacuation of homes in area of B12 and fire station.
1100/1200	OSFM Marion TF assigned and preparing for structural protection in Division Q and roads B100/B12/B166/Sidwalter Buttes and the new Warm Springs (Sidwalter) fire station; supported by Division Q ORCA hand crews and air operations (GS Orr).
1100/1200	Fire primarily confined to Sidwalter Buttes at B12 and B166 pushing northerly.
1100/1200	OSFM Linn TF assigned to support burnout operations, structural protection and air operations along Mill Creek Road (B-100) from fire station to B-140 area, working with ORCA Division Q (GS Orr), approximately 10 to 15 structures in immediate area.
1200/1215	Orr and Ketchum talk on phone. Orr tells Ketchum fire will be making a significant run in two hours.
1200/1300	OSFM IC and Operations Chief arrive to visit fire ground; Operations Chief requests Clackamas TF to return to the fire due to familiarity with the area and increasing fire behavior. Clackamas TF delayed due to fueling delays at fire camp.
1300	Operations Chief and Deputy Operations Chief brief and meet with Barney. Operations Chief requests OSFM to activate two additional TF (Yamhill and Columbia). Orr meets with Ketchum, Barney, and LaBelle.

1300/1315	Fire conditions increasing in the West Hills area. Structure threat beginning to increase, but does not appear to be immediate.
1300/1400	Extreme fire condition changes; winds change direction pushing fire from northwest towards ORCA burnout operations; spotting occurring in various directions; and fire begins to run through cured grass and spotty sage and juniper. ORCA GS Orr declares wildfire unattainable, but can defend homes.
1300/1400	Fire appears to be moving erratically towards residential homes in the area of B100 and B140; ORCA hand crews regrouping and relocating.
1300/1400	Brownsville E64 from Linn TF assigned to pre-designated draft site southwest of B100 and B140 at Mill Creek water shed for water supply and to support TF.
1300/1400	Brownsville E64 scouts area and develops action plan if roadway compromised for exit; E64 would shelter-in-place.
1400/1430	Hood River crews returning from fire camp are activated by Barney and used to defend homes on B100 between fire station and B140.
1430/1500	Fire is at B100 moving towards homes and structures at a rapid pace towards more cured grassland, sage, juniper, and High Cascade timber.
1430/1500	Marion TF is committed to the B12, B100, and fire station area protecting homes and structures.
1430/1500	Clackamas TF on Mill Creek Road from Hwy. 26 approaching area.
1500	Operations Chief and Deputy Operations Chief meet with GS Barney.
1500	Deputy Operations Chief on B140 south of Mill Creek. Operations Chief at B100 and B140, along with GS Barney.
1500/1515	OSFM IC returns to fire camp. Fire reached several homes in the area of B100 and B140. Linn TF actively protecting homes, moving from structure to structure. Marion TF working its way down Mill Creek with crews to assist.
1500/1515	Brownsville E64 calls over Linn County frequency attempting to contact Linn TFL. Their exit had been overtaken by fire; smoke was dark and low to ground; and heat conditions were increasing. No return contact was made or heard.
1500/1515	GS Orr heading southeast on B100 to County Road to size up homes; hears E-64 asking for helicopter drop; tries to help obtain water drop.
1500/1515	Brownsville E64 advises over State Fire Net "sheltering-in-place." Operations Chief and Deputy Operations Chief hear this call and Operations Chief clears the air and asks E64 to clarify and advise location.

1505/1515	Brownsville E64 advises location and that they are sheltering-in-place in Mill Creek. E64 personnel were heard over the radio breathing from their air packs.
1505/1515	Operations Chief announces emergency traffic and directs GS Barney to lead a RIT/Rescue group to rescue E64. Barney assigned Clackamas B11 and Canby E63 from Clackamas TF to be a RIT and directs them down to E64's location.
1505/1515	Various radio traffic occurs on each TF's individual working frequency and State Fire Net. Traffic is difficult to understand due to multiple units talking.
1510/1515	Canby E63 begins entering roadway towards E64's location. Clackamas B11 crew delayed due to firefighter transferring equipment from a different vehicle. GS Barney joins E63 crew who is attempting to pump and roll while personnel walk alongside E63. Roadway fuel was blooming High Cascade timber pine needles, sage, patch curd grass, and some juniper.
1512/1515	Clackamas B11 followed about 50 yards behind E63. E63 retreated to apparatus cab due to smoke and heat. E63 and B11 continue down the roadway having to stop several times due to low visibility and fire conditions. E63 went to the Y intersection.
1515	Canby E63 and Clackamas B11 made their way slowly through the smoke and heat until they located E64 crew and apparatus near Mill Creek. The crew was using SCBA. E63 and B11 crews were able to exit apparatus because smoke had diminished, and they assisted E64.
1515/1517	Brownsville E64 personnel removed their SCBA and returned to their engine. They followed E63 out through the burned-out roadway with B11 following behind.
1517/1520	Brownsville E64, Canby E63, and Clackamas B11 arrived at B100 and B140. Operations Chief advised GS Barney to have E63 and B11 return to Clackamas TF and to remove E64 from the fireline for a break to recuperate before returning back to the fireline.
1520/1525	Canby E63 and Clackamas B11 returned to Clackamas TF. Deputy Operations Chief redirected Clackamas TF to the County Road area for structure protection.
1600/1615	Brownsville E64 rejoined Linn TF.

HIGH CASCADE COMPLEX FIRE
BROWNSVILLE E64 - INCIDENT INVESTIGATION

Findings

On August 29, 2011, at around 1400 hours, Brownsville E64 was sent to a predetermined and scouted draft site (refer to Exhibit 6, diagram provided by Captain Codino). This crew along with the TFL predetermined that even if the only means of egress was compromised by fire, they had a large enough safety zone at the draft site to sit out any fire danger. A predetermined trigger point was chosen by the TFL, but was not relayed to the crew. Trigger point effectiveness was discussed after each briefing on August 28 and 29. It was felt that it would be too difficult to establish trigger points or visualize them in the terrain. When the TFL noticed that the trigger point was crossed, the fire had progressed and spotted way out in front (refer to Exhibit 1 aerial photo, Exhibit 5 photo Linn TFL location and trigger point) compromising E64's egress (refer to Exhibit 8, taken at 1508 hours by OSC).

Communication on the radios failed due to multiple factors: low output by portable radios, uncontrolled radio traffic from multiple units, one designated operating frequency for a large geographic area (frequency used for both West Hills and Powerline fires), dense smoke, and multiple jurisdictions and agencies operating on the State Fire Net.

When Brownsville E64 announced that they were "sheltering-in-place" and/or taking shelter in the river, it was understood by some what was occurring, but others took it that they were deploying fire shelters. This terminology is common in the structural arena, but not readily understood in the wildland suppression arena. TFL was aware of the safety zone, but was unable to convey that to the OSC at the time of the event due to heavy radio traffic. (Refer to Exhibit 10, photo taken seconds before OSC heard E64 announce they were sheltering in the river at 1511 hours.)

The OSC took control of this incident by declaring "Emergency Traffic" on the State Fire Net, and it was clarified if E64 were actually deploying fire shelters. They were not, but they were taking refuge in the river and the OSC could hear the crew utilizing SCBA. Due to the poor radio communications and the fact that the crew was on SCBA and sheltering in the river, the OSC determined a RIT/rescue team needed to be deployed to determine and ensure the crew's safety.

The OSC appointed a GS to quickly requisition a RIT/rescue team and to check on E64 and get them out of the draft site. The GS utilized the most available resources near the incident, E63 and B11 (Clackamas County TF crew). The OSC felt that the needle bloom and grass had burned most of its fuel prior to the rescue team being deployed and was confident that the rescue team would lead a safe operation. The rescue team crew (E63 and B11), along with GS, quickly devised a pump and roll plan of attack (refer to Exhibit 12, photo taken by B-11 crew at 1512 hours of entrance leading to draft site), believing they only had a short distance to travel, but had to back up and regroup several times due to the heat and distance. After slowly moving down the road, stopping several times to wait for smoke to clear, they were able to reach E64; suppress the remaining flames around the safety zone; and escort the crew, who was already out of the river, to the staging area.

E64 was removed from active fire suppression efforts for a period of time to regroup. The rescue crew was returned to their TF to resume their tasks. There were no injuries or damage to apparatus;

however, a firefighter's helmet received light heat damage. Two portable radios and two cell phones also received water damage.

HIGH CASCADE COMPLEX FIRE
BROWNSVILLE E64 - INCIDENT INVESTIGATION

Conclusion

I was assigned to investigate the incident that occurred on August 29, 2011, with Brownville Engine 64 and the subsequent RIT/rescue team from Canby Engine 63, Clackamas Brush 11, Group Supervisor Barney, and Operations Section Chief Ketchum. I have concluded that no crewmember, leader, or individual acted with gross negligence.

Furthermore, the pre-situational strategy and tactics and the active firefighting tactics taken by the E64 crew were well within fire service standards. Their action to move to the safety zone and seek shelter in the river was appropriate for the conditions they encountered. Their actions and use of PPE, apparatus, and equipment prevented any injury to the crew.

The activation of a RIT/rescue team was a solid strategy and tactic based on what appeared to be a desperate situation for a crew. The rescue team's actions were consistent with fire service standards. They acted quickly while moving at an efficient pace, and their actions were exemplary.

Operational and Safety Concerns

Lookouts - Although the geographical area and terrain were difficult to visually read, utilization of non-committed resources to function as a lookout in these types of wildland/structural situations needs to be considered.

Trigger Points - Even though trigger points were discussed, it is important that each and every crew boss and crewmember know where those trigger points are established and what role each crew boss plays once the trigger point has been compromised.

Radio - Communication via radio is a critical component to the decision process of any operational period and is crucial in disseminating critical information. However, during the crucial time of this event radio traffic was overwhelmed with communications from multiple units and bleed-over from nearby fires. Listed below are some contributing factors:

- Command/operating frequency was overloaded with radio traffic.
- Transmitting/receiving power for portable radios was limited.
- Dense smoke created an unstable platform and disrupted radio capabilities.
- Lower elevation and bowl topography effected ability to transmit and receive.
- Radio identifiers such as "Division Q Structural Barney" or "Clackamas County Task Force Leader" were extremely long.
- Communication over large geographical area.

Suggested Solutions:

- Utilization of OSFM communication unit due to the complexity of this incident and large geographical area. It may have provided the necessary equipment, knowledge, and personnel to improve communications and/or equipment needed to upgrade frequencies and radios.
- Utilization of a working/operational frequency for West Hills fire and a separate working/operational frequency for the Powerline fire.
- Reduce radio identifiers from their county name to TF-1, TFL-1 (Karn) to provide a consistent or uniform practice when multiple counties and jurisdictions are mobilized.
- Utilize last name as identifiers (similar to federal crews) for ISO, OSC, DOSC, GS, and TFL.

IAP - Although ORCA provided a good, complete 24-hour IAP, it lacked substance for the OSFM teams. It was a good working IAP for the ORCA and BIA. However, OSFM crews are unfamiliar working with a 24-hour IAP. The August 29, 2011, IAP had limited information pertaining to OSFM operations. Safety messages and tactics were mainly related to wildland strategy and tactics and not wildland interface/structural protection. I suggest that on Unified Command incidents that the OSFM team complete their own independent team IAP with 12-hour time periods. This will allow a more accurate document for our teams to reference. Any corrections made to the IAP at a meeting should be corrected in the formal IAP document, and the most accurate copies should be distributed before entering the field.

Terminology - Terminology of wildland and structural departments can cause interpretation problems.

- I suggest we utilize team briefings to discuss what type of common terminology will be used during these types of activations or potential emergencies.

  Such as:
  - How we obtain emergency traffic over the radio
  - Structural terms versus wildland terms (In this event terms that were used commonly in the structural arena, may have been misunderstood by several key participants.)

Personnel Identifiers - Due to the complexity of the incident command structure (number of unified command personnel), it was decided not to use position vests. Due to the multiple agencies involved, current department identifiers can confuse personnel (Battalion Chief, Incident Command, Operations Chief, etc.). To prevent further confusion in the field of operations, I suggest the following:

For all Command and Control Staff, Group Supervisors, and Task Force Leaders:

- Outfit positions with PPE vests identifying position and name on front and large (four to six-inch) position identification on back.
- Provide position identification on vehicles (magnetic signs).

Command and Control - When E64 announced their problem and the OSC decided to take control of the operations, it might have more clear if the OSC had indicated he was taking control of the rescue operation when he declared "emergency traffic" over the air, in addition to identifying who he wanted

assigned and/or leading the operation as well as assigning a rescue group leader (as he did face-to-face with Barney).

It was clear that crews were confused about who to report directly to and who was "in charge." However, it was noted by all of the crews involved that radio traffic was overwhelming at that time.

RIT/Rescue Deployment - I suggest that time should have been taken to brief both crew bosses (B11 and E63) and confirm the strategy and tactic to take place, or at least bring them both together to inform them of the plan of attack and who was directed to lead them. I believe this would have only taken a short period and possibly helped with team cohesiveness.

Damaged Equipment - Although the crew was forced into the creek, I suggest protecting radios or securing them above water when possible, especially if needed for further communication or in the event of separation from crew. When the RIT/rescue team felt like heat was penetrating their PPE, it is imperative to take necessary action and relay those concerns to your supervisor. I believe the damage to the helmet's headlamp was caused by the heat the RIT/rescue team encountered during suppression efforts. The correct PPE prevented the firefighter from being injured. There was no report of injury; however, FF Stoner stated at one point that it felt like his ears were getting sunburned.

Fire Behavior - The fire behavior on this day was different and developed several concerns that could or should caution the most experienced fire service personnel. At times the fire burned through flashy grass fields (fast) while being supported by moderate to heavy fuel loads of sage, juniper, and High Cascade timber with dry needle bloom. It created its own weather along with a substantial northwest wind that was gusting up to 30 mph. Thermal smoke columns were created at two different levels. One low to the ground in the Mill Creek drainage appeared to be pushed by the current wind at a greater pace. The second, with dense darker smoke and at times black smoke, was being pushed up into a more unstable atmosphere. The second smoke column went up much higher and laid down out in front of the fire, appearing to support a large amount of heat and burning combustion. As it came down out in front of the fire, it created several spot fires 100 feet to about 600 yards in front of the main body of the fire. The down canyon winds and drainage winds mixing with this erratic behavior created a firestorm in the area of B100 and B140.

IMT Staffing - It appeared that the ISO staffing was inadequate during this event and could have used the assistance of at least one more ISO to cover the larger geographic areas and span of control. The following is a list of positions that might have benefited if they were staffed:

- OSC/DOSC appeared at times to be doing split duties, filling in for the lack of additional Group Supervisors and IMT staffing.
- At least one additional Group Supervisor was needed in the Powerline fire due to the location of structures and complexity of the fire.
- Additional Task Forces could have been utilized to help support current activities, lessoning the "leap frog" from home to home.

Fatigue/Stress - The ISO and OSC checked on the Brownsville E64 crew and communicated their relief and stress concerns to them. However, the ISO and supervisors need to consider all personnel utilized in a higher risk situation and communicate between channels to insure that proper debriefing and critical stress relief is provided. Although difficult, I suggest that crews be rotated sooner and additional

resources ordered to allow for appropriate rest and debriefing. It is imperative that crews get downtime/sleep on these types of long duration periods.

Communications - After reviewing both Barney's and Codino's interviews and Codino's report, the word "retreat" was used to step back away from current suppression activities and get into the cab of E63. The term "retreat" appeared to cause confuse until personnel entered the cab. It is difficult to make a determination regarding E63 crew's concerns that the Group Supervisor was pushing them down the road. I have concluded that this was a unique and stressful situation for all the crews involved in the RIT/rescue team. Decisions were being made on the move; noise levels were elevated; and crews were not familiar with one another or their skill levels. This and the hostile atmosphere they were entering caused a greater-than-normal apprehension of the situation and possibly elevated their parasympathetic nervous system (fight or flight).

I am unable to differentiate whether or not one individual's comment was "out of control," based on the information.

OSFM Activation of Team and Training Positions - I suggest in future activations that the OSFM and the EOC/AOC communicate this directly to the IC or their designated representative, along with the OSFM and EOC/AOC. I suggest this be included at check-in and then relayed to the PSC.

Training and Experience - Training credentials are the responsibility of the OSFM office and their administrative staff. I was informed by the OSFM office that all individuals involved met the current standards to be active in their current positions. Alan McMahan the Fire Marshal's Office explained that the "T" after a current IMT name identifies that the individual has a few tasks that need to be checked in their task book; it is **not** to identify that the individual is a "trainee." All IMT personnel at this activation had been accepted to the team and were to be fully used in their listed position; contrary to the report that trainees were used. It is the responsibility of the OSFM to keep current and accurate accounts of team members' level of training. During my investigation, conversations, and interviews, it was apparent that the experience level in this type of arena varied from minimal to high level of experience.

Incident Within Incident (IWI) SOG - It was suggested by several individuals not directly involved with this incident that an IWI report should have been filed and the SOG should have been followed. I do not believe the current standard operating guideline supports this incident being an IWI. However, I suggest that we address the IWI SOG and possibly change the wording to include incidents that pose an eminent danger or high potential risk, such as utilizing or activating a RIT/rescue team.

Final - Even though it was a concern of the IC and his staff to help disseminate information to control and contain rumors and to get in front of the social network, it still moved quicker than staff could investigate and/or get current accurate information to the appropriate crews, personnel, and agencies involved. I caution any firefighter and supervisor to maintain the confidence and respect of the command structure. I suggest that fatigue and the lack of proper communications contributed to the breakdown during this event. The gossip, rumors, and finger-pointing seemed to foster a hostile environment and subsequent investigation. Patience and diligence would have assisted in correct information getting to the crews through proper channels or chain of command. Thus, communication to the correct team members would have assisted this investigation and fostered a more stable environment. I have great concern regarding the information I was told by non-involved task forces and their leaders about how hostile the task forces were feeling about one another. Non-involved task force personnel felt like they were being dragged into something they wanted no part in or had any direct

impact on what they were to accomplish. Communicating concerns through proper channels would have helped disseminate the proper information back and forth between the ICP and crews.

Exhibit 1

Line 171
Corning & Sandy
Q&C Kathleen
Group Sup Sandy
Q&C LaBelle

Exhibit 2
August 29, 2011, 1350-1400 hours - E64 at Draft Site (Photo 133)

Exhibit 3
August 29, 2011, 1400 hours - E64 at Draft Site

Exhibit 4
August 29, 2011, 1350 hours - E64 at Draft Site

Exhibit 5
August 29, 2011, 1455 hours - House West of B100 and B140 (Linn TFL)

Exhibit 6
Graph created by Captain Cordino



Exhibit 7
August 29, 2011, 1450 hours - E64 (Photo taken facing NW from draft site.)

Exhibit 8
August 29, 2011, 1508.28 hours - B100 at B140 (OSC Photo)

Exhibit 9
August 29, 1511.54 hours - B100 at B140 (OSC Photo)

Exhibit 10
August 29, 2011, 1511.55 hours - B100 at B140 (OSC Photo)

Exhibit 11
August 29, 2011, 1511.56 hours - B100 and B140 (OSC Photo)

Exhibit 12

August 29, 2011, 1512 hours - B100 at B140 Road to Draft Site (Capt. Burke's Photo)

Exhibit 13
August 29, 2011, 1545 hours - Draft Site (E64 Photo)

Exhibit 14
August 29, 2011, 1545 hours - Draft Site Safety Zone (E64 Photo)

Exhibit 15
August 29, 2011, 1545 hours - Draft Site Safety Zone and Creek (E64 Photo)

Exhibit 16
August 29, 2011, 1545 hours - Draft Site Safety Zone and Burn Area (E64 Photo)

HIGH CASCADE COMPLEX FIRE
BROWNSVILLE E64 - INCIDENT INVESTIGATION

Interviews

Interview: Linn County Task Force Leader
AC Tim Frost

August 30, 2011; 1230 hours

TFL Frost's team assignment from Deputy Ops Chief LaBelle for day operations was to support burnout operations being conducted by Division Q (Chris Orr) by assisting in structural protection in the area of B100 and B140.

Frost told me that early in the day Linn Task Force pre-triaged the structures in the area of Mill Creek, B100 and B140. They had predetermined the only hydrant located at the fire station about two miles down the road was inadequate to support filling operations for both Marion TF (who was assigned to the homes by the fire station) and Linn TF. He drove down to the draft site located on Mill Creek, determined it was a defendable safe area, with green vegetation, water, and a useful cleared safe zone, in case they had any issues. Frost then had all the apparatus in his task force drive down to the site so they would know how to get to it. He chose E64 because it was the only front-mount pump and it was capable of filling all of their apparatus quickly. He also decided to use E64 because he was very confident with the experience of Chief Roger and his crew.

Frost had predetermined a trigger point to abandon the draft site if fire started to move down the ravine, but he was confident even if it passed the trigger point they were in a safe zone and could sit it out.

As they were assisting on B100 with burnout operations, ORCA Division Q Group Supervisor said over the radio that they had lost the fire and it is now coming at them (Linn TF). The fire rapidly came up on the structures they were protecting and it was up on the flat area in grass and sage with occasional torching of juniper or timber. The task force was actively trying to protect structures when TFL Frost noticed the fire in the trees above his trigger point. He still felt E64 was in a safe area and it would be more dangerous to try to move them at this point. Before he could react, the fire was in the sage and grass, moving rapidly down the ravine and towards E64. He was trying to contact them, but there was a lot of radio traffic. Also, his TF was involved with protecting the two structures and then the fire split around the intersection in two different directions.

At this point TFL Frost was unaware E64 was having pump issues. He had two Type VI from another TF with him defending a structure, then one of them said they were reassigned and left. He was unaware that this equipment was even assigned to the area. ORCA Division Q was trying to backburn around the structures and then he heard from E64 on the Linn County frequency. He tried to communicate on Linn frequency, but was unsuccessful due to all the heavy radio traffic.

He then heard Ops Chief Ketchum and Deputy Ops Chief LaBelle on State Fire Net talking to E64. He heard they were sheltering in the river and that a RIT team was being sent down to them. He then heard from E64 that they were okay. Seeking shelter in creek, a few minutes went by then he heard they were out of the area and okay.

He was directed by Group Supervisor Barney to remove them from fire suppression activities for an hour to see if they were all okay and ready to return to suppression activities. He talked to E64 crew and they were doing okay; no damage or injuries to personnel or apparatus. However, they damaged two portable radios and two cell phones when they entered the creek. They rested for an hour and were cleared by TFL Frost and crew boss Rogers to return to the task force.

Interview: Clackamas Task Force Leader
BC Jamie Karn

August 31, 2011; 1700 hours

On August 29, 2011, BC Karn and his task force were in fire camp after working the night ops on the Powerline fire. They were getting their needed down time, supplies, and rest. Karn met with Deputy Operations Chief Rich LaBelle. LaBelle told Karn that the fire was going to be very active and that they would be fighting a lot of fire today. Later they were requested to respond. They were delayed due to waiting to have all his apparatus refueled.

After all the apparatus was ready to go, Karn had his task force respond Code 3, due to the information he had received on the fire threat to several structures. After arriving in the area of Mill Creek Road (B100) and B140, Karn scouted down B140 and met with LaBelle (south of Mill Creek and the south intersection of B140 and B110). Hearing E64 traffic and Barney requesting a priority drop, he realized E64 appeared to be in danger and being "ran over by fire."

E63 called Karn on their county frequency stating they were requested to go help and that B11 was with them too. Karn told E63 and B11 to be the rescue team. Karn new that B11 was delayed because they had to move a FF from a support vehicle to B11. Then Karn started back with two of his apparatus to his crews involved in the rescue, after hearing over the radio from E63 that they had found E64 and that the crew was okay. Karn went back to LaBelle's location on B140 and B100 south of the creek. After talking with LaBelle, Karn regrouped his task force and they were reassigned to the county road structure protection.

Karn told me he was unaware of any direct concerns from E63 until later that night and into the next day at the fire station when he talked to E63 and B11 crews. They all became increasingly upset when no one had come out and interviewed them, and that they heard the ISO was out giving a report on the incident. I asked Karn if he told anyone of the crews' concerns. He told me that he discussed it with his crews and Group Supervisor Blount. He also added that he had talked to other task force leaders.

Karn added at this point that he and Ketchum had a face-to-face prior to this incident; they had a different view on the task to be completed; he did not agree with Ketchum; and they argued. He added that Ketchum was a "liar" and that I would figure that out with my investigation. I asked why he felt Ketchum was a "liar." He told me I would figure it out with my investigation and that he and Ketchum have had problems in the past. I was unclear at this point of the animosity, but told him I would do the best I could.

Karn added that he was glad we were doing an investigation. I told him that my first assignment was to do a preliminary investigation about E64 and why they needed to "shelter-in-place" and that until today after giving my review to the three task forces was unaware of any concerns from the "RIT" crews that went in.

During my interview with TFL Karn it was evident that he had animosity towards Ops Chief Ketchum, and that he was extremely upset with previous encounters (prior to this complex fire) and encounters during this complex.

Interview: Clackamas Task Force Assistant Team Leader
Lt. Mark Corless

August 31, 2011; 1730 hours

On August 29, 2011, Lt. Corless was assigned as the Clackamas task force leader; Karn's driver. He was in the ICP with Karn around 1400 after being on night operations at the Razorback fire. The task force had received about 50% of their down time. He was told by Karn that they were needed at the Powerline fire; structures were being threatened by the fire. They left the ICP with the task force and responded Code 3. They met up with Deputy Operations Chief Rich LaBelle on the south side of Mill Creek on B100. T71, B11, and E63 were left on the north side of Mill Creek by B140 and B100. After having a face-to-face with LaBelle, T71 and B140 went to LaBelle for structure protection. B11 was switching its firefighter from support vehicle, then Ketchum came up to Karn. They had a face-to-face. Corless heard Ketchum tell Karn to help on structure protection on the north side of Mill Creek. Karn told Ketchum they had different orders. It appeared to Corless that Karn and Ketchum exchanged a few heated words, but he did not recall what was said.

He and Karn returned to LaBelle's location, when he noticed the radio traffic was crazy on state fire net and their county frequency. Corless heard the emergency radio traffic and that an engine was sheltering-in-place. The radio traffic increased and it was hard to follow. Karn directed him to drive towards the direction of the rescue. While driving towards the area of the rescue, the next thing Corless recalls is Val from E63 said everyone is okay and we are bringing them out. Karn then had Corless drive back to LaBelle's location, and they were reassigned to the county line area.

Corless told me he was concerned that the OSFM was going to try to sweep this incident under the covers. I told him today was the first I had heard of their concerns, and that I had relayed the concerns to my IC and that they directed me to do a follow-up investigation and that is why I am interviewing all of the personnel involved. He added that they all went into the night and worked mostly on the county road area, and did not know of the crews' concerns until Karn had discussed it with him and the other crews.

Interview: E63

August 31, 2011

1745 hours; Crew Boss Captain Val Codino
1800 hours; Driver Matt Dale
1830 hours; Firefighter Duane Stoner

Captain Codino and his crew told me that on August 29, 2011, they were assigned to the Clackamas County Task Force and after working the night operational period were at fire camp, eating, refueling, and getting supplies. Around noon they were told by their TFL (Jamie Karn) that they were needed back at Mill Creek Road area. The task force was delayed because they had to wait to be refueled. At around 1415/1430 hours they were back on the road and enroute. While enroute the TFL advised them that the fire was now threatening structures and to respond together Code 3.

When they arrived in the area of Mill Creek Road (B100) and B140, they staged in a driveway trying to stay out of the way of the Marion County TF (who was engaging in structure protection) and a trailered dozer. Radio traffic was extremely busy on State Fire Net and the area was in moderate smoke conditions with trees torching along with a wind-driven grass fire. Chris Barney, who they identified later, came up to the engine and said, firefighters were in danger and he needed their help. He indicated the direction and stated several times the trapped crew was about 20 yards down the road (he was pointing in the area, later identified as the draft site). Codino exited the engine and talked to Barney. Codino contacted his TFL via the radio. It was decided that E63 and B11 would make a rescue of the engine crew trapped by the fire. E63 crew believed that the trapped engine crew had no escape route or safety zone and were in imminent danger.

E63 was directed by Codino to begin a pump and roll operation with booster lines down the road. They were encountering dense smoke, heat, and fire from the Cascade Timber sage and grass. Codino and FF Stoner were operating the booster lines while Driver Dale was operating the apparatus. The crew was operating with the knowledge that the trapped crew was about 20 yards down the road and that they had no knowledge where the road led to or that there was a creek at the end. Conditions degraded while continuing down the road. The fire, smoke, and heat increased with poor visibility. At this time, Barney came up to Codino saying over and over that we've got to keep going. Then Barney opened up the FF door on the officer side and over his portable radio called for an emergency helicopter drop. Barney left the door open causing the cab to fill with smoke. Codino and Stoner began to roll up the booster line, and then they returned to the cab of E63 due to the dense smoke, heat, and fire. After retreating to the cab Codino directed Dale to back up. Dale was uncertain where B11 was so he waited until he could see their emergency lights; it appeared that B11 was way behind them.

It was evident to them that they would not be reaching the crew within 20 yards since they had traveled over about 100 yards. Barney directed Dale to drive down the road towards the fire in front of them. Dale asked Codino if he should continue. Codino hesitated and was uncertain if they should continue, but Barney said to go. At this point the smoke had cleared enough and the fire sat down enough for them to continue (they could see the road). Codino told Dale to go until they could not see the road due to dark smoke. They stopped; Barney told them to stay left at the Y. Dale had been looking for the Y the entire time. Fearing they would get trapped or stuck, they waited for the smoke visibility to improve before proceeding further. After a brief pause, the wind blew the smoke enough for them to proceed with adequate visibility. After making a right rolling turn, they came to an open area and they could see E64 (Brownsville) nosed down into the river, seeing a helmet in the water, then the crew appeared from

around the rear of E64. Codino and Barney exited the engine and contacted E64 crew. They helped them secure the E64 crew and helped get E64 ready to exit the area. Codino had Stoner wet down the unburned
area behind E64. Codino contacted his TFL (Karn) and updated B11 via the radio. Barney and Codino decided it would be best if E63 led E64 out while B11 followed closely from behind. Codino relayed this to both E64 and B11. Conditions had improved enough for them to exit the area, so they proceeded up the road they came in on without having to stop. After returning to the starting point at the intersection of B100 and B140, Barney thanked the E63 crew, got out of the engine, and they were redeployed by their TFL to his location on B140. They were reassigned to the County Line Road area protecting structures and supporting burnout operations around structures holding lines until approximately 0700 hours.

During my individual interviews with E63 I found that Captain Codino was upset with the findings in the preliminary report and that he was angry. He seemed to question why he and Barney made the decisions they did. He was very concerned with putting his crew in harm's way. He seemed fatigued, stressed, and anxious (anxiety level was up). He did not understand why E64 needed to be rescued; they were found uninjured and in a safe area.

Driver Dale was calm during his interview and did not seem to be as upset as Codino, saying he had been a wildland firefighter for years and seen similar type of fire. He was disappointed when they reached the crews, because he felt they were in a survivable area and did not really need a rescue.

FF Stoner expressed his concern for his safety and stated he was nervous the entire time, not sure they were going to get out of the situation safely. When he retreated back to the cab of the engine he noticed the strap to his headlight had melted. He was hoping that his crew and Barney knew what they were doing.

During my interview with E63 crew, they expressed the following concerns:

- Confusion of who was "in charge"
- Confused who Barney was and his position
- Confused on personnel's position/titles; who's who in the chain
- Felt that Barney was pushing them into a dangerous situation without knowing the total picture and that his information and knowledge of the area and situation was lacking
- Confused on who to report to and who they were assigned to
- Unsure of risk factors involved with the erratic fire behavior, experience in this type of scenario
- Confusion on which frequency to communicate
- Unrelated radio traffic or too much traffic and unable to clearly understand radio traffic
- Not being properly debriefed or talked to after event by ISO or Ops

Interview: B11
Crew Boss Captain Brian Burke
Driver Jim Donahue
Firefighter Bob Atiyah

August 31, 2011; 1900 hours

Captain Burke and his crew told me that on August 29, 2011, they were assigned to the Clackamas County Task Force and after working the night operational period, returned to fire camp to eat, refuel, and get supplies. Around 1200 hours they were told by their TFL (Jamie Karn) that the task force was needed back out at Mill Creek Road area; the fire was threatening several structures. The task force was being delayed because they had to wait to be refueled. At around 1420 hours they were back on the road headed towards the Powerline fire code 3.

B11 crew is a three-person crew, but they travel with a support vehicle (FF follows behind the task force in it). They arrived in the area of B100 and B140 the same time E63 did. While staging on the road, Chris Barney came up and told Captain Burke that he needed their help; firefighters were trapped and in need of immediate help. They were told (over the radio on Simplex) to assist E63 with the RIT/rescue of the trapped engine and firefighters. B11 crew was under the impression that the trapped crew was in immediate danger. E63 started down the road before B11; they had to secure the support vehicle and wait for the FF to get up to them with his gear on. Captain Burke and FF Atiyah pulled booster lines (2) and began to support the same pump and roll operations E63 was doing. B11 was about 75 yards behind E63. As they progressed down the road they too had to stop several times due to the heat and smoke conditions. After E63 retreated into their cab, Burke and Atiyah retreated to B11 cab, continued to follow E63 at a safe distance, and would stop when the smoke visibility was zero. After about three minutes, B11 arrived behind E63 who had located E64. Burke got out and discussed the exit plan with Barney and Codino. They were to follow E64 out while E63 led them.

B11 felt it took about two minutes or less to exit the area and return to the intersection of B100 and B140. After returning to the area they contacted their TFL (Karn) meeting up with him, then they were reassigned with their TF to structure protection and to help support burnout operations on the County Road.

B11 crew seemed to be the most seasoned and calm crew I interviewed. As a group they expressed the concern of why the crew did not relay they were in a survivable area and that they could sit it out. However, they did add that they were not in that situation, and by the time they got to them conditions had improved. Given the information the group supervisor had, they felt the crew was in immediate danger and that they would attempt the rescue again given the circumstances. Captain Burke, Driver Donahue, nor FF Atiyah seemed upset or anxious of the situation. They too did not understand why they were not asked about the incident earlier.

Mark Matthews

August 31, 2011; 1930 hours

After concluding these interviews, I was approached by several other individuals from other task forces who told me they were glad we were talking to these crews and that it had been disrupting the crews that were not involved. TFL from the other teams told me the Task Forces and crews were trying to drag them into the controversy, but they did not want their crews involved. The Clackamas County Task Force was causing unneeded stress and pushing the issue with uninvolved crews.

I was also approached by two Newberg crew members who told me after I gave my preliminary report to the crews, Captain Corless was so upset and said in reference to me, "I want to kick that guy's ass," and indicating that I was trying to cover this whole thing up.

Interview: Division Q Structural Group Supervisor Chris Barney

September 1, 2011; 1400 hours

On August 28, 2011, at about 0630 hours, DOSC Rich Labelle assigned GS Chris Barney to the Power line fire as Division Q structural. Barney would be assigned Linn TF and Marion TF and they were responsible to protect structures and help support burnout operations being conducted in Division Q. Barney was to work with ORCA GS Chris Orr. Barney had Marion TF assisting in structural triage N/W and West of the fire station on Mill Creek Rd. The main portion of the Power line fire in Division Q was moving North by North East towards several homes. Linn TF was assigned to triage homes on B100 between the fire station and B140 and to help support ORCA crews burnout operations.

At about 1215 hours, Barney received a call from OSC Ketchum; Orr had just called Ketchum and told him that in about two hours your area was going to get hit with fire. Within about ten minutes, Orr was trying to get in contact with Barney, but the portable radio and traffic was poor, so they had a face-to-face. Orr and Barney met on B100 (Mill Creek Road) about three-quarters mile from the intersection of B100 and B140. Orr's crews were getting ready to burnout from B100 to prevent the fire from making a run towards Hwy. 26 and several other homes.

At about 1240 hours, the Hood River TF was returning from fire camp in preparation to bed down at the fire station when Barney asked them to help protect the structure, they were located in front. Marion TF was on their way, but delayed because of the homes they were protecting in the area of the fire station.

ORCA crews began their burnout operation at about 1300/1315 hours. During this time the main head of the fire began to make a run in a southeast direction. By the time any of the ORCA crews could adjust, the fire had passed their operation and was now heading towards the south and southeast. Barney concurred with Orr that the fire was moving way too fast for the burnout operation to be effective. Barney relocated some of the Hood River TF to the homes around the B100 and B140 area. Linn TF was already deployed in the area and preparing to protect homes.

TF apparatus was leaping from area and structure trying to direct the fire away from the homes and preventing it from crossing B100. Barney met with Linn TFL and Hood River TFL and quickly briefed them on what was occurring and then met with OSC Ketchum. The fire was moving in the direction of B100 and B140 rapidly and erratically. Barney was in the staging area with Ketchum when E64 announced they were sheltering. Ketchum directed Barney to grab the two units from Clackamas TF that were in staging and get the guys (E64) out of there. Believing they were in immediate danger, he ran up to E63 and B11 and told them he needed their help rescuing the Brownsville engine, telling them they knew where they were and pointing down the road to the draft site. He thought they were only a hundred feet or so down the road.

E63 began down the road, while Barney was talking to the B11 crew. Then Barney ran up to E63 crew helping them with the hose lines and then jumped into the cab of E63 asking for a water drop. He was told the smoke was too dense. He then told the crew boss on E63 to retreat to the cab. They all got into the cab of E63 and slowly made their way down the road, having to slow and stop several times due to the smoke and fire. After about three minutes they came to the crew of E64. The engine was nose down in the creek area and the crew was by the engine with SCBA on and in use. He got out and confirmed with OSC Ketchum that they reached E64; they were okay; and they would be coming out soon. Barney

helped secure the crew and their equipment. E64 was placed between E63 and B11 while they escorted them to the staging area.

Barney thanked both E63 and B11 and told them they could return to their TF. He was directed by Ketchum to have E64 sit out for an hour to recoup and to make sure they were doing okay. He told E64 TFL to have them stay out of the action for an hour, then if they were okay to have them reassigned. He then went back to his normal assignment.

Interview: Night Ops Group Supervisor
Group Supervisor Jason Blount OSFM Night Ops

September 1, 2011; 1945 hours

On September 1, 2011, at about 1945 hours, I talked with Group Supervisor Jason Blount regarding the crews that were involved with the "RIT" deployment. He told me he was not assigned to the day ops, on August 29, 2011, but had been working with Clackamas TF the night before and has had them assigned to him during night operations at the Powerline fire. TFL Karn approached Blount on August 30, 2011, and he advised Blount of the situation his task force was involved in. Over the next few operational periods, it was brought to his attention that the crews involved, including the TFL, were upset and concerned that no one was talking to them. He was concerned because the Clackamas TF had several members upset and wanting to go home. Other TF were being drawn into the conversation and it was causing problems. On August 31, 2011, around 1430 hours, Blount talked to ISO Matthews at the Warm Springs Fire Station on Mill Creek Road just before Matthews addressed the crews with the preliminary PP and report. Blount told Matthews, we might want to talk to the Clackamas TFL because he was very upset.

Blount went on to say to ISO Matthews that it was upsetting some of the other crews; they were tired of hearing from Clackamas TF; and they needed their rest. He was concerned for the safety and wellbeing of all the TF who were resting at the fire station. He went on to tell me he stayed for the preliminary report update and was thankful it was discussed and that the ISO interviewed the crews. He concurred it was a good idea to send Clackamas TF home; they were fatigued and ready to go home.

Interview: Operations Section Chief
John Ketchum

September 6, 2011; 0945 hours

On August 29, 2011, OSC John Ketchum was out touring the Power line fire with IC Doug Koellermeier. At about 1200 hours he received a call from Orr saying the fire was going to make a significant run in about two hours in the direction of the homes on B100 (Mill Creek Rd.). Ketchum remained out on the Mill Creek Road area while IC Koellermeier returned to the ICP. He then called GS Q structural Barney and relayed the information Orr gave him. He told Barney to find Orr and work together on structural protection.

Seeing that the fire was making significant changes and the behavior was rapidly changing, he met with Barney around 1400 hours, making sure they were in place to secure the homes and to try and prevent the fire from crossing B100 and making a run down the drainage area towards Hwy. 26 and several homes between B100 and Hwy. 26.

Around 1500 hours, he was sitting at the intersection of B100 and B140, when the fire began to blow by the intersections and the road. He got out of his rig and tried to clear the intersection because Clackamas TF showed up around the same time a dozer transport arrived. Clackamas TF split up, with a few rigs and TFL Karn driving down towards Mill Creek or B140. Still out of his rig he directed apparatus out of the way so the dozer transport could move through. The fire was burning rapidly through the tall timber needle bloom, and the grass and brush was moving even faster.

At about 1512 hours, Ketchum heard E64 on the State Net asking to clear the air; they were sheltering-in-place. Ketchum announced emergency traffic, and due to the radio traffic, understood they were taking shelter in the river due to smoke and heat conditions. He believed the crew to be in a bad situation and needing rescue. He went to GS Barney who was by his rig at the intersection and directed him to get those guys out of there, pointing to the draft site, and explaining to Barney it was the Brownsville engine crew and that he wanted him to establish a RIT crew to drive down and get them out of the draft site.

Ketchum watched as Barney went up to Canby E63 and B11 crews, then they followed him towards the road that leads down to the draft site. The needle bloom had almost burned out or through at this point and the main body of fire had already moved past the road. He added that the smoke was dark and the wind was blowing hard, keeping the smoke low to the ground. Ketchum watched as the two rigs drove down the road pumping and rolling with the FF out hosing the route down. Then they stopped and got back into the cab of their rigs, hearing Barney ask for a helicopter drop. He told Barney that the smoke was too dense for the helicopter to see them. A minute or two went by after he had lost sight of B11 and E63 and then heard from Barney that they had reached E64 and they were okay and on the way out.

The Canby rig was in front when they came out followed by Brownsville then the Clackamas County brush rig. He went to the crew of E64 and asked if they were okay and if they damaged anything. They told him all was okay. Ketchum then directed Barney to sit E64 out for an hour and then check and see if they were ready to go back on line, making sure they had a meaningful task to do. He left Barney to regroup the Clackamas crews and Linn crews.

Ketchum saw both the Linn TF and Clackamas TF several times that night and talked with Clackamas TFL several times, but was unaware of any concerns until the ISO brought it to his attention on August 31, 2011, at the fire station.

Ketchum added he took photos of the fire prior to the call for help. They are time stamped and show that most of the pine bloom was burned or burning off before crews went down the road. He also added the fire behavior was erratic and moving out in front of the main body in different locations several times. Once the fire reached the intersection, it shot up the Mill Creek drainage quickly and seemed as if the fire had split.

Ketchum added that he thought the crew was in imminent danger and there was a need to rescue the crew. Radio traffic and the poor output of portables made it difficult to understand all of E64 transmissions, but he was clear they were not deploying shelters. It concerned him greatly that they were forced to use SCBA. He did not feel the fire on the top of the road had much more fuel; most of the needle bloom had burned away and the main fire front had passed. He felt it was okay for the rescue team to try to go down the road. He understood that the rescue crew felt a need to get back into the cab, due to the smoke and heat conditions. He did not see or hear of any damage other than the headlight melted from a FF helmet, until the ISO told him.

Interview: Deputy Operations Chief
Chief Richard LaBelle

September 7, 2011; 1700 hours

DOSC LaBelle was the assigned Red Team DOSC for the High Cascade Complex Fires OSFM Structural Protection Team. On August 29, 2011, he was assigned the operation duties for the West Hills fire and Powerline fire structural protection and to work with ORCA operations and group supervisors at both fires. He assigned Barney to the Powerline fire and Stutzman to the West Hills fire. Barney had TF Marion and Linn assigned, while Stutzman had Washington and Lane. It appeared that the fire on the Powerline fire would be pushing on towards several structures and communities today.

At about 1200 hours, he received notice that the fire was going to be coming towards several homes in the area of B100, B140, and the fire house. He was overseeing the operations of GS Q, Barney, and Orr (ORCA), when extreme fire changes occurred and started threatening structures in their area. He made a request for more task forces and was notified that Clackamas TF would be on their way after refueling. He also noticed the rapid fire change. At about 1400 hours the fire had begun to change and move rapidly towards the intersection of B100 and B140. He heard that the Division Q (Orr) burnout was unsuccessful and that the fire was moving rapidly upon structures.

At about 1500 hours LaBelle was talking to Barney at the home due west of the B100 and B140 intersection, then he heard E64 on State Fire Net ask if they should leave. LaBelle continued on B140 scouting the fire area, when he saw the fire jump the road and head up the drainage of Mill Creek. Then he heard E64 say they were sheltering. He was under the assumption they were deploying shelters. He asked the ISO who had just drove up to scout the B140 area at Mill Creek to see if access could be made down to the draft site. The fire had already moved down and across the road, making access poor. Then he heard Ops Chief Ketchum take over the situation, clarify that they are sheltering-in-place and not deploying shelters. The next radio traffic he heard was Barney asking for a helicopter to drop water. He and TFL Karn were across from E64 on the north side of Mill Creek attempting to find better access to them. Karn told LaBelle on State Fire Net that they should be okay, then he heard Ketchum ask for emergency traffic again. A minute went by, then LaBelle heard that E64 was okay. LaBelle asked for a PAR to make sure. Then LaBelle moved down B100 south to scout out the homes on the county line road. He assigned Clackamas TF to the county line road and stayed until he delivered MREs to the Clackamas TF at around 2300 hours. He had not heard of any concerns from TFL Karn that night or for two days until the ISO told OSC and IC.

Interview: ORCA Division Q Group Supervisor
ORCA Group Supervisor Chris Orr

September 17, 2011; 1930 hours

On August 28, 2011, Chris Orr was the assigned ORCA group supervisor for Division Q Powerline fire. During the morning briefing with OSFM OSC, DOSC, and Division Q Structure, Orr explained what his plans were for the day. He also explained that today might have some erratic fire behavior and that he was going to need support protecting structures in the B100, B140, and fire station area, while his hand crews did back burns along with air support.

At about 1150 hours, Orr called his Ops Chief and told him to get a hold of OSFM Ketchum and to let him know that fire was shortly going to be moving down on several homes in Division Q. Ketchum called Orr shortly after that and Orr told him they would be initiating burnouts for defensive tactics around the B100 and fire station.

Orr's crews began to burn out on the north and then the south of the driveway and home about one-half to three-quarters mile away from the fire station. The southside burn created a fire whirl and crossed the road about 200 yards south of B100, putting a house on the east side in jeopardy. The main body of fire was about 300 yards behind this whirl. The fire behavior was so erratic that the main body would have jumped the road too. Orr was having complications with air attack dropping where he wanted. He talked to Barney and requested to have his crews protect the structure while his crews moved further down south. Orr had ordered a dozer to blade a line around the structure in an attempt to keep the slopover contained.

Barney had two brush rigs anchor in, and they flanked the fire around and prevented the fire from reaching the house. Then he met with Ketchum and Barney and discussed tactics. Realizing the fire was moving way too quick for his hand crews, Orr pulled his crews further south, down B100, attempting to burn out and slow the progress of the fire.

Barney called Orr and asked if it was okay to burn out around the house at B100 and B140, due to the fire coming right at it. Orr had him wait about two minutes until he pulled his hand crew and then had Barney continue with his burnout tactics. Orr met with Barney and Ketchum and told them that the homes were defendable with his task forces, but we were in a defensive mode. His hand crews were no use in the area, so he directed his hand crews to the east side of B100 to prevent the fire from going down 140 towards the county line road. Orr declared the land untenable, but felt the homes were defendable and asked Ketchum and Barney to stay and defend the homes; his crews were going to move to the county line road.

Orr was now further south on B100 when he heard, "Shelter," on Tack 7-State Fire Net. Orr talked to air attack and asked if they could drop at the dip site. Air attack advised they could not get in due to the smoke. Orr worked independent trying to get air attack to find resources that could go in and drop, but they could not. Orr's radio broke up and he could not copy traffic because he was too far away.

When Orr was in the area of the draft site earlier in the day, he noticed you could not understand portables in the area of the draft site due to the little drop in elevation (sitting in a bowl), and when smoke was in the area it was much worse. When he was just north of B100 and B140 he could not hear any of his crews when they were on B140 and Mill Creek.

I asked Orr if he had visited the area before and after the incident, he told me he had. Orr told me the safe area away from the creek would not have been very safe in wildland gear; breathing would have been very uncomfortable; and wildland PPE would have been questionable protection. He added that if he had known there was a crew down there sheltering-in-place, he would have made every attempt to get them out.

Orr believed the creek area was survivable without using shelters; the heat was blowing up away from the creek at the draft side down in the bowl. There was "Riparian Vegetation" (not very combustible vegetation) all around the draft site. The survivability was high. He added again that he would have sent a crew in there to rescue the crew; there were no guarantees.

Orr told me this fire moved so much faster than it should have. It moved past his four plans quicker than any fire he has been on. By 1300 hours, it passed plan B, then before he knew it was past plan D. He was asked if a dedicated lookout would have helped. Orr told me there were no real advantage points; the ground was too flat. This was discussed in both AM briefings. Group supervisors felt it was impossible to use lookouts affectively and they would need to look out for each other. He added that anything below that rim would not be able to judge what the main fire was doing, and the dense smoke made radio communications impossible to hear if you were above the rim.

Orr told me that if he was in OSFM's position, he would have ordered crews to attempt a rescue and the risk was worth the benefit. He felt that once the needle bloom burned by (it should have taken no more than one to two minutes), they could have moved down the road with hose lines. He felt his crew bosses would know when to move forward and when to slow down. He felt that having a group supervisor or TFL leading is an added bonus if available. I asked him if they should have gone down when the needle bloom first started to burn. He indicated not; all they had to do was give it a minute and it would have burned enough, especially how fast this fire was moving and burning.

I asked Orr if he had anything else to add. He added that working with the multiple layers of command was extremely difficult. Working with OSFM OSC, DOSC, and Barney made this a lot easier and he felt they developed a cohesive approach and made his job easier. He felt Barney did an outstanding job; controlled himself well; and did a great job directing his crews safely around the structures and home. His tactics worked well and prevented the loss of several homes. The multiple command structure was alien to him, especially working side-by-side with another GS. However, Barney was able to mitigate problems and communicate well with Orr.

I asked him what common terminology they would have used when announcing this type of emergency over the air. He told me they would have announced, "Priority Traffic," that the crew was moving to their safe zone in the creek. Shelter-in-place to them is sheltering in a structure, but understood that was a common structure fire term. However, they still would have attempted to rescue/get to the crews.

We concluded our interview at 2040 hours.

HIGH CASCADE COMPLEX FIRE
BROWNSVILLE E64 - INCIDENT INVESTIGATION

Incident Reports

Brownsville Fire Engine 64 Incident

Engine Boss- Fire Chief Kevin Rogers
Engineer- Lt. Joe Kirk
Firefighter- Alex Parker

On August 29th Linn County Task Force was sent to the Powerline Fire at Warm Springs Oregon.

Engine 64 was sent to the designated draft site on Mill Creek. The whole task force went to the site for familiarization of site for future filling and to look at safety areas.
The rest of the task force then went up to Sidwalter road to triage houses and prepare should the fire reach the area.
E64's crew spent the morning filling tenders and other water trucks with water from the draft site. All through the morning it was discussed that should the fire reach the draft site the river and gravel area would be our safety zone.
Trigger points that if reached would determine the time for Engine 64 to leave but were never determined at the draft site. Engine 64 was counting on the rest of the Linn County Task Force to be the Lookout since the draft site set in a little bit of down grade and the area could not be seen from there. Engine 64's crew consisted of 3 people and they did not feel it was safe to separate 1 person from the crew and isolate them by their self to be a lookout.
Around 1500 hours radio traffic increased significantly and in the distance 2 large smoke headers were observed.
While drafting about this time we began having priming issues so a small portable pump was put into the river to assist with filling. Several attempts were made on the radios (portable and mobile) to reach our Task force leader about our mechanical issues. No contact was reach, not sure whether to much radio traffic or too far of distance to get a reply.
At no time through this incident other than after the fire storm did the draft area get any smoke.
We looked up the road to the north were our only entrance and exit was and saw the road pinch off by fire. We then looked to the east and the fire had spotted approximately 1000 yards ahead of itself. We knew our escape route had been compromised and prepared to use our safety zone.
All lines were removed from the river and the Engine was pulled down next to the river on the gravel. At this time Joe Kirk pulled 3 air packs and found our mask. Attempts were made on State Fire Net to get a helicopter drop in our area. This was not available because of the heavy smoke and they were not sure where we were.
I then announced on radio that we were "sheltering in place". The response was, "are you deploying your fire shelters". I replied "No, were getting in the river, our safety zone."
Engine 64's crew got behind the engine with air packs and lay down in the river behind the engine using it as a heat shield. The fire came from the northwest and the northeast at the same time. Everything was on fire all at once. While lying in the river my helmet blew off my head forward. I grabbed my helmet and we looked behind us and everything behind us was on fire also.

Communications were continued while we were in the river trying for a helicopter drop. Again this was unsuccessful since they did not know our exact location.
When the fire storm had blown through we were contacted on the radio to see if we were alright. Our reply was "we are alright and still in river".
At this time the Div. Sup. and a Canby Fire Engine arrived to lead us out of the draft site area.
No injuries were sustained and no damage to the engine occurred. The only losses were 2 Kenwood portable radios and 2 cell phones that sustained water damage.

Kevin Rogers
Brownsville Rural Fire District

CANBY FIRE DISTRICT # 62

INCIDENT REPORT

NAME: Matt Dale DATE: 8/29/11

CREW: V.Codino, M.Dale, D. Stoner

APPARATUS: E-63 ALARM # 2011-1324

SUBJECT: Narrative for Warm Springs Conflag

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT

The afternoon of Monday August 29th we had backed our apparatus into the first driveway on the North side of the 100 road. This was on the West side of the intersection. The intersection was very crowded with the Marion County Task Force that was defending structures and a trailered dozer, radio traffic was very busy on state net and the area was in moderate smoke conditions with single tree torching and a wind driven grass fire about us. We had just responded to the location from Fire Camp with urgency. We where currently parked in a good safe zone awaiting instructions from BC4 whom had went ahead with BR140 and BR172. Chris Barney, previously unknown to me, approached our apparatus stating firefighters where in trouble and he needed our help indicating the direction of trouble. Barney stated several times that they (the trapped crew) where about 20 yards down the road. Captain Codino exited our apparatus to acquire more information. I heard Codino transmit the request for help to our task force leader, BC4. By radio it was decided that Brush 11 and Engine 63 would make rescue of an engine crew trapped by fire. It was my understanding that the trapped engine crew had no escape route or safety zone and where in imminent danger from fire.

Codino returned to the Engine and directed us to proceed to the East side of the closest intersection and begin a pump and roll operation with the booster line. Brush 11 was to follow doing the same. I was the driver, I shifted the transfer case to low, locked in the front axle, shifted the 100gpm pump into gear and put the transmission into first gear. FF Duane Stoner and Cpt. Codino manned the booster line as we proceeded down the road. At this point we where operating with information that the crew was about 20 yards ahead of us and I had no knowledge of where this road led to or that there was a creek at the bottom. We had not been given a briefing or an up to date IAP for this work period. As we began down the road the conditions began to degrade. Fire and heat increased. The air conditioner couldn't keep up as the cab temperature increased. Smoke also increased and a majority of this time I was unable to see Codino, Stoner or the front of the apparatus anymore due to thick brown smoke. I could see next to me that the booster line was still being pulled forward. For fear of running over Codino or Stoner or letting

an excessive amount of hose deploy off the reel I only bounced my foot on the brake each time I made a forward movement in order to make noise that might be heard to give my location and not to advance on top of them. Doing this braking maneuver while maintaining vehicle RPM's at 1500 with the accelerator, I drained the front and rear air tanks to the point that the low air buzzer began to sound but the brakes where still operational. At this point Chris Barney came forward down the driver side of the engine and tied in with Codino and Stoner whom I could temporarily see. Chris Barney then came back to E63, opened the officer side rear door and sat in the firefighter seat leaving the door open and continued calling for an emergency bucket drop from a heavy helicopter using his portable radio. The Cab filled with heat and smoke while Codino and Stoner rolled up the booster and both then returned to the cab. Now with all doors shut and Barney inside with us; Codino directed me to back up. I asked about BR11 behind us, Codino said they had already backed up, I held my position for several moments until I saw the overhead emergency lights of BR11 quite away behind us and I backed up without a backer as it was now too hot for someone to be outside the refuge of the Engine.

It was now evident that we would not reach the trapped crew within 20 yards or even 100 yards. Now Barney, in the cab with us, directed us to drive into the fire that was across the road in front of us. I asked Codino if we where really going to drive the apparatus into this (a no visibility fire front). I do not remember his answer, only that he didn't answer yes or no. Moments later the fire was not crossing the road and I had enough visibility to proceed. After saying I see the road and want to proceed forward, Codino said to go. We drove forward until there was too much thick brown smoke to see the road or front of the apparatus again. I stopped the apparatus. Barney said we where to stay left at the 'Y' in the road as we had been looking for the 'Y' the entire time. I felt that if I proceeded without seeing the road and stuck the engine; our engine could catch on fire and we would then become screwed. Again, moments later, enough wind came and blew the smoke out enough to see the road directly in front of us and I immediately accelerated coming into what would be the right hand curve prior to seeing the Brownsville Engine nosed into the creek. We never found the 'Y' in the road but did stay to the left side of the road the entire time. I did not see anyone immediately but did notice a structural fire helmet laying brim down in the middle of the creek. It took me a bit to understand, due to smoke, this creek to be too shallow for someone to be underwater while wearing the helmet and determined it to be a currently disregarded fire helmet. Once stopped Barney and Codino exited the engine. I could see the roadway continue and assumed it went further into the well involved drainage. Barney came to my window that I now unrolled and directed me to park nose into a stand of tall unburned bushes. I told him I'd be afraid of burning the engine if that brush caught on fire. He then said I needed to turn around then. I asked Stoner to exit the vehicle and help me make a 3 point turn to face out the way we came. After turning around Stoner deployed the booster line to wet down the stand of tall unburned bushes nearest the Brownsville Engine per instructions from Codino. I stayed in the cab with my foot on the accelerator with the RPM's to 1500 and then I saw Brush 11 as I listened to Codino updating BC4 and BRUSH 11 on the radio. I used simplex channel 1 to ask Codino if I should move the apparatus forward to allow for BR11 to turn around behind us and face out. I did this to prompt the fact that the booster line was deployed and would need to be moved in order to facilitate the turning around of BR11 and let BR11 know they would be able to turn around behind us. After BR11 was facing out, conditions seem to improve slightly and I took my foot off the accelerator and exited the engine. I saw a Brownsville

firefighter wearing an SCBA, no helmet, and he was 'on air'. I asked if we where going to get out of here. Codino or Barney (don't recall which) told the Brownsville firefighter to just take it off (the SCBA), he did and put it back in his apparatus compartment. We then wound up our booster line. The plan was for us to lead, Brownsville to be in the middle and BR11 to follow in the rear in order to get the Brownsville engine back up to the intersection. The smoke and fire conditions on the way out where slightly improved. I did not need to stop as I could see the roadway directly in front of us but could not see too far out in front of me due to smoke. We did not go out fast as I still had the engines transfer case in low and the front axle engaged. However the transmission was now set to go up the range to 5th gear. Back at the intersection, Barney thanked us, exited the engine and we where immediately re-deployed by BC4 to his location. We worked with BIA burn out crews around residences and then held line until morning.

The two attached satellite pictures taken June 28, 2005 show the road that we proceeded down, the intersection we parked at and the overview of the drainage.

SIGNATURE:_____ **DATE:**__**9/4/11**_____

Firefighter Rescue 8/29/11

Captain Brian Burke – Brush 11

On August 29th 2011, the Clackamas Task Force was at base camp. At 1400 Task Force Leader (TFL) Karn received a call to activate to the Powerline Fire area. All crews began to get ready with full PPE. Clackamas Task Force was assigned to the night shift so this was an early activation. Due to this several crews needed to fuel up at the Shell station on Hwy. 26. After fueling up we headed up the hill out of Warm Springs toward the fire. After cresting the hill we could see a large volume of dark smoke, at this time TFL Karn asked all crews to respond with their overhead emergency lights on.

Clackamas Task Force arrived at the intersection of B-100 and B-160 sometime between 1510 and 1515. The intersection is large and is a good safe zone. There was a lot of smoke and fire (on multiple sides of the road) upon our arrival. BC Karn radioed on Simplex 1 for BR71 and BR11 to follow him to scout out our assigned area. At the same time FF Atiyah was parking the training van in the safe zone. I was approached by a person with a wildland PPE with Portland Fire on the back and he told me, in a panicked voice, I needed to get down the road where a crew of firefighters need immediate help and are in trouble. I also heard him say something about ordering a helicopter drop. At this time I notified TFL Karn that we are going to perform a firefighter rescue. I asked him to return if possible because I felt like we were given multiple tasks by two different commanders. I decided the firefighter rescue was the #1 priority. The PFB employee gave me the impression that the other firefighters were going to die without our help. BR140 bumped up and took my original assignment. All of this occurred in a very short time frame.

I went to get my fire shelter on and waited for FF Atiyah to return from parking the van. I noticed one of the trees to south of the safe zone was torching off. After we had full PPE and shelter on we teamed up with E63 from Canby Fire. All communication was handled on Simplex 1. The air remained clear for BR11 and E63. We did not have a detailed map of the area or know how far we were traveling to make the rescue. We began down the road with two booster lines pulled, manned by FF Atiyah and Captain Burke, solely for escape route (the road) protection. It was extremely hot and smoky. There was fire on both sides of the road and above our heads. I radioed to E63 that we are watching their back side. We preceded about 30-50 feet when E63 stopped and said conditions are too bad ahead and they are backing up. BR11 backed about 20 feet and paused (with hose deployed and operating). After about 30 seconds the heat decreased and visibility increased. The conditions were still dangerous only improved from initial attack. BR 11 then started moving forward again, until the outside conditions were too unsafe. At this time I ordered FF Atiyah back inside the cab of BR11. All 3 members of BR11 remained inside the vehicle until we reached the bottom.

E63 advanced beyond my vision. AO Donahue traveled very slow, at times coming to a complete stop due to zero visibility. E63 radioed to BR11 to stay left at the fork in the road. I copied and we moved forward. We had to stop several times to wait for smoke and fire to clear in front of us. I heard E63 radio that "we are in the safe zone and there is plenty of room for us". E63 officer then radioed to me he could see me and to turn right just past the burning bush/tree. BR 11 had passed the fork in the road but did not realize it because of heavy smoke. I re-confirmed the directions because I could not see E63 at this time. After we went around the corner I could see a rocked area with E63 and E64. E64 was nosed down to the creek. BR11 pulled protection lines and began to keep the fire away from some unburned fuel on the edge of the rock area and creek. E63 was assisting the crew of E64 to remove their SCBA's. It is my opinion that E64 was ineffective at this time because at least one firefighter appeared unable to accomplish a simple task such as removing the SCBA regulator and mask. E63 officer got the 64 crew together and they cut all hose and equipment and get back in the engine to leave. BR11 continued

spraying water until all three crews were ready to get back up the road. The trip up the road was smoky but uneventful.

After we were all back in the intersection safe zone, TFL Karn was notified. All crew members and apparatus were checked to safety and injuries. BC Karn gave us directions to his location via Hwy. 26. BR11, E63 and WT110 all left together at this time.

Figure 1 - Conditions upon arrival (road down to trapped FFs outlined) 08/19/11 1512

Summary of FF Atiyah's Account of the incident

I parked the van near the middle of the parking area, in what I considered to be the safest possible area to leave it, before attempting to join the rest of my crew on Brush 11. It was then that someone apparently in command of the area ordered me to "move that van!". When I asked him where he wanted me to move it, he yelled "get it out of here!". My initial impression of this person was of someone who was panicked, unable to control his emotions, and with an impaired ability to make rational decisions. I quickly informed Capt. Burke what I was doing before driving the van about 20-30

yards and parking it to the side of the road so as not to impede other traffic. I ran back to Brush 11 and started putting on the rest of my protective gear.

We had been ordered by the same person in charge of the area to attempt to drive down a narrow dirt road to rescue a crew that was trapped. We were preceded by a Canby apparatus pursuing the same objective. As we were about to start down the road, a wave of fire moved across the road, completely igniting all of the trees and brush on both sides of the road. We had no choice but to retreat a short distance and wait. At this point I had a few cogent thoughts about our situation: the first was why a crew was down a narrow vegetation-choked dirt road with fire headed in their direction, the second being that if that crew was not in a tenable situation, then they would probably not survive the intense fire coming through the area, and the third was that we were about to place ourselves in an extremely dangerous situation with an unknown outcome.

Upon starting down the road behind the Canby apparatus, I was walking just ahead of our brush rig on the driver's side of the road with a booster line, attempting to control the worst of the flaming vegetation and provide some protection for our apparatus. Visibility was very limited, and the driver was using me to guide him down the road. It was hard to see and to breathe (even with a filter mask) and the heat was intense. I advanced as far as possible, before seeing an area of intense fire just ahead of us, which left me no choice but to climb back into the cab for protection. We waited a short time for the worst of the fire ahead to abate, before slowly driving down the remainder of the road. The Canby crew was the first to reach the trapped crew, and radioed back to us that it was OK to proceed.

Warm Springs Complex notes

Doug Koellermeier, IC OSFMO Red Team

On the afternoon of August 29 while assigned to the Warm Springs Complex I had just completed a briefing from OSC Ketchum on Power Line fire. Structural resources were spread out between Power Line fire, West Hills fire, or resting at this point. The fire had just begun to increase in intensity and we met with Warm Springs FMO Trey Leonard regarding ordering more task forces. We made a decision to wake up night crews who were still sleeping to ensure we had adequate resources for the burn period, and I ordered two more task forces through the AOC for support and night operations, and more overhead to support the team needs. I asked Ketchum for a ride to review and tour the Power Line fire. Structural task forces were spread out amongst homes as part of structural protection during an increase in fire activity. More task forces were being moved in to support the increased threat. Task forces were to support burnout operations with coordinated air operations and burn crews. Deputy OSC Labelle also in the area and coordinating with wildland and structural crews.

Our team had deployed on August 27 arriving late afternoon with four task forces, IC, PSC, FSC, OSC, two Div/Sups. I had requested a full short team but was initially denied. Over the next two days four more task forces were ordered two at a time. More command staff were also ordered in two separate orders eventually rounding out a short team. This included ISO, Deputy OSC, one additional Div/Sup, one LSC, one IIO.

I had just completed a briefing with Chief Deputy Walker via cell phone when burn out operations began. Chief Walker had consulted with me regarding mission creep in supporting burnout operations while I assured him that structures were threatened and we had structural resources divided to both protect homes and support burnout. I noted active fire burning along tree line with homes in immediate danger, structure engines parked in driveways. Fire was working its way across tree line and grass fuels toward our position. Active retardant drops in and around homes.

Burnout operations began along the B140 rd when the fire progressed toward us across grass lands to a point to best support the firing operations. Gravel and dirt roads provided anchor points with aerial resources providing support. Structural resources provided protection at and between homes, main body of fire, and firing operations. Due to the increased fire activity and demands on Ketchum, I asked PSC Lighty who was back at base camp, to come and give me a ride back to base camp.

Main body of fire jumped B-140 road behind structural resources. Chief Ketchum advised crews they had fire behind them and directed them back toward homes. Some crews were noted taking pictures or video with cell phones of burnout and air operations and not aware of fire situation behind them. Chief Ketchum addressed immediate need and directed crews to cut fences and begin suppression efforts. Burnout operations ceased and were abandoned. Chief Ketchum and I moved south on B140 to the intersection of Mill Creek/B-100 and B140 intersection. This area provided a very safe and confortable safety zone despite smoke and fire conditions. I was outside of vehicle and noted fire had now crossed the B140 rd from the west to the east and crews were defending structures on the east side of B-100. Fire was now also growing in intensity to the south of this intersection with trees torching next to the

safety zone. The area remained safe and I felt comfortable in the area outside my vehicle and in full PPE. PSC Lightly arrived at the same time as the Clackamas TF. Lighty mentioned to me that he had very smoky conditions on the way in with fire on both sides of road. I noted a dozer on a lowboy came to the intersection from the south at about the same time as the Clackamas TF arrived from the east. PSC Lighty parked next to Clackamas support van and Div/Sup Barney staff vehicle. Lightly and I waited until the Clackamas TF got moved and allowed and the dozer to clear, we then left the area along the B-100/Mill Creek Rd. As I left the area traveling down Mill Creek/B100 rd back toward US 26. I noted the road was covered by smoke and fire had burned both sides of the road, I then heard a radio report advising of a shelter in place. I could not hear the unit number. Chief Ketchum attempted to clear radio traffic and asked the unit to identify themselves and requested condition and needs. Again I heard clarification of shelter in place (not to be confused with shelter deployment). I heard no mayday declared. I then left the area and returned to base camp.

I later spoke with Ketchum via phone and he reported what unit was involved and that they were OK and returning to work in structural defense. He verified there was not a shelter deployment and that they did get into the water. No known injuries or damaged vehicles. He noted one member who was shaken up and was now doing better. He has sat out the involved crew to regain their composure before returning them to active portions of the line without incident. Chief Ketchum, Labelle and I spoke about the matter further that evening and gathered details. We agreed to discuss it with the team the next morning.

The next morning at our C&G meeting, this subject was addressed. We began discussions to determine the facts and of particular note was what this was to be called. Part of the concern was proper use of terminology ie: burnover, IWI, etc. We concluded we would use E-64 incident until we knew anything further. I asked Matthews and Ketchum to review the matter beginning that same day and put together a report to be included into our AAR as needed and so that I could pass on to OSFMO staff and our wildland partners. Additionally I would want to be kept informed as the progress. After our meeting I called Chief Walker on his cell to brief him on the matter and left him a voice message to call me. I spoke later in the day with Marianna and briefed her. I then spoke with ORCA IC Brett Fillis and briefed him and advised I would keep him informed. Later that afternoon I spoke with Jim Walker and updated him. That evening I spoke with Ketchum and Matthew and got briefed on the progress of the fires and investigation of the E-64 incident. Matthews advised they had taken pictures and interviewed the crew from Brownsville and will be producing a report likely the next morning. The next morning after I attended my morning meetings we had a C&G meeting. Updates to all team members including the safety incident were included. I received my first brief on the findings of the investigation. (see preliminary report) pictures still on laptop. I again briefed ORCA IC on our progress and either Chief Walker or Mariana (can't remember which) with my morning call. I later briefed Warm Springs FMO Trey Leonard.

That afternoon I received a final copy of the report. That same afternoon I spoke with Chief Labelle advising that we need to look deeper into this incident as there are numerous rumors starting to spread about the details, and some crews appeared angry. Night crews were sleeping at a fire station for greater comfort. Chief Labelle also was sleeping there and it appears that location was where most of

the discussions were occurring. That same day, I spoke with Clackamas County TF leader Jamie Karns who was requesting contact at a later time to discuss this matter and he gave me his contact number. He questioned Chief Ketchums' decisions on the incident and his background experience. I asked ISO Matthews to look more into this matter and see what is going on. What was reported to me through our Ops folks and ISO Mathews, was numerous rumors surrounding not just the incident, but the method our team was addressing it. Some frustration and anger was evident that not everyone involved was interviewed and that these discussions were not coming from the E-64 crew, rather coming from those crews who were involved in going in to check on the E-64 crew and other TF members including TFL Karns. I directed OSC Ketchum to stay out of the process as some of the concerns were regarding his decisions and capabilities and directed ISO Matthews to include all the individuals necessary to his investigation in order to make his process complete and transparent.

Later the next day (not sure what time) I was informed of rumors regarding issues between OSC Ketchum and Clackamas TFL Karns. What I was told was there were issues between them that impacted the Clackamas task force. Ketchum and I discussed the matter and we decided to go with ISO Matthews and discuss the matter at the fire station. I started a private conversation outside with Ketchum and Karns while ISO Mathews reviewed his investigation with the TF members inside the fire station. I advised Ketchum and Karns that there were rumors spreading about their inability to get along and Karns questioning of the decisions surrounding the E-64 incident. I asked them to resolve the matter and that it was impacting our deployment (paraphrased, not exact words). Once the conversation started I removed myself and allowed them to have the conversation privately. Ketchum and Karns completed their discussion, Ketchum and I toured the E-64 site and returned to base camp.

ISO Mathews met with most all TF's to review the investigation. Some TF's did not get information until demob due to work / rest schedule and other duties we all had (fire still burning and crews were stretched between three of the seven fires on the complex. Only a short team on scene). Through discussions with Marianna, I learned that they were now getting phone calls at OSFMO regarding the matter.

Mariana, Jim and Chief Wallace visited and were provided copies of report and briefed along with all other matters of the incident. All attended an agency administrator meeting, and ate lunch with our C&G. Marianna was given a tour of part of the fire including the E-64 site the previous day with OSC Ketchum.

Upon demobilization of all the TF, most of the C&G were in attendance as per Red Team customary practice. As part of the process in addressing the Clackamas TF, I spoke directly regarding rumors, gossip, and damage that had been done through misinformation, and that some of these messages have gone out statewide and potentially further to a point where we have no concept of who knows what information. None of which was directed through the IMT or our PIO. I also offered anyone not happy with the team decisions or who may have questions to contact me privately directly afterward. No one did. I also advised that I had heard from OSFMO that someone from Clackamas TF had requested for the TF to go home but no one from the IMT had been informed or contacted by the TFL. I did have a number of TF members including the crew from Sandy thank our team and asked not to let behavior of others

reflect on them. I have other TF's offer their appreciation for Clackamas demob advising members of that TF were the root of the discussions in the fire station and that it was frustrating for them to be exposed to.

I did have one conversation with Clackamas TFL Jamie Karns regarding his viewpoints and opinion of OSC Ketchum. Jamie advised he was not responsible for rumors and agrees with my direction to investigate. While it was not what I would call an overly positive conversation it was also not derogatory. Jamie did air his feelings. He seemed to now be pointing at our Div Sup Chris Barney rather than OSC Ketchum as a fault in this incident. He also advised of the credentials of his crews and insinuated lack of training or experience of some of our team members. He further advised at least one crew member had been burned, a headlamp was damaged due to heat, and that Barney was yelling retreat, retreat, retreat at one point. I advised Jamie that our investigation would be inclusive and we needed all the facts. I did ask him at one point if this is how Clackamas responds after an incident such as E-64 incident. Referring to gossip, anger, rumors and finger pointing, rather than speaking candidly and professionally with those involved to determine what went right and what could have been done better. We had more discussion but left with a hand shake and to my understanding that our team would conclude our investigation and allow OSFMO to take over.

IC summary

Our team was very aggressive in their protection of structures on this incident. By most accounts at least 25 homes were saved by direct and indirect methods of attack with active fire in and among the homes. This is one of the more active deployments in terms of structural defense in many years for the state IMT. Through understanding our primary mission, that is what we are mobilized to do in a safe and efficient manner. Traditionally most wildland deployments are short and involve mostly mop up and standby to hold and protect actions done by IA crews. I have full confidence and trust in our team and those task forces we mobilize. I thank all those who selflessly left their home units and families to help the community of Warm Springs. The Red team operations section lead by Chiefs Ketchum and Labelle are aggressive, well trained, experienced, calculated, and safe on our deployments. They understand our incident priorities and do them well. That said, as the IC, I also believe we always will remain open to learn more and identify our areas we need to improve. Through the efforts of all on this incident, I believe we are all welcome back in this community should they have a need, and we built solid relationships with our partner agencies, BIA, Warm Springs Fire, Warm Springs FMO, and ORCA IMT, and the community we were there to protect.

As of this writing, having seen the site, listened to team input and at least knowing some of the rumors, all the information I have received regarding this incident indicates that there were no apparent intentional actions to pose a safety threat or risk personal injury, damage to vehicles, or loss to structures. In my opinion no one was asked to do anything that those giving the orders were not willing to do themselves. The OSC. Deputy OSC, and Div/SUP were on scene and in place and coordinated with our agency partners when this incident occurred. Active fire was involved and numerous personnel were involved in fighting fire including structural, wildland, and air resources.

I can attest that by my direction no minimizing or covering up of facts or details in this incident has occurred and if any does occur it will be with my objection. I also can attest that numerous accusations and misinformation is being said that is not factual or based on partial fact and are likely to some degree misguided. In most cases opportunities to address accusations have not been forthright so the ability for teachable moments has passed on specifics. There also appears to be a difference in terminology used to describe this incident that varies greatly in meaning between individual experience and training viewpoints.

It is disappointing that there are individuals who point fingers and make inaccurate accusations of individuals or a team without the courtesy to address them to the individuals involved, and pass stories through social media or post them anonymously to a website. Individuals were given an opportunity to comment directly with C&G staff while still in Warm Springs and with one known exception (Karns), did not. I support team tactical decisions that were made and the ongoing investigation to determine if there were opportunities for different actions that we all can learn from this incident. I would encourage anyone given the same situation without the benefit of knowing the outcome, to make a better decision and have a better outcome. A better approach to address situations like this is with professional discussions that include alternatives rather than judgment and back room conversation, and is always welcome. I would have welcomed and still do offer, the opportunity for those who are questioning decisions to respectfully speak directly with me so that I can better understand their viewpoint, and they have the opportunity to learn what information was present and why the decisions were made so that they can learn as well.

Respectfully

Doug Koellermeier, IC Red Team, High Cascades Complex

Canby Fire District

AFTER ACTION REPORT

High Cascade Complex

Brownsville Fire Department
Engine 64 Sheltering Incident

Val Codino
Captain / Paramedic
Canby Engine 63 Crew Boss

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Photo 3 (mid point down road looking west).....Page 10

Photo 4 (location where we found Brownsville's engine).....Page 11

Copy of Engine 63's FSP-01.....Page 12

During the time period of August 27, 2011 to August 31, 2011 I was deployed with Clackamas County Task Force 1 (CTF-1) under the command of Task Force Leader BC Jamie Karn, to the conflagration at the High Cascade Complex fires in Warm Springs, OR. I was crew boss on Engine 63 with apparatus operator Matt Dale and firefighter Duane Stoner. The following is my report of the incident on August 29, 2011.

On Monday August 29, 2011 at 08:00 CTF-1 returned to the Warm Springs ICP fire base, after being deployed to the Razorback fire near the junction of HWY 97 and HWY 197 north of Madras, OR.

At approximately 14:15 hours Task Force leader Karn alerted us that we were being immediately requested to the Power Line Fire off of Road B-100. CTF-1 assembled and responded Code 3 from Warm Springs ICP to the area.

At approximately 15:00 hours as we were approaching the intersection of Road B-100 and B-140 I heard "Emergency Traffic" declared on the State Fire Net Radio. CTF-1 Karn arrived at the intersection and informed us via our operating channel, Simplex 1, he and two of our brush rigs were being requested at another location, that the intersection of Roads B-100 and B-140 were our "Safety Zone" and ourselves, Brush 11 and Water Tender 110 were to stage there. I acknowledged on Simplex 1 and began assessing the situation.

As I was assessing the area for a staging location, someone began yelling at us to move because there was a bulldozer on a low boy truck trying to get through. The activity in the intersection was very chaotic. The area around our safety zone was densely covered in ladder fuels and heavy timber with extreme fire conditions present. We staged on the NW corner of the intersection and CTF-1 Brush 11 and support van staged on the south side (see Scene Diagram)

As we were backing in I used my cellular phone and captured a photo of the extreme fire conditions (see Photo 1, the entrance to the road is just to the right of Brush 11). My cellular phone was readily accessible because we were having constant communication problems on Simplex 1. Frequently transmissions were either unreadable or unable to communicate altogether.

Shortly after we were staged I heard Brush 11 calling for CTF-1 BC Karn on Simplex 1 stating they were being requested to perform a firefighter rescue but unable to immediately deploy because their crew was split between the support van and Brush 11. BC Karn did not reply to my knowledge.

Shortly after hearing Brush 11, an individual jumped up on the door step of my engine and said we needed to get in there because firefighters were trapped and needed rescue.

The individual was wearing a nomex shirt with a Portland Fire patch on one sleeve and an Oregon State Fire Marshal's patch on the other. I asked him who he was and he replied that he was a "division sup". I asked which division? And he replied "Delta" I later learned the gentleman's name was Chris Barney.

I called "Priority Traffic" to BC Karn on Simplex 1 and had no reply (again this was not unusual being unable to establish contact). I had not heard BC Karn on the State Fire Net or I would have interrupted the continuous communications due to the critical nature of the situation. Being told it was a "rescue" situation I made the decision to deploy.

I ordered AO Dale to reposition Engine 63 to the south side of the intersection and prepare for a pump and roll operation. As Firefighter Stoner and I were deploying a booster line, Mr. Barney came to me and said we need to "get down there and get those guy's out or they would die'. I asked him how far down the road they were and he replied "20 yards". I confirmed Brush 11 was with us and ready; Brush 11's Crew Boss Captain Burke replied he was and I began the attack.

Fire conditions were like I have never experienced in a wildland or natural cover fire. The fire was burning from our right to left. As we progressed down the road I allowed, as best I could, the fire storm to pass through its significant flame phase. Our conditions were zero to minimal visibility, extreme heat and choking hot smoke. At no time did I press our attack into direct flame contact on us or our apparatus; however I was very concerned about respiratory compromise and superficial skin burns.

As we fought our way down the road, all of a sudden Mr. Barney appeared at our side. He said we "need to get in there and get those guy's out". I pointed to approximately 20 yards in front of us, where the fire extended completely across the road, fully involving two large trees, with flames extending 40 feet into the air and asked him "how?" I again asked him how far the down the road the crew was located and he replied "15 yards". I replied "you said that 20 yards ago". As he was pressing us to attack more aggressively, he then stated "retreat". Due to the extreme heat I felt this was a correct tactic so I had AO Dale back up Engine 63 a short distance and continued to have Firefighter Stoner attack the fire and attempt to reduce some of the heat.

Mr. Barney said get in and let's get going and he got in the right rear passenger seat of my engine. At that moment I felt that was a reasonable tactical decision for our firefighter rescue situation let alone the fact that conditions were not tenable outside our engine. I got in the cab and my AO Dale asked me if I really wanted to try it; I was assessing the situation and don't believe I told him yes or no, I believe I said let's try it.

As we proceeded down the road Mr. Barney was calling for an emergency helicopter water drop. I was unsure where the missing firefighters were located. At no time was I informed they were in a safe zone or by a body of water.

The visibility was near zero and Mr. Barney told us to stay to the right when we reached a "Y" in the road. I never recall reaching a "Y" but AO Dale kept to the left as we proceeded. A short time later we apparently had caught up with the back edge of the fire storm and encountered literally a wall of fire. AO Dale asked me what I wanted to do, I leaned over the dash of Engine 63 and could barely see the road which went to the right. I told AD Dale to go to the right and watched his progress from my vantage point.

As we rounded the corner we broke out into a fairly large area next to a creek. We found the Brownsville engine but I did not see any firefighters. The area was gravel and had near normal visibility although it was still quite hot from the fire. Mr. Barney directed my AO to pull forward next to the only remaining large stand of heavy brush. AO Dale questioned him and repositioned the engine to a more tactically sound position. I had FF Stoner deploy the booster line and attack the fire front moving into the stand of brush. Mr. Barney directed FF Stoner to cool the Brownsville engine; I countermanded to order and had him return to attacking the fire which was our immediate threat.

I became concerned for Brush 11's safety and began scanning for them. I could barely see a periodic flash from their emergency light through the smoke proceeding toward the wall of fire on the hillside we had previously encountered. I radioed Brush 11 and stated "keep going straight, when you reach the wall of fire turn right, trust me, you'll then see us". Brush 11 arrived and immediately deployed hose and began fighting fire.

I then saw Mr. Barney with members of the Brownsville engine. They were doing something with their SCBA. I told them to get their packs off and cut their hoses, that they were either getting in my engine or driving out of following us; either way we were leaving. I could hear the rotors of a heavy helicopter above us and was very concerned about injury from a water drop from either impact with a bucket load of water or branches it could knock loose.

We formed in a line with Engine 63 leading, Brownsville engine in middle and Brush 11 in the rear. We proceeded out the same way we had come in even though I could plainly see that the road continued on. Given that I was in unfamiliar territory with minimal visibility when you went away from the waters edge, I felt is prudent to back track rather than go off in a unknown direction possibility into more danger than I had already lead the crews into.

We proceeded out back to the intersection of Roads B-100 and B-140. We let Mr. Barney out and were instantly redeployed to County Line Road where we regrouped with CTF-1.


BROWNSVILLE ENGINE INCIDENT
SCENE DIAGRAM
RESIDENTIAL STRUCTURE
SIDWALTER CORAL
B-140
B-100
TO US HWY 26
CFD E63 INITIAL STAGE LOCATION
PORTLAND FIRE COMMAND PICK UP
CCFD BRUSH 11 INITIAL STAGE LOCATION
CCFD #1 SUPPORT VAN
BRIDGE
CREEK
BROWNSVILLE ENGINE
0
100
200
300
SCALE IN FEET
DATA SOURCE GOOGLE EARTH
PAGE 6


BROWNSVILLE ENGINE INCIDENT
PHOTO LOG
RESIDENTIAL STRUCTURE
SIDWALTER CORAL
TO US HWY 26
CFD E63 INITIAL STAGE LOCATION
PHOTO 1
PHOTO 2
PORTLAND FIRE COMMAND PICK UP
CCFD BRUSH 11 INITIAL STAGE LOCATION
CCFD #1 SUPPORT VAN
PHOTO 3
PHOTO 4
BRIDGE
CREEK
BROWNSVILLE ENGINE
0
100
200
300
SCALE IN FEET
DATA SOURCE GOOGLE EARTH

PAGE 7

PHOTO 1



PHOTO 2

PHOTO 3

PHOTO 4

RESOURCE INVENTORY ROSTER: FSP-01

FIRE DEFENSE DISTRICT: Clackamas

ST/TF LEADER NAME: Jamie Karl

VEHICLE INFORMATION

LOCAL F. D. AGENCY: Canby Fire Dist.

LOCAL FD VEHICLE ID #: Engine 63

KIND/TYPE OF VEHICLE:

- [X] ENGINE: (TYPE) I II III IV
- [ ] SUPPORT:
- [ ] TENDER: (TYPE) I II III
- [ ] SQUAD:
- [ ] OTHER: _____ (Describe)

ST/TF DEPARTURE POINT: Sandy Fire

ST/TF DESTINATION POINT: Warm Springs, ICP

SIGNATURE: _____ (Strike Team/Task Force Leader)

DATE: _____ **TIME:** _____

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO RESOURCE:

OFFICER IN CHARGE: VAL CODINO

VEHICLE OPERATOR: SCOTT DALE

FIREFIGHTER: DUANE STONE

FIREFIGHTER:

FIREFIGHTER:

FIREFIGHTER: 503 829 1556

REMARKS:

927536	CC 1	DO NOT WRITE IN THIS SPACE
RESOURCE ID #	ST/TF ID # (Assigned by OSFM)	Resource officer retain this copy. (Local Fire Department)

UNIT LOG

MAJOR EVENTS	DATES/TIMES
ALERTED: (Initial mobilization)	1557 8/27/11
RESPONDING: (From departure point)	1720 8/27/11
ARRIVED: (At destination point)	1800 8/27/11
CHECK-IN: (With OSFM representative)	1913 8/27/11
Enroute to Sandy FD	1639 8/27/11
Arrive Sandy FD	2058 8/27/11
Depart staging to fuel pumps	2150 8/27/11
Arrive @ area/not at Tenino Rd detail area	2235 8/27/11
Depart Tenino Rd for new rally LOC	2238 8/27/11
Fuel @ Shellwarm Springs	2302 8/27/11
Depart Fuel to another LOC	0644 8/28/11
V Fire w/ DC4/recalled	0625 8/28/11
return to Fire Camp ICP	0815 8/28/11
depart to RR base ICP	0900 8/28/11
Arrive Sidwalter FD Camp	1600 8/28/11
Safety brief	

NOTE: Continue Unit Log on back as needed.

DEMOBILIZED: (State Fire Marshal representative signature required before leaving)	Date / Time
OSFM Representative	
RETURNING: (To Fire Defense District)	
SECURED IN QUARTERS: (At local FD)	
Resource Officer Signature	Date

AOC 503-075-0001

UNIT LOG	MAJOR EVENTS	DATES/TIMES
move to position / structure trigger		8/28/11 1640
Return to base camp via gas station		8/28/11 1740
back at base camp Wamsegui		8/28 1815
Depart for HW 97	RAPID DEPLOY	8/28 1900
Rest Stop - took #2		8/28 1945
Arrive base HWY 97/197		8/28 1950
Move to new position	South junction	8/28 2204
move to LOC/home protection		8/28 2345
Return to Base Camp WS ICP		8/29/11 0630
Back @ WS Base Camp ICP		8/29/11 800
Depart for Fuel & Briefing		8/29/11 1415
Depart for op area	OUT FOLLOW	8/29/11 1445
Arrive - Immediate deploy - mayday		8/29/11 1450
W/Ell rescue Brownville Eng. Co		
Depart for secondary op area		1700
Arrive mirror Lk Rd op area		1800
Depart to WS Fire Camp		8/30/11 0640
in WS Fire Camp		0700
E63 - turbo hose broke		8/30/11 0730
Fueled in WS Fire Camp		8/30/11 0815
Robert Wolfe Truck & Equip / 541-475-2360 / repair		8/30/11 956

UNIT LOG	MAJOR EVENTS	DATES/TIMES
Leave for Sidwalter FD camp		8/30/11 955
Arrive Sidwalter FD camp		8/30/11 11:00
Leave for WS Camp ICP		8/30/11 1700
in WS Camp ICP		8/30/11 1730
Rapid deploy - Powerline	OUT FOLLOW	8/30/11 18:05
Arrive OP area		8/30/11 1835
Leave to WS Base Camp		8/31/11 06 15
Arrive WS Base Camp ICP		8/31/11 0635
Fuel in WS ICP 17 Gal		8/31/11 955
Depart to Sidwalter Station		8/31/11 1005
Return to WS ICP		8/31/11 1507
Demobilized		8/31/11 2110