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Final Order
Hearings Unit: Final Order

 
BEFORE THE COMMISSIONER
OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES
OF THE STATE OF OREGON
 
In the Matter of
Case Number 24-97
SUSAN PALMER
dba Sea Breeze Delivery Respondent

 
FINDINGS OF FACT
ULTIMATE FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
OPINION
ORDER
 

 
SYNOPSIS
 
Respondent, who was in default for failing to appear at hearing, failed to pay three wage claimants all wages due upon termination, in violation of ORS 652.140(1) and (2). Respondent´s failure to pay the wages was willful, and the Commissioner ordered Respondent to pay civil penalty wages, pursuant to ORS 652.150. ORS 652.140(1) and (2), 652.150, 653.261, and OAR 839-20-030, 839-050-0330.
 

 
The above-entitled contested case came on regularly for hearing before Douglas A. McKean, designated as Administrative Law Judge by Jack Roberts, Commissioner of the Bureau of Labor and Industries for the State of Oregon. The hearing was held on Thursday, December 19, 1996, in Room 1004 of the Portland State Office Building, 800 NE Oregon Street, Portland, Oregon.
 
The Bureau of Labor and Industries (the Agency) was represented by Judith Bracanovich, an employee of the Agency. Yahya "John" Farhat (Claimant Farhat), Mike Huntsinger (Claimant Huntsinger), and Connie Scott (Claimant Scott) were present throughout the hearing. Susan Palmer (Respondent), after being duly notified of the time and place of this hearing, failed to appear in person or through a representative.
 
The Agency called the following witnesses: Claimants Farhat, Huntsinger, and Scott; Lois Banahene and Sanford Groat, compliance specialists with the Wage and Hour Division of the Agency; and David Statchwick, a customer service agent with United Airlines in Portland. Administrative exhibits X-1 to X-16 and Agency exhibits A-1 to A-5 and A-7 to A-15 were offered and received into evidence. The Agency withdrew exhibit A-6. The record closed on December 19, 1996.
 
Having fully considered the entire record in this matter, I, Jack Roberts, Commissioner of the Bureau of Labor and Industries, hereby make the following Findings of Fact (Procedural and on the Merits), Ultimate Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Opinion, and Order.
 
 
    1)On April 16, 1996, Claimant Scott filed a wage claim with the Agency. She alleged that she had been employed by Respondent and that Respondent had failed to pay wages earned and due to her. At the same time that she filed the wage claim, Claimant Scott assigned to the Commissioner of Labor, in trust for Claimant, all wages due from Respondent. (Exhibits A-1, A-2; Testimony of Claimant Scott)
    2)On May 2, 1996, Claimant Farhat filed a wage claim with the Agency. He alleged that he had been employed by Respondent and that Respondent had failed to pay wages earned and due to him. At the same time that he filed the wage claim, Claimant Farhat assigned to the Commissioner of Labor, in trust for Claimant, all wages due from Respondent. (Exhibits A-4, A-5; Testimony of Claimant Farhat)
    3)On June 24, 1996, Claimant Huntsinger filed a wage claim with the Agency. He alleged that he had been employed by Respondent and that Respondent had failed to pay wages earned and due to him. At the same time that he filed the wage claim, Claimant Huntsinger assigned to the Commissioner of Labor, in trust for Claimant, all wages due from Respondent. (Exhibits A-7, A-8; Testimony of Claimant Huntsinger)
    4)On August 30, 1996, the Agency served on Respondent an Order of Determination based upon the wage claims filed by Claimants and the Agency´s investigation. The Order of Determination found that Respondent owed a total of $2,397.14 in wages and $5,040 in civil penalty wages. Respondent filed a timely answer through counsel in which she denied the allegations in the Order of Determination, denied that she was the employer, and alleged the affirmative defense that any non-payment of wages was as a result of the financial inability of the actual employer to pay the wages at the time they accrued. The Administrative Law Judge later allowed the Order of Determination to be amended to allege that the total wages due was $2,399.38. (Exhibits X-2, X-3, X-4, X-6, X-9, X-10, X-11, X-12, X-15, X-16)
    5)On November 13, 1996, the Hearings Unit issued a Notice of Hearing to the Respondent, the Agency, and the Claimants indicating the time and place of the hearing on December 19, 1996. Together with the Notice of Hearing, the forum sent a document entitled "Notice of Contested Case Rights and Procedures" containing the information required by ORS 183.413, and a copy of the forum´s contested case hearings rules, former OAR 839-50-000 to 839-50-420. (Exhibits X-1, X-5)
    6)On November 26, 1996, the Administrative Law Judge issued a discovery order to the participants directing them each to submit a summary of the case, including a list of the witnesses to be called, and the identification and description of any physical evidence to be offered into evidence, together with a copy of any such document or evidence, according to the provisions of former OAR 839-50-210(1). The Administrative Law Judge also granted an Agency motion to compel discovery and ordered Respondent to provide certain documents to the Agency. The Agency submitted a timely summary of the case and later supplemented it. (Exhibits X-7, X-8, X-9, X-10, X-11, X-13, X-14)
    7)On December 13, 1996, Respondent´s attorney, Michael Kennedy, withdrew as attorney of record for Respondent. (Exhibit X-15)
    8)At the time and place set forth in the Notice of Hearing for this matter, Respondent did not appear or contact the Agency or the Hearings Unit. Pursuant to OAR 839-050-0330, the Administrative Law Judge waited 15 minutes before resuming the hearing. At that time, Respondent had still not appeared or contacted the Agency or the Hearings Unit. The Administrative Law Judge then found Respondent in default as to the Order of Determination, and proceeded with the hearing.
 
FINDINGS OF FACT -- THE MERITS
 
    1)Oregon 101 Services, Inc., an Oregon corporation, was incorporated in December 1993. At the same time, the corporation registered the assumed business name (ABN) of "Sea Breeze Delivery." Respondent was the corporation´s secretary and the authorized representative for the ABN registration. On December 24, 1994, the assumed business name became inactive due to an "ABN FAILUR [sic]". On February 16, 1996, the corporation was involuntarily dissolved by the state Corporation Division. (Exhibit A-10; Testimony of Groat)
    2)During all times material herein, that is, during the period January to April 1996 (both before and after February 16, 1996), Sea Breeze Delivery was a business that contracted with airline companies at the Portland International Airport to deliver lost luggage and baggage to its owners in Oregon and southwest Washington. Both before and after February 16, 1996, Respondent operated this same business, using the same assumed business name, at the same location, using substantially the same workforce, providing the same service, and with substantially the same equipment (including office equipment and several vehicles). There was no lapse of time between the operation of the business by Oregon 101 Services, Inc. and the operation of the business by Respondent. (Exhibit A-13; Testimony of Claimants, Statchwick)
    3)During all times material, Respondent held herself out as the owner and operator of the Sea Breeze Delivery business. She hired each Claimant, set their hours and rate of pay, directed their duties, and provided the equipment they needed to perform their duties (such as the office equipment and vehicles). (Testimony of Claimants, Statchwick)
    4)Claimant Scott was employed at Sea Breeze Delivery during the period January 29 to March 7, 1996. Her rate of pay was $7.00 per hour. Her duties included office work, picking up baggage from United Airlines at the Portland International Airport, sorting the baggage, and dispatching drivers. During that period of time, she worked a total of 277 hours, 51 of which were hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a work week. She earned $2,117.51 (226 hours times $7.00 per hour equals $1,582, plus 51 hours times $10.50 (the statutory overtime rate of pay) equals $535.51). Respondent paid Claimant Scott $580. (Exhibits A-1, A-3, A-14; Testimony of Claimant Scott, Banahene, Statchwick; Calculations of the ALJ)
    5)Claimant Scott quit working for Respondent without notice on March 7, 1996. At that time, she was owed wages of $1,537.51 ($2,117.51 minus $580). Respondent told Claimant that she (Respondent) did not have the money to pay Claimant´s wages. Claimant Scott has received no pay from Respondent since March 7, 1996. (Exhibits A-1, A-3; Testimony of Claimant Scott, Banahene)
    6)Claimant Farhat was employed at Sea Breeze Delivery during the period November 1995 to March 1996. His rate of pay was $7.00 per hour. His duties included picking up lost baggage from airlines at the Portland International Airport, sorting it, and delivering it to its owners in Oregon and southwest Washington. He drove a company vehicle. During the period February 8 to 25, 1996, he worked a total of 98.41 hours. He earned $688.87 (98.41 hours times $7.00 per hour equals $688.87). Respondent paid Claimant Farhat $100. (Exhibits A-4, A-9; Testimony of Claimant Farhat, Banahene; Calculations of the ALJ)
    7)Respondent discharged Claimant Farhat. His last day of work was February 25, 1996. At that time, he was owed wages of $588.87 ($688.87 minus $100). Respondent told Claimant that she did not have the money to pay Claimant´s wages. Claimant Farhat has received no pay from Respondent since his discharge. (Exhibits A-4, A-9; Testimony of Claimant Farhat, Banahene)
    8)Claimant Huntsinger was employed at Sea Breeze Delivery during the period March 28 to April 4, 1996. His rate of pay was $7.00 per hour. His duties included picking up lost baggage from airlines, sorting it, and delivering it to its owners in Oregon and southwest Washington. He drove a company vehicle. During that period of time, he worked a total of 39 hours. He earned $273 (39 hours times $7.00 per hour equals $273). Respondent paid Claimant Huntsinger nothing. (Exhibit A-7; Testimony of Claimant Huntsinger, Banahene)
    9)Claimant Huntsinger quit working for Respondent without notice on April 4, 1996. At that time, he was owed wages of $273. Respondent first told Claimant that she did not have the money to pay Claimant´s wages. In June 1996, when Claimant filed his wage claim, Respondent stated that she had sent Claimant´s wages three or four weeks before. Claimant Huntsinger has received no pay from Respondent since April 4, 1996. (Exhibit A-7; Testimony of Claimant Huntsinger, Banahene)
    10)Respondent hired and fired additional employees and continued to operate the delivery business from April to November 1996. United Airlines´ primary contract for delivering lost baggage in the Portland metro area and the north coast was with Sea Breeze Delivery through June 1996. Respondent signed the contract for Sea Breeze Delivery in April 1994. United Airlines continued to use Respondent´s services until November 1996, when the airline company lost contact with Respondent. (Testimony of Statchwick, Groat)
    11)Civil penalty wages for each Claimant, computed in accordance with Agency policy, are as follows: $7.00 (each Claimant´s hourly rate of pay) times eight (eight hours per day) times 30 (the maximum number of days for which civil penalty wages continued to accrue) for a total of $1,680. (Exhibits A-3, A-9; Testimony of Banahene; Official Notice; Calculations of the Administrative Law Judge)
    12)The testimony of each Claimant was found to be credible. They had the facts readily at their command and their statements were supported by other credible testimony and documentary records. There is no reason to determine the testimony of the Claimants to be anything except reliable and credible. The testimony of the other witnesses was credible.


 
    1)During times material herein, Respondent was a person who employed one or more persons in the State of Oregon.
    2)From December 1993 to February 16, 1996, Oregon 101 Services, Inc. did business under the assumed business name of "Sea Breeze Delivery." Respondent was the corporate secretary. On February 16, 1996, the corporation was involuntarily dissolved. Thereafter, Respondent conducted essentially the same business as the corporation had. She used the same name, location, and substantially the same workforce; she offered the same services and used the same equipment as the corporation had used. There was no lapse in time in the operation of the business when the corporation dissolved.
    3)Oregon 101 Services, Inc. employed Claimant Scott from January 29 to February 16, 1996. Thereafter, Respondent employed Claimant until she quit without notice on March 7, 1996. Her rate of pay was $7.00 per hour. Claimant Scott earned $2,117.51 in wages. Respondent paid her a total of $580. Respondent owes Claimant Scott $1,537.51 in earned and unpaid compensation.
    4)Oregon 101 Services, Inc. employed Claimant Farhat from November 1995 to February 16, 1996. Thereafter, Respondent employed Claimant Farhat until she discharged him around February 25, 1996, his last day of work. His rate of pay was $7.00 per hour. Claimant Farhat earned $688.87 in wages during the period February 8 to 25, 1996. Respondent paid him a total of $100. Respondent owes Claimant Farhat $588.87 in earned and unpaid compensation.
    5)Respondent employed Claimant Huntsinger from March 28 to April 4, 1996, when he quit. His rate of pay was $7.00 per hour. Claimant Huntsinger earned $273 in wages during this period. Respondent paid him nothing and owes Claimant Huntsinger $273 in earned and unpaid compensation.
    6)Respondent willfully failed to pay Claimants Scott and Huntsinger all of their earned and unpaid wages within five days, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, after each claimant quit. More than 30 days have elapsed from the date Claimant Scott´s and Huntsinger´s wages became due and payable.
    7)Respondent willfully failed to pay Claimant Farhat all of his earned and unpaid wages no later than the end of the first business day after his discharge. More than 30 days have elapsed from the date Claimant Farhat´s wages became due and payable.
    8)Civil penalty wages for each Claimant, computed pursuant to ORS 652.150 and Agency policy, equal $1,680.


 
    1)Respondent was an employer and Claimants were employees subject to the provisions of ORS 652.110 to 652.200, 652.310 to 652.414, and ORS chapter 653.
    2)The Commissioner of the Bureau of Labor and Industries has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the Respondent herein. ORS 652.310 to 652.414.
    3)Respondent is a "successor" within the meaning of ORS 652.310(1), and therefore is subject to the provisions of ORS 652.110 to 652.200, 652.310 to 652.414, and ORS chapter 653. In the Matter of Anita´s Flower & Boutique, 2 BOLI 187 (1987); In the Matter of Waylon & Willies, Inc., 7 BOLI 68 (1988); In the Matter of Tire Liquidators, 10 BOLI 84 (1991).
    4)ORS 653.261(1) provides:
"The commissioner may issue rules prescribing such minimum conditions of employment, excluding minimum wages, in any occupation as may be necessary for the preservation of the health of employees. Such rules may include, but are not limited to, minimum meal periods and rest periods, and maximum hours of work, but not less than eight hours per day or 40 hours per week; however, after 40 hours of work in one week overtime may be paid, but in no case at a rate higher than one and one-half times the regular rate of pay of such employees when computed without benefit of commissions, overrides, spiffs and similar benefits."
OAR 839-20-030(1) provides in part:
"[A]ll work performed in excess of forty (40) hours per week must be paid for at the rate of not less than one and one-half times the regular rate of pay when computed without benefit of commissions, overrides, spiffs, bonuses, tips or similar benefits pursuant to ORS 653.261(1)."
Respondent was obligated by law to pay Claimant Scott one and one-half times her regular hourly rate for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a week. Respondent failed to so pay Claimant Scott.
    5)ORS 652.140(1) provides:
"Whenever an employer discharges an employee or where such employment is terminated by mutual agreement, all wages earned and unpaid at the time of such discharge or termination shall become due and payable not later than the end of the first business day after the discharge or termination."
Respondent violated ORS 652.140(1) by failing to pay Claimant Farhat all earned and unpaid wages not later than the end of the first business day after Claimant´s discharge.
    6)ORS 652.140(2) provides:
"When an employee who does not have a contract for a definite period quits employment, all wages earned and unpaid at the time of quitting become due and payable immediately if the employee has given to the employer not less than 48 hours´ notice, excluding Saturdays, Sundays and holidays, of intention to quit employment. If notice is not given to the employer, the wages shall be due and payable within five days, excluding Saturdays, Sundays and holidays, after the employee has quit, or at the next regularly scheduled payday after the employee has quit, whichever event first occurs."
Respondent violated ORS 652.140(2) by failing to pay Claimants Scott and Huntsinger all wages earned and unpaid within five days, excluding Saturdays, Sundays and holidays, after Claimants quit employment without notice.
    7)ORS 652.150 provides:
"If an employer willfully fails to pay any wages or compensation of any employee whose employment ceases, as provided in ORS 652.140 and 652.145, then, as a penalty for such nonpayment, the wages or compensation of such employee shall continue from the due date thereof at the same hourly rate for eight hours per day until paid or until action therefor is commenced; provided, that in no case shall such wages or compensation continue for more than 30 days from the due date; and provided further, the employer may avoid liability for the penalty by showing financial inability to pay the wages or compensation at the time they accrued."
Respondent is liable for a civil penalty under ORS 652.150 for willfully failing to pay all wages to each Claimant when due as provided in ORS 652.140.
    8)Under the facts and circumstances of this record, and according to the law applicable to this matter, the Commissioner of the Bureau of Labor and Industries has the authority to order Respondent to pay Claimants their earned, unpaid, due, and payable wages and the civil penalty wages, plus interest on both sums until paid. ORS 652.332.


 
Default
Respondent failed to appear at the hearing and thus defaulted to the charges set forth in the amended Order of Determination. In a default situation, pursuant to ORS 183.415(5) and (6), the task of the forum is to determine if a prima facie case supporting the Agency´s amended Order of Determination has been made on the record. See In the Matter of John Cowdrey, 5 BOLI 291, 298 (1986); In the Matter of Art Farbee, 5 BOLI 268, 276 (1986); In the Matter of Judith Wilson, 5 BOLI 219, 226 (1986); see also OAR 839-050-0330(2).
 
Where a respondent submits an answer to a charging document, the forum may admit the answer into evidence during a hearing and may consider the answer´s contents when making findings of fact. Where a respondent fails to appear at hearing, the forum may review the answer to determine whether the respondent has set forth any evidence or defense to the charges. In the Matter of Jack Mongeon, 6 BOLI 194 (1987); In the Matter of Richard Niquette, 5 BOLI 53 (1986). In a default situation where a respondent´s total contribution to the record is a request for a hearing and an answer that contains nothing other than unsworn and unsubstantiated assertions, those assertions are overcome wherever they are controverted by other credible evidence on the record. Mongeon, supra.
 
The Agency has established a prima facie case. A preponderance of the credible evidence on the whole record showed that Respondent employed Claimants during the wage claim period and willfully failed to pay them all wages, earned and payable, when due. That evidence was credible, persuasive, and the best evidence available, given Respondent´s failure to appear at the hearing. Having considered all the evidence on the record, the prima facie case has not been contradicted or overcome.
 
The record establishes that Respondent has violated ORS 652.140 as alleged and that she owes Claimants civil penalty wages pursuant to ORS 652.150.
Respondent Was An Employer
 
Respondent alleged in her answer that she was not the employer. The issue is whether Respondent was a successor employer to Oregon 101 Services, Inc. ORS 652.310(1) defines, in pertinent part, "Employer" as "any person who * * * engages personal services of one or more employees and includes any producer-promoter, and any successor to the business of any employer, or any lessee or purchaser of any employer´s business property for the continuance of the same business, so far as such employer has not paid employees in full." Thus, an employer includes:
A) any producer-promoter; and
B)1) any successor to the business of any employer, so far as such employer has not paid employees in full; or
2) any lessee or purchaser of any employer´s business property for the continuance of the same business, so far as such employer has not paid employees in full.
 
As the language of the statute shows, a "successor" employer may be "any successor to the business of any employer," or "any lessee or purchaser of any employer´s business property for the continuation of the same business." That language clearly recognizes two kinds of "successor" employers. In the Matter of Anita´s Flowers & Boutique, 6 BOLI 258, 267-68 (1987).
 
To decide whether an employer is a "successor," the test is whether it conducts essentially the same business as the predecessor did. The elements to look for include: the name or identity of the business; its location; the lapse of time between the previous operation and the new operation; the same or substantially the same work force employed; the same product is manufactured or the same service is offered; and, the same machinery, equipment, or methods of production are used. Not every element needs to be present to find an employer to be a successor; the facts must be considered together to reach a decision. Anita´s Flowers, 6 BOLI 267-68; and see N.L.R.B. v. Jefferies Lithograph Co., 752 F2d 459 (9th Cir 1985).
 
In brief, the evidence in this case revealed the following facts, which were undisputed. Following the involuntarily dissolution of the corporation, Respondent conducted the same business as the corporation had. She used the same name (Sea Breeze Delivery), location, equipment, and substantially the same workforce as the corporation had used. She offered the same services as the corporation had offered. There was no lapse in time between the corporation´s operation of the business and when Respondent operated it.
I conclude from these facts that Respondent conducted essentially the same business that her predecessor, Oregon 101 Services, Inc., had conducted. Applying the facts found to the test described above, I conclude that as a matter of law Respondent was a "successor" within the meaning of ORS 652.310(1).
 
Respondent employed all three Claimants after February 16, 1996, and so is liable for their wages earned after that time. Only Claimants Scott and Farhat earned wages before the corporation was dissolved. As the successor to the corporation, Respondent is also liable for these wages earned before February 16, 1996. She was the employer of all three Claimants on the dates when their employment terminated, and thus she is liable for the violations of ORS 652.140 and for civil penalty wages pursuant to ORS 652.150, which is discussed below.
 
Penalty Wages
Awarding penalty wages turns on the issue of willfulness. Willfulness does not imply or require blame, malice, wrong, perversion or moral delinquency, but only requires that that which is done or omitted is intentionally done with knowledge of what is being done and that the actor or omittor be a free agent. Sabin v. Willamette Western Corp., 276 Or 1083, 557 P2d 1344 (1976). The evidence established that Respondent knew she was not paying Claimants´ wages and that she either claimed she did not have the money to pay the wages or claimed she had later sent the money. The evidence demonstrates that Respondent acted voluntarily and was a free agent. Under the circumstances, I conclude that Respondent acted willfully under the Sabin requirements and thus is liable for penalty wages under ORS 652.150.
 
Financial Inability
Respondent alleged in her answer that "the actual employer" was financially unable to pay Claimants. This forum has repeatedly held that it is a respondent´s burden to show the respondent´s financial inability to pay a claimant´s wages. See ORS 652.150, 183.450(2), and OAR 839-050-0260(3). See also In the Matter of Jorrion Belinsky, 5 BOLI 1, 9-10 (1985); In the Matter of Mega Marketing, 9 BOLI 133, 138 (1990). Respondent failed to show that she was financially unable to pay Claimants´ wages at the time they accrued and cannot escape penalty wage liability.


 
NOW, THEREFORE, as authorized by ORS 652.332, the Commissioner of the Bureau of Labor and Industries hereby orders SUSAN PALMER to deliver to the Fiscal Services Office of the Bureau of Labor and Industries, 800 NE Oregon Street, Portland, Oregon 97232-2162, the following:
1) A certified check payable to the Bureau of Labor and Industries IN TRUST FOR YAHYA FARHAT in the amount of TWO THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED SIXTY EIGHT DOLLARS AND EIGHTY SEVEN CENTS ($2,268.87), less appropriate lawful deductions, representing $588.87 in gross earned, unpaid, due, and payable wages and $1,680 in penalty wages; plus
a) Interest at the rate of nine percent per year on the sum of $588.87 from April 1, 1996, until paid, plus
b) Interest at the rate of nine percent interest per year on the sum of $1,680 from May 1, 1996, until paid.
2) A certified check payable to the Bureau of Labor and Industries IN TRUST FOR MIKE HUNTSINGER in the amount of ONE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED AND FIFTY THREE DOLLARS ($1,953), less appropriate lawful deductions, representing $273 in gross earned, unpaid, due, and payable wages and $1,680 in penalty wages; plus
a) Interest at the rate of nine percent per year on the sum of $273 from May 1, 1996, until paid, plus
b) Interest at the rate of nine percent interest per year on the sum of $1,680 from June 1, 1996, until paid.
3) A certified check payable to the Bureau of Labor and Industries IN TRUST FOR CONNIE SCOTT in the amount of THREE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED SEVENTEEN DOLLARS AND FIFTY ONE CENTS ($3,217.51), less appropriate lawful deductions, representing $1,537.51 in gross earned, unpaid, due, and payable wages and $1,680 in penalty wages; plus
a) Interest at the rate of nine percent per year on the sum of $1,537.51 from April 1, 1996, until paid, plus
b) Interest at the rate of nine percent interest per year on the sum of $1,680 from May 1, 1996, until paid.
 
DATED this ____ day of January, 1997.
 
JACK ROBERTS, Commissioner
Bureau of Labor and Industries
JUDICIAL NOTICE
 
Pursuant to ORS chapter 183, you are entitled to judicial review of this Final Order. To obtain judicial review, you must file a Petition for Judicial Review with the Court of Appeals in Salem, Oregon, within sixty (60) days of the issuance of this Final Order. If you file a Petition for Judicial Review, you must also serve a copy of the Petition on the BUREAU OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIESand THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE -- APPELLATE DIVISIONat the following addresses:
 
BUREAU OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES
HEARINGS UNIT
1005 STATE OFFICE BUILDING
800 NE OREGON STREET # 32
PORTLAND, OREGON 97232-2162

 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
APPELLATE DIVISION
400 JUSTICE BUILDING
SALEM, OREGON 97310