

# IMPACTS OF ARRA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURES IN OREGON

Prepared for the State of Oregon  
Department of Community Colleges  
and Workforce Development

FINAL REPORT

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**ECONorthwest**

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The federal American Reinvestment and Recovery Act (ARRA) of 2009 increased government spending in several areas, including state and local workforce development. Oregon's Department of Community Colleges and Workforce Development (CCWD) engaged ECONorthwest to evaluate the short- and long-term impacts of stimulus spending on workforce development in Oregon to understand which aspects of the funded programming were effective and what their ultimate effects were on Oregon's people and economy.

The federal government intended that states would spend ARRA funds quickly to maximize the impact on local economies and to meet growing workforce training needs. The flexibility that CCWD gave programs in implementing ARRA programs, and the challenges of the prevailing economic climate, created a unique situation where local programs could experiment with new approaches to serving clients. Our study provides a detailed look at both the operation of ARRA-funded programs and the likely impacts of the spending on the Oregon economy, program participants, and program operations.

### **Total ARRA Funding Analyzed**

*Workforce Investment Act (WIA) Programs:* In early 2009, the U.S. Department of Labor allocated \$46.8 million in ARRA funds to WIA programs in Oregon. Almost half of that amount (\$21.3 million) went to WIA Adult/Dislocated Worker (DW) programs, while \$14.3 million went to WIA Youth programs and \$14.8 million funded National Emergency Grants (NEGs).

*Oregon Youth Employment Initiative (OYEI):* By December 2011, Oregon Youth Conservation Corps (OYCC) will have received more than \$9.6 million in ARRA funding for OYEI, to be distributed among Oregon's 36 counties.

This report describes ARRA expenditures through June 30, 2010.

### **Key Findings**

ARRA spending on workforce development and training in Oregon affected programs at the state, county, and local levels.<sup>1</sup> Programs used ARRA dollars to serve a larger number of clients, expand existing programs, and design and create new programs or program elements to respond to local needs. For each WIA program category and for OYEI we analyzed sets of quantitative and qualitative data: expenditure data, participant counts and characteristics, resource adequacy, and results from interviews with representatives from each area.

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<sup>1</sup> ARRA funds flowed to workforce development and training programs across Oregon through three channels: (1) additional formula WIA funding distributed by the U.S. Department of Labor to CCWD and then allocated by CCWD to LWIBs; (2) NEGs generally targeted to laid-off employees of companies; and (3) money distributed by the U.S. Department of Agriculture/Forestry Department to OYCC/CCWD and then distributed by OYCC to county-level providers as part of OYEI.

## **ARRA Program Spending and Participation**

### **WIA Programs**

**Expenditures:** In general, workforce development regions spent ARRA funds relatively quickly, consistent with the legislation's intent, especially considering the constraints inherent in expanding programs in a short period of time. WIA Adult/Dislocated Worker and Youth programs spent about 90 percent of their allocation by June 30, 2010. The fastest spending occurred in WIA Youth programs, which spent 96 percent of their ARRA funding by June 30, 2010, followed by Adult/DW programs, which spent 86 percent by that date. ARRA allocations for NEGs amounted to about \$14.8 million, with individual awards distributed throughout the year. About \$5.2 million in ARRA NEG funds were spent by June 30, 2010.

**Participation:** Participation increased significantly in all WIA programs from 2007 to 2009, though most of that increase was due to Oregon's Integrated Service Delivery initiative. The demographic characteristics of participants changed slightly over time. The share of minorities participating in WIA programs was five to ten percentage points higher than the statewide minority shares for all programs in all three years we examined, likely reflecting the fact that minorities and are disproportionately affected by unfavorable conditions in the broader economy.

**Per capita spending:** WIA programs across Oregon spent an average of \$15 in ARRA funds in 2009 for each adult living below 200 percent of the federal poverty level (FPL), and \$72 for each youth living below 200 percent of FPL.<sup>2</sup> Also, WIA programs across Oregon served 21 percent of the target adult population in 2009 and 4 percent of the target youth population.

Staff interviews provided detail about how each region served their rapidly increasing caseloads with ARRA funds. We found many similarities across workforce regions. Staff from across the state emphasized the importance of the flexibility they had in designing programs. Every region discussed the challenges of quickly spending ARRA funds, particularly for the Summer Youth programs. ARRA funding allowed regions to deliver programs and services in innovative, locally specific ways, although some interviewees expressed a desire for more consistent oversight from CCWD.

### **OYEI Program**

**Expenditures:** The total allocation of ARRA funding for OYEI will ultimately amount to about \$9.6 million, distributed between April 2009 and December 2011. During the program's first two quarters, between April 1 and September 30, 2009, OYEI expenditures amounted to approximately \$2.0 million. About three-quarters of this spending went toward crew member and crew leader wages, with the remaining amount going toward transportation, tools and materials, and other costs. From October 1, 2009 through December 31, 2010, another \$6.2 million in expenditures brought the total to more than \$8.2 million. OYCC plans to spend the remaining \$1.4 million throughout 2011.

**Participation:** There were 847 OYEI participants in Oregon in the spring and summer of 2009. About 74 percent of OYEI participants were men and 20 percent were minorities. This is a larger share of men and a slightly smaller share of minorities than participated in WIA Youth programs.

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<sup>2</sup> Although not necessarily exclusive or exhaustive of program-eligible individuals, we use the number of individuals living below 200 percent of FPL as a useful and readily available proxy for these programs' target populations.

Despite the challenges of distributing ARRA funds quickly, the initiative succeeded in using the funding to significantly expand the program in a short period of time.

**Spending per participant:** The average cost per participant for OYEI programs in 2009 was approximately \$2,350.

OYCC used ARRA funds to expand existing programs and develop new partnerships. OYEI's focus on natural resources employment (e.g., forest fuel reduction, invasive species removal, and natural habitat restoration) is aligned with the governor's green jobs focus area. One significant challenge for the OYEI team has been managing the different requirements of federal and state agencies in terms of tracking, reporting, and accounting.

### ***Statewide Initiatives***

CCWD also allocated ARRA funds to two ongoing statewide initiatives: the National Career Readiness Certificate (NCRC) program and the Integrated Service Delivery initiative. Some regions have not implemented the NCRC program, in part because businesses are hiring fewer workers during the recession, but more than one interviewee indicated that ARRA money enabled a stronger rollout of the program and the creation of more pilot sites than would otherwise have been possible. Interviewee responses about the relationship between ARRA funds and statewide integration efforts were more mixed; it was less clear whether ARRA spending significantly affected integration efforts, a process already underway when Congress authorized ARRA.

### ***Short-term Economic Impacts of ARRA Expenditures***

We estimated the economic impacts of workforce development-related ARRA spending that occurred in Oregon in the year ending June 30, 2010. Such spending generates "ripples" of economic impacts across the economy. We used the IMPLAN (IMpact analysis for PLANning) input-output modeling software to estimate the total economic impacts generated by the initial and subsequent spending cycles.

### ***WIA Programs***

CCWD and LWIAs spent approximately \$35.0 million of ARRA funding on WIA programs and CCWD statewide activities (represented by the orange bar in Figure ES.1) in the one-year period ending June 30, 2010. ***As this money flowed through the economy, it generated a total of \$48.8 million in total economic output in Oregon in the year ending June 30, 2010.***<sup>3</sup>


The total economic impact includes approximately \$27.0 million in personal income (wages, salaries, and proprietor's income), most of which went to local residents who, in turn, likely spent much of the increased income in the local economy. Across the state, \$45.2 million of the total Oregon impacts (93 percent) stayed within the region where the initial spending occurred.

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<sup>3</sup> These estimates for the economic impacts of ARRA spending apply more or less equally to spending on the same program activities regardless of funding source (e.g., non-ARRA WIA expenditures would have the same dollar-for-dollar impact as ARRA WIA). Thus, the results of this study speak to the broader benefits of the programs analyzed, not just to the impacts of ARRA funds.

The initial WIA ARRA spending also generated approximately 438 full- and part-time jobs in Oregon in the year ending June 30, 2010.<sup>4</sup>

**Figure ES.1: Summary of statewide economic impacts of ARRA WIA expenditures**




Source: IMPLAN and ECONorthwest analysis of CCWD data

### OYEI Program

In the spring and summer of 2009, OYCC spent approximately \$2.0 million of ARRA money to fund Summer Youth employment programs in most Oregon counties (represented by the orange bar in Figure ES.2). *As this money flowed through the economy, it generated approximately \$3.0 million in total economic output in Oregon throughout the following year.* The total economic impact includes approximately \$1.9 million in personal income (wages, salaries, and proprietor’s income), most of which went to participants from disadvantaged backgrounds who likely have a greater propensity to spend locally and quickly than employees funded by ARRA WIA dollars. Of the \$2.9 million in total impacts, nearly all (97 percent) stayed within the region where the initial spending occurred. The initial ARRA OYEI spending generated 16 full- and part-time jobs throughout the economy in the first year.

<sup>4</sup> These are jobs that occurred throughout the economy in support of the production generated by the additional spending, but they do not include short-term summer employment for the participants because those jobs were too short-lived to have a measurable impact on employment. However, the 3,859 summer WIA jobs and 847 OYEI summer jobs did provide household income to participants, and the impacts of that spending are measured in the model.

**Figure ES.2: Summary of statewide economic impacts of ARRA OYEI expenditures**



Source: IMPLAN and ECONorthwest analysis of CCWD data

### **Other Impacts of Job Training**

In addition to short-term economic impacts, we estimated potential benefits for participants who received ARRA services. *Based on a recent net impact analysis of Washington’s workforce development program, we estimate that total net benefits attributable to the training itself of Oregon’s ARRA workforce expenditures at between \$117 million and \$176 million through June 30, 2010.* Even the lower end of this range would represent a substantial return on this investment of federal funds. A more focused study, as conducted in Washington, could provide more precise estimates tuned specifically to conditions in Oregon.

Another measure of short-term impacts of ARRA-funded youth programs is the extent to which the programs help youth remain engaged or re-engage with educational institutions.<sup>5</sup> Our high-level analysis of academic engagement for program participants implies that, *after controlling for observable characteristics, WIA Summer Youth participants were more likely to enroll in high school or college than otherwise similar non-participants if they were enrolled in 12th grade or not enrolled prior to participation, with particularly strong and positive effects on 12th graders in Region 2 and Region 8* (note that these results do not *prove* that the programs caused the identified difference in enrollment).

### **Recommendations and Conclusion**

Beyond the immediate economic impacts of program spending, ARRA-funded programs provided benefits to participants that will continue to accrue over many years. Unfortunately, we could not separately identify changes in caseload composition due to economic conditions, program characteristics, service integration, and differences in data entry procedures. Nonetheless, certain trends bear continued monitoring:

- The state and individual workforce regions could routinely monitor service penetration estimates similar to those presented in the report to better quantify resource equity and adequacy (or lack thereof).

<sup>5</sup> While important to individuals’ career prospects, educational engagement was not necessarily a primary program goal for all initiatives.

- With more complete fiscal data, a deeper understanding of these measures could help regions develop related benchmark performance metrics for assessing the equitable distribution of resources across regions and for assessing resource adequacy relative to need.
- The apparent correlation between WIA participation and education enrollment warrants continued monitoring of youth participant outcomes to identify program characteristics that appear to promote connection to education among participants.
- As Oregon's workforce development system progresses toward more integrated data systems, all stakeholders would benefit from a strong emphasis on consistent fiscal and program data entry that meets mandatory reporting needs and that allows CCWD the ability to understand how the portfolio of workforce development programs operate across the state.

We view this report as a first look at program implementation using ARRA funds. As of publication, many programs continue to spend their remaining ARRA funds, and the effects of ARRA funding on program operations and on participants will continue to unfold for many years. Of particular interest are the longer-term impacts on participants. Additional time and data could provide a robust analysis of the extent to which ARRA participation affected educational attainment and employment. Even if ARRA funds are not replaced and existing programs must scale back operations, as seems increasingly likely given the dire fiscal conditions of state and local governments, the Oregon ARRA workforce experience provided valuable information about Oregon's workforce development system from which the state can and should continue to learn.

# Chapter 1 – BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW

The federal American Reinvestment and Recovery Act of 2009 (ARRA) was a major policy intervention that will be discussed and debated for decades to come. It is imperative that, while the experience is still fresh, stakeholders in Oregon’s workforce development system evaluate the impacts of stimulus spending on Oregon to understand which aspects of the funded programming were effective and what their ultimate impacts were on Oregon’s people and economy. As noted in the Training and Employment Guidance Letter,

*“The One-Stop system’s success in implementing the Recovery Act will be gauged in part by the progress it achieves in using annual appropriations along with Recovery Act funds to help unemployed, underemployed, and dislocated workers find new, good jobs and to access and remain in the middle class; to help low-skill or low-income workers acquire 21<sup>st</sup> century skills, find family-supporting jobs in healthy industries and access the middle class; and to help enhance the education pathways for disadvantaged and disconnected youth to improve their labor market prospects and long term career success.”<sup>6</sup>*

With a slow economic recovery underway in Oregon and across the nation, and with ARRA-funded projects winding down, Oregon’s Department of Community Colleges and Workforce Development (CCWD) engaged ECONorthwest to help answer what the agency saw as the key evaluation questions:

- *To what extent did ARRA funds affect Oregon’s economy in the immediate term?*
- *How did ARRA-funded workforce programs improve the state’s workforce development system?*
- *What are the prospects for continuing successful programs and best practices into the future?*

As we describe in this report, ARRA dollars disbursed by CCWD have had important short-term impacts and will also have long-term impacts on individuals and Oregon’s economy. In the immediate term, ARRA stimulus delivered direct wages to program participants and workforce trainers alike. Participants and trainers, in turn, spent those wages to purchase goods and services in the economy. This spending fostered additional economic activity as the original funds circulated and generated a larger impact on the economy than did the original infusion of ARRA funds. CCWD’s ARRA spending affected every geographic area of the state and nearly every economic sector.

The longer-term impacts of the stimulus money will unfold for several years. Workforce training, delivered well, can build the skills of participants, boost their prospects for employment, and improve earnings.<sup>7</sup> Although these longer-term impacts are more challenging to pin down with precision, they are a critical aspect of the ARRA story. As important as discussing *what* happened

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<sup>6</sup> TEGL 14-08, p. 4. <http://wdr.doleta.gov/directives/attach/TEGL/TEGL14-08.pdf>

<sup>7</sup> Hollenbeck, K.M., & Huang, W. (2006, September). “Net Impact and Benefit-Cost Estimates of the Workforce Development System in Washington State.” Upjohn Technical Report No. TR06-020.

with ARRA is *how* it happened. Timing was critical in the stimulus package and, in one dimension, the federal effort will be judged by the pace at which dollars hit the economy. Where did local actors meet timing goals, where did they miss, and why?

CCWD welcomed the ARRA funding to assist Oregonians most affected by the recession, and sought to expeditiously provide funds to local areas to address community needs. However, this process was complicated by some confusion on federal guidance as well as short timelines for required actions. CCWD's responsiveness to local areas was also affected by the increased workload caused by state furlough days and not having extra staff to help administer the additional funding (almost double the regular WIA funding, not counting national emergency grants [NEGs]). Additionally, required WIA reports increased from approximately 50 to 375 per quarter. Reporting was further complicated by the State of Oregon's decision to create a new reporting system for tracking the results of all ARRA funds, which also affected the local areas.

A primary goal of this evaluation was to identify ARRA-funded successes while documenting unsuccessful efforts and any apparent obstacles to success in achieving federal, state, and local goals. In addition to measuring the rate of spending and the number of participants directly affected by ARRA funds in each of Oregon's workforce regions, we have analyzed the broader quantitative and qualitative economic impacts of ARRA funding. This approach provides a comprehensive evaluation that will help stakeholders make the strongest case for continuing successful programs and practices.

The following questions guided our evaluation:

- *Were ARRA funds invested appropriately and used efficiently?* ARRA legislation emphasized the importance of spending ARRA funds quickly and effectively to meet workforce employment and training needs. We examined regional spending rates to identify the success of regions at using resources provided by ARRA.
- *What impact have ARRA funds had on program participants and on other aspects of Oregon's workforce development system?* For each program, we investigated participant demographics, the extent and intensity of participation, the benefits of CCWD's flexible approach to the use of ARRA funds, and the extent to which programs varied with geographic region.
- *What short-term impacts have ARRA funds had on the broader economy, in terms of employment, income, and spending?* An infusion of federal dollars from outside the region generates additional economic activity as the funds circulate through the local economy. We conducted an economic impact analysis to quantify these important effects of ARRA funds.
- *What long-term impacts could Oregon expect from ARRA funding?* This question addresses how well ARRA-funded programs succeeded in achieving their stated goals and how Oregon can leverage these successes to strengthen its workforce in the future.

For the evaluation we collected fiscal and participant data from CCWD and local workforce development partners, interviewed program staff and key agency contacts about ARRA-funded programs, and reviewed research related to ARRA-type funding impacts. This report includes

both qualitative and quantitative results from this research. The remainder of this chapter provides an overview of research relevant to understanding the impacts of ARRA spending and outlines the programs that received ARRA funding through CCWD.

## **Research Context**

Many reports and papers have examined the effects of government spending on job training, both in general and specific to ARRA. This section describes some of this research and illustrates the need for evaluations of ARRA funds spending at the state level.

### **Government spending on job training**

For decades, economists have studied the effects of changes in government fiscal policy (i.e., tax rates and government spending) in response to economic downturns. Some studies conclude that temporary government spending in categories such as job training increases long-term productivity and reduces unemployment, but other studies find that such government spending crowds out private investments that may be more effective in the long run. To a certain extent, economic models can demonstrate the potential effects of government spending on job training. For example, the model in one recent paper shows that government stimulus spending initially results in increased output and jobs but is eventually associated with a downturn in growth and employment.<sup>8</sup> The author points out that the benefits of immediate gains may outweigh the costs of any eventual downturn.

### **ARRA research at the national level**

Job training and workforce development is the primary focus of this study but is also a relatively small part of the stimulus plan (about \$4.8 billion, or less than 1 percent of the total \$787 billion).<sup>9</sup> ARRA consisted primarily of increased government spending on income supports, infrastructure development, aid to state and local governments, health care, and education. ARRA also included tax cuts for individuals and businesses. Thus, national-level reports on ARRA include evaluations of job training but also many other categories.

ARRA included specific evaluation and reporting requirements.<sup>10</sup> Agencies that received ARRA funds were required to submit quarterly reports that included an estimate of the number of jobs created and retained because of ARRA dollars, with reporting guidance provided by the Office of Management and Budget.<sup>11</sup> Further, ARRA required the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to comment on the job estimates reported by

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<sup>8</sup> Uhlig, H. (2009, May 15). "Some Fiscal Calculus." Prepared for the conference on "Monetary-Fiscal Policy Interactions, Expectations, and Dynamics in the Current Economic Crisis" at Princeton University, May 22-23, 2009. Available at

[http://economics.uchicago.edu/money\\_banking\\_papers/Uhlig\\_SomeFiscalCalculus\\_AEA\\_v03.pdf](http://economics.uchicago.edu/money_banking_papers/Uhlig_SomeFiscalCalculus_AEA_v03.pdf)

<sup>9</sup> Bradley, D.H., & Lordeman, A. (2009, February 19). "Funding for Workforce Development in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009." Congressional Research Service, R40182. Available at [http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40182\\_20090219.pdf](http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40182_20090219.pdf)

<sup>10</sup> Levine, L. (2009, October 2). "Job Loss and Infrastructure Job Creation Spending During the Recession." Congressional Research Service. Available at [http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40080\\_20100121.pdf](http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40080_20100121.pdf)

<sup>11</sup> Office of Management and Budget. (2009, June 22). "Implementing Guidance for the Reports on Use of Funds Pursuant to the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009." M-09-21, Washington, D.C. Available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/memoranda\\_fy2009/m09-21.pdf](http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/memoranda_fy2009/m09-21.pdf)

funding recipients within 45 days after they have been received by federal agencies. The CBO has published quarterly reports that measure ARRA's nationwide impact using two methods: (a) recipients' reports and (b) economic models and historical data.<sup>12</sup> The GAO reports bimonthly on "the uses of and accountability for Recovery Act funds" in 16 selected states and certain localities in those states, which together receive two thirds of ARRA funds.<sup>13</sup>

The White House Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) was also required by ARRA to release quarterly evaluations of the effects of nationwide ARRA spending. In the most recent report, the CEA estimated that, as of the second quarter of 2010, ARRA raised the level of GDP, relative to what it would have been, by between 2.7 and 3.2 percent.<sup>14</sup> During the same time period, ARRA is estimated to have increased employment by between 2.5 and 3.6 million jobs. These results are consistent with the data in the CBO's quarterly reports.

Other ARRA-related reports include three that were published in 2009. A CBO letter to the Senate Committee on Finance described potential short- and long-term effects of ARRA and year-by-year estimates of its net effects on output and employment;<sup>15</sup> a paper by an economist reviewed issues with the size, timing, and roll-out of the stimulus;<sup>16</sup> and a Congressional Research Service report provided a brief overview of the workforce development programs that received ARRA funding and estimated the dollar amounts granted to each state.<sup>17</sup>

### **ARRA research at the state level**

Because of ARRA's federal reporting requirements, states are gathering and tracking data about ARRA dollars spent and jobs created or retained. The Council of State Governments has a site dedicated to tracking ARRA-related activities in each state,<sup>18</sup> and state governments are maintaining individual sites that report their use of stimulus dollars.<sup>19</sup> However, states can benefit from deeper analyses than are federally required, such as this state-level study that examines how stimulus spending affects the local workforce development system. Such research can help governments and workforce development organizations better understand and learn from the changes that programs undergo as a result of federal funding.

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<sup>12</sup> Congressional Budget Office (2010, July). "Estimated Impact of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act on Employment and Economic Output from April 2010 Through June 2010." Available at <http://cbo.gov/ftpdocs/117xx/doc11706/08-24-ARRA.pdf>

<sup>13</sup> See "GAO Releases Its Most Recent Report on the Recovery Act" at <http://www.gao.gov/recovery/>

<sup>14</sup> Council of Economic Advisers. (2010, July 14). "The Economic Impact of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009." Fourth Quarterly Report. Available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/files/documents/cea\\_4th\\_arra\\_report.pdf](http://www.whitehouse.gov/files/documents/cea_4th_arra_report.pdf)

<sup>15</sup> Congressional Budget Office (2009, March 2). "Estimated Macroeconomic Impacts of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009." Available at [http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/100xx/doc10008/03-02-Macro\\_Effects\\_of\\_ARRA.pdf](http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/100xx/doc10008/03-02-Macro_Effects_of_ARRA.pdf)

<sup>16</sup> Zandi, M. (2009, January 21). "The Economic Impact of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act." Available at [http://www.economy.com/mark-zandi/documents/Economic\\_Stimulus\\_House\\_Plan\\_012109.pdf](http://www.economy.com/mark-zandi/documents/Economic_Stimulus_House_Plan_012109.pdf)

<sup>17</sup> Bradley, D.H., & Lordeman, A. (2009, February 19). "Funding for Workforce Development in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009." Congressional Research Service, R40182. Available at [http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40182\\_20090219.pdf](http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40182_20090219.pdf)

<sup>18</sup> See <http://statercovery.org/state-responses.html>

<sup>19</sup> See list of state-level ARRA websites in Klarman, K.W., & Jennings, J. (2009, September 2009). "Authoritative Resources on the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA)." Congressional Research Service, R40244. Available at [http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40244\\_20090910.pdf](http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40244_20090910.pdf)

## Program Overview

CCWD distributed ARRA funds through Workforce Investment Act (WIA) programs and the Oregon Youth Conservation Corps (OYCC). This section highlights the major characteristics of these programs.

### WIA

WIA was enacted in 1998 to update federal and state workforce development systems. In the new regime, Local Workforce Investment Boards (LWIBs) administer workforce funds allocated to each Local Workforce Investment Area (LWIA). There are seven LWIAs in Oregon:

Region	Local Workforce Investment Area/Board	Counties
2	Worksystems, Inc. (WSI)	Multnomah, Washington
3	Job Growers Incorporated (JGI)	Yamhill, Polk, Marion
4	Community Services Consortium (CSC)	Benton, Lincoln, Linn
5	Lane Workforce Partnership (LWP)	Lane
8	The Job Council/Rogue Valley (TJC)	Jackson, Josephine
15	Workforce Investment Council of Clackamas County (WICCO)	Clackamas
1, 6, 7, 9-14 (also referred to as Region 24)	The Oregon Consortium/Oregon Workforce Alliance (TOC/OWA)	Clatsop, Columbia, Tillamook, Coos, Curry, Douglas, Hood River, Wasco, Sherman, Gilliam, Wheeler, Jefferson, Deschutes, Crook, Klamath, Lake, Morrow, Umatilla, Baker, Union, Wallowa, Grant, Harney, Malheur

Members of the local business community chair each LWIB, thus giving the private sector an active role in workforce development. States are responsible for WIA program management and operations including certification of training providers, participant enrollment, and service delivery. State WIA fiscal agents may reserve up to 15 percent of WIA funds for eligible statewide activities. WIA dollars comprise three distinct funding streams: Title IB Dislocated Worker (DW) funds, Title IB Adult funds, and Title IB Youth funds. In addition, up to 25 percent of WIA DW funds may be used for Rapid Response activities. This report also reviews ARRA-funded NEGs, which are issued by the Secretary of Labor to temporarily expand the service capacity of WIA Dislocated Worker programs.

The WIA Adult/DW programs focus on delivering skilled workers to employers. Key program goals include increasing employment and retention among all workers and improving earnings prospects for dislocated workers—workers who have been laid off or have been notified that they will be laid off. All adults, 18 years and older, are eligible for *core services*, which include job search assistance as well as labor market information. Low-income individuals receive priority for more expensive intensive and training services. *Intensive services* include individual counseling, assessments, and career planning. *Training services* provide occupation-specific training for local job opportunities. Training recipients have individual training accounts and select an appropriate program from a qualified training provider. Under certain circumstances, WIA funds supportive services for transportation, childcare, or housing. In addition to unemployed adults, employed adults can receive services that help them obtain or retain

employment that enables self-sufficiency. States and LWIAs are responsible for establishing self-sufficiency thresholds.

WIA Youth programs serve low-income youth, 14-21 years old, who face barriers to education and employment. WIA Youth programs include summer employment opportunities and paid and unpaid year-round work experiences. Summer Youth programs had essentially disappeared in the years leading up to ARRA. ARRA explicitly encouraged states and LWIAs to use funds to create and expand summer employment and work experience opportunities for eligible youth. Youth up to age 24 were eligible to receive youth services funded by ARRA.

NEGs temporarily expand the service capacity of WIA Dislocated Worker programs by providing additional targeted funding in response to large, unexpected job loss episodes or closures generally based on company layoffs within a region or regions. These funds can “assist dislocated workers, and the communities in which they live and work, recover economically from the effects of plant closures and mass layoffs.”<sup>20</sup> Each NEG has its own beginning and ending dates, which are determined by timelines given in the awards. Using NEGs, states and LWIBs can quickly enroll laid-off workers in training programs to increase their occupational skills. Both ARRA and regular WIA can fund different types of NEGs: *regular NEGs* (covering layoff events affecting at least 50 workers), *dual-enrollment NEGs* (providing WIA services to recipients of Trade Adjustment Assistance [TAA]), and *health coverage tax credit NEGs* (providing health coverage assistance for TAA recipients). ARRA funds could also support *regional economic impact NEGs* (responding to the needs of an entire region affected by economic changes) and *formula funds replenishment NEGs* (replenishing formula Dislocated Worker funds). ARRA funds could not be used for traditional disaster NEGs or base realignment and closure (BRAC) NEGs.<sup>21</sup> The state fiscal agent can hold back a maximum of 1.5 percent of the funds for NEG administration.

This report assesses the extent to which ARRA-funded programs in these areas ultimately supported program goals, particularly the governor’s four focus areas (health care, manufacturing, green jobs, and high-wage and high-demand jobs), largely through interview responses made by LWIA staff. At the beginning of our research, CCWD indicated that an important component of how they administered ARRA funding was allowing LWIAs the flexibility to allocate funds consistent with local priorities and strategic goals. In theory, programmatic flexibility creates programs better tailored to local conditions and can foster beneficial experimentation, but the state also needs comprehensive, consistent measures of program impacts. Of interest here is the extent to which local goals reinforce or conflict with each other and ARRA’s guiding principles.

### **Oregon Youth Conservation Corps**

The Oregon Legislature created the Oregon Youth Conservation Corps (OYCC) in 1987 to increase educational and employment opportunities for youth by providing work experiences and encouraging commitment to personal responsibility. The purpose of the jobs provided is to protect and conserve Oregon’s natural, historical, and cultural resources. OYCC administers ARRA funds through the Oregon Youth Employment Initiative (OYEI), creating employment

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<sup>20</sup> “Eligible Events for National Emergency Grant Funding,” <http://www.doleta.gov/neg/dislocation.cfm>

<sup>21</sup> For more information about eligible events for national emergency grant funding, see <http://www.doleta.gov/neg/dislocation.cfm>

opportunities for youth as well as the adults who work with them. The U.S. Forest Service (USFS) and U.S. Department of Agriculture have granted the State of Oregon, through OYCC/CCWD, more than \$9.6 million in OYEI funds. The project runs from April 2009 through December 2011. More than \$8.2 million in OYEI funds have been expended as of December 2010. Funding has been received in every Oregon county for specific projects selected by the OYEI Advisory and Oversight Committee. Under the initiative, governmental and non-governmental organizations propose specific natural resource or conservation education projects to OYCC, which selects and sponsors individual programs in each county across the state.

### ***Total ARRA Funding Amounts***

In early 2009, the U.S. Department of Labor allocated \$46.8 million to WIA programs in Oregon. Almost half of that amount (\$21.3 million) went to WIA programs for adults and dislocated workers, while \$14.3 million went to WIA programs for youth and \$11.1 million funded NEGs. (Additional ARRA-funded NEGs obtained through June 2010 increased the total of ARRA-funded NEGs to \$14.8 million.)


Also, by December 2011, OYCC will have received a total of more than \$9.6 million in ARRA funding for OYEI, to be distributed among Oregon's 36 counties. Chapter 2 details the ARRA expenditures of each region and program through June 30, 2010.

### ***Snapshot of Participation***

Below, we present Oregon WIA participant data from January 2007 through July 2010 to provide additional context about the preexisting WIA programs and the addition of ARRA funds. Figure 1.1, which shows adult and youth WIA participants per month, illustrates the gradual increase in monthly participation from early 2007 to September 2008. Monthly adult participation counts (the green line) increased sharply from October 2008 to April 2010, stayed close to 25,000 from March 2009 to April 2010, and dropped to about 21,000 by August 2010. The number of adult WIA participants peaked in December 2009 at 27,587.

The primary cause for the dramatic rise in adult participation in late 2008 was the statewide Integrated Service Delivery initiative, which created a common customer registration process for customers seeking WIA-funded services. This effectively created a common customer pool comprised of customers who received services from multiple funding sources (Title IB Adult and Dislocated Worker, Title III Wagner-Peyser, etc.) and were co-enrolled much earlier than under the previous service delivery model. Although most of the common WIA participants probably did not receive ARRA-funded WIA services, there is not a reliable way to separate participants who would have been reported only as WIA Title IB Adult or Dislocated Workers participants under the previous service delivery model from the expanded pool of common participants. However, with Oregon's high and increasing unemployment rate and increasing number of people entering WorkSource Oregon centers, the majority of post-integration participants received short-term services as opposed to longer, occupation-specific training.

**Figure 1.1: Adult and youth WIA participants by month in Oregon, January 2007 - July 2010 (youth < 21 years, adult > 21 years)**



Source: ECONorthwest analysis of CCWD data

Monthly WIA Youth participation counts (the blue line in Figure 1.1) also increased from 2007-2010, most significantly because of ARRA funding in 2009, which allowed LWIAs across Oregon to expand existing WIA Youth programs and create new youth programs where none existed. There were about 1,000 participants in January 2007 and almost 7,400 in July 2009. In October 2009, after the Summer Youth programs ended, monthly participation levels dropped to about 4,000 youth and stayed at that level until decreasing to about 3,400 in July 2010.

We also received participation data for OYCC/OYEI programs. During spring and summer 2009, there were 847 youth served by the initiative across Oregon: 250 in the spring and 597 in the summer. By December 2010, more than 3,200 youth and supporting adults had participated in the OYEI program.

### **Outline of this Report**

In Chapter 2 we present the fiscal and participation data for WIA and OYEI programs that received ARRA funding. WIA programs are organized into three categories: Adult/DW, NEG, and Youth (summer and year-round). For each WIA program category and OYEI we analyze sets of quantitative and qualitative data: expenditure and spending data, participation counts, participant characteristics, resource adequacy, and results from interviews with representatives from each area. At the end of Chapter 2 we discuss two statewide initiatives that are related to ARRA stimulus funding: National Career Readiness Certificates (NCRCs) and Integrated Service Delivery (or Service Integration). This information paints a quantitative and qualitative picture of the workforce development programs that received ARRA funds, the innovations each region implemented with the funds, and the client populations served by each program and

region. Due to limitations in the data, we were unable to thoroughly analyze differences in funding or caseloads between ARRA and non-ARRA components of the analyzed programs.

Chapter 3 describes our estimates of the impacts of ARRA stimulus spending on workforce development and training in Oregon. First, we present the short-term economic impacts of ARRA that we calculated using IMPLAN econometric modeling software. Second, we estimate the net private and public benefits of increased spending on job training, using a recent study of workforce development programs in Washington State. Third, we analyze an OYEI/WIA participant data set linked to student-level data from the Oregon Department of Education (ODE) and the National Student Clearinghouse (NSC) to determine the educational outcomes associated with ARRA-funded youth programs.

This report also includes two sections with one-page data summaries for each region identified earlier. The section following Chapter 2 presents regional participation data, and the section following Chapter 3 summarizes the short-term economic impacts for programs in each region. In Chapter 4, we provide our conclusions about the effectiveness and impacts of ARRA spending on workforce development in Oregon.



## Chapter 2 – PROGRAM DETAIL

ARRA funds flowed to workforce development and training programs across Oregon through three channels: (1) additional formula WIA funding distributed by the U.S. Department of Labor to CCWD and then allocated by CCWD to LWIBs, (2) NEGs generally targeted to laid-off employees of companies, and (3) money distributed by the U.S. Department of Agriculture/Forestry Department to OYCC/CCWD and then distributed by OYCC to county-level providers as part of OYEI. The state also retained a small portion of ARRA funds for statewide activities and administrative costs. This chapter contains our analysis of the fiscal and participation data for WIA, NEG, and OYEI programs that received ARRA funding through these channels. The last section of the chapter describes two statewide initiatives related to ARRA stimulus funding: NCRCs and Service Integration.

Specific program indicators vary slightly depending on the program, but each section of this chapter includes some or all of the following quantitative and qualitative topics:

- **Expenditure data**
  - ARRA allocations, expenditures, and spending rates by program, quarter, and workforce region
- **Participation data**
  - Number of participants and demographic characteristics by highest level of service received (core, intensive, or training), program, year, and region<sup>22</sup>
  - ARRA spending per capita (e.g., Summer Youth expenditures per low-income youth) and “service penetration” per capita
- **Interview results**
  - Project implementation approaches, challenges faced and overcome, and ideas about the future of ARRA-funded projects
  - Regional success stories

### **ARRA WIA Program Detail**

#### **Overall Expenditures and Spending Rates**

In passing the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, Congress intended the funds to be spent quickly to achieve the greatest possible impact on the ailing economy. Indeed, our analysis shows that most LWIAs spent their ARRA WIA Adult/Dislocated Worker and Youth formula allocations quickly, with little remaining by June 30, 2010. (National Emergency Grants are discussed later in this section). Table 2.1 shows ARRA allocations, expenditures, and remaining

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<sup>22</sup> Appendix A contains a description of the participant data, including definitions and assumptions.

balances as of June 30, 2010, for WIA Adult/Dislocated Worker and Youth programs for each LWIA.

**Table 2.1: Total allocations, expenditures, and remaining balances of ARRA funds by LWIA and program through June 30, 2010**

LWIA	Program	Total ARRA Allocation	Total Expenditures as of 6/30/10*	Remaining Balance as of 6/30/10	Percent remaining as of 6/30/10
2 WSI	Adult/DW	\$5,327,553	\$4,602,311	\$725,242	14%
	Youth	\$3,764,804	\$3,459,083	\$305,721	8%
3 JGI	Adult/DW	\$2,499,129	\$2,346,979	\$152,150	6%
	Youth	\$1,974,457	\$1,935,457	\$39,000	2%
4 CSC	Adult/DW	\$1,259,501	\$1,199,565	\$59,936	5%
	Youth	\$1,191,907	\$1,162,550	\$29,357	2%
5 LWP	Adult/DW	\$2,461,837	\$1,676,730	\$785,107	32%
	Youth	\$1,522,109	\$1,522,109	\$0	0%
8 TJC	Adult/DW	\$1,770,277	\$1,629,756	\$140,521	8%
	Youth	\$1,272,835	\$1,238,500	\$34,335	3%
15 WICCO	Adult/DW	\$1,787,373	\$1,368,094	\$419,279	23%
	Youth	\$888,393	\$785,873	\$102,520	12%
TOC/OWA	Adult/DW	\$6,221,544	\$5,571,201	\$650,343	10%
	Youth	\$3,686,930	\$3,640,674	\$46,256	1%
Oregon	Adult/DW	\$21,327,214	\$18,394,635	\$2,932,579	14%
	Youth	\$14,301,435	\$13,744,246	\$557,189	4%
Grand Total		\$35,628,649	\$32,138,881	\$3,489,768	10%

Source: ECONorthwest analysis of CCWD data

Note: Excludes NEG funds

\*Includes all spending since ARRA allocations were distributed in early 2009. The IMPLAN analysis in this report includes one fiscal year of spending between July 1, 2009 and June 30, 2010.

Table 2.2 shows the declining balances of ARRA allocations over the five quarters between the initial allocations in early 2009 and the quarter ending June 30, 2010. Based on CCWD's quarterly spending reports, WIA Adult/Dislocated Worker and Youth programs in Oregon received a total ARRA allocation of \$35.6 million in early 2009. LWIAs spent most of that amount between July 1, 2009 through June 30, 2010. The April-June 2009 quarter was the first in which ARRA funding was available. In Table 2.2, the percent remaining at the end of April-June 2009 reflects the spending that occurred during that quarter. For example, WSI had 85 percent of its youth funds remaining by the end of the April-June 2009 quarter, which means they spent 15 percent of their allocation during that quarter.

The Oregon section at the bottom of Table 2.2 shows that, as a whole, LWIAs spent almost half of the total allocation for Adult/DW and Youth programs combined by the end of September 2009, with 53 percent remaining. By the end of December 2009, LWIAs had 35 percent of the total amount remaining. However, ARRA spending rates varied significantly across regions and programs. LWIAs spent their Adult/DW funding at a relatively consistent rate over time,


whereas they spent the bulk of their Youth funds by the end of September 2009 (see the comparison in Figure 2.1). According to CCWD, the federal government strongly encouraged states to focus their Youth dollars on summer employment programs during the summer of 2009.

**Table 2.2: Percent of initial ARRA allocations remaining by quarter, LWIA, and program through June 30, 2010**

LWIA	Program	Percent Remaining at End of Quarter				
		Apr-June 2009	July-Sep 2009	Oct-Dec 2009	Jan-Mar 2010	Apr-June 2010
2 WSI	Adult/DW	100%	78%	60%	40%	14%
	Youth	85%	17%	13%	9%	8%
3 JGI	Adult/DW	100%	68%	26%	15%	6%
	Youth	100%	38%	10%	3%	2%
4 CSC	Adult/DW	87%	69%	47%	12%	5%
	Youth	92%	37%	26%	12%	2%
5 LWP	Adult/DW	97%	74%	62%	49%	32%
	Youth	90%	28%	20%	15%	0%
8 TJC	Adult/DW	100%	75%	52%	32%	8%
	Youth	90%	37%	25%	14%	3%
15 WICCO	Adult/DW	100%	83%	51%	35%	23%
	Youth	95%	44%	26%	19%	12%
TOC/ OWA	Adult/DW	90%	67%	43%	26%	10%
	Youth	73%	10%	5%	1%	1%
Oregon	Adult/DW	96%	73%	49%	31%	14%
	Youth	86%	24%	14%	8%	4%
	Grand Total	92%	53%	35%	22%	10%

Source: ECONorthwest analysis of CCWD data

**Figure 2.1: Balance of ARRA WIA Adult/DW and Youth funds by LWIA and quarter**



Source: ECONorthwest analysis of CCWD data

TOC/OWA spent its Youth funds more quickly than other LWIAs, with 10 percent remaining by the end of September 2009, whereas JGI, CSC, TJC and WICCO had between 37 and 44 percent remaining. However, the JGI Youth spending rate increased over the next several months; only 10 percent of their ARRA Youth funds remained by the end of 2009. Overall, WIA Youth programs had 24 percent of ARRA funds remaining by the end of September 2009 and 4 percent remaining by the end of June 2010.

Spending occurred more slowly among WIA Adult/DW programs, in part because LWIBs were focused on spending ARRA Youth dollars on summer 2009 programs.<sup>23</sup> TOC/OWA, JGI, and CSC Adult/DW programs spent their ARRA allocations most quickly relative to the other LWIAs, with each having about two thirds remaining by the end of September 2009. JGI's Adult/DW programs had just 26 percent of ARRA funding remaining by the end of the year, whereas CSC Adult/DW programs had spent all but 12 percent of their allocation by the end of March 2010. Conversely, LWP and WICCO had slower-than-average spending rates, with 32 percent and 23 percent of ARRA funds unspent by the end of June 2010, respectively. Taken together, Adult/DW programs across Oregon spent half of their ARRA funds by the end of 2009 and 86 percent by June 30, 2010.

### ***Qualitative Results Related to All WIA Programs***

In May and June 2010, we interviewed staff from CCWD and each LWIB in Oregon. These discussions provided the information used in our qualitative analysis for each program. The following questions and answers provide an introduction to ARRA-funded WIA programs; the answers describe the alignment of ARRA-funded programs, how the economic downturn has affected WIA programs, and the relationship between LWIAs and CCWD from the perspective of the interviewees.

#### ***Did your ARRA-funded programs align with the governor's focus areas (health care, manufacturing, green jobs, and high-wage and high-demand jobs)?***

All interviewees reported that their LWIB's ARRA-funded projects were aligned with the governor's focus areas. However, alignment was not necessarily driven by the governor's directive—most staff members reported that they allocated ARRA dollars by considering local workforce needs and general federal and state occupational guidelines. Not surprisingly, many of the resulting programs were focused on health care, manufacturing, green jobs, and high-wage and high-demand jobs, which WSI staff called “guided coincidence.”

- JGI “always tries to invest in high-wage, high-demand jobs by staying current on labor market research” and recently received health care and green jobs grants as part of the ARRA competitive grants process. They are also participating in the State Energy Sector Partnership green training initiative. They have four manufacturing consortia: metals, secondary woods, food processing, and high performance (focusing on lean-green manufacturing).

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<sup>23</sup> Some Rapid Response funds for dislocated workers were allocated after September 2009 but did not affect spending rates materially.

- WICCO workers reported that they prioritized Dislocated Worker dollars based on the findings from an Oregon Employment Department (OED) report. CSC programs highlighted green jobs and health care. The LWP has “always” focused on manufacturing and high-demand occupations, has given special attention to health care since 2001, and is watching the evolution of green jobs to determine where the demand will be. A TJC worker commented that, in practice, they “look at any available job as a good job, and help people transition into those jobs.”

***What has been the general impact of the economic downturn on your programs?***

- **Capacity challenges.** Not surprisingly, all interviewees said that the economic downturn caused a steep increase in client volume. ARRA funds have helped; one TJC worker said, “Capacity issues are not presently a large problem because of the flexibility of ARRA money, but capacity issues are going to arise down the road.” JGI workers said that the recession has revealed some physical capacity issues, which caused everyone to realign their resources. They have done lean training in centers and used value stream mapping to build a process map to see where problems exist.
- **Fewer jobs.** Another major impact of the downturn has been fewer available jobs for clients. WICCO staff members said that local employers have been hesitant to be work experience sites, sometimes because of the appearance of hiring young interns when regular staff had been laid off or were in fear of being laid off. TOC/OWA has shifted its focus from the supply side (i.e., training) to the demand side to understand how to help create economic opportunity in communities.
- **Increased enrollment at community colleges.** A few LWIB staff members noted the effect of the downturn on community colleges. One CSC worker noted that the local community college is “stuffed to the gills, with waiting lists to get in.” In the TJC region, many WIA clients returned to school and received grants to support themselves, but interviewees said that many of these individuals would rather be working than going to school.

***How would you describe the relationship between your LWIA and CCWD? How would you rate the support you've received from CCWD in helping you manage ARRA funding? How responsive have they been to your needs?***

Most interviewees reported that the relationship between LWIAs and CCWD was good in some ways but challenging in others. Many people expressed appreciation for the flexibility that CCWD provides them in terms of program and spending decisions. Several said that CCWD staff members and liaisons are usually very helpful, responsive, and hard working, and most commented on the apparent constraints that CCWD staff members work under (e.g., staff shortages, lack of resources, high turnover, and working within a large, centralized agency). One person commented on the good quality of the CCWD IT group’s online reports, and another said that, overall, CCWD does a “good job with the resources they have to work with.”

The range of opinions included one person giving the relationship “a strong ‘B’” and another pointing out that there is “room for improvement on both sides” [LWIA and CCWD]. There

were also comments about differences across organizational levels, for example: “Executive-level relationships are excellent, management-level relationships are good, and staff-to-staff relationships are strained.” Some interviewees discussed the quality of liaisons at the regional level (staff from one region felt that they’d never had an effective liaison), and a few people suggested that CCWD could be a stronger advocate for LWIAs at the state level.

One specific area of concern that was raised by LWIB interviewees was basic communication and support from CCWD. Several individuals said that some CCWD staff members do not consistently respond to phone calls or emails and suggested that staff update their voicemail greetings and automated email responses when they are out of the office. One person would have appreciated receiving more up-front information about ARRA as opposed to responses when problems arose, but recognized the challenges of managing ARRA funds so quickly. Respondents in another region didn’t feel that they received any support regarding ARRA funding: “We had no guidance and there was very minimal contact with the fiscal side.” They said that they called OED directly when they had problems and questions. But other interviewees said that communication between CCWD and LWIAs was good and that they received good support. One region indicated that they had weekly calls with CCWD.

Another challenge that was mentioned several times was the disjointed nature of the data tracking and reporting processes across regions. One interviewee described how the Department of Labor reporting requirements changed over time: as the stimulus program progressed, reporting requirements became more specific and comprehensive; it was difficult to keep up with the changing requirements. Another person expressed the general feeling that the data systems were inadequate to track ARRA-related spending/program data:

“Data requests were a big problem. Nobody knew exactly what anybody was going to be collecting. It is a system-wide problem. This may be an inherent problem with trying to get so much money out the door, but there needs to be more planning and integration with existing reporting, clearer timelines, and reasonable due dates.”

Regarding data processes in general, several interviewees said that they recognized the benefits of service integration, but many expressed frustration with the way the project was managed and were disappointed that they had to give up familiar and valuable data management tools. One said that the data “information system has not been responsive to the needs of LWIBs,” and another said staff members spend more time reviewing data because of inconsistencies between the two different systems. Other interviewees criticized the logic behind the performance measures, the stringency of the confidentiality rules, the lack of availability of fiscal reports, and the perceived loss of local control as a result of service integration.


While CCWD does not control all of these issues (e.g., U.S. Department of Labor reporting requirements), and opinions vary across the regions, these comments suggest that the state could benefit from continued efforts by CCWD to streamline data systems, reporting requirements, and communications with local program staff. These efforts, and CCWD’s central role, become especially important in times of dramatic change such as the recent recession. At the same time, LWIA staff expressed appreciation for the flexibility CCWD has historically provided, and that suggested that their flexibility served the state well for ARRA implementation.

## Results Related to WIA Adult and Dislocated Worker Programs

### Analysis of WIA Adult/DW participation data

Figure 2.2 shows monthly participation counts for WIA Adult/DW programs by participants' highest level of service received.<sup>24</sup> Similar to Figure 1.1, the figure indicates a sharp increase in participation in late 2008 because of statewide service integration. Core service participant counts (the blue line) increased the most because most participants in the new data set received core services as their highest level of service. Participants with intensive services as the highest level of service (the green line) also increased significantly, to nearly 10,000 participants per month in early 2009. Participation levels among adults and dislocated workers with training services as their highest level of service (the yellow line) were less affected by data integration: the increase in participation among this population occurred later (peaking at 3,738 in September 2009) and was likely a result of ARRA funding. Note that adult/DW participant information is self-reported upon program registration; some information is requested but not required.

**Figure 2.2: WIA Adult/DW program participants in Oregon by month and highest level of service received (core, intensive, or training)**




Source: ECONorthwest analysis of CCWD data

To estimate the resource availability for WIA Adult/DW programs in 2009, we calculated ARRA resources per capita and service penetration per capita for the target population in each workforce region (see Figure 2.3). We defined the target population as the number of individuals 18 to 64 years old living below 200 percent of the federal poverty level (FPL), which amounted to about 735,000 people across Oregon in 2009. Adult/DW WIA participants are not required to

<sup>24</sup> There are three levels of WIA services for Adult/DW participants: Core, Intensive, and Training (core services are the lowest intensity and training services are the highest). Core services include job search assistance as well as labor market information. Intensive services include individual counseling, assessments, and career planning. Training services provide occupation-specific training for local job opportunities.

have incomes below 200 percent of the FPL, but it is a reasonable benchmark and a common upper eligibility limit for social service programs. Our goal was not to produce a precise measure of the population eligible for services. Rather, it was to produce a consistent, reasonable metric for approximating resource availability with which we could compare regions.

**Figure 2.3: Unemployment rates, percentage of target adult population served, and ARRA spending per capita in Oregon, by region, 2009**



Notes: Due to data limitations, participants are assigned to the first region in which they received services. The target population is measured as the number of people 18 to 64 years old living below 200 percent of the federal poverty level.

Sources: ECONorthwest analysis of WIA administrative data; calculations from U.S. Census Bureau's 2006 to 2009 American Community Surveys.

The blue columns illustrate the unemployment rate for Oregon (11 percent) and each workforce region. WIA formula funding is determined in part by unemployment rates, with regions with higher unemployment rates theoretically receiving more per capita funding than do regions with lower unemployment rates. There is significant variation in both unemployment rates and the percentage of target adult population served by workforce programs in regions across Oregon.

The green columns show the percentage of the target population served in each region. We compared the size of the target population across the state and in each workforce region to the number of adults served by WIA programs in 2009. Because these data reflect all adult WIA participants, regardless of funding source, we could not calculate a per-participant program cost. Statewide, about 21 percent of the target adult population received WIA services. The figure illustrates the regional variation in percentage of target population served: from 13 percent in WSI (Region 2) to 31 percent in TOC/OWA (Region 24).

The orange columns show ARRA spending per capita for the identified target population in the state and each region. Overall, \$15 of ARRA funds were spent for each member of the target population across Oregon. Across regions, this amount varied from \$9 in WSI (Region 2) to \$22 in TOC/OWA (Region 24). Because these dollar amounts do not include regular WIA funding, they are not a comprehensive measure of resource availability, as we calculated in a previous


report for CCWD on Oregon’s broader workforce development system. Instead, they identify the extent to which ARRA funds supplemented other available workforce funding streams. Evaluation of a more comprehensive measure of resources, which was outside the scope of this study, would be required to evaluate program effectiveness and differences in service penetration across regions.

Figure 2.4 through Figure 2.6 show how WIA Adult/DW participant demographics changed from 2007 to 2009. The average age decreased, the share of male participants increased, and the share of minority participants decreased by 5 percent. We cannot determine the extent to which these trends reflect changes in caseloads due to the recession, to ARRA funding, to service integration, or to differences in data entry procedures.

In Figure 2.6, the first column shows Oregon’s statewide race/ethnicity shares: 82 percent white non-Hispanic, 10 percent Hispanic, and 9 percent non-white non-Hispanic. The next three columns illustrate how these shares compare to those for WIA Adult/DW participants from 2007 to 2009. In all three years, the share of minorities was higher than the share of minorities in Oregon overall. This corresponds with the relatively high share of minorities among unemployed adults in Oregon.<sup>25</sup> In 2007, about 30 percent of WIA Adult/DW participants were minorities; this share decreased to about 25 percent in 2009.


We also examined average ages for WIA participants whose highest level of service was training. We found that, statewide, the average age of WIA training recipients was about 40 in all three years, although we find a very slight upward trend over time. Because training recipients were less affected by changes in statewide data due to integration efforts, this upward trend could reflect the effects of the recession on older workers, largely independent of the effect of service integration. The average age of training recipients increased from 2007 to 2009 in all LWIAs except two: JGI and CSC. The oldest WIA participants in the training category were in the CSC region, where WIA training recipients had an average age of 44 years in 2008.

**Figure 2.4: WIA Adult/DW participant gender shares in Oregon, by year**




Source: ECONorthwest analysis of CCWD data

**Figure 2.5: Average age of WIA Adult/DW participants in Oregon, by year**



Source: ECONorthwest analysis of CCWD data

**Figure 2.6: Race/ethnicity shares for Oregon and WIA Adult/DW participants, by year**



Source: American Community Survey 2006-2008; ECONorthwest analysis of CCWD data

<sup>25</sup> Beleiciks, N. (2010, October 27). “Unemployment Up Across All Race and Ethnicity Groups.” WorkSource Oregon. Available at <http://www.qualityinfo.org/olmisj/ArticleReader?itemid=00007322>

The changes in age and gender reflect the general effects of the recession on employment: young adult workers are disproportionately affected by economic downturns, and men have experienced higher unemployment rates than women during this recession because most job losses have occurred in the manufacturing and construction industries, which have predominantly male workforces.<sup>26</sup> In Oregon, unemployment rates for both men and women in 2007 were about 5 percent. In 2009, 12.2 percent of men were unemployed versus 8.5 percent of women.<sup>27</sup> Thus, the increase in the share of male WIA Adult/DW participants over time corresponds with the statewide and national trends, although service integration might also drive the observed trends.

In addition, we analyzed several other WIA participant characteristics:

- **Median episode lengths.** In Adult/DW programs, median episode lengths for all service levels dropped significantly from 2007 to 2009, primarily because of the effects of statewide workforce services integration that introduced a large number of “new” participants into the data. In particular, individuals whose highest level of service was core services caused episode lengths to drop because most of these participants received short-term services that usually lasted just one day. The change was less significant among WIA training participants—median episode length was 540 days in 2007 and 263 days in 2009. Median episode length dropped by a significant amount across all regions for all levels of services.
- **Veteran status.** The percentage of WIA participants that are veterans increased from 7.0 percent in 2007 to 9.5 percent in 2009. Most regions experienced a similar increase. CSC’s share of veteran participants was higher than the average, reaching 13.2 percent in 2008. LWP’s share was below the average in 2007 (3.3 percent) but increased to 10.5 percent by 2009. In predominantly rural regions—CSC, TJC, and TOC/OWA—the percentage of WIA participants that are veterans increased from 7.4 percent in 2007 to 10.2 percent in 2009.
- **Veteran spouse status.** The share of veteran spouses in WIA Adult/DW programs across Oregon was consistently low, decreasing from 1.0 percent in 2007 to 0.3 percent in 2009. In 2007, four regions had zero participants with veteran spouse status, whereas LWP had a much higher percentage: 6 percent of participants in LWP were veteran spouses. By 2009, all regions had the same approximate share of veteran spouses (0.3 percent).
- **Low-income status.** The percentage of WIA Adult/DW participants across Oregon who were classified as low-income was 49.7 percent in 2007, 14.7 percent in 2008, and 22.0 percent in 2009. This “V” pattern in the data occurred for each LWIA, with TJC having the highest share of low-income participants (by this measure, 71.1 percent in 2007 and 35 percent in 2009) and LWP have the lowest share (31.0 percent in 2007 and 18.8 percent in 2009). A potential explanation for the “V” pattern comes from the effects of service integration that occurred in 2008: the influx of individuals counted as WIA

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<sup>26</sup> Tauer, G. (2010, March 23). “Recession’s Effects on Oregon’s Youth Employment”. WorkSource Oregon. Available at <http://www.qualityinfo.org/olmisj/ArticleReader?itemid=00006966>

Beleicks, N. (2009, October 22). “Whose Recession is it Anyway?” WorkSource Oregon. Available at <http://www.qualityinfo.org/olmisj/ArticleReader?itemid=00006737>

<sup>27</sup> State-level data from the Current Population Survey, 2007, 2008, 2009 (<http://www.bls.gov/lau/>).

participants may have brought the low-income shares down in 2008, and the effects of the recession on household incomes may have brought the shares back up in 2009.

- **Employment barriers.** In Adult/DW programs in Oregon in 2009, 25.2 percent of participants reported at least one employment barrier, as listed in CCWD’s WIA Data Elements dictionary. For adults/DWs these barriers are limited English proficiency, single parent, offender, displaced homemaker, homeless person, lack child/adult dependent care, lack of technical/vocational skills and disabled/handicapped. As Table 2.3 shows, LWP had the lowest share of participants with employment barriers in 2009 (18.4 percent) and CSC had the highest (37.9 percent).

**Table 2.3: Percentage of WIA Adult/DW caseload with employment barrier(s) in Oregon in 2009**

Region	Adult/DW
2 Worksystems, Inc.	28.3%
3 Job Growers Incorporated	22.4%
4 Community Service Consortium	37.9%
5 Lane Workforce Partnership	18.4%
8 The Job Council / Rogue Valley	22.6%
15 Workforce Investment Council of Clackamas	28.8%
The Oregon Consortium/Workforce Alliance	22.4%
Oregon	25.2%

Source: ECONorthwest analysis of CCWD data

- **Economic barriers.** Participants that are counted as having economic barriers receive assistance from at least one of the following sources: TANF, state/local government general assistance, refugee cash, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), or food stamps. As shown in Table 2.4, 17.7 percent of Adult/DW participants in Oregon in 2009 had at least one economic barrier, with regional percentages ranging from 13.5 percent (LWP) to 29.4 percent (CSC).

**Table 2.4: Percentage of WIA Adult/DW caseload with economic barrier(s) in Oregon in 2009**

Region	Adult/DW
2 Worksystems, Inc.	16.4%
3 Job Growers Incorporated	16.6%
4 Community Service Consortium	29.4%
5 Lane Workforce Partnership	13.5%
8 The Job Council / Rogue Valley	23.0%
15 Workforce Investment Council of Clackamas	15.4%
The Oregon Consortium/Workforce Alliance	16.6%
Oregon	17.7%

Source: ECONorthwest analysis of CCWD data

## Regional Success Stories

### *Workforce Investment Council of Clackamas County (WICCO)*

When the Workforce Investment Council of Clackamas County (WICCO) was awarded ARRA funding for its Summer Youth Academy, the organization's staff, like many of their peers, considered how these new resources could expand existing programs. Recognizing the opportunity to better serve youth ages 21 to 24, WICCO decided to direct a portion of its ARRA funds to develop several new career-oriented programs, including an innovative Certified Nursing Assistant (CNA) program.

WICCO turned to Clackamas Community College (CCC) to help develop the program, but the school was unable to spare facilities and instructors due to increased enrollment. Undeterred, WICCO pursued its own certification and was approved by the Oregon State Board of Nursing. The CNA program employs a combination of online learning, instructor-led facilitation, clinical lab training and on-site experience at Willamette View retirement community. College credit for the program is offered through CCC; a total of 1,231 credits were awarded at the close of summer 2009. Despite lack of funding, the community college will continue to offer academic credit for the CNA program through the summer of 2011.

ARRA funding provided a critical boost that enabled the CNA program to take flight. Although those funds have since expired, the program's success continues to be leveraged through the partnership between WICCO and CCC.



Overall, these data present a detailed portrait of program participants (including those funded with non-ARRA WIA funds) during tough economic times. Unfortunately, we cannot separately identify changes in caseload composition due to economic conditions, program characteristics, and service integration. Nonetheless, certain trends bear continued monitoring. For example, our estimate of program service penetration could be routinely evaluated to better understand why regions vary so significantly, and whether the differences suggest changes to program operations. The same is true for participant data presented below for other programs.

## Interview results

The remainder of this section summarizes our interviews of LWIB staff about the successes and challenges of WIA Adult/DW programs.

### ***How were Adult/DW programs supported by ARRA? What new strategies or approaches did you pursue with ARRA funds?***

LWIB staff members reported using ARRA funds to expand existing programs and increase training capacity and access in various ways:

- WSI “added speed and depth to their existing approaches” and shifted to a system that is more integrated with other providers. Among other things, they created the WorkSource Regional Business Services team and started an on-the-job (OJT) training program that served 122 people from January to May 2010. They opened two WorkSource express centers and developed new relationships with agencies providing public services (e.g., housing authorities, SunSystems, Goodwill).
- WICCO focused on training in target industries and gave priority to services for low-income and low-skilled customers. ARRA funds went toward new occupational training programs: they bundled existing computer

numerical controlled (CNC) and welding classes together into a career pathway and developed training for social service agency case management. They formalized an agreement with the local community college regarding internships and college credits, began a certified nursing assistant (CNA) training program, and used iMatchSkills to create a large bank of internship sites and add several hundred registrants (all ARRA participants were required to register in iMatchSkills). Program participants could use their individual training accounts (ITAs) with any program on the eligible training provider list.

- JGI staff members reported a significant increase in training and the number of vocational scholarships offered at their centers. They improved processes to ensure that training aligned with career opportunities and created a CNA program that was part of summer youth employment. They issued an RFP for new or innovative programs for adults and dislocated workers but were disappointed by the responses they received and decided to fund only one program, for ex-offenders. They used the rest of the money to expand existing programs.
- CSC used ARRA money to “lay the groundwork for career ladders and health care training programs.” The funding allowed them to focus on projects and programs they’d been planning and that were easy to implement, especially related to weatherization, green jobs, and health care.
- LWP used ARRA money to continue to orient their focus on training enhancement. They funded scholarships and expanded community college training programs in energy management and health care (e.g., nursing and CNA training). For the ESL population, they offered vocational English as a second language (VESL) training and entry-level personal care assistance jobs. They expanded their GED program and use of career readiness certificates (NCRs). ARRA funding allowed them to “infuse new approaches into their existing programming.”
- TJC focused on providing more placements within their existing OJT and work experience programs. Staff members said that this strategy was an intentional response to the recession; their goal was “to get people working again.”
- TOC/OWA required its counties to invest at least 60 percent of adult and dislocated worker ARRA funds in training and education through individual training accounts and scholarships.

### ***What supportive services did you offer to program participants using ARRA funds?***

Most LWIB programs focused their supportive services for participants on costs related to training, such as tools (e.g., stethoscopes), work clothing and uniforms (e.g., shoes for nursing assistant students or boots and gloves for welding students), and books. Most also provided transportation services, such as mileage reimbursement, gas cards, minor car repairs, and bus passes. Less common services included eye exams and glasses, childcare, Internet access, emergency rent payment, and temporary assistance with rent and mortgage obligations.

WSI and CSC staff reported that they are allowed to make decisions regarding simple support services on a case-by-case basis. CSC has been able to serve more people but each person has received less money.

### ***What were your major accomplishments?***

- WSI workers noted the success of their express centers, WorkSource Regional Business Services team, and OJT programs. ARRA funding has enabled them to offer specialized services (e.g., Microsoft training for Russian immigrants) and increase their ESL and GED services.
- WICCO developed 10 additional training cohorts and trained an additional 314 participants. By spending ARRA funds on occupational training, they were able to use formula funds to develop and provide two new programs: Spanish GED and Fast Track GED. They created a new career pathway certificate program in human services / family development and piloted an online training for incumbent workers of Headstart. Finally, they facilitated a middle-of-the-night welding training program for one of their cohorts and created a material handling / warehousing intensive service course.
- JGI provided additional scholarships and assumed responsibility for direct service delivery with a focus on technical training through vocational work. They doubled the number of people served and the amount allocated per person, which increased the length of training people received from one to two terms. Longer training is significant because it helps people progress in the community college system: “It is basically impossible for an individual to get a new career going after a three-week class.” All participants were required to apply for financial aid.
- LWP set up a help line, added a cohort of nursing students, and focused on the shift toward training rather than case management or process. They also set up work experiences and paid internships at the community college in focus industries.
- TJC placed a lot of people in jobs, which they would not have been able to do without ARRA funds. Several of these jobs have turned into regular jobs. In particular, they noted the large number of layoffs in construction and wood products, and commented that dislocated workers in these fields are often more interested in finding work immediately than returning to school. Providing this group with quality services and coping with a “300 percent increase in client flow” are notable accomplishments, as is their adaptation to the new data, integration, and tracking systems.
- TOC/OWA workers listed their major successes as program development and enhancements, heavy investments in education and training, and staff training.

### ***What challenges and obstacles did you face and overcome?***

Of all the interviewees, only those from TOC/OWA said that they did not face any particular challenges or obstacles involving ARRA funding, giving credit to their “exceptional providers” for this. Other LWIB staff described various challenges, such as increased demand for services and staff resulting from the increase in the number of clients served. JGI workers said that their greatest challenge was “keeping up with demand at current staffing levels.” The high demand has “put strain on all systems and programs that have maintained current staffing levels to ensure that funds are going to participants that need them.” CSC also could have used more staff to help with the extra reporting and presentation demands—they didn’t want to spend money on hiring new staff.

### *Other challenges*

- WSI's ambition to create express centers was affected by the slower pace of the OED, which made the ARRA timeline harder to meet.
- According to a WSI worker, ARRA simultaneously created unrealistic expectations in the community and energy for staff to "adapt more quickly than they would have otherwise."
- WICCO workers said that there was not a lot of guidance on meeting ARRA regulations; people were "shooting from the hip."
- WICCO had a hard time recruiting instructors in the health sciences area.
- It was difficult for CSC to find enough training slots, and in the beginning, staff didn't receive enough information about ARRA amounts or timing.
- Data requests were "a big problem" for CSC; system-wide, "nobody knew exactly what anybody was going to be collecting." One worker said, "There needs to be more planning and integration with existing reporting, clearer timelines, and reasonable due dates."
- LWP staff said that data systems were inadequate to track the spending/program data.

### ***How did ARRA funding affect regular WIA programs?***

All LWIB staff members reported that ARRA money augmented program capacities and enabled LWIBs to provide more assistance. The funding supported existing programs and plans but also allowed for implementation of new program elements:

- WSI staff members reported that they did not make any major changes that they hadn't already planned for, but ARRA funds did allow them to expand their programs and partnerships, such as with the county and community-based organizations.
- For WICCO, ARRA dollars funded additional classes in the medical assistant and CNA programs and allowed staff to deliver intensive services and occupational trainings they would not have been able to provide otherwise, including 350 additional work experiences and twice the number of individual service plans from 2008 to 2009.
- CSC interviewees noted that WIA programs benefited from the planning and energy that went toward ARRA but were negatively affected by some aspects of ARRA, such as "trying to do things too quickly."

### ***How has ARRA funding affected your community partnerships?***

All LWIB interviewees described community partnerships that were either strengthened by or initiated because of ARRA funding. Relationships with community colleges, contractors, neighborhood associations, government agencies, community businesses, and employers were enhanced:

- ARRA money allowed WSI to start OJT programs, which directly connected them to the business community. This has not been a particular strength of WSI or OED in the past.

- WICCO connected with two new employers as they sought more placements for nursing and medical assistants.
- JGI used ARRA money to improve the vendor training process and expand the eligible training provider list.
- TJC staff cited the example of a local business owner who had closed his businesses but got an ARRA-funded contract. He couldn't afford to hire workers to restart operations, so TJC used OJT to help him get his business up and running.
- TOC/OWA staff indicated that their Oregon Trails project would not have been possible without ARRA funding. Also, the ARRA-funded State Energy Sector Partnership grant opened doors with community colleges.

***Do you offer training scholarships?***

All LWIBs offer some sort of financial assistance, either scholarships or individual training accounts that fund training expenses or expenses directly related to training. In addition, all WIA IB participants seeking training are required to apply for Pell grants. LWP funded 600 individual training scholarships in the last year alone in high-demand areas, with ARRA money funding an additional 110 scholarships. TOC/OWA's scholarships are specifically for education and training in high-demand, high-wage occupations.

***If there were more funding, what additional steps could be taken by CCWD, OYCC, and/or LWIBs to strengthen workforce development?***

Interviewees suggested several ways that additional funding could be used. Many suggested ongoing flexibility with how funds are spent. TJC workers would like to expand their use of NCRCs. Other ideas included addressing the problems with the reporting systems, expanding career academies and pathways, improving online services, offering more opportunities in remote locations, and collaborating more on talent and community development (e.g., the New Oregon Trails program).

Several staff members suggested increased services for incumbent services. WICCO workers requested more incumbent worker training funds via the Employer Workforce Training Fund (EWTF) as well as statewide guidance on how to better use WIA Customized Training for incumbent workers.

TJC workers want to expand incumbent worker training through the Power Up Academies they started in 2009. Businesses in their region had been sending employees to half-day or one-day training sessions, but TJC saw a need for multi-day training sessions. After learning what employers needed (e.g., forklift training, Excel training), TJC developed Power Up Academies at community colleges on these topics.

Finally, staff members from WICCO offered several ideas for how to use additional funds:

- Concrete, written guidelines to assist in program development
- More assistance in recruiting and engaging local businesses as work experience sites
- Two funding streams (Adult and Dislocated Worker) instead of one

- More opportunities like Elevate America and a group discount rate for additional vouchers when that program is completed
- Increased ability to deliver Rapid Response services on site (laptops; integrated OED/Rapid Response staff)
- Integrated small business services to cultivate more local entrepreneurs
- Development of the layoff prevention services system
- Up-to-date media marketing (Internet, video, TV, blogs, podcasts, Job Rooster, etc.)
- Continued integration of customized training
- Updated eligible training provider list (more user-friendly, like Washington State's) and a simplified process for requesting that new programs be placed on the list (State Board of Education paperwork could be used to eliminate paperwork redundancy)
- Fully funded community colleges that offer all courses necessary for participants to complete programs in a timely manner
- An allowance for unemployed workers to be enrolled in classes part time to improve their marketable skills without jeopardizing their unemployment insurance
- A satellite WorkSource center in East County and Clackamas County

**Results Related to National Emergency Grants**

**Expenditures**

In Oregon, total ARRA funds for NEG's amounted to more than \$14.8 million. JGI (Region 3) received the smallest allocation, \$723,465, while TOC/OWA's 24 counties received more than \$5.3 million. For regular WIA ARRA programs, LWIAs received an initial allocation of funding at the beginning of the ARRA program, which they have drawn down over time. However, LWIAs have received ARRA NEG funds in response to specific business closures that occur over time. For example, the U.S. Department of Labor issued four NEG's totaling more than \$4 million between April and June 2010 (the last quarter of the fiscal year), including a \$2.1 million NEG issued on June 30, 2010. This grant is counted in the total ARRA NEG allocations shown in Table 2.5, but expenditures from this grant would not begin until the next fiscal year (July 1, 2011 through June 30, 2012). Below, we present the total ARRA NEG allocations that occurred from the beginning of the ARRA program up to June 30, 2010, and the total expenditures from those allocations during the period from July 1, 2009 to June 30, 2010.

**Table 2.5: ARRA NEG allocations and expenditures through June 30, 2010**

<b>Region</b>	<b>Total ARRA NEG Allocations</b>	<b>ARRA NEG Expenditures, July 1, 2009- June 30, 2010</b>
2 WSI	\$1,807,378	\$540,630
3 JGI	\$723,465	\$51,364
4 CSC	\$2,083,313	\$512,260
5 LWP	\$1,873,005	\$1,045,470
8 TJC	\$937,459	\$110,000
15 WICCO	\$1,971,830	\$255,699
TOC/OWA	\$5,330,216	\$2,641,858
State Admin	\$104,267	\$10,296
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$14,830,933</b>	<b>\$5,167,577</b>

Source: CCWD data


## Analysis of NEG participation data

In our analysis, NEG participants include all recipients of NEG funding, including those who also received WIA Adult/DW funding.<sup>28</sup> According to our analysis, there were 446 WIA participants in 2007 who received NEG funding. This number increased to 1,558 in 2008 and 2,925 in 2009. Much of the increase was the result of CCWD applying for and receiving an increased number of NEGs as unemployment rose and many businesses closed. Monthly NEG participation peaked at 1,280 participants in January 2010.


Figure 2.7 through Figure 2.9 show how demographic characteristics of NEG participants changed from 2007 to 2009. As noted for WIA adults, the trends displayed here could result from a number of programmatic and non-program factors, such as the characteristics of workers laid off from specific business closures.

The average age of participants dropped from 44.5 to 40.5, then increased to 42.3 in 2009. Gender shares stayed nearly constant over time, with 69 percent of NEG participants in 2009 being male. This is about 10 percent higher than the share of male WIA Adult/DW participants. In Figure 2.9, the first column shows that about 19 percent of Oregon adults are minorities. The next three columns illustrate how statewide shares compare to those for NEG participants. In all three years, the share of NEG participant minorities was higher than the share of minorities in Oregon overall. In 2008, almost half (43 percent) of NEG participants were minorities.


**Figure 2.7: Average age of NEG participants in Oregon, by year**



**Figure 2.8: NEG participant gender shares in Oregon, by year**



**Figure 2.9: Race/ethnicity shares for Oregon and NEG participants, by year**



<sup>28</sup> NEG participants for any given year are those individuals with a service episode during any part of that year and NEG-funded services at any time during that episode. For example, NEG participants for 2009 include individuals with NEG-funded services during 2009 as well as some individuals with NEG-funded services in 2007, 2008, or 2010, if their 2009 episode extended into those years. In terms of main funding sources, these individuals are nearly all included in the “Adult” and “Other” categories.

In addition, we looked at the presence of barriers in the NEG population:

- **Employment barriers.** More than half of NEG participants reported at least one employment barrier, as listed in CCWD’s WIA Data Elements dictionary. For NEG participants these barriers are limited English proficiency, single parent, offender, displaced homemaker, homeless person, lack child/adult dependent care, lack technical/vocational skills, disabled/handicapped, and disabled/handicapped/barrier to employment. As Table 2.6 shows, there was a wide range in percentages across regions. TJC had the lowest share of participants with employment barriers in 2009 (14.3 percent) and TOC/OWA had the highest (74.0 percent). Most of these shares are significantly higher than those for WIA Adult/DW participants.

**Table 2.6: Percentage of WIA participants in 2009 with NEG-funded services and employment barrier(s)**

Region	NEG
2 Worksystems, Inc.	24.5%
3 Job Growers Incorporated	71.6%
4 Community Service Consortium	23.7%
5 Lane Workforce Partnership	32.8%
8 The Job Council / Rogue Valley	14.3%
15 Workforce Investment Council of Clackamas	25.2%
The Oregon Consortium/Workforce Alliance	74.0%
Oregon	51.9%

Source: ECONorthwest analysis of CCWD data

Note: Some participants whose service episodes extended beyond 2009 received their NEG-funded services in years other than 2009.

- **Economic barriers.** Participants that are counted as having economic barriers receive assistance from at least one of the following sources: TANF, state/local government general assistance, refugee cash, SSI, or food stamps. As shown in Table 2.7, 9.5 percent of NEG participants in Oregon in 2009 had at least one economic barrier, with regional percentages ranging from zero percent (TJC) to 17.3 percent (LWP).

**Table 2.7: Percentage of WIA participants in 2009 with NEG-funded services and economic barrier(s)**

Region	NEG
2 Worksystems, Inc.	6.0%
3 Job Growers Incorporated	7.9%
4 Community Service Consortium	1.9%
5 Lane Workforce Partnership	17.3%
8 The Job Council / Rogue Valley	0.0%
15 Workforce Investment Council of Clackamas	6.1%
The Oregon Consortium/Workforce Alliance	7.7%
Oregon	9.5%

Source: ECONorthwest analysis of CCWD data

Note: Some participants whose service episodes extended beyond 2009 received NEG-funded services in years other than 2009.

In Region 8 (TJC) in 2009, there were a total of 7 NEG participants, none of which had an economic barrier.

## Interview results

During our interviews of LWIB staff, we asked the following question about NEGs:

***What were the major differences, if any, between ARRA-funded and non-ARRA-funded NEGs? How did you use ARRA-funded NEGs?***

Most interviewees did not perceive any major differences between ARRA and non-ARRA NEGs. However, LWP workers said that their ARRA-funded NEG, which they used to develop a help line staffed with career advisors, was so different from their dual-enrollment Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA)-funded NEG that “they can’t be compared.”

WICCO workers reported success with their ARRA-funded NEGs: in addition to workshops and career counseling, they have hired peer advocates from companies that are closing to do outreach to their peers about the opportunities available through the NEG. Interviewees indicated that they would be interested in facilitating a workshop for other LWIBs on how to prepare and use NEGs.

## Results Related to WIA Youth Programs

### Analysis of WIA Youth and Summer Youth participation data

CCWD groups WIA youth participants into three categories: regular formula WIA Youth (including Year-Round and Summer participants), ARRA Summer Youth, and ARRA Year-Round Youth. However, the participant data we analyzed indicated that for many participants, funding for services received did not fall cleanly into a single category. Many youth participants received funding from more than one funding source (e.g., Summer and Year-Round funding or ARRA and formula funding).


For this reason, we grouped WIA youth participants into two categories: Summer Youth (all Summer participants) and WIA Youth (Year-Round participants only). By definition, the Summer Youth participants received services funded with ARRA dollars. Because the data included many individuals whose services were funded by both ARRA and WIA formula sources, and because LWIAs reported no substantive difference between formula- and ARRA-funded Year-Round programs, we did not further classify Year-Round youth by funding source.

Figure 2.10 shows monthly participation counts for WIA Youth and Summer Youth programs. The blue line illustrates total participant counts per month; the green line shows the number of new participants each month. As seen here, WIA Youth participation counts were not affected by the service integration initiative in late 2008. The effects of ARRA are clear in our analysis of the data: 5,275 youth participated in WIA Youth and Summer Youth programs in July 2009, almost double the 2,729 participants in April 2009.<sup>29</sup> The yellow line represents the number of WIA Youth (Year-Round participants) in the summer months; the distance from the yellow line to the blue line represents WIA Summer Youth participants in 2009. The spike in the green line illustrates the increase in new program participants that resulted from ARRA funding: in June 2009, there were 1,673 new participants.

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<sup>29</sup> See Appendix A for a discussion of our assumptions and methods in analyzing participant data.

**Figure 2.10: WIA Youth and Summer Youth participants in Oregon, by month**



Source: ECONorthwest analysis of CCWD data

Note: In this figure, the 125 participants who received Summer Youth funding in 2010 and not 2009 were classified as WIA Youth (Year-Round participants).

Any individual who received Summer Youth funding any time through July 2010 was classified as a Summer Youth participant. Nearly all Summer Youth participants received funding during summer 2009. However, 125 Summer Youth participants received Summer Youth funding in summer 2010 but not in summer 2009. These 125 participants are counted as Summer Youth participants in the tables and charts throughout this report, except in Figure 2.10.

Our analysis of the WIA Youth participation data also showed an increase in monthly participation counts from early 2007 to mid 2008. We used service start and end dates to determine participants per month, which revealed an increase in individuals exiting WIA Youth programs beginning in the summer of 2008. Because the number of new program participants remained fairly constant during this time period, the flattening of the blue line illustrates youth leaving WIA programs. Based on our analysis of the data, we are not able to explain with certainty the leveling off of monthly participation counts starting in July 2008. Individuals who exited WIA Youth programs in late 2008 participated in programs across the state and did not share any major common characteristics. Because analyzing participant data using client record registration dates does not reveal the same change in monthly participation counts from early 2007 to mid 2008, the increase can likely be explained by differences in the way service start and end dates were recorded during this time period.<sup>30</sup>

<sup>30</sup> Comparing client records and service records revealed that 81 percent of client record registration dates were the same as service start dates.

To estimate the resource availability for WIA Youth and Summer Youth programs in 2009, we calculated ARRA resources per capita and service penetration per capita for the target population in each workforce region (see Figure 2.11). All WIA youth participants have to meet low-income eligibility thresholds: income received over a six month period cannot exceed 100 percent of the FPL or 70 percent of the Lower Living Standard Income Level (LLSIL) (whichever is higher). We defined the target population as the number of individuals 14 to 21 years old living below 200 percent of the FPL, which amounted to about 169,000 young people across Oregon in 2009.

We used a benchmark of 200 percent of the FPL because a threshold close to 100 percent of the FPL (such as 70 percent LLSIL) could easily understate the number of youth eligible for WIA programs during a given year. Particularly during an economic downturn, many families could have an annual income that exceeds the LLSIL as calculated on an annual basis, but for whom layoffs and other adverse events lower income dramatically during the year, making a youth potentially eligible after a few months.<sup>31</sup>

The green columns in Figure 2.11 show the percentage of the target youth population served in each region in 2009 by WIA Youth and Summer Youth programs. Because these data reflect all WIA Youth and Summer Youth participants, regardless of funding source, we could not calculate a per-participant program cost. Statewide, about 4 percent of the target youth population received WIA services. The figure illustrates the regional variation in percentage of target population served: from 2 percent in LWP (Region 5) to 6 percent in WICCO (Region 15) and TOC/OWA (Region 24).


The orange columns show ARRA spending per capita for the identified target population in the state and each region. Overall, \$72 of ARRA funds were spent for each member of the target population across Oregon.<sup>32</sup> Across regions, this amount varied from \$48 in LWP (Region 5) to \$95 in TOC/OWA (Region 24). Because these dollar amounts do not include regular WIA funding, they are not a comprehensive measure of resource availability, as we calculated in a previous report for CCWD on Oregon's broader workforce development system. Instead, they identify the extent to which ARRA funds supplemented other available workforce funding streams. Evaluation of a more comprehensive measure of resources, which was outside the scope of this study, would be required to evaluate program effectiveness and differences in service penetration across regions.

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<sup>31</sup> The data we have reflect only annual income levels.

<sup>32</sup> Note the overlap between defined target adult and youth populations: youth are 14 to 21 and adults are 18 to 64.

**Figure 2.11: Percentage of target youth population served and ARRA spending per capita in Oregon, by region, 2009**




Notes: Due to data limitations, recipients are identified by the first region in which they received services. The target population is measured as the number of people 14 to 21 years old living below 200 percent of the federal poverty level. Sources: ECONorthwest analysis of Oregon WIA Youth participation data; calculations from U.S. Census Bureau's 2006 to 2009 American Community Surveys

Figure 2.12 through Figure 2.14 compare demographic characteristics of WIA youth from 2007 to 2009. As noted for WIA adults, the trends displayed in this section could result from a number of programmatic and non-program factors.


The average age increased from 17.9 in 2007 to 18.8 in 2009. This change could reflect the effects of the recession; it could also be the result of the intentional shift in focus to older youth.<sup>33</sup> However, as reported in the interview summary later in this section, some LWIBs found it difficult to find and serve older youth. Another evaluation of ARRA-funded WIA Youth programs reported that local areas across the nation also experienced challenges in reaching older youth.<sup>34</sup> WIA Youth participant gender shares did not change appreciably over time. From 2007 to 2009, WIA Youth programs included slightly more women than men.

**Figure 2.12: Average age of WIA Youth participants in Oregon, by year**



Source: ECONorthwest analysis of CCWD data

**Figure 2.13: WIA Youth participant gender shares in Oregon, by year**




Source: ECONorthwest analysis of CCWD data

<sup>33</sup> Regular WIA formula funds require local areas to serve youth 14 to 21 years old. Under ARRA, local areas were allowed to serve youth up to 24 years old.

<sup>34</sup> Workforce Investment Act (WIA) Youth program Guidance for Program Year 2010, adapted from Training and Employment Guidance Letter 27-09 (issued on May 13, 2010). Available at [http://www.doleta.gov/youth\\_services/pdf/WIA\\_Program\\_Guidance.pdf](http://www.doleta.gov/youth_services/pdf/WIA_Program_Guidance.pdf)

The first column of Figure 2.14 shows Oregon's race/ethnicity shares for youth: 76 percent white non-Hispanic, 13 percent non-white non-Hispanic, and 11 percent Hispanic. Compared with minority adults in Oregon, there are proportionately more minority youth. The next three columns illustrate that from 2007 to 2009, the share of youth minority participants was about 35 percent, or 10 percentage points higher than the share of youth minorities in Oregon overall, and much higher than the share for Adult/DW programs.

**Figure 2.14: Race/ethnicity shares for Oregon and WIA Youth participants, by year**




Source: American Community Survey 2006-2008; ECONorthwest analysis of CCWD data

For WIA Summer Youth, we compared participants' demographic characteristics of with those of WIA Youth participants in 2009. Figure 2.15 through Figure 2.17 show that (a) the average age of WIA Summer


Youth participants was slightly lower than that of WIA Youth participants, (b) the percentage of male participants was higher for summer youth (56 percent) than for year-round youth (49 percent), and (c) the share of non-Hispanic minorities was about 10 percentage points higher in the WIA Summer Youth program than in the WIA Youth program.

**Figure 2.15: Average age of WIA Summer and WIA Youth participants in Oregon in 2009**




Source: ECONorthwest analysis of CCWD data

**Figure 2.16: Gender shares for WIA Summer and WIA Youth participants in Oregon in 2009**



Source: ECONorthwest analysis of CCWD data

**Figure 2.17: Race/ethnicity shares for WIA Summer and WIA Youth participants in Oregon in 2009**



Source: ECONorthwest analysis of CCWD data

In addition to these demographic characteristics, we analyzed the frequency of employment and economic barriers among WIA youth:

- Employment barriers.** In WIA Youth programs in Oregon in 2009, nearly all participants reported at least one employment barrier, as listed in CCWD’s WIA Data Elements dictionary. For youth, in addition to the employment barriers listed for adults/DWs in Table 2.3, other barriers are homeless or runaway youth, pregnant or parenting youth, youth who needs additional assistance, youth with serious barriers, and foster care youth. As Table 2.8 shows, the shares of WIA Summer participants with employment barriers ranged from 58.9 percent (CSC) to 100.0 percent (TJC). The regional range for WIA Youth participants was smaller: 79.2 percent (JGI) to 99.5 percent (TOC/OWA). *Note: 100 percent of WIA Youth participants must have at least one employment barrier as listed above (out-of-school youth could also be unemployed or underemployed) and/or one educational barrier.*

**Table 2.8: Percentage of WIA Youth caseload with employment barrier(s) in Oregon in 2009**

Region	Summer Youth	Year-Round Youth
2 Worksystems, Inc.	93.4%	93.2%
3 Job Growers Incorporated	91.4%	79.2%
4 Community Service Consortium	58.9%	82.8%
5 Lane Workforce Partnership	98.5%	99.2%
8 The Job Council / Rogue Valley	100.0%	94.8%
15 Workforce Investment Council of Clackamas	71.0%	90.1%
The Oregon Consortium/Workforce Alliance	99.4%	99.5%
Oregon	91.3%	92.7%

Source: ECONorthwest analysis of CCWD data

- Economic barriers.** At least 95 percent of WIA Youth participants are to be from low-income families, that is, their family income cannot exceed 70 percent of the lower living standard income level. In addition to youth participants meeting low-income requirements, their economic barriers might include receiving public assistance from sources such as TANF, state/local government general assistance, refugee cash, SSI, or food stamps. Foster child status is also included as an economic barrier. As shown in Table 2.9, 56.7 percent of summer youth participants in Oregon in 2009 were reported as receiving public assistance, including foster child assistance, with regional percentages ranging from 43.2 percent (JGI) to 67.1 percent (CSC). Similar shares of WIA year-round youth participants had economic barriers, from 40.0 percent in WICCO to 73.5 percent in CSC.

**Table 2.9: Percentage of WIA Youth caseload with economic barrier(s) in Oregon in 2009**

Region	Summer Youth	Year-Round Youth
2 Worksystems, Inc.	57.6%	55.2%
3 Job Growers Incorporated	43.2%	60.5%
4 Community Service Consortium	67.1%	73.5%
5 Lane Workforce Partnership	62.2%	55.4%
8 The Job Council / Rogue Valley	56.6%	59.7%
15 Workforce Investment Council of Clackamas	50.3%	40.0%
The Oregon Consortium/Workforce Alliance	56.5%	62.3%
Oregon	56.7%	57.4%

Source: ECONorthwest analysis of CCWD data

## Regional Success Stories

*Workforce Investment Council of Clackamas County (WICCO)*

As unemployment rates rise, so does the competition for entry-level jobs traditionally filled by younger workers. To help young adults gain the skills and confidence needed to succeed in this challenging environment, Clackamas Community College (CCC) used ARRA funds to integrate the National Career Readiness Certificate (NCRC) into its Cooperative Work Experience Program.

High school students earned college credit while working in local businesses, gaining experience in fields such as event planning and auto detailing. At the end of the program, youth were invited to take the NCRC exam, which evaluates candidates in three categories: reading for information, locating information and applied mathematics.

By earning a Career Readiness Certificate, job seekers can present potential employers with tangible proof of their aptitude and motivation. Equally important is the confidence these young adults gain, giving them a critical boost in a crowded market.

"I felt a sense of accomplishment for doing this. It really helps to have something to show in an interview," said Shawnie, a high school student planning to attend Clackamas Community College to study nursing. "I'm proud of myself."



## Interview results

The remainder of this section summarizes our interviews of LWIB staff about WIA Youth programs.

***What new strategies or approaches did you pursue with ARRA funds? What were your major accomplishments? How did ARRA funding affect regular WIA Youth programs and community partnerships?***

- For WICCO, ARRA funding provided work experience for more than 350 youth. At the time of the interview, more than 30 businesses and 13 agencies had hosted youth, and youth had accumulated 38,700 hours of work experience and earned 1,372 college credits. Another accomplishment was that the youth services provider became a licensed CNA trainer, which alleviated the “bottleneck” at the community colleges. WICCO tried some new approaches to allocating youth funds by forming community partnerships with other youth-serving agencies and local business. They built on existing relationships with area schools by placing youth in work capacities within the schools, including office work, custodial work, grounds keeping, and assisting in special needs classrooms.

- JGI developed new training approaches for youth and increased internships in the year-round program. They spent their Summer Youth employment allocation in the first year, as was intended by the funds. One worker said, “every individual who finished the program is a success, especially the ones with a job or who end up knowing what they want to do.” The youth they interviewed all felt that the program gave them a sense of community, and they appreciated having an opportunity to give back to the community. One interviewee cited the example of an ex-gang member who testified to the board about how the program had changed his life.

Interviewees reported that new employers are asking them whether there are any additional opportunities to help youth.

- CSC programs employed about 350 youth for the summer. The weatherization program, which provided training and certification, and the community garden, which provided school credit, were “hugely successful.” They also contracted with the community college for a 20-week accelerated welding program and transitioned YouthBuild into a fee-for-service program. CSC staff cited improved partnerships with OSU’s research facility at the Oregon Coast, the Santiam Wilderness Academy, and several local businesses. One person said, “It is easier with Youth programs to connect with private businesses.”
- For the summer program, LWP staff emphasized career pathways and preparation for post-secondary training and employment and offered a dual-credit program for high school and community college credit. To support the career pathways initiative they created a partial FTE for a program coordinator. The funding also helped LWP recruit youth for the year-round program.
- TOC/OWA workers noted the accomplishments of their Summer Youth program across 24 counties: 1,233 participants earned high school and college credit, found 125 permanent jobs, worked more than 200,000 hours, and generated \$4.7 million in total economic impact. TOC/OWA required its counties to spend all ARRA Youth funds by the end of September 2009.

***What steps did you take to ensure that youth had meaningful work experiences?***

The strategies that LWIB staff described can be divided into two categories: employer-side and employee-side. Employer-side strategies consisted of recruiting and selecting partners that could provide meaningful work experiences and potentially some training in target industries.


**Regional Success Stories**  
***Lane Workforce Partnership (LWP)***

Great things can happen when a community rallies around a singular cause. Faced with the challenging task of developing and implementing its Summer Youth Jobs and Careers Program in a matter of weeks, Lane Workforce Partnership turned to local businesses for help.

Through a competitive bid process, eight businesses were selected as contractors to administer the program. What began as an ambitious goal for Lane Workforce Partnership and its community contractors resulted in 300 youth participating in paid work experiences.

The local contractors designed projects that offered participants the opportunity to explore a variety of career pathways in industries such as healthcare, software development and green technology. Youth also received training in financial literacy and workplace readiness. “[The contractors] did an excellent job,” said Paula Medaglia, a senior program coordinator with Lane Workforce Partnership. “It was a great learning experience.”

The collaborative and innovative partnerships forged through the Summer Youth Jobs and Careers Program yielded impressive results: The youth collectively worked more than 45,000 hours and earned more than 323 community college credits.



**Regional Success Stories**  
*Worksystems, Inc. (WSI)*

In 1998, Oregon cut funding for summer work programs, reducing the opportunities for at-risk youth to gain work experience and exposure to work environments. Thanks to ARRA funding, Worksystems, Inc. was able to revitalize its SummerWorks program.

From cleaning crews to cartography, the youth participating in SummerWorks clocked more than 185,000 hours and earned more than \$2 million in wages during the summers of 2009 and 2010, funneling \$3.4 million of new money into the local economy, bolstering the state during a challenging time.

The low-income, historically disadvantaged youth that participate in the program receive more than job placement services; they receive the support and tools necessary to succeed in the working world—long after summer ends. The program placed 150 youth in year-round jobs and approximately 90% of participating youth returned to school in the fall of 2009.

Barbara Timper of Worksystems, Inc. described an emotional letter-writing campaign to President Obama in which the participating youth expressed gratitude for SummerWorks. “For some kids, [the program] made all the difference.”



LWIBs also built on relationships they had established with employers during previous Summer Youth programs.

On the employee side, interviewees said that they matched youth and employers by considering participants’ needs and interests, establishing site-learning agreements and career plans, incorporating educational components into the programs, and monitoring experiences through surveys, pre- and post-assessments, and site visits. Educational components included high school or college credit and training on how to find, keep, and advance in a job. A TJC worker stressed the importance of maintaining a good “communication pipeline” for everyone involved.

***What challenges and obstacles did you face and overcome?***

*Short time frame for spending money*

Nearly all LWIB interviewees indicated that spending ARRA money in the given time period was difficult, particularly in the Youth programs. As one WICCO worker said, “For the Youth programs, the largest obstacles were the short timeline in which to create a meaningful summer program and verifying eligibility for so many participants in such a short period of time.”

- WICCO issued an RFP to engage as many other organizations as possible. This allowed them to spend their time supporting community partners, determining eligibility, and keeping records instead of developing jobs and monitoring sites. They were able to interview and register about 400 youth in 16 hours with only four staff members.

- With only 14 months to develop, implement, spend, and evaluate programs, JGI staff felt that “the shelf life of the ARRA money was a limiting factor.” One worker said, “The short time frame in which to

expend the funds . . . created a situation where it was difficult to double expenditures so quickly while ensuring that funds were spent on quality meaningful training and services. Two years . . . would have allowed for a more thoughtful and well-planned strategy.” JGI staff also said that the program did not allow for the same follow-up services that the year-round WIA program does. This meant that once youth ended the work experience, contact with the program ended and there was no support to help some youth transition from the program. If they could do it again, they would end the work experience portion earlier in the summer and spend some time transitioning those youth that would not be enrolling in the year-round WIA programs.

- TJC staff also felt pressed for time; they did not receive ARRA program information until April or May 2009. Despite this, they were still able to serve more than 300 youth by relying on community connections from programs in past years (their last Summer Youth program was in 2004).

#### *Other challenges related to WIA Youth programs*

- WICCO didn’t have enough youth to create a whole manufacturing cohort, so staff split the money with the Adult/DW programs.
- For LWP, the out-of-school requirement added a lot of budget tracking work and contractor training. Also, college faculty and staff were often unavailable during the summer, so LWP staff had difficulty finding local construction placements.

#### ***How were your programs connected to educational enrichment and/or advancement opportunities?***

Interviewees reported that all ARRA-funded youth programs had educational components. Many programs included both high school and college credits, depending on the LWIB’s partnerships with area schools:

- WSI established learning agreements between employers, programs, and participants; each participant made a career plan that was tied directly to learning objectives and outcome measures. WSI programs also provided credit recovery. Staff members reported that their goal was to move every youth into a “post-secondary transition” and that WSI’s post-training placement rate for youths had gone up to 75 percent (the statewide average is about 40 percent).
- All WICCO program participants were enrolled in a community college internship program and received college credit, which many high schools then converted into high school credits. Participants also were able to arrange with their high schools to earn career-related learning experience (CRLE) credits. Some programs, such as the CNA training program, included college classes and credit.
- LWP used a career academy model, offered dual credit, and emphasized financial literacy training. Contractors were able to choose the financial curriculum; next time, LWP will specify the curriculum.

## Regional Success Stories

### *Community Service Consortium (CSC)*

If you build it, they will come. Community Service Consortium (CSC) took this maxim to heart when the organization used its ARRA funding to transform an existing building in Corvallis into a new training facility for its innovative weatherization training program, the first of its kind in Oregon. The skills gained through the program empower participants to take advantage of the robust growth in the green energy industry.

ARRA funding was the catalyst for expanding the program to include at-risk youth; previously the program served adult workers exclusively. CSC also used the funds to facilitate train-the-trainer workshops. Youth, adult workers and weatherization professionals trained side by side at CSC's facility to learn the latest in weatherization techniques and receive their Lead Safety certification. The program also emphasized energy conservation and work readiness. The weatherization crews applied their new skills by providing services to low-income families.

CSC's weatherization program earned national kudos for its innovative model. Youth participating in the program traveled to the National Association of Workforce Development Professionals' annual conference in Chicago to give a presentation about their experience.

Although funding for the youth portion of the program has expired, the weatherization training program continues for adult workers in Linn and Benton counties. CSC is currently seeking funding to bring back the youth program. Reflecting on the highly successful pilot experience, Clay Martin of CSC says, "None of it would have happened without ARRA."



- All TJC participants completed a work ethics class and an employment portfolio. The LWIB supported a few YouthBuild participants who attended a community college class in construction technology.

### ***Did you offer internships for WIA Summer participants? In what types of occupation groups?***

Most interviewees indicated that their LWIB provided internships for Summer Youth participants:

- WICCO program participants received internship credits in high-growth, high-wage industry work experiences. Internships with private businesses focused on retail, transportation logistics, manufacturing, and healthcare.
- JGI offered internships in healthcare, service industry, construction, fiber optics, manufacturing, concrete and masonry, visual arts and media, and administrative/professional.
- CSC staff described three types of work experiences: internships, work experiences, and crew-based activities. Internships had a career exploration focus in which participants received an "incentive" rather than a wage.
- LWP offered internships in health care, construction, green weatherization, public utilities, and fire and rescue. They also developed an EMT program.
- In the TJC region, most participants had paid work experiences, but some received stipends and had internship-like experiences.

***What general criteria did you use to determine whether participants would be placed in an internship versus a work experience?***

Nearly all interviewees indicated that youth program placements were based on available opportunities and participants' interests, skills, and age. Other comments about placement included the following:

- Through the community college partnership, all WICCO participants were placed in work experience opportunities that also qualified as internships. Older youth were generally placed in career pathways whereas younger youth were placed on crews.
- JGI placements were determined by employers and depended on agreements about workers' compensation, the type of work, number of hours, etc. JGI defines work experience as working for a wage, whereas interns are not under wage laws and receive a stipend. Employers were not allowed to specify whether they wanted to provide a work experience or an internship.
- In most cities, CSC focused more on crew work than internships or work experience. Younger youth were probably placed in internships more often than older youth.
- LWP required that all interns complete at least one work experience prior to internships to ensure work readiness skills.

***What additional youth-related information, if any, did your LWIB collect?***

Some LWIBs collected additional information from Summer Youth participants. CSC administered informal surveys regarding Summer Youth eligibility and collected "more data than necessary (e.g., grade level, testing)." LWP staff interviewed more than 50 percent of youth participants on work experiences and received strong positive feedback. TJC "revived" pre- and

**Regional Success Stories**

*The Job Council / Rogue Valley (TJC)*

In the past decade, Oregon has seen a shift in funding for youth work programs. As a majority of funding was directed towards year-round programs, summer youth employment programs became increasingly scarce. During the summer of 2009, ARRA funding allowed The Job Council of Rouge Valley to bring back its summer program and provide more than 300 in-school youth with valuable work experiences.

Sherri Stratton knows firsthand the difference these programs can make. More than 20 years ago, Sherri participated in The Job Council's program as a young mother. "I remember not really having a clue [about job hunting] and not having the resources," she says.

At The Job Council, Sherri found herself surrounded by people who loved their work, and she decided to build a career there. After graduating from high school and landing a job elsewhere, a position as a temporary receptionist became available at the organization. She jumped at the opportunity, was hired and worked her way up to her current role as a project manager. Along the way, Sherri returned to school to earn her bachelor's and master's degrees.

Sherri credits her mentors at The Job Council for the guidance they have provided over the years. "They created a pathway I wasn't aware of," she says. By leveraging the opportunities and career-building tools she received two decades ago, Sherri continues to enjoy a fulfilling career with the organization that helped her get her start.



## Regional Success Stories

*Job Growers, Inc.*

*Arbor Education and Training: Summer Training and Employment Program (STEP)*

When Anthony applied to the July session of STEP, the documents included a letter from his grandmother, who wanted to convince Arbor that Anthony was a perfect candidate for the Summer Program. She felt that, because of past events and a lack of family support, Anthony could benefit greatly from the training and experience offered by Arbor. Anthony was accepted into the program.

At first, Anthony was quiet and shy, but in only a few days he was interacting with the other participants and smiling constantly. With every assignment, activity, and new phase of the program, Anthony's enjoyment showed in his huge smile. His preferred areas of work were food service, cooking, and customer service, and he was placed in a work experience position in the Deli at Roth's Fresh Market. On his first evaluation, he had gained in every area. His supervisors, Drew and Cheryl, were so impressed that before the end of the second week they approached him to ask if he would consider working for them permanently.

Anthony completed the STEP program on August 4th and began his new full-time, permanent position in the Deli at Roth's on August 10th.

Any time Arbor staff spoke with Anthony, he was smiling and saying "thank you" over and over. Anthony showed his appreciation for the help he received by referring at least six friends to Arbor!



post-assessment data collection and work readiness performance measures.

WICCO keeps information in I-TRAC about youth enrolled in year-round services; they don't have as much information for Summer Youth participants. Work experience plans are supposed to include a pre-assessment, mid-assessment, and post-assessment, but "everyone had something different." One interviewee also described how the Department of Labor reporting requirements changed over time: as the stimulus program progressed, reporting requirements became more specific and comprehensive.

### ***What was the impact, if any, of the age eligibility change?***

Most interviewees noted that the age eligibility change brought both benefits and challenges. Although LWP was unable to attract any applicants older than 22 years old, all other LWIBs were able to serve the older youth population. WSI has historically not focused on serving the older youth population, and staff appreciated being able to engage this group. In TOC/OWA counties, many older youth found permanent jobs after the summer program. Other interviewees reported the following:

- WICCO marketed to older participants by sending a "FastPass" to iMatch clients. They focused on career pathways and recruited some older youth to be assistant crew leaders. They have received more inquiries from older youth since the ARRA-funded Summer program and have referred these youth to the WIA Adult program.
- JGI staff said it was good to be able to serve older youth for the summer, but that it was difficult to not continue to serve those older youth when summer ended. Older youth were referred to the adult system, but that system does not offer the same level of one-on-one support.

- CSC staff noted that the change gave them flexibility (e.g., in the weatherization training program), but eligibility was a problem and individuals older than 22 years old often don't think of themselves as "youth." They also reported challenges with mixing age ranges: "There are real differences between 24 years old and 16 years old." In the future, they would want to collect more data and create separate tracks.
- TJC was also able to serve younger youth (14-16 years old), which staff reported has been difficult in the past.

***What was the impact, if any, of the requirement that at least 30 percent of the funds expended in the summer program be for out-of-school youth?***

Of all the interviewees, only those from LWP indicated that it was challenging to meet this requirement: "Contractors had to learn to recruit out-of-school youth, and managing the dual funding streams doubled the necessary administrative work." LWIB staff members had to work extensively with contractors on budget management. The rest of the interviewees said that they were already meeting this requirement. WSI, WICCO, and JGI programs already consisted of approximately 40 percent, 50 percent, and 70 percent out-of-school youth, respectively.

***How did you determine the allocation of resources and funds to Youth programs?***

There was significant variation in the allocation methods described by LWIB staff:

- WSI allocated funds geographically and then selected contractors "based on neighborhood focus and target population." The community-based organizations that participated in ARRA-funded programs were mostly year-round providers.
- WICCO used ARRA funds to provide a robust summer work experience and training program. Many youth who participated in the summer program wanted to continue in a year-round program.
- JGI placements varied by project. Some were primarily made on a one-on-one basis for each youth as determined by youth interest, employer need, and type of work. Others were crew-based in nature. Some projects were actual "work" with youth on payroll, and others were developed as paid internships, depending on whether the work experience was performance driven or based on hours.
- CSC "didn't have the luxury to make that determination." Staff didn't know whether they would have money for year-round programs, so they "created the best summer program they could" and tried to spend all the money in the summer." When they did receive funding for year-round programs, it came "in discrete chunks."
- LWP workers "sent out a combined RFP and let the contractors choose." If contractors wanted to participate in both summer and year-round programs, LWP created two separate contracts.
- TJC intended to spend all the ARRA money in the summer; they ended up spending nearly 75 percent. With the remaining funds they served 60 youth in year-round programs.
- TOC/OWA used the same methods to allocate summer and year round funds across regions.

## Oregon Youth Employment Initiative (OYEI) Program Detail

This section presents our study of OYEI expenditures, the characteristics of OYEI participants, and program impacts according to an interview conducted with the director of OYCC.

### Expenditures

The total allocation of ARRA funding for OYEI will ultimately amount to about \$9.6 million, distributed between April 2009 and December 2011. During the program's first two quarters, between April 1 and September 30, 2009, OYEI expenditures amounted to approximately \$2.0 million. From October 1, 2009 through December 31, 2010, another \$6.2 million in expenditures brought the total to more than \$8.2 million. OYCC plans to spend the remaining \$1.4 million throughout 2011.

OYCC distributed OYEI ARRA funding to county-level providers that ran Summer Youth programs in accordance with the guidelines established by OYCC and USFS. Table 2.10 and the map in Figure 2. show the expenditures in each county. About half the OYEI funding went to Oregon's rural counties in the TOC/OWA regions (Regions 1, 6, 7, and 9 through 14). Of all Oregon counties, Lane and Linn counties had the highest OYEI expenditures: \$187,194 and \$135,854, respectively. Jefferson County spent the smallest amount, \$16,659. In addition to these amounts, Northwest Service Academy spent approximately \$38,000 for regional projects.


OYEI grants are designated for a specific period of time. Partner agencies are not required to match ARRA funds (there is a required match with regular OYCC funds), but some partners provide matching funds anyway. For example, the Warm Springs program subsidized OYEI's wage of \$10.00 per hour by \$4.50 per hour.

**Table 2.10: OYEI's ARRA expenditures by county**

<b>County</b>	<b>Initial Spending</b>	<b>County</b>	<b>Initial Spending</b>	<b>County</b>	<b>Initial Spending</b>
Baker	\$70,966	Harney	\$76,650	Morrow	\$28,602
Benton	\$32,000	Hood River	\$26,578	Multnomah	\$81,517
Clackamas	\$56,782	Jackson	\$128,000	Polk	\$31,926
Clatsop	\$32,228	Jefferson	\$16,659	Sherman	\$32,000
Columbia	\$63,865	Josephine	\$96,000	Tillamook	\$63,164
Coos	\$62,787	Klamath	\$83,919	Umatilla	\$26,947
Crook	\$47,920	Lake	-	Union	\$38,665
Curry	\$59,504	Lane	\$187,194	Wallowa	\$25,045
Deschutes	\$25,129	Lincoln	\$54,322	Wasco	-
Douglas	\$91,083	Linn	\$135,854	Washington	\$23,662
Gilliam	\$27,045	Malheur	\$48,000	Wheeler	\$27,019
Grant	\$42,209	Marion	\$88,237	Yamhill	\$59,332
				<b>Total</b>	<b>\$1,990,810</b>

Source: ECONorthwest analysis of OYCC data

**Figure 2.18: OYEI's ARRA expenditures in spring/summer 2009, by county**



Source: ECONorthwest analysis of OYCC data

**Analysis of OYCC/OYEI participation data**

The number of OYEI participants in spring/summer 2009 ranged from 21 in Region 15 (WICCO) to 209 in Regions 9-14 (part of TOC/OWA) (see Table 2.11). These regions also spent the least and the most, respectively, during that time period. Based on these data, the average cost per participant for all OYEI programs in 2009 was approximately \$2,350. Individual regions varied from a low of \$1,282 in Region 5 (Lane County), to a high of \$3,250 in Region 1 (Clatsop, Columbia and Tillamook Counties).

**Table 2.11: OYEI participants, expenditures, and cost per participant, by region, spring/summer 2009**

Region	Participants	Spending	Cost per Participant
Region 1	49	\$159,257	\$3,250
Region 2	42	\$105,179	\$2,504
Region 3	61	\$179,495	\$2,943
Region 4	83	\$222,176	\$2,677
Region 5	146	\$187,194	\$1,282
Regions 6-7	127	\$213,374	\$1,680
Region 8	109	\$224,000	\$2,055
Regions 9-14	209	\$643,353	\$3,078
Region 15	21	\$56,782	\$2,704
<b>Total</b>	<b>847</b>	<b>\$1,990,810</b>	<b>\$2,350</b>

Source: ECONorthwest analysis of OYCC data


We analyzed statewide OYCC/OYEI participant characteristics using administrative data provided by OYCC as well as ODE enrollment data. We were not able to determine participant characteristics for individual regions because we did not have complete data.

There are no strict eligibility rules for OYEI participants (though OYCC collects GPA and basic demographic and attendance information). The average age for OYEI participants as of June 2009 was 17.5 years old, about a year younger than the average age of year-round WIA Youth participants in 2009. About 74 percent of the youth served by OYEI were men. This is significantly higher than the share of male participants in WIA Youth programs (56 percent in summer 2009 and 49 percent in year-round programs in 2009).

Figure 2.19 and Figure 2.20 illustrate the race/ethnicity share for OYEI participants. ODE data matched with OYCC administrative data indicated that about 20 percent of participants were minorities, compared with 24 percent of the statewide youth population being minorities. Figure 2.20 is an analysis of the OYCC survey data, which indicate that 70 percent of participants were white alone, 12 percent were some combination of races/ethnicities, and the remaining 18 percent fell into distinct race/ethnicity categories as indicated.

Our analysis of ODE and OYCC data also showed that approximately 60 percent of OYEI participants in 2009 were economically disadvantaged, and 27 percent had received special education services at some point since the 8th grade.<sup>35</sup>


**Figure 2.19: Race/ethnicity shares for OYEI participants in Oregon, 2009**



Source: American Community Survey 2006-2008; ECONorthwest analysis of ODE data and OYCC data

**Figure 2.20: Race/ethnicity shares for OYEI participants in Oregon, 2009**

Source: ECONorthwest analysis of OYCC survey data



<sup>35</sup> In our analysis of ODE data for OYEI participants, some participants were excluded because we had no program data and no ODE enrollment data. Economically disadvantaged, a proxy for economic barriers, indicates eligibility for free/reduced price lunch. This measure comes from the 8th and 10th grade OAKS tests. Participants were excluded if we had no test data for them (more likely for older participants).

## **Interview results**

The following interview questions and answers provide context for the quantitative results of our analysis:

### ***How do OYCC's programs align with the Governor's focus areas (health care, manufacturing, green jobs, high-wage high-demand jobs)?***

OYEI's focus on natural resources employment is aligned with the governor's green jobs focus area. Examples of natural resources jobs include forest fuel reduction, invasive species removal, and natural habitat restoration.

### ***What new strategies or approaches have you implemented with ARRA funds?***

OYCC used ARRA funds to expand existing programs and develop new partnerships. One new strategy involved using ARRA money to reach out to typically underserved populations such as blind/visually impaired and deaf/hard of hearing students. Projects were developed specifically to meet the needs of both the students and the intent of OYEI. Otherwise, OYCC used the funds to develop both new and existing partnerships with federal, state, local, and non-profit entities and other programs with demonstrated experience in running "conservation corps" type programs to add youth job components to their existing and future projects. Given the spending requirements they faced, staff members focused on their partnerships with USFS, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), and the Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife. OYCC hopes to sustain these partnerships after ARRA funding ends.

### ***What major challenges and obstacles have you faced in program implementation?***

OYCC's director said that the timeline surrounding ARRA money was very intense—OYEI was selected for funding and tasked with implementation within 7-14 days. OYCC accomplished this by using existing programs and infrastructure, which allowed time for the development of the current grant system. Another major challenge for the OYEI team was managing the different requirements of federal and state agencies in terms of tracking, reporting, and accounting. According to the director, state agencies are "getting better and more streamlined," yet some aspects still prove to be a challenge.

### ***What impacts did ARRA funds have on your regular, ongoing OYCC programs?***

In a typical school year, OYCC will fund about 25 programs. In spring 2009, ARRA funds allowed OYCC to provide 13 of these programs, with additional funding to pay the youth for project work that fell within OYEI guidelines. About 250 youth and adults participated in this phase. In summer 2009, OYCC was able to add 60 additional crews statewide. More than 600 youth and supporting adults participated in this phase. ARRA funds also paid for Outdoor School interns to teach more than 25,000 middle and high school students about green issues, sustainability, and recycling.

***If more funding were available in the future, what additional steps could be taken by CCWD, OYCC, and/or LWIAs to strengthen workforce development for youth?***

According to the OYCC director, future workforce development opportunities in natural resources for Oregon’s youth will depend on the willingness of organizations to use youth crews on public land. From his point of view, Oregon’s future jobs will include many opportunities for employment in natural resource fields. He is seeing growing interest in natural resources employment: several high schools decided to continue their jobs program despite the end of the stimulus funding, and the USFS and BLM are interested in future workforce development. The director feels that OYCC could maintain these programs with half the amount of funding they received from ARRA.

***Have you collected any additional information about your participants beyond what is required (i.e., from surveys or interviews)?***

OYCC asked all program participants to complete an online survey; about 300 participants completed the survey in summer 2009. OYCC also collects a lot of participant data during their regular programs, and many OYEI participants are also regular-program participants. The same student could appear in the database under several different funds, for example as an OYEI enrollee and again as a WIA enrollee.

## ***Statewide Initiatives***

### ***Spending on Statewide Activities***

Although CCWD allocated most of the ARRA money to local entities, they held back a portion to fund statewide activities and administrative costs. From July 2009 through June 2010, this spending totaled \$581,279 and included the following activities:

<b>Program/Activity</b>	<b>Expenditures for year ending 6/30/10</b>
Career Pathways	\$109,370
National Career Readiness Certificates	\$254,283
Evaluation of ARRA Activities	\$13,945
Oregon Food Bank (wages for workers)	\$104,952
Oregon Workforce Healthcare Institute	\$15,000
Workforce Integration Professional Development	\$54,000
ARRA Reporting	\$19,433
NEG Administration	\$10,296
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$581,279</b>

This chapter concludes with a discussion of two statewide activities: National Career Readiness Certificates and statewide Service Integration efforts.

### ***National Career Readiness Certificates***

Oregon has adopted the educational attainment goal of 40-40-20 by 2025. The targets propose goals of 40 percent of the population having a four-year college degree by 2025, 40 percent of the population having post-secondary training, and the remaining 20 percent having a high school degree or equivalent (in benchmark terms this equates to 100 percent of the population having a high school diploma or equivalent). One credentialing option the state is using to address the needs of the middle 40 percent is the National Career Readiness Certificate (NCRC), a nationally recognized portable certificate issued by ACT to applicants who complete assessments in three areas: applied mathematics, reading for information, and locating information.<sup>36</sup> Individuals can receive bronze, silver, gold, or platinum certificates. The NCRC is a useful screening tool for employers making hiring and promotion decisions, and it could eventually attract businesses considering relocation to Oregon.

In Oregon, the NCRC initiative is funded with WIA and ARRA dollars and is administered by CCWD. In spring of 2009, 13 pilot sites began developing the infrastructure that will be the foundation for the statewide implementation of the NCRC. As of June 2010, more than 2,000 NCRCs had been awarded to Oregonians; by early January 2011, this number had increased to more than 4,200. The implementation team's stated goal was to formally launch the program to Oregon employers by the end of 2010, thereby extending the core level of NCRC service provision to all 15 workforce regions. LWIBs will convene partners in their regions and develop customized NCRC processes that will best address local needs. WorkSource Oregon centers are to be the NCRC "front door" for employers and job seekers, but each region will determine which local organizations will deliver which NCRC services. The same marketing and communications materials will be used across the state.<sup>37</sup>

In May 2010, we interviewed the adult basic education state director about the relationship between ARRA funding and the NCRC initiative. He described the basic NCRC implementation strategy and timeline and indicated that the economic downturn has had a significant impact on the process: businesses that under normal circumstances would be interested in using the NCRC as a hiring tool simply aren't hiring right now. Thus, the primary message to employers at this point is that there will be a broader pool of higher skilled people available to work as the economy improves and the NCRC infrastructure will be in place when businesses are ready to hire again. Employers will be able to designate NCRCs as preferred or recommended for job applicants.<sup>38</sup>

The ARRA money was "a huge infusion" for the NCRC initiative; without ARRA, the rollout would have been much smaller and there would have been fewer pilot sites. Further, the quality, scope, and level of communication would have been much more limited. ARRA funding has

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<sup>36</sup> See <http://www.act.org/certificate/> for more information.

<sup>37</sup> See <http://www.ode.state.or.us/superintendent/priorities/2010-june-25-adult-credential-attainment.doc>

<sup>38</sup> The director reported that utility and manufacturing companies have expressed the most interest in the CRC. High schools and apprenticeship programs might also be able to use the CRC as an alternative assessment tool. The CRC will probably have less value in the health care field because it is already certificate driven.

enabled the implementation team to provide pilot sites with marketing materials and other support services. The director reported that the program’s potential sustainability beyond ARRA funding is “good,” especially if they use ARRA dollars wisely and if the NCRC is a priority for the next governor and other state leaders. One potential funding strategy is a shared cost model with employers.

The NCRC implementation team is discussing the possibility of establishing customized performance targets for regions, and they plan to evaluate NCRC outcomes by individual, by site, and by tier. The team has helped the pilots sites market the NCRC to local businesses by referring them to same-industry businesses in other states that have a history of using and trusting the NCRC. Funding models in other states are “mixed” because they depend on levels of funding and decisions made by local leaders.

In our LWIB interviews, we asked staff members about the effect of ARRA funds on NCRC projects:

***Did you use ARRA funds to collaborate with other programs on NCRCs?***

- Workers from JGI and TOC/OWA reported that businesses “have not bought into the NCRC,” which makes successful implementation challenging.
- WICCO uses NCRCs, with the youth and OJT programs just starting to use NCRCs this year. Students in their materials handling cohort took the NCRC assessment as a pilot implementation. Staff members said that the lack of available jobs encouraged the students to pursue the NCRC as a way to increase their visibility and credibility.
- JGI began implementing the NCRC before many other regions in the state and has integrated NCRCs into other initiatives, but they did not use ARRA funds for these activities.
- LWP used ARRA funds to expand NCRC use and create a partial FTE for a career readiness coordinator.
- TJC staff said that they chose not to participate in the NCRC program because they “didn’t feel prepared or knowledgeable about NCRCs,” but they would be interested in applying additional funding to begin NCRC use.

***Integration***

The word *integration* is used throughout Oregon’s workforce system, but its meaning must be viewed contextually. *Integration* can refer to the integrated service delivery initiative Oregon is implementing, the physical and technological integration of various data systems, or even the co-locating of staff from different funding stream partners. It is often used as a catch-all term that encompasses elements from all of these related efforts at integrating a diverse workforce system.

***Service integration***

The purpose of the statewide Integrated Service Delivery initiative by CCWD and OED is to integrate job seeker and training services and skills assessment and development, and to implement a common data system. This is expected to improve the quality of services delivered

across the state, strengthen focus on individual skill and talent development, increase wages and job retention among Oregonians, and raise the general economic well being of the state. The stated requirements of the initiative are as follows:

- Move beyond partnership to multidisciplinary service integration
- Establish integration minimums expected in all local areas
- Require LWIBs to convene partners and be accountable for the development of an integrated service delivery system with OED and the LWIB

The initiative created a common registration process for customers seeking WIA-funded services, effectively creating a pool of customers who received services from multiple funding sources (Title IB Adult and Dislocated Worker, Title III Wagner-Peyser, etc.) and were co-enrolled much earlier than under the previous service delivery model.

The “Highest Level of Service Received” represents a customer’s progression through the workforce system, depending on the customer’s needs. The initiative has resulted in exponentially larger numbers of customers receiving Core services than in pre-Integration years, with a large number of customers only being in the system for a very short period of time. While the numbers of customers who receive Intensive-level services has also increased, it has not kept pace with Core services because of the nature of Intensive-level services. Likewise, the number of customers transitioning from Intensive- to Training-level services has increased, but due to the cost of delivering these services compared to available resources in relation to the increased number of customers, the percentages continue to drop while the numbers climb.

The significant increase in the total number of customers receiving WIA- and ARRA-funded core services has resulted in decreased *percentages* of customers receiving Training services. However, CCWD reports that, statewide, the *number* of customer receiving training services increased from over 2,600 in 2007-08, to over 3,300 in 2008-09 and about 5,000 in 2009-10.

### **Data integration**

In addition to developing integrated service delivery strategies described above, CCWD, LWIAs, and OED are working toward what is sometimes referred to as *data integration* – the consolidation or integration of multiple data systems. One of the primary goals of data integration is to create a single data warehouse where all customer service, enrollment, demographic, and related information across multiple partner programs is housed and accessed. These ongoing changes to existing data and reporting systems have sometimes made it more difficult to get accurate reporting information and at other times have provided greater clarity than was previously available. Implementing a common registration system, an integrated service delivery strategy, and a universal access/co-enrollment function has created challenges in managing performance and consistent data collection statewide and with LWIAs.

We asked LWIB interviewees the following question about the service integration initiative:

***What is the relationship between service integration and ARRA funds? Have there been any major impacts on clients?***

Interviewees from two LWIBs—WSI and LWP—indicated that ARRA funds allowed them to strengthen and “speed up” service integration efforts because they could serve an increased number of clients, whereas workers from two other LWIBs—JGI and TJC—said that ARRA money did not contribute to any integration work in their regions. Other interviewees commented on the economic downturn’s general effect on the integration process: “the economic crisis needs to be recognized for really derailing integration in many ways.” Conversely, WICCO staff members reported that the downturn increased the pressure to collaborate on integration efforts.

CSC workers said that it was difficult to know whether service integration efforts were funded by ARRA because “the money is all mixed up.” They also reported that integration efforts have involved (a) a “tremendous amount of training” that takes staff away from clients and (b) a constant stream of data system changes and updates.

A few interviewees mentioned how integrating service delivery has changed the case management process so that there is less follow up with trainees. WICCO staff members were pleased that ARRA funding enabled them to track employment outcomes in real time as opposed to 9-12 months after placement. Since 2008, integrated WICCO staff have increased (a) the number of job seekers attending core workshops (e.g., resume writing, interviewing) from 1,474 customers to 2,195, (b) the number of clients on public assistance from 278 to 1,864, and (c) the number of clients with disabilities from 190 to 484.

## ***Chapter Summary***

ARRA spending on workforce development and training in Oregon had a significant impact on programs at the state, county, and local levels. All programs used ARRA dollars to (a) serve a larger number of clients, (b) expand and bolster their existing programs, and (c) design and create new programs or program elements that respond to local needs.

In this chapter we presented our analysis of the expenditure and participation data we received for WIA and OYEI programs. WIA programs received \$46.8 million in ARRA funding and OYEI received \$2.0 million. Nearly all programs spent their ARRA allocations quickly and efficiently, with 4 percent of WIA Youth ARRA dollars and 14 percent of Adult/DW ARRA dollars remaining at the end of FY 2010.

The changes that occurred in the data system in late 2008 and the intertwined nature of the data for ARRA-funded and non-ARRA-funded programs make it difficult to draw definite conclusions about the precise relationships between ARRA spending and participation rates and participant characteristics, but it is clear that ARRA funding enabled programs to serve more clients in a more comprehensive way than would have been otherwise possible.


# Participant Characteristics

## WIA Programs in Oregon, 2009


### Region 2: Worksystems, Inc. (Multnomah and Washington Counties)

	Number of Participants		Level of Service			Average Age		
	Region		Region		State	Region		State
Adult/DW	41,460		Adult/DW core	71.6%	76.2%	Adult/DW	41.3	39.8
NEG	184		Adult/DW intensive	24.9%	20.8%	NEG	46.1	42.3
Summer Youth	1,275		Adult/DW training	3.4%	3.0%	Summer Youth	18.4	17.7
Year-Round Youth	527					Year-Round Youth	19.0	18.8

#### Adult/DW Participant Characteristics



#### NEG Participant Characteristics




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
- Participants are assigned to the first region in which they received services. Adult/DW participants are grouped by the highest level of services received (core is the lowest intensity and training is the highest). The relatively low percentage of Adult/DW training recipients is a function of the large total number of service recipients. For most LWIAs, the number of training recipients has increased significantly each year since 2007.
- Most NEG participants are also Adult/DW participants. Some NEG participants with service episodes that extended beyond 2009 received their NEG-funded services in years other than 2009.
- Year-Round Youth participants are those who did not receive any summer ARRA funding, whereas all Summer Youth participants received summer ARRA funding. Many Summer Youth participants also received services funded by regular WIA funds. Any individual who received Summer Youth funding any time through July 2010 was classified as Summer Youth. See the full report for additional information about program populations.

# Region 2: Worksystems, Inc. (Multnomah and Washington Counties)

### Year-Round Youth Participant Characteristics



### Summer Youth Participant Characteristics




# Participant Characteristics

## WIA Programs in Oregon, 2009


### Region 3: E3/Job Growers, Inc. (Yamhill, Polk, and Marion Counties)

	Number of Participants		Level of Service			Average Age		
	Region		Region		State	Region		State
Adult/DW	25,051		Adult/DW core	85.1%	76.2%	Adult/DW	38.7	39.8
NEG	190		Adult/DW intensive	12.9%	20.8%	NEG	43.5	41.6
Summer Youth	303		Adult/DW training	2.0%	3.0%	Summer Youth	19.0	17.7
Year-Round Youth	448					Year-Round Youth	19.3	18.8

#### Adult/DW Participant Characteristics



#### NEG Participant Characteristics




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
- Participants are assigned to the first region in which they received services. Adult/DW participants are grouped by the highest level of services received (core is the lowest intensity and training is the highest). The relatively low percentage of Adult/DW training recipients is a function of the large total number of service recipients. For most LWIAs, the number of training recipients has increased significantly each year since 2007.
- Most NEG participants are also Adult/DW participants. Some NEG participants with service episodes that extended beyond 2009 received their NEG-funded services in years other than 2009.
- Year-Round Youth participants are those who did not receive any summer ARRA funding, whereas all Summer Youth participants received summer ARRA funding. Many Summer Youth participants also received services funded by regular WIA funds. Any individual who received Summer Youth funding any time through July 2010 was classified as Summer Youth. See the full report for additional information about program populations.

# Region 3: E3/Job Growers, Inc. (Yamhill, Polk, and Marion Counties)

### Year-Round Youth Participant Characteristics



### Summer Youth Participant Characteristics




# Participant Characteristics

## WIA Programs in Oregon, 2009


### Region 4: Community Services Consortium (Benton, Lincoln, and Linn Counties)

	Number of Participants		Level of Service			Average Age		
	Region		Region		State	Region		State
Adult/DW	15,995		Adult/DW core	43.6%	76.2%	Adult/DW	40.0	39.8
NEG	316		Adult/DW intensive	54.6%	20.8%	NEG	49.2	42.3
Summer Youth	319		Adult/DW training	1.8%	3.0%	Summer Youth	17.5	17.7
Year-Round Youth	204					Year-Round Youth	18.7	18.8

#### Adult/DW Participant Characteristics



#### NEG Participant Characteristics




**Notes:**


- Participants are assigned to the first region in which they received services. Adult/DW participants are grouped by the highest level of services received (core is the lowest intensity and training is the highest). The relatively low percentage of Adult/DW training recipients is a function of the large total number of service recipients. For most LWIAs, the number of training recipients has increased significantly each year since 2007.
- Most NEG participants are also Adult/DW participants. Some NEG participants with service episodes that extended beyond 2009 received their NEG-funded services in years other than 2009.
- Year-Round Youth participants are those who did not receive any summer ARRA funding, whereas all Summer Youth participants received summer ARRA funding. Many Summer Youth participants also received services funded by regular WIA funds. Any individual who received Summer Youth funding any time through July 2010 was classified as Summer Youth. See the full report for additional information about program populations.

# Region 4: Community Services Consortium (Benton, Lincoln, and Linn Counties)

## Year-Round Youth Participant Characteristics



## Summer Youth Participant Characteristics




# Participant Characteristics

## WIA Programs in Oregon, 2009


### Region 5: Lane Workforce Partnership (Lane County)

	Number of Participants		Level of Service			Average Age		
	Region		Region		State	Region		State
Adult/DW	19,454		Adult/DW core	81.6%	76.2%	Adult/DW	40.0	39.8
NEG	805		Adult/DW intensive	16.3%	20.8%	NEG	40.9	42.3
Summer Youth	333		Adult/DW training	2.0%	3.0%	Summer Youth	17.9	17.7
Year-Round Youth	251					Year-Round Youth	18.8	18.8

#### Adult/DW Participant Characteristics



#### NEG Participant Characteristics




**Notes:**


- Participants are assigned to the first region in which they received services. Adult/DW participants are grouped by the highest level of services received (core is the lowest intensity and training is the highest). The relatively low percentage of Adult/DW training recipients is a function of the large total number of service recipients. For most LWIAs, the number of training recipients has increased significantly each year since 2007.
- Most NEG participants are also Adult/DW participants. Some NEG participants with service episodes that extended beyond 2009 received their NEG-funded services in years other than 2009.
- Year-Round Youth participants are those who did not receive any summer ARRA funding, whereas all Summer Youth participants received summer ARRA funding. Many Summer Youth participants also received services funded by regular WIA funds. Any individual who received Summer Youth funding any time through July 2010 was classified as Summer Youth. See the full report for additional information about program populations.

## Region 5: Lane Workforce Partnership (Lane County)

### Year-Round Youth Participant Characteristics



### Summer Youth Participant Characteristics




# Participant Characteristics

## WIA Programs in Oregon, 2009


### Region 8: TJC/Rogue Valley (Jackson and Josephine Counties)

	Number of Participants		Level of Service			Average Age		
	Region		Region		State	Region		State
Adult/DW	11,386		Adult/DW core	76.1%	76.2%	Adult/DW	39.9	39.8
NEG	7		Adult/DW intensive	21.3%	20.8%	NEG	49.0	42.3
Summer Youth	281		Adult/DW training	2.6%	3.0%	Summer Youth	16.7	17.7
Year-Round Youth	154					Year-Round Youth	18.5	18.8

**Adult/DW Participant Characteristics**



**NEG Participant Characteristics**




**Notes:**


- Participants are assigned to the first region in which they received services. Adult/DW participants are grouped by the highest level of services received (core is the lowest intensity and training is the highest). The relatively low percentage of Adult/DW training recipients is a function of the large total number of service recipients. For most LWIAs, the number of training recipients has increased significantly each year since 2007.
- Most NEG participants are also Adult/DW participants. Some NEG participants with service episodes that extended beyond 2009 received their NEG-funded services in years other than 2009.
- Year-Round Youth participants are those who did not receive any summer ARRA funding, whereas all Summer Youth participants received summer ARRA funding. Many Summer Youth participants also received services funded by regular WIA funds. Any individual who received Summer Youth funding any time through July 2010 was classified as Summer Youth. See the full report for additional information about program populations.

# Region 8: TJC/Rogue Valley (Jackson and Josephine Counties)

## Year-Round Youth Participant Characteristics



## Summer Youth Participant Characteristics




# Participant Characteristics

## WIA Programs in Oregon, 2009


### Region 15: Workforce Investment Council of Clackamas County (Clackamas County)

	Number of Participants		Level of Service			Average Age		
	Region		Region		State	Region		State
Adult/DW	11,468		Adult/DW core	49.4%	76.2%	Adult/DW	42.4	39.8
NEG	115		Adult/DW intensive	45.7%	20.8%	NEG	43.3	42.3
Summer Youth	290		Adult/DW training	4.9%	3.0%	Summer Youth	17.3	17.7
Year-Round Youth	483					Year-Round Youth	18.6	18.8

#### Adult/DW Participant Characteristics



#### NEG Participant Characteristics




**Notes:**


- Participants are assigned to the first region in which they received services. Adult/DW participants are grouped by the highest level of services received (core is the lowest intensity and training is the highest). The relatively low percentage of Adult/DW training recipients is a function of the large total number of service recipients. For most LWIAs, the number of training recipients has increased significantly each year since 2007.
- Most NEG participants are also Adult/DW participants. Some NEG participants with service episodes that extended beyond 2009 received their NEG-funded services in years other than 2009.
- Year-Round Youth participants are those who did not receive any summer ARRA funding, whereas all Summer Youth participants received summer ARRA funding. Many Summer Youth participants also received services funded by regular WIA funds. Any individual who received Summer Youth funding any time through July 2010 was classified as Summer Youth. See the full report for additional information about program populations.

# Region 15: Workforce Investment Council of Clackamas County (Clackamas County)

## Year-Round Youth Participant Characteristics



## Summer Youth Participant Characteristics



# Participant Characteristics


## WIA Programs in Oregon, 2009

### Regions 1, 6, 7, 9-14: TOC/OWA


(Clatsop, Columbia, Tillamook, Coos, Curry, Douglas, Hood River, Wasco, Sherman, Gilliam, Wheeler, Jefferson, Deschutes, Crook, Klamath, Lake, Marrow, Umatilla, Baker, Wallowa, Grant, Harney, and Malheur Counties)

	Number of Participants		Level of Service			Average Age		
	Region		Region		State	Region		State
Adult/DW	52,018		Adult/DW core	89.4%	76.2%	Adult/DW	38.3	39.8
NEG	1,308		Adult/DW intensive	6.9%	20.8%	NEG	40.6	42.3
Summer Youth	1,058		Adult/DW training	3.6%	3.0%	Summer Youth	17.0	17.7
Year-Round Youth	1,046					Year-Round Youth	18.8	18.8

#### Adult/DW Participant Characteristics



#### NEG Participant Characteristics




#### Notes:

- Participants are assigned to the first region in which they received services. Adult/DW participants are grouped by the highest level of services received (core is the lowest intensity and training is the highest). The relatively low percentage of Adult/DW training recipients is a function of the large total number of service recipients. For most LWIAs, the number of training recipients has increased significantly each year since 2007.
- Most NEG participants are also Adult/DW participants. Some NEG participants with service episodes that extended beyond 2009 received their NEG-funded services in years other than 2009.
- Year-Round Youth participants are those who did not receive any summer ARRA funding, whereas all Summer Youth participants received summer ARRA funding. Many Summer Youth participants also received services funded by regular WIA funds. Any individual who received Summer Youth funding any time through July 2010 was classified as Summer Youth. See the full report for additional information about program populations.


# Regions 1, 6, 7, 9-14: TOC/OWA

(Clatsop, Columbia, Tillamook, Coos, Curry, Douglas, Hood River, Wasco, Sherman, Gilliam, Wheeler, Jefferson, Deschutes, Crook, Klamath, Lake, Marrow, Umatilla, Baker, Wallowa, Grant, Harney, and Malheur Counties)

## Year-Round Youth Participant Characteristics



## Summer Youth Participant Characteristics



## Chapter 3 – IMPACTS OF ARRA-FUNDED PROGRAMS

In this chapter we summarize our analysis of the short- and long-term effects of ARRA spending on workforce development and training in Oregon. As we conducted our analysis, we focused on determining the extent to which individuals and communities are better off as a result of ARRA-funded projects. We analyzed three types of impacts:

- Short-term economic impacts (IMPLAN analysis)
- Potential long-term impacts of job training on future earnings
- Post-participation enrollment of youth participants

These three impacts do not represent a complete list of every conceivable impact. For example, we do not have the data necessary to identify whether the programs had a significant impact on participants' employment after receiving program services. But they do capture salient impacts related to major program goals.

### ***Economic Impact Analysis of ARRA Spending***

For this project, we estimated the economic impacts of the workforce development-related ARRA spending that occurred in Oregon in the year ending June 30, 2010. This spending amounted to approximately \$35.0 million for WIA programs and approximately \$2.0 million for OYCC's Oregon Youth Employment Initiative that occurred during the spring and summer of 2009. CCWD administered program funds and distributed most of the WIA money to local workforce regions, retaining about \$3.7 million for statewide activities. CCWD's OYCC distributed nearly all the OYEI money to county-level providers, with a small amount allocated to a program that served youth from throughout the state. In this section, we estimate the economic impacts of these funds as they flowed into the community, generating "ripples" of economic impacts across the economy. With each round of spending, some of the money "leaks" out of the region and state. We used the IMPLAN (IMpact analysis for PLANning) input-output modeling software to estimate the total economic impacts generated by the initial spending and subsequent spending cycles until the funds fully dissipate.

Below, we describe the fundamentals of economic impact analysis, the data and modeling approach used for this study, and some caveats and limitations of this type of analysis. Following this introduction, we present and discuss the results of the economic impact analysis for each workforce region and for the state as a whole.

### **About economic impact analysis and IMPLAN**

The IMPLAN model is based on an input-output modeling framework and uses secondary source data and proprietary analytic methods to estimate empirical input-output relationships from a combination of national technological relationships and county-level measures of economic activity.

The IMPLAN model has advantages that are particularly relevant for this analysis. First, the model is widely used and well respected. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) recently recognized the IMPLAN modeling framework as “one of the most credible regional impact models used for regional economic impact analysis” and, following a review by experts from seven USDA agencies, selected IMPLAN as its analysis framework for monitoring job creation associated with ARRA.

Second, the IMPLAN model is based on a well-structured, input-output modeling framework that relies on data specific to Oregon. This modeling framework produces economic impact estimates tailored to the economic conditions in individual Oregon counties.

The IMPLAN model measures shifts in economic activity that result from changes in economic conditions relative to a baseline representation of the economy. The sources of the changed conditions can vary but typically involve changes in production or consumption activities, government policies, and other activities that significantly affect economic activity.

### **Types of economic impacts**

For any change in economic activity, we report impacts at three levels:

- **Direct impacts** include the output (as measured by expenditures), payroll, and jobs associated with program activities supported by ARRA funding. This includes the staff hours retained or increased within CCWD, OYCC, and local workforce regions, as well as wages paid to program enrollees. These organizations also purchase services to conduct program operations, for example, transportation service providers who transport work crews to work sites. From a program perspective, these payroll and operating expenses represent the *direct output* associated with ARRA funding.
- **Indirect impacts** occur as businesses that are paid with stimulus money buy goods and services from other businesses. Indirect impacts are often referred to as “supply-chain impacts.” For example, an LWIB might purchase training slots for a nursing class (a direct impact), and as a result the community college must pay an instructor and order classroom supplies (an indirect result of the initial spending). The providers of classroom supplies will, in turn, purchase goods and services, which will *indirectly* generate additional sales, jobs, and income for others.
- **Induced impacts** are generated when households spend the additional wages and income they earn. For example, with the earnings from the extra class session the welding instructor buys groceries at the local store, and the driver who delivers an extra load of supplies dines at a local restaurant. The increase in income, in effect, increases the purchasing power of households. Induced impacts are also described as “consumption-driven” effects.

These three levels of impacts determine the larger economic impact of the initial change in spending. The following example illustrates how these types of impacts affect overall economic activity.

*Suppose that an LWIB uses some of its ARRA funding to establish an additional welding class at the local community college. The **direct impacts** consist mostly of the LWIB’s expenditure at the community college and some part of the salary and related expenses for the LWIB staff member who coordinates the contract. In the next round of spending—*

*the first round of **indirect impacts**—the community college will pay the welding instructor and will purchase additional goods and services such as welding supplies, classroom space, and electricity. This spending leads to additional rounds of indirect impacts as subsequent suppliers and vendors purchase additional goods and services. For example, the local welding supply store will increase its orders to meet the needs of the additional class and might require extra labor hours and fuel for delivery.*

*The direct and indirect increases in income and employment enhance the overall purchasing power in the economy. The welding instructor may spend the additional income to purchase groceries or go to the theater. Workers at the welding supply store will do the same. This spending will generate **induced impacts** for workers and businesses in other sectors of the economy.*

### **Spending “leakage”**

This cycle of direct, indirect, and induced spending does not go on forever. It continues until the spending eventually leaks out of the economy as a result of taxes, savings, or purchases of non-locally produced goods and services, or “imports.” All else being equal, smaller economies will have larger propensities to import and, as a result, will have smaller economic impact “multipliers”. This is particularly important in this analysis because ARRA funding supports program activities in large and diverse economies such as Portland, Salem, and Eugene, as well as in small and relatively more limited economies such as Burns, Coos Bay, and Baker City.

### **Measures of economic impact**

The economic impacts associated with ARRA stimulus spending can be measured in several ways. This report focuses on two of the most common and useful measures relevant to ARRA spending:

- **Economic output** is the broadest measure of economic activity and represents the value of goods and services produced as a result of program spending. Output includes the value of intermediate goods used in production; wholesale and retail margins on the sale of goods; the wages and income paid to workers; rents and profits earned by households and businesses; and excise taxes paid to governments.
- **Personal income** is a subset of economic output. It includes both employee compensation and proprietary income. Employee compensation (or wages) includes workers’ wages and other benefits such as retirement payments and health and life insurance. Proprietary income (or business income) represents the payments received by small-business owners or self-employed workers. Business income includes, for example, income received by private business owners, doctors, accountants, and attorneys.

Another commonly reported economic impact measure is jobs, that is, the change in the number of people working full- or part-time jobs as a result of some change in spending. In this analysis, the IMPLAN model estimates relatively small job creation impacts related to ARRA spending for WIA and OYEI programs. The ARRA spending was short term, and most of the resulting employment activity was in the form of summer jobs or temporary additional hours by existing employees, rather than the creation of new long-term jobs. However, we include the economic activity generated by additional employment hours as direct output (the value of the work) and as

personal income from wages. We also report the number of participants in the WIA and OYEI summer employment programs, because while they do not appear as job impacts in the IMPLAN model, they are nevertheless important to both the participating youth and to the local community.

### **Economic impact modeling assumptions and caveats**

Below we describe key modeling assumptions and caveats that are important to consider when interpreting the results of the impact analysis.

- ***Gross versus net impacts.*** Economic impact modeling considers many factors, including the funding source of spending that occurs in the economy. The gross impacts include any type of activity from any funding source, whereas the net impacts exclude activity generated by the redistribution of funds within the area of analysis (e.g., a city tax that pays for a city police officer). Because all ARRA funding came from the federal government rather than being *redistributed* within a workforce development region or within Oregon, the model includes all of the economic activity associated with ARRA spending. Put another way, net impacts equal gross impacts in this analysis.
- ***Static economic modeling.*** Like many quantitative tools, the IMPLAN model relies on a set of assumptions. Indeed, without simplifying assumptions it would be impossible for researchers to model something as complex as the Oregon economy. In this sense, the IMPLAN model is a static model because it measures the flow of inputs and outputs in an economy at a point in time; it does not account for changing conditions over time. The economic turmoil during the recent recession increases the importance of recognizing the static nature of the modeling approach.
- ***Time lag.*** Modeling software has a natural lag between actual data collection and incorporation of that data into the modeling software. The model built for this analysis utilizes IMPLAN 2008 data—the most current year available. Also, the indirect and induced impacts take time to filter through the economy. Economic impact analysis allows us to estimate the impacts in a one-year period as spending cycles between businesses, consumers, governments, and foreign entities.

### **Economic impact model for 2009-10 ARRA spending on workforce development in Oregon**

This IMPLAN model follows expenditures as they move through different sectors of the economy. Each sector in the model has its own, locally specific set of assumptions for how the different economic sectors are linked together and how money circulates through or moves out of the local economy. The more detailed we can be about what sectors the initial spending goes into, the more accurate the results of the model will be. As we show the initial spending amounts in this section, we discuss how and why this spending was allocated to different sectors.

#### ***Industry sector allocations in IMPLAN***

To create an accurate model of economic impacts, we must allocate initial expenditures to various industry sectors. Money flows through each sector differently, and IMPLAN has a detailed input-output model for each sector. For example, spending on an employee's salary circulates through the economy very differently than spending on a computer. The employee's

salary becomes household income and is likely to be spent on a variety of goods and services. A relatively larger portion of the impacts from this spending will occur in the local economy as people pay rent, purchase groceries, and get haircuts. Salaries and other household income do not produce direct or indirect impacts, but instead are counted entirely as induced impacts.

The purchase of goods has a different effect on the economy. For example, an LWIB's computer purchase generates some direct impacts (if the computer is purchased locally, the computer store earns revenue) and indirect impacts (the delivery contractor buys more fuel). However, because the computer is manufactured outside Oregon, most of the impact occurs outside of the state.

We used expenditure data from CCWD, OYCC, and LWIBs to allocate spending to the following sectors: non-profit and government payroll, community colleges, petroleum, transportation services, building supplies, clothing, and, for youth employment programs, income for low-income households. IMPLAN uses a detailed set of assumptions about how income is spent and saved by low-income households.

### ***IMPLAN Results***


In this section we discuss the results of the IMPLAN model, first at the state level, and then for each LWIA. For the state and each region, the results are shown separately for WIA spending and OYEI spending.

#### ***Statewide economic impacts from WIA expenditures***

For the year ending June 30, 2010, CCWD and LWIAs spent approximately \$35.0 million of ARRA funding on WIA Adult, Dislocated Worker, Youth, and NEG programs and CCWD statewide activities (represented by the orange bar in Figure 3.1). As this money flowed through the economy, it generated approximately \$23.6 million in direct economic output as direct providers of services paid wages and purchased goods and services in the economy (represented by the dark blue segment of the middle bar). Another \$7.0 million in indirect output accrued to the state as the suppliers of these goods and services paid wages and purchased goods and services to enable their production (the light blue segment). Finally, as workers who received these wages purchased goods and services in their local economies and beyond, they generated another \$18.1 million in induced economic output (the grey segment). ***The initial \$35.0 million in ARRA spending generated an estimated \$48.8 million in total economic output in Oregon in the year ending June 30, 2010.***

The total economic output includes approximately \$27.0 million in personal income (wages, salaries, and proprietor's income). The amounts of direct, indirect, and induced income are represented by the dark blue, light blue, and grey segments in the bottom bar. Most of the income is a direct impact because it includes the wages paid to participants in the Summer Youth program.

**Figure 3.1: Summary of statewide economic impacts of ARRA WIA expenditures**



Source: IMPLAN and ECONorthwest analysis of CCWD data

The table at the bottom of Figure 3.1 shows how the economic impacts were distributed by area. Of the \$48.8 million in total Oregon impacts, nearly all (\$45.2 million, or 93 percent) stayed within the region where the initial spending occurred. Five percent of the impacts of LWIA spending occurred elsewhere in Oregon, and another two percent is associated with CCWD’s central operations. More than half of the total economic impacts occurred in the form of income, most of which went to local residents who likely spent much of it in the local economy. The initial ARRA spending generated some full- and part-time jobs as well as economic output (or at least additional hours for current employees equivalent to the stated number of full- and part-time jobs). Based on the IMPLAN model, we estimate that the \$35.0 million in expenditures generated approximately 438 full- and part-time jobs in Oregon between July 1, 2009 and June 30, 2010 (see chart above). The IMPLAN estimate does not include the 3,859 Summer Youth program participants because those jobs were too short-lived to have a measurable impact on employment. However, these summer job opportunities are relevant for other reasons, so we report them separately here.


**Statewide economic impacts from OYEI expenditures**

In spring and summer of 2009, OYCC spent approximately \$2.0 million of ARRA money to fund OYEI programs (as represented by the orange bar in Figure 3.2). As this money flowed through the economy, it generated approximately \$1.6 million in direct economic output as direct providers of services paid wages and purchased goods and services in the economy (the dark blue segment of the middle bar). Another \$25,000 in indirect output accrued to the state as the suppliers of these goods and services paid wages and purchased goods and services to enable their production (the light blue segment). Finally, as workers who received these wages

purchased goods and services in their local economies and beyond, they generated another \$1.4 million in induced economic output (the gray segment). *The initial \$2.0 million in ARRA spending in the spring and summer of 2009 generated an estimated \$3.0 million in total economic output in Oregon.*

The total economic output includes approximately \$1.8 million in personal income (wages, salaries, and proprietor’s income). The amounts of direct, indirect, and induced income are represented by the dark blue, light blue, and grey segments in the bottom bar. Most of the income is a direct impact because it includes the wages paid to participants in the Summer Youth program.

**Figure 3.2: Summary of statewide economic impacts of ARRA OYEI expenditures**



Source: IMPLAN and ECONorthwest analysis of CCWD data

The table at the bottom of Figure 3.2 shows how the economic impacts were distributed by area. Of the \$3.0 million in total impacts, nearly all (\$2.9 million, or 97 percent) stayed within the region where the initial spending occurred. Only three percent of the impacts occurred elsewhere in Oregon. Well over half of the total economic impacts occurred in the form of income, most of which went to youth participants who likely spent much of it in the local economy.

As measured by IMPLAN, the initial ARRA spending generated 16 full- and part-time jobs. These are jobs that occurred throughout the economy in support of the production generated by the additional spending, but they do not include short-term summer employment for the youth participants because those jobs were too short-lived to have a measurable impact on employment. However, the 847 summer jobs did provide household income to participants, and the impacts of that spending are measured in the model.

## **Economic impacts by region**

The IMPLAN model traces economic output at the county level, allowing us to achieve accurate estimates of economic activity in relatively small geographic units. This section shows detailed IMPLAN results for individual LWIAs. Because TOC/OWA encompasses nine workforce development regions (1, 6, 7, and 9 through 14) spanning the state, we divided it into three smaller geographic units to reflect shared geography and economic ties: Region 1 in Northwest Oregon, Regions 6 and 7 on Oregon's South Coast, and Regions 9 through 14 east of the Cascades.

Like the initial ARRA spending itself, the economic impacts of the spending vary for each LWIA depending on a number of factors, including the size of the local economy, the size of the geographic area of analysis, proximity to larger centers of economic activity, and the characteristics of the industry sectors in the local economy.


### ***ARRA WIA expenditures for Adult, Youth, and NEG programs***

Figure 3.3 shows a comparison of the initial ARRA WIA spending to the total economic output (direct, indirect, and induced) it generated. The total output shown amounts to \$48.8 million in economic impacts in Oregon (including \$581,279 in CCWD statewide spending).

Region 2 (WSI, Multnomah and Washington counties), the most populous and economically diverse region in the state, clearly experienced the greatest economic impact from ARRA expenditures, with total economic output more than twice the initial spending (\$8.1 million in spending generated \$17.4 million in impacts throughout Oregon, 98 percent of which stayed within Region 2). Region 5 (LWP, Lane County) had \$4.0 million in expenditures, which generated \$5.9 million in economic output, the second highest amount. Regions 9 through 14 (Eastern Oregon) had \$6.3 million in economic impacts, but this was closer to their expenditures of \$5.7 million.

Regions 3, 4, and 8 had similar levels of impacts, with initial spending generating from 1.2 to 1.5 times the initial spending. Each of these regions has a relatively strong economic center (for example, Region 8 is centered around the Medford area), allowing it to capture a larger share of the impacts of the initial spending. In contrast, Region 1 (Tillamook, Clatsop, and Columbia counties) and Region 15 (Clackamas County) experienced economic impacts smaller than the initial expenditures, and in Regions 6 and 7 (Coos, Curry, and Douglas counties), initial spending and economic output are nearly the same. These four regions lack strong economic centers and are closely tied to larger economic centers in neighboring regions, so a smaller share of the impacts from the ARRA expenditures in those regions stayed within the local area.

**Figure 3.3: Comparison of ARRA WIA expenditures 7/1/09-6/30/10 and the resulting economic output by region**




Source: IMPLAN and ECONorthwest analysis of CCWD data

***OYEI spending***

As shown in Figure 3.4, the economic impacts of OYEI spending in each region are more similar to each other than to the WIA/NEG impacts. Eastern Oregon (Regions 9 through 14) had by far the largest OYEI expenditures, which generated an estimated \$935,048 in total economic output, or about 1.5 times the initial expenditures. For all the regions, output equaled between 1.2 and 1.6 times initial spending. OYEI spending was relatively small in all regions and consisted mostly of wages to Summer Youth participants. This type of expenditure generates only direct impacts (the value of the work) and induced impacts (the household income that gets spent in the economy); it does not generate indirect impacts because no intermediate suppliers of goods and services are involved in production. These factors tend to reduce the magnitude of the impacts.

**Figure 3.4: Comparison of ARRA OYEI expenditures in spring/summer 2009 and the resulting economic output by region**



Source: IMPLAN and ECONorthwest analysis of CCWD data

### Regional IMPLAN results

The pages at the end of this chapter provide details of the IMPLAN analysis for each region, for both WIA/NEG and OYEI expenditures. The first chart on each page shows the initial spending for that region, the resulting direct, indirect, and induced impacts of the expenditures in one year, and the share of the total economic output that went to individuals and business proprietors as income. The table on each page shows the direct, indirect, and induced impacts that occurred within that region, and the share that occurred elsewhere in Oregon (some share of expenditures in each region immediately left the state as export purchases and therefore do not generate economic impacts). The first chart on the lower right shows total spending-related job impacts as measured by IMPLAN, and the total number of Summer Youth employment participants. The second chart on the right shows what share of the total economic impacts that occurred in Oregon stayed within that region and what share occurred elsewhere in Oregon, and compares it to the average for all regions.

## ***Other Impacts of Job Training***

The previous section characterized the short-term economic impacts of ARRA workforce development spending. But the programs themselves also produce benefits for program participants and society at large. Individuals who receive WIA-funded training should have better employment prospects than they would have had without the training; youth participants might remain more strongly connected to education and the labor force than they would have otherwise, thereby also improving their future employability. Quantifying these impacts in dollar terms presents many challenges, and a rigorous impact evaluation is beyond the scope of this project.

In addition, training might improve an individual's skills, but in today's economy, skills do not guarantee employment to the extent they might have a few years ago and existing research, based on program participation during an earlier time period, might overstate program benefits. Nonetheless, existing research on job training programs can provide some guidance for estimating the likely magnitude of program benefits, but with important caveats. In this section, we apply findings from a recent net impact analysis of Washington's workforce development programs to estimate the magnitude of benefits derived from the services provided by ARRA.

Hollenbeck and Huang, 2006 (hereafter HH), estimate the net private and public benefits of several Washington State workforce development programs, including WIA Title 1B Adult, Displaced Worker, and Youth programs.<sup>39</sup> The study uses data on program participation and post-participation outcomes from the July-to-June years 2001-02 through 2004-05 to identify the impacts of program participation on employment and use of social services (Washington's Workforce Training and Education Coordinating Board commissions a similar study every four years). Of course, economic conditions, training program characteristics, and other important factors can vary considerably across states, so findings for Washington's workforce programs do not directly identify the impact of Oregon's programs—an analysis of Oregon data would provide better information but was well outside the scope of our project. Nonetheless, HH's analysis can provide a rough estimate for the likely magnitude of net benefits Oregon derived from ARRA-funded job training.

The authors consider both public and private benefits and costs. Private benefits include changes in income from employment and changes in transfer payments (e.g., UI benefits and food stamps); public benefits include changes in tax receipts and transfer payments. Private costs include estimated foregone earnings during the period of training; public costs include the cost of providing the training. All benefits and costs could in theory be positive or negative, depending on program impacts, with the exception of program cost, which is always positive. We refer interested readers to the report for additional detail on HH's methodology.

HH's findings regarding lifetime program impacts (i.e., impacts estimated through age 65 for participants) imply that, for the participant cohorts studied, WIA adult programs have a benefit-cost ratio of \$5.49. In other words, each dollar invested in the adult program yielded \$5.49 in net public and private benefits over the course of the participant's working lifetime. The implied benefit-cost ratio for displaced worker participants was \$3.21, and that for WIA Youth

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<sup>39</sup> Hollenbeck, K.M., & Huang, W. (2006, September). "Net Impact and Benefit-Cost Estimates of the Workforce Development System in Washington State." Upjohn Technical Report No. TR06-020.

participants was \$5.28. These ratios incorporate both program costs and the private costs identified above—in the HH analysis, program costs represent between 40 and 100 percent of the total costs, depending on the program—and we cannot simply multiply expenditures by the ratios to estimate total net benefits of ARRA expenditures.

Table 3.1 presents our estimates of these net benefits, using the benefit and cost information provided in HH and adjusting for the fact that participants bear a share of the costs in the form of wages foregone during training. The “Full impacts” column provides an estimate assuming that Oregon’s ARRA funds provided the same impact as the programs studied by HH. We treat OYEI expenditures the same as WIA Youth expenditures. We do not include NEG or statewide WIA funds in our estimates.

**Table 3.1: Oregon expenditures, assumed benefit-cost ratios, and estimated net benefits, by program (\$ millions) for the year ending June 30, 2010**

Program	FY 2010 expenditures	Assumed B-C ratio (includes non-program costs)	Estimated net benefit (public and private)	
			Full impacts	Discounted impacts
Adult	\$4.80	5.49	\$26.66	\$13.33
Displaced Worker	\$12.66	3.21	\$89.76	\$89.76
Youth	\$11.85	5.28	\$50.71	\$11.85
OYEI	\$2.02	5.28	\$8.66	\$2.02
<i>Total</i>	<i>\$31.33</i>	<i>N/A</i>	<i>\$175.80</i>	<i>\$116.97</i>

Note: FY 2010 expenditures do not include NEG or statewide WIA expenditures.

Source: ECONorthwest estimates, based on Hollenbeck and Huang (2006).

While these estimates give a reasonable first approximation to possible impacts, HH did not study summer employment programs independently, and we have no basis on which to conclude that youth summer employment has a greater or lesser impact than year-round youth programs on subsequent employment outcomes. In addition, typical WIA adult training episodes were much shorter in Oregon during the year ending June 30, 2010 (median of 184 days for completed episodes) than for the sample of WIA adult participants in the sample studied by HH (average of about 330 days). Episode lengths for displaced workers and youth were much more similar to relevant statistics presented in HH. Here, too, we lack sufficient data to determine whether Oregon’s WIA programs are better or worse, or more or less intensive, than Washington’s.

To provide a reasonable lower bound estimate for ARRA impacts, the “Discounted impacts” column in Table 3.1 discounts the adult, youth, and OYEI impacts as follows. First, we cut the WIA adult impact by 50 percent, to reflect the possibility that net benefits scale linearly with typical training duration. Second, we assume zero net benefit for the youth and OYEI programs. In other words, one dollar spent on these programs yields \$1.00 in lifetime benefits. This relatively conservative assumption is interpretable as assuming no post-participation impact on employment, but that spending on the summer programs translated more or less directly into earnings that participants would not otherwise have had and many youth developed work readiness skills.

In total, our estimates suggest total net benefits of Oregon's ARRA workforce expenditures of between \$117 million and \$176 million for the year ending June 30, 2010. Even the lower end of this range would represent a substantial return on this investment of federal funds.

However, these estimates provide only a very rough indication of the possible magnitude of long-term benefits deriving from ARRA expenditures. We have already identified specific differences between Oregon's workforce programs and those studied by HH that might affect program impacts. In addition, the employment situation during the year ending June 30, 2010 and the following several years will be less favorable than during the middle part of the last decade. This suggests both lower foregone earnings for training participants and dimmer post-training job prospects. In addition, HH analyzed per-participant program costs, while we have access only to total program expenditures (available data do not allow us to reliably produce per-participant costs that would in any way resemble those used by HH). All of these factors could significantly affect estimates of net program benefits. Ultimately, only an Oregon-focused study could provide reasonably precise net benefit estimates.

### ***Post-Participation Youth Enrollment***

As discussed above, ARRA stimulus spending has both short-term economic impacts, through the injection of federal funds into the local economy, and potentially long-term impacts to the extent that ARRA-funded training increases future earnings of training participants. Another measure of short-term impacts of ARRA-funded youth programs is the extent to which the programs help youth remain engaged or re-engage with educational institutions. Improved educational attainment presumably leads ultimately to better employment prospects.

To address this outcome, we present a high-level analysis of academic engagement for participants in OYEI and WIA youth programs. Below, we describe the data used in the analysis, characterize the demographic and academic characteristics of program participants, relative to those of non-WIA students, and conclude with a presentation of results from a regression analysis that suggests positive effects program participation.

We caution that, while important to individuals' career prospects, educational engagement was not necessarily a primary program goal for these initiatives. For the most part, the ARRA-funded youth employment programs sought to connect youth to the labor market to provide work experience, although connections to academic and occupational learning were strongly encouraged. Improvements in educational outcomes clearly benefit participants. But increased connection to the labor market after participation would as well, although we cannot address this important outcome with the available data.

### **Data description**

We analyze a data set comprised of administrative data about recent OYEI and WIA participants linked to student-level data from the Oregon Department of Education (ODE) and from the National Student Clearinghouse (NSC). This allows us to track K-12 and post-secondary enrollment of recent enrollees in Oregon's public K-12 system. The ODE data include enrollment, graduation, and achievement data for all enrollees from the 2004-05 school year through the 2008-09 school year. We also have enrollment data for the 2009-10 school year, which allows us to track post-participation enrollment for OYEI and WIA Summer Youth

participants. For comparison, we also provide results for selected samples of recent (since about 2007) WIA participants who were 24 or younger during June 2010. The NSC enrollment data covers a similar time period.

For a variety of reasons, the analysis data does not include every program participant we have identified. We exclude any participant which ODE could not identify as recently enrolled in an Oregon school. Excluded participants fall into two groups. First, many participants had not enrolled in an Oregon school during the period for which data are available. This group includes older youth, younger youth who dropped out prior to the analysis period, and youth who left school before moving to Oregon. Second, a number of participants likely have recent ODE records but the records could not be linked because of missing or ambiguous data. As a result of the different data sources and participant counts, population characteristics may not match exactly those presented in other chapters.

In all, we have linked participation data for 81 percent of the 32,919 youth identified as receiving WIA services from January 2007 to July 2010. Of the WIA participants, 3,879 received a service from the WIA Summer program during 2009. We have linked ODE data for 92 percent (3,580) of these WIA Summer youth. We also have linked data for 92 percent (607) of the 663 spring and summer 2009 OYEI participants identified by program staff. A small number of participants were enrolled in multiple programs.

For the analysis below, we assign individuals to one of four groups: OYEI participants, WIA Summer Youth participants (including those who received both WIA Youth and other WIA services), WIA youth who did not receive services from the WIA Summer program (regardless of whether they participated in the WIA Adult or the Youth program), OYEI participants, and current or former students who did not participate in either WIA or OYEI programs. For WIA Summer Youth participants, we display statistics by region. We provide statewide data for OYEI participants because of the smaller number of participants.

### **Profile of program participants**

Table 3.2 highlights the differences in demographics and prior educational experience across OYEI participants, WIA Summer Youth participants (by region), other young WIA participants, and non-WIA students. Because of these differences, simple comparisons of enrollment outcomes across groups can be misleading.

As illustrated in the table, a majority of OYEI and Summer Youth participants were enrolled in high school during 2008-09. A much smaller share of students enrolled in college during the year, and between 10 and 20 percent had not enrolled at either level, depending on program and region. Other WIA participants, who were an average of about two years older than OYEI and WIA Summer Youth participants, were much less likely to be enrolled at all (but had enrolled in an Oregon school at some point during 2004-05 through 2008-09).

The table also highlights the extent to which program participants face more serious barriers to success than do non-WIA students. Between 20 and 30 percent of participants were identified as special education students, depending on region, compared to 12 percent for non-WIA students;

63 percent of participants were identified as economically disadvantaged<sup>40</sup>, compared to 42 percent of the non-WIA group; and WIA participants were much more likely to identify as non-white or Hispanic than were non-WIA students (OYEI participants were less likely to identify as non-white or Hispanic). These barriers translate into lower achievement. For program participants, the average percentile rank on Oregon’s 10<sup>th</sup> grade math and reading achievement tests was between 33 and 39 percent, depending on program and subject. Average rank for non-participants is close to, but not exactly 50 percent because this group excludes participants and also includes data from multiple academic years.

**Table 3.2: Demographic and academic characteristics of the analysis sample, by program**

	OYEI	WIA ARRA Summer Youth							Other WIA Youth	Non-WIA Students
		Region 2	Region 3	Region 4	Region 5	Region 8	Region 15	TOC/OWA		
<b>Total participants</b>	662	1,275	311	334	325	285	311	1,038	29,040	453,039
<b>2008-09 enrollment status</b>										
9th grade	8.9	1.0	0.0	9.0	6.8	14.7	10.9	15.3	0.3	10.2
10th grade	23.1	14.7	2.6	23.7	14.2	14.0	15.8	17.0	0.9	10.2
11th grade	26.0	23.3	15.1	22.2	21.8	24.6	28.9	20.4	2.6	10.1
12th grade	18.4	22.7	40.5	13.5	26.5	17.5	17.7	15.0	11.2	10.4
Other K-12***	2.4	0.5	**	**	**	10.2	4.2	8.4	0.1	10.0
Comm. College	2.4	6.7	6.8	4.2	5.8	**	6.8	3.5	8.9	7.0
4-year college	1.4	3.7	**	**	**	**	0.6	1.3	2.4	9.2
Not enrolled	8.9	17.6	22.5	18.9	15.4	9.1	11.6	12.2	53.0	32.9
Not matched	8.5	9.7	9.6	6.9	7.1	6.0	3.5	6.8	20.6	N/A
<b>Demographics*</b>										
Percent male	74.3	48.9	65.3	56.6	56.3	56.8	57.9	58.1	53.2	51.5
Percent non-Hispanic white	79.0	35.1	58.4	79.4	74.4	67.7	77.5	75.5	73.0	73.1
Percent Hispanic	10.1	20.9	29.4	9.5	9.7	19.8	11.2	12.5	15.9	14.3
Percent other race/ethnicity	10.8	44.0	12.2	11.1	15.9	12.5	11.2	12.0	11.1	12.6
Age	17.4	18.5	19.3	17.8	18.3	17.2	17.7	17.3	20.2	18.3
Percent econ. disadvantaged	61.3	80.6	72.0	77.6	71.7	75.9	69.1	77.4	59.0	42.4
Percent special ed.	27.0	21.2	26.7	35.2	41.3	23.2	50.0	28.7	19.6	12.4
<b>Ave. 8th grade OAKS percentile (students enrolled in 8th or 9th grade during 2008-09)*</b>										
Math	42.7	**	N/A	29.8	41.3	44.4	33.1	36.3	34.0	49.9
Reading	39.9	**	N/A	25.1	42.2	48.0	37.0	36.7	32.2	49.9
<b>Ave. 10th grade OAKS percentile (students enrolled in 10th-12th grade during 2008-09)*</b>										
Math	36.4	32.2	35.2	33.3	30.1	36.7	33.3	34.5	34.5	50.4
Reading	37.8	30.6	35.2	34.6	33.8	41.0	33.8	38.0	36.1	50.4

Note: A small number of OYEI participants also participated in a WIA Summer program and are included in both columns. \*Data not available for all participants. Age calculated as of June 2009. \*\*Data omitted to preserve confidentiality. \*\*\*Other K-12 includes 8<sup>th</sup> grade and non-graded enrollments.

Source: ECONorthwest analysis of WIA, OYEI, and ODE data.

### Post-participation enrollment

Educational goals for the year following program participation should reasonably vary depending on an individual’s educational attainment at the time of participation. For example, enrolling in 11<sup>th</sup> grade in 2009-10 seems a reasonable goal for summer participants who completed 10<sup>th</sup> grade in 2008-09; college is the logical next step for participants who received a high school diploma during 2008-09. Thus, for our outcome analysis, we focus on five groups of

<sup>40</sup> Economically disadvantaged status indicates eligibility for the federal free and reduced-price lunch programs. Although imperfect, this indicator serves as the best available proxy for a student’s socio-economic status.

students, defined by individuals' 2008-09 enrollment status: (1) students not enrolled in high school or at a post-secondary institution; (2) students enrolled in 11<sup>th</sup> grade or lower; (3) students enrolled in 12<sup>th</sup> grade but who did not graduate; (4) students who received a high school diploma; and (5) students enrolled at a post-secondary institution.

We quantify the success of OYEI and WIA Summer Youth programs at keeping youths engaged in education by analyzing the 2009-10 enrollment status for individuals defined by the groups listed above. Table 3.3 displays the percent of students in each program and enrollment group who enrolled in either high school or college during 2010.

**Table 3.3: Percentage of participants enrolled in high school or post-secondary education during 2009-10, by 2008-09 enrollment status and program**

Enrollment status in 2008-09	OYEI	WIA Summer Youth							Other WIA Youth	Non-WIA Students
		Region 2	Region 3	Region 4	Region 5	Region 8	Region 15	TOC/OWA		
Not enrolled	11.9	18.3	14.3	11.1	20.0	7.7	13.9	15.0	9.2	12.2
8th-11th grade	90.0	82.6	80.4	81.4	79.6	92.3	88.7	88.0	52.9	89.3
12th grade, no diploma	58.2	62.7	47.1	57.1	40.5	52.0	64.0	28.2	33.9	38.1
12th grade graduate	41.8	65.9	44.6	54.2	56.8	76.0	46.7	43.6	37.7	59.6
Post-secondary	80.0	77.3	55.2	46.7	70.8	63.6	91.3	78.0	56.9	78.0

Note: A small number of OYEI participants also participated in a WIA Summer program and are included in both columns.

Source: ECONorthwest analysis of WIA, OYCC, and ODE data.

The table indicates that among non-enrolled youth, participation in the WIA Summer program, at least in some regions, correlates with an increased rate of enrollment after participation, compared to that for non-participants and, to a slightly larger degree, to that for other WIA participants. Both OYEI and WIA Summer participants who were enrolled in 12<sup>th</sup> grade without graduating fare better than non-participants. Consortium summer participants comprise the only exception to this pattern (an exception based on only 39 participants). Outcomes appear relatively less favorable, relative to non-WIA students, for participants in the other enrollment groups, although participants in some enrollment group and region combinations perform at least as well as non-WIA students.

To the extent that enrollment is higher because of the programs, the programs would appear to support more promising career trajectories for participants. But the raw outcome statistics can mislead. First, the average outcome for non-WIA students is not necessarily an appropriate benchmark for success. After all, OYEI and WIA summer program participants have better outcomes than other WIA participants, a group with more similar demographics, as demonstrated in Table 3.2. To create better measures of relative program success, we implemented a multivariate regression model that, in essence, compares outcomes for individuals with similar characteristics other than participation in a program to determine whether participation relates to changes in enrollment. If, after controlling for characteristics such as age, race, and achievement

test scores, participant outcomes systematically outperform those for non-WIA students, we say that the program has a statistically significant relationship with enrollment.<sup>41</sup>

The data do not allow strong conclusions about whether observed differences in post-participation enrollment across programs were caused by program participation because we cannot rule out the possibility that program participants have an inherent advantage over similar non-participants. For example, the more favorable outcomes observed for some groups of OYEI and WIA Summer participants relative other WIA participants could reflect the fact that the most employable, ambitious WIA participants entered these programs.

To refine our analysis, we developed two separate models for students enrolled in high school during 2008-09 (one for students enrolled in 10<sup>th</sup> or 11<sup>th</sup> grade and one for students enrolled in 12<sup>th</sup> grade) and one for non-enrolled students. We do not model enrollment for students enrolled in 8<sup>th</sup> grade, 9<sup>th</sup> grade, or post-secondary education during 2008-09 because there are too few program participants in these categories. We present model details and results for each model in turn.

### **Students enrolled in 10th or 11th grade during 2008-09**

The regression model includes controls for all of the characteristics included in Table 3.2 with the exception of 8<sup>th</sup> grade achievement test percentile ranking (the model includes 10<sup>th</sup> grade percentile rank). The model also includes controls for whether an individual dropped out of school during 2008-09, and for systematic differences in 2009-10 enrollment across workforce regions. Controls for program participation (OYEI, WIA Summer, and other WIA) provide our program effect estimates. After excluding individuals with missing data, this model used data from 78,888 individuals.

For this population, all else equal, we find no statistically significant difference in outcomes between OYEI participants and non-participants, although students in this group were 18 percentage points more likely to enroll during 2009-10 than the group of non-Summer WIA participants. WIA Summer youth in this enrollment group were 2 percentage points more likely to reenroll than similar non-participants, a statistically significant difference (they were 20 percentage points more likely to reenroll than non-Summer WIA participants). Within regions, several summer programs had students who were more likely to enroll in 2009-10. But only summer participants in the Consortium regions reenrolled at rates that were higher than those for similar non-participants to a statistically significant degree. These participants were 4 percentage points more likely to reenroll than similar non-WIA students (21 percentage points more than non-Summer WIA participants).

### **Students enrolled in 12th grade during 2008-09**

The regression model includes all of the controls listed for the previous model, with the addition of controls for completion status (received a regular diploma, received a modified diploma, completed 12<sup>th</sup> grade but did not graduate, or dropped out of 12<sup>th</sup> grade). We include controls for completion status because individuals likely have very different enrollment patterns depending on whether they have graduated from high school or not. In total, this model used data from 35,717 individuals.

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<sup>41</sup> Throughout, we report results as statistically significant only if the reported effect has an associated p-value<0.05.

Here, we find more positive results for WIA Summer participants. Overall, these youth were 8 percentage points more likely to enroll in 2009-10 than otherwise similar non-WIA students, and 15 percentage points more likely to enroll than non-Summer WIA participants, although we find significant variation across regions. Individually, only regions 2 and 8 were associated with statistically significant differences in enrollment (16 percent and 27 percent, respectively), although the Region 8 data reflect the experience of only 28 participants. Average outcomes for OYEI participants were not different from those for otherwise similar non-WIA students (the analysis sample included only 48 OYEI participants). Both of these latter groups were 8 percentage points more likely to enroll during 2009-10 than similar non-Summer WIA participants.

### **Students not enrolled during 2008-09**

This student population is more diverse in terms of educational background than the other groups. To select a reasonable set of comparison students, and because we only have ODE data for years in which a student is enrolled in Oregon, we limit this analysis to individuals enrolled in an Oregon high school during 2005-06, 2006-07, or 2007-08. Thus, we limit the sample to students who left school at some point during the three academic years prior to participation in OYEI or WIA during the summer of 2009.

The regression model includes a similar set of controls as the prior models, with the following exceptions. First, we control for the last grade enrolled, rather than grade in 2008-09, number of years since the last enrollment, and the last completion status (dropout, graduation, or non-graduate), and whether the student attended college at any point during 2005-06 through 2007-08. In all, this analysis included data from 56,557 individuals. We do not include 10<sup>th</sup> grade achievement scores.

We again find positive effects for WIA Summer participation, but there were too few individuals to reliably estimate effects for individual regions. On average, participants were 11 percentage points more likely to re-enroll, and hence re-engage with education, than were otherwise similar non-participants. We find no significant difference in OYEI outcomes, although only 15 OYEI participants fell into this group.

### **Summary of enrollment impacts**

In summary, we find that, after controlling for observable characteristics, WIA Summer Youth participants were more likely to enroll in high school or college than otherwise similar non-WIA students if they were enrolled in 12<sup>th</sup> grade or not enrolled during 2008-09, with particularly strong and positive effects on 12<sup>th</sup> graders in Region 2 and Region 8. We also find that Summer WIA participants in the Consortium regions who were enrolled in 10<sup>th</sup> or 11<sup>th</sup> grade during 2008-09 were more likely to enroll during 2009-10 than were otherwise similar non-WIA students. We find no statistically significant difference in outcomes for OYEI participants relative to otherwise similar non-WIA students. In other words, OYEI participants were about as likely to enroll during 2009-10 as non-WIA students.

While largely encouraging—if anything, the programs appear to have a positive impact on enrollment overall—we again caution that the results do not prove that the programs *caused* the identified difference in enrollment, and the observed variation across regions warrants further investigation. In addition, enrollment during the year following participation is only one short-

term measure of academic potential. We cannot identify the extent to which participation correlates with subsequent employment and wages, or with post-secondary degree attainment. A more rigorous analysis than possible within the scope of this project or with the available data is required to fully address these questions.




# The Economic Impacts of ARRA Expenditures

## WIA Programs, July 1, 2009 to June 30, 2010

### Region 1: Clatsop, Columbia & Tillamook Counties


A. Economic impacts of ARRA expenditures by type of impact




B. Economic output generated by ARRA expenditures by type and area of impact

Impact Area	Type of Impact			Grand Total
	Direct Impacts	Indirect Impacts	Induced Impacts	
Within the Region	\$794,993	\$144,768	\$418,872	\$1,358,633
Elsewhere in Oregon	\$0	\$80,639	\$78,900	\$159,539
<b>Total Oregon Impacts</b>	<b>\$794,993</b>	<b>\$225,407</b>	<b>\$497,772</b>	<b>\$1,518,172</b>

C. IMPLAN job impacts & summer youth program participants



D. Percent of economic output that stays within this region vs. average for all regions




### Key Findings:

- Region 1 is part of the TOC/OWA local workforce investment area, but it is geographically and economically isolated from the larger TOC/OWA area so we consider it separately in this analysis. However, most of the fiscal data for Region 1 is combined with all of the TOC regions, so we estimated Region 1's share using data provided by TOC.
- Figures A and B show the economic impact of ARRA WIA spending between July 1, 2009 and June 30, 2010. Region 1 spent about \$1.9 million in ARRA WIA funding, which amounts to five percent of the total ARRA WIA spending by all TOC regions, and six percent of the spending statewide. This initial spending generated total economic output of approximately \$1.5 million in Oregon. This includes approximately \$795,000 in direct economic output as the LWIB paid wages and purchased goods and services. As this spending circulated throughout the economy, it generated another \$225,000 in indirect impacts as the providers of goods and services paid wages and made purchases to support their production. As workers spent part of their incomes in the local economy, they generated another \$498,000 in induced impacts. The total output includes approximately \$803,000 in personal income.
- Figures B and D break down the types of impacts by geographic area as a result of ARRA spending. Of the total \$1.5 million in Oregon impacts, approximately \$1.4 million, or 89 percent, occurred within the three-county area, and another \$160,000, or 11 percent, occurred elsewhere in Oregon. Because Region 1 has a relatively small economy, it captured less of the total Oregon impact than the average region in the state (95 percent).
- Figure C shows the ARRA impact on jobs in the region. Based on IMPLAN's measurement of job impacts, Region 1 gained the equivalent of 17 full- or part-time jobs as a result of ARRA WIA spending in the year that ended June 30, 2010. In addition to the spending-related job impacts measured by IMPLAN, 153 youths (ages 16-24) participated in short-term summer work experiences for which they were paid wages.
- Because this economy is relatively small, most of the goods and services purchased here come from outside the area, and the spending quickly "leaks out" into the larger economy, including elsewhere in the state and outside the state. This explains why the total impacts are smaller than the initial spending in Region 1.

# The Economic Impacts of ARRA Expenditures


## WIA Programs, July 1, 2009 to June 30, 2010

### Region 2: Multnomah & Washington Counties



**B. Economic output generated by ARRA expenditures by type and area of impact**

Impact Area	Type of Impact			Grand Total
	Direct Impacts	Indirect Impacts	Induced Impacts	
Within the Region	\$7,250,759	\$2,925,232	\$6,681,331	\$16,857,323
Elsewhere in Oregon	\$0	\$215,106	\$321,041	\$536,148
<b>Total Oregon Impacts</b>	<b>\$7,250,759</b>	<b>\$3,140,339</b>	<b>\$7,002,373</b>	<b>\$17,393,471</b>




### Key Findings:

- Figures A and B show the economic impacts of ARRA WIA spending. For the year that ended June 30, 2010, ARRA expenditures in Region 2 amounted to approximately \$8.1 million, or 23 percent of statewide ARRA WIA spending. This spending generated approximately \$17.4 million in total economic output in the state of Oregon. This includes \$7.3 million in direct economic output as the LWIB paid wages and purchased goods and services. As this spending circulated throughout the economy, it generated another \$3.1 in indirect impacts as the providers of goods and services paid wages and made purchases to support their production. As workers spent part of their incomes in the local economy, they generated another \$7.0 million in induced impacts. The total output includes approximately \$9.4 million in personal income.
- Of all the regions, Region 2 experienced the largest economic output relative to the initial ARRA expenditures. Region 2 contains the state's largest economy, with the greatest diversity of economic activity, which allows the initial expenditures to circulate through the economy for more rounds of spending before it eventually leaks out. Smaller regions have smaller economies with less economic diversity, so they tend to experience leakages more quickly.
- Figures B and D break down the types of impacts by geographic area. Of the total economic impacts that occurred in Oregon as a result of spending in Region 2, approximately \$16.9 million (97 percent) occurred within Region 2, and another \$536,000 (3 percent) occurred elsewhere in Oregon.
- Figure C shows the ARRA impact on jobs in Region 2. Based on IMPLAN's measurement of job impacts, Region 2 gained the equivalent of 146 full- or part-time jobs as a result of ARRA WIA spending during the year that ended June 30, 2010. In addition to the spending-related job impacts measured by IMPLAN, 1,275 youths (ages 16-24) participated in short-term summer work experiences for which they were paid wages.

# The Economic Impacts of ARRA Expenditures


## WIA Programs, July 1, 2009 to June 30, 2010

### Region 3: Yamhill, Polk & Marion Counties



**B. Economic output generated by ARRA expenditures by type and area of impact**

Impact Area	Type of Impact			Grand Total
	Direct Impacts	Indirect Impacts	Induced Impacts	
Within the Region	\$2,794,142	\$344,916	\$1,662,861	\$4,801,919
Elsewhere in Oregon	\$0	\$260,198	\$305,442	\$565,639
<b>Total Oregon Impacts</b>	<b>\$2,794,142</b>	<b>\$605,114</b>	<b>\$1,968,303</b>	<b>\$5,367,559</b>



### Key Findings:


- Figures A and B show the economic impact of ARRA WIA spending. For the year that ended June 30, 2010, ARRA expenditures in Region 3 amounted to approximately \$4.3 million, or 12 percent of statewide ARRA WIA spending. This spending generated approximately \$5.4 million in total economic output in the state of Oregon. This includes \$2.8 million in direct economic output as the LWIB paid wages and purchased goods and services. As this spending circulated throughout the economy, it generated another \$605,000 in indirect impacts as the providers of goods and services paid wages and made purchases to support their production. As workers spent part of their incomes in the local economy, they generated another \$2.0 million in induced impacts. The total output includes approximately \$3.0 million in personal income.
- Figures B and D break down the types of impacts by geographic area as a result of ARRA spending. Of the total economic impacts that occurred in Oregon, approximately \$4.8 million (89 percent) occurred within Region 3, and another \$566,000 (11 percent) occurred elsewhere in Oregon. Because it is a relatively small economy, Region 3 captured less of the total Oregon impact than the average region in the state (95 percent).
- Figure C shows the ARRA impact on jobs in the region. Based on IMPLAN's measurement of job impacts, Region 3 gained the equivalent of 42 full- or part-time jobs as a result of ARRA WIA spending during the year that ended June 30, 2010. In addition to the spending-related job impacts measured by IMPLAN, 303 youths (ages 16-24) participated in short-term summer work experiences for which they were paid wages.

# The Economic Impacts of ARRA Expenditures

WIA Programs, July 1, 2009 to June 30, 2010


## Region 4: Linn, Benton & Lincoln Counties

A. Economic impacts of ARRA expenditures by type of impact



B. Economic output generated by ARRA expenditures by type and area of impact

Impact Area	Type of Impact			Grand Total
	Direct Impacts	Indirect Impacts	Induced Impacts	
Within the Region	\$1,870,933	\$221,807	\$1,079,332	\$3,172,073
Elsewhere in Oregon	\$0	\$121,370	\$179,504	\$300,875
<b>Total Oregon Impacts</b>	<b>\$1,870,933</b>	<b>\$343,177</b>	<b>\$1,258,836</b>	<b>\$3,472,947</b>



### Key Findings:


- Figures A and B show the economic impact of ARRA WIA spending. For the year that ended June 30, 2010, ARRA expenditures in Region 4 amounted to approximately \$2.6 million, or seven percent of statewide ARRA WIA spending. This spending generated approximately \$3.5 million in total economic output in the state of Oregon. This includes \$1.9 million in direct economic output as the LWIB paid wages and purchased goods and services. As this spending circulated throughout the economy, it generated another \$343,000 in indirect impacts as the providers of goods and services paid wages and made purchases to support their production. As workers spent part of their incomes in the local economy, they generated another \$1.3 million in induced impacts. The total output includes approximately \$2.3 million in personal income.
- Figures B and D break down the types of impacts by geographic area as a result of ARRA spending. Of the total economic impacts that occurred in Oregon, approximately \$3.2 million (91 percent) occurred within Region 4, and another \$301,000 (9 percent) occurred elsewhere in Oregon. Because it is a relatively small economy, Region 4 captured 91 percent of the Oregon impacts of ARRA spending, which is less than average for all regions in the state (95 percent).
- Figure C shows the ARRA impact on jobs in the region. Based on IMPLAN's measurement of job impacts, Region 4 gained the equivalent of 30 full- or part-time jobs as a result of ARRA WIA spending during the year that ended June 30, 2010. In addition to the spending-related job impacts measured by IMPLAN, 319 youths (ages 16-24) participated in short-term summer work experiences for which they were paid wages.

# The Economic Impacts of ARRA Expenditures

## WIA Programs, July 1, 2009 to June 30, 2010


### Region 5: Lane County

#### A. Economic impacts of ARRA expenditures by type of impact



#### B. Economic output generated by ARRA expenditures by type and area of impact

Impact Area	Type of Impact			Grand Total
	Direct Impacts	Indirect Impacts	Induced Impacts	
Within the Region	\$2,883,355	\$704,102	\$1,907,536	\$5,494,993
Elsewhere in Oregon	\$0	\$173,445	\$204,174	\$377,619
<b>Total Oregon Impacts</b>	<b>\$2,883,355</b>	<b>\$877,547</b>	<b>\$2,111,710</b>	<b>\$5,872,612</b>



### Key Findings:


- Figures A and B show the economic impact of ARRA WIA spending. For the year that ended June 30, 2010, ARRA expenditures in Region 5 amounted to approximately \$4.0 million, or 12 percent of statewide ARRA WIA spending. This spending generated approximately \$5.9 million in total economic output in the state of Oregon. This includes \$2.9 million in direct economic output as the LWIB paid wages and purchased goods and services. As this spending circulated throughout the economy, it generated another \$878,000 in indirect impacts as the providers of goods and services paid wages and made purchases to support their production. As workers spent part of their incomes in the local economy, they generated another \$2.1 million in induced impacts. The total output includes approximately \$3.2 million in personal income.
- Figures B and D break down the types of impacts by geographic area as a result of ARRA spending. Of the total economic impacts that occurred in Oregon from spending in Region 5, approximately \$5.5 million (94 percent) occurred within Region 5, and another \$378,000 (6 percent) occurred elsewhere in Oregon. This is about equal to the average for all regions (95 percent).
- Figure C shows the ARRA impact on jobs in the region. Based on IMPLAN's measurement of job impacts, Region 5 gained the equivalent of 58 full- or part-time jobs as a result of ARRA WIA spending during the year that ended June 30, 2010. In addition to the spending-related job impacts measured by IMPLAN, 333 youths (ages 16-24) participated in short-term summer work experiences for which they were paid wages.

# The Economic Impacts of ARRA Expenditures

## WIA Programs, July 1, 2009 to June 30, 2010

### Region 6 & 7: Coos, Curry & Douglas Counties

A. Economic impacts of ARRA expenditures by type of impact



Type of Impact: Expenditures (Orange), Direct Impacts (Dark Blue), Indirect Impacts (Light Blue), Induced Impacts (Grey)


B. Economic output generated by ARRA expenditures by type and area of impact

Impact Area	Type of Impact			Grand Total
	Direct Impacts	Indirect Impacts	Induced Impacts	
Within the Region	\$1,539,031	\$241,820	\$756,448	\$2,537,300
Elsewhere in Oregon	\$0	\$73,450	\$71,195	\$144,645
<b>Total Oregon Impacts</b>	<b>\$1,539,031</b>	<b>\$315,270</b>	<b>\$827,644</b>	<b>\$2,681,945</b>

C. IMPLAN job impacts & summer youth program participants



D. Percent of economic output that stays within this region vs. average for all regions



### Key Findings:


- Regions 6 and 7 are part of the TOC/OWA local workforce investment area, but because they are geographically and economically isolated from the larger TOC/OWA area of Eastern Oregon so we consider it separately in this analysis. However, most of the fiscal data for Regions 6 and 7 are combined with all of the TOC regions, so we estimated these Regions' share using data provided by TOC.
- Figures A and B show the economic impact of ARRA WIA spending. For the year that ended June 30, 2010, ARRA expenditures in Regions 6 and 7 combined amounted to approximately \$2.6 million (seven percent) of statewide ARRA WIA spending. This spending generated approximately \$2.7 million in total economic output in the state of Oregon. This includes \$1.5 million in direct economic output as the LWIB paid wages and purchased goods and services. As this spending circulated throughout the economy, it generated another \$315,000 in indirect impacts as the providers of goods and services paid wages and made purchases to support their production. As workers spent part of their incomes in the local economy, they generated another \$828,000 in induced impacts. The total output includes approximately \$1.7 million in personal income.
- Figures B and D break down the types of impacts by geographic area as a result of ARRA spending. Of the total economic impacts that occurred in Oregon, approximately \$2.5 million (95 percent) occurred within Regions 6 and 7, and another \$145,000 (5 percent) occurred elsewhere in Oregon. This is equal to share of impact that the average region in the state captures.
- Figure C shows the ARRA impact on jobs in the region. Based on IMPLAN's measurement of job impacts, Regions 6 and 7 gained the equivalent of 26 full- or part-time jobs as a result of ARRA WIA spending during the 2009-10 fiscal year. In addition to the spending-related job impacts measured by IMPLAN, 238 youths (ages 16-24) participated in short-term summer work experiences for which they were paid wages.

# The Economic Impacts of ARRA Expenditures

WIA Programs, July 1, 2009 to June 30, 2010



## Region 8: Jackson & Josephine Counties

### A. Economic impacts of ARRA expenditures by type of impact



### B. Economic output generated by ARRA expenditures by type and area of impact

Impact Area	Type of Impact			Grand Total
	Direct Impacts	Indirect Impacts	Induced Impacts	
Within the Region	\$1,678,509	\$354,607	\$1,140,846	\$3,173,962
Elsewhere in Oregon	\$0	\$37,005	\$50,620	\$87,625
<b>Total Oregon Impacts</b>	<b>\$1,678,509</b>	<b>\$391,612</b>	<b>\$1,191,466</b>	<b>\$3,261,587</b>




### Key Findings:

- Figures A and B show the economic impact of ARRA WIA spending. For the year that ended June 30, 2010, ARRA WIA expenditures in Region 8 amounted to approximately \$2.8 million, or about eight percent of statewide ARRA WIA spending. This spending generated approximately \$3.3 million in total economic output in the state of Oregon. This includes \$1.7 million in direct economic output as the LWIB paid wages and purchased goods and services. As this spending circulated throughout the economy, it generated another \$392,000 in indirect impacts as the providers of goods and services paid wages and made purchases to support their production. As workers spent part of their incomes in the local economy, they generated another \$1.2 million in induced impacts. The total output includes approximately \$1.9 million in personal income.
- Figures B and D break down the types of impacts by geographic area as a result of ARRA spending. Of the total economic impacts that occurred in Oregon, approximately \$3.2 million (97 percent) occurred within Region 8, and another \$88,000 (3 percent) occurred elsewhere in Oregon. This is a greater share than the average region in the state (95 percent), but about equal to share of impact captured by Multnomah and Washington Counties in Region 2. Jackson and Josephine Counties have a larger, more diverse economy than many workforce regions in the state, and at the same time they are geographically isolated, allowing a greater share economic activity to remain in the local economy.
- Figure C shows the ARRA impact on jobs in the region. Based on IMPLAN's measurement of job impacts, Region 8 gained the equivalent of 30 full- or part-time jobs as a result of ARRA WIA spending during the year that ended June 30, 2010. In addition to the spending-related job impacts measured by IMPLAN, 281 youths (ages 16-24) participated in short-term summer work experiences for which they were paid wages.

# The Economic Impacts of ARRA Expenditures


## WIA Programs, July 1, 2009 to June 30, 2010

### Regions 9-14: Eastern Oregon Counties



**B. Economic output generated by ARRA expenditures by type and area of impact**

Impact Area	Type of Impact			Grand Total
	Direct Impacts	Indirect Impacts	Induced Impacts	
Within the Region	\$3,275,721	\$739,361	\$2,067,195	\$6,082,277
Elsewhere in Oregon	\$0	\$89,826	\$105,531	\$195,357
<b>Total Oregon Impacts</b>	<b>\$3,275,721</b>	<b>\$829,187</b>	<b>\$2,172,726</b>	<b>\$6,277,634</b>



### Key Findings:


- Regions 9 through 14 are part of the TOC/OWA local workforce investment area, containing all of the central and eastern Oregon counties. TOC/OWA also include the North Coast counties of Region 1 and the South Coast counties of Regions 6 and 7, but because those counties are geographically and economically separated from the eastern Oregon counties, we considered those regions separately in this economic impact analysis.
- Figures A and B show the economic impacts of ARRA WIA spending. For the year that ended June 30, 2010, ARRA WIA expenditures in Regions 9 through 14 amounted to approximately \$5.7 million, or about 16 percent of statewide ARRA WIA spending. This spending generated approximately \$6.3 million in total economic output in the state of Oregon. This includes \$3.3 million in direct economic impacts as the LWIB paid wages and purchased goods and services. As this spending circulated throughout the economy, it generated another \$829,000 in indirect impacts as the providers of goods and services paid wages and made purchases to support their production. As workers spent part of their incomes in the local economy, they generated another \$2.2 million in induced impacts. The total output includes approximately \$3.6 million in personal income.
- Figures B and D break down the types of impacts by geographic area as a result of ARRA spending. Of the total economic impacts that occurred in Oregon, approximately \$6.1 million (97 percent) occurred within the Eastern Oregon counties, and another \$195,000 (3 percent) occurred elsewhere in Oregon. This is a greater share than the average region in the state (95 percent), but about equal to the share of impact captured by Multnomah and Washington Counties in Region 2. This result occurs mainly because the area of analysis includes six geographically large workforce regions, and the impact model captures the economic flow between these regions.
- Figure C shows the ARRA impact on jobs in the region. Based on IMPLAN's measurement of job impacts, Regions 9 through 14 gained the equivalent of 63 full- or part-time jobs as a result of ARRA WIA spending during the year that ended June 30, 2010. In addition to the spending-related job impacts measured by IMPLAN, 667 youths (ages 16-24) participated in short-term summer work experiences for which they were paid wages.

# The Economic Impacts of ARRA Expenditures

## WIA Programs, July 1, 2009 to June 30, 2010


### Region 15: Clackamas County

#### A. Economic impacts of ARRA expenditures by type of impact



#### B. Economic output generated by ARRA expenditures by type and area of impact

Impact Area	Type of Impact			Grand Total
	Direct Impacts	Indirect Impacts	Induced Impacts	
Within the Region	\$986,647	\$131,858	\$594,650	\$1,713,155
Elsewhere in Oregon	\$0	\$82,868	\$107,400	\$190,268
<b>Total Oregon Impacts</b>	<b>\$986,647</b>	<b>\$214,726</b>	<b>\$702,050</b>	<b>\$1,903,423</b>



### Key Findings:


- Figures A and B show the economic impacts of ARRA WIA spending. For the year that ended June 30, 2010, ARRA WIA expenditures in Region 15 amounted to approximately \$2.4 million, or seven percent of the total ARRA WIA spending in the state. This spending generated approximately \$1.9 million in total economic output in the state of Oregon. Of this, \$987,000 was direct economic output as the LWIB paid wages and purchased goods and services. As this spending circulated throughout the economy, it generated another \$215,000 in indirect impacts as the providers of goods and services paid wages and made purchases to support their production. As workers spent part of their incomes in the local economy, they generated another \$702,000 in induced impacts. The total output includes approximately \$1.1 million in personal income (see Figure A).
- Figures B and D break down the types of economic impacts by geographic area as a result of ARRA spending. Of the total economic impacts that occurred in Oregon as a result of spending in Region 15, approximately \$1.7 million (90 percent) occurred within Region 15, and another \$190,000 (10 percent) occurred elsewhere in Oregon. The average region in the state captures about 95 percent of the Oregon impacts. Region 15 (Clackamas County) is one of the few regions in which the economic impacts amount to less than the initial spending. In this case, the difference is largely explained by Region 15's proximity to the larger economy in Region 2, which captures a relatively large share of the economic activity generated by the initial spending in Region 15.
- Figure C shows Region 15 gained the equivalent of 14 full- or part-time jobs as a result of ARRA WIA spending during the year that ended June 30, 2010. In addition to the spending-related job impacts measured by IMPLAN, 290 youths (ages 16-24) participated in short-term summer work experiences for which they were paid wages.
- A contributing factor to this region's relatively low economic impacts is that little of the spending in Clackamas County's non-profit sector remains in the local economy. Of the \$1.2 million in spending going to non-profits, only \$201,000 was spent locally.

# The Economic Impacts of 2009-10 ARRA Expenditures

## OYEI Programs, Spring & Summer 2009

### Region 1: Clatsop, Columbia & Tillamook Counties

#### A. Economic impacts of ARRA expenditures by type of impact



Type of Impact ■ Expenditures ■ Direct Impacts ■ Indirect Impacts ■ Induced Impacts

#### B. Economic output generated by ARRA expenditures by type and area of impact

Impact Area	Type of Impact			Grand Total
	Direct Impacts	Indirect Impacts	Induced Impacts	
Within the Region	\$145,093	\$709	\$78,965	\$224,768
Elsewhere in Oregon	\$0	\$387	\$10,375	\$10,762
<b>Total Oregon Impacts</b>	<b>\$145,093</b>	<b>\$1,096</b>	<b>\$89,340</b>	<b>\$235,530</b>

#### C. IMPLAN job impacts & summer youth program participants

Total spending-related job impacts (IMPLAN)	1
Summer 2009 Youth Participants	49

#### D. Percent of economic output that stays within this region vs. average for all regions

Region 1	95%
Average for all regions	97%


### Key Findings:

- Figures A and B show the economic impact of ARRA OYEI spending. Region 1 spent about \$160,000 in ARRA OYEI funding during the spring and summer months of 2009. This amounts to approximately eight percent of the total ARRA OYEI spending statewide. Most of this spending went to pay crew wages, so it is counted as direct economic output and as household income that creates induced impacts. This initial spending generated total economic output of approximately \$236,000 in Oregon. This includes approximately \$145,000 in direct economic output as the LWIB paid wages and purchased goods and services. As this spending circulated throughout the economy, it generated another \$1,100 in indirect impacts as the providers of goods and services paid wages and made purchases to support their production. As workers spent part of their incomes in the local economy, they generated another \$89,000 in induced impacts. The total output includes approximately \$167,000 in personal income.
- Figures B and D break down the types of impacts by geographic area as a result of ARRA spending. Of the total \$236,000 in Oregon impacts, approximately \$225,000, or 95 percent, occurred within the three-county area, and another \$11,000, or five percent, occurred elsewhere in Oregon. The average region in the state captured about 97 percent of the Oregon impacts.
- Figure C shows the ARRA impact on jobs in the region. The IMPLAN model counts essentially no job impacts from this spending, mainly because the OYEI program was a relatively small, short-term program. Forty-nine students participated in the OYEI summer program. Existing staff absorbed the administration of the program, and the participating youth were employed for too short a time to be counted as a new job in the economy. The additional household spending that the program generated was also relatively small and would likely have been absorbed by the existing economy without inducing additional employment.
- Youth wages accounted for about 75 percent of OYEI program spending in this region. Non-wage spending went to mostly to the transportation, tools and materials sectors. While such purchases generate indirect impacts, in this case the regional indirect impacts are small because these sectors purchase few of their inputs from within the region.

# The Economic Impacts of 2009-10 ARRA Expenditures



## OYEI Programs, Spring & Summer 2009

### Region 2: Multnomah & Washington Counties



**B. Economic output generated by ARRA expenditures by type and area of impact**

Impact Area	Type of Impact			Grand Total
	Direct Impacts	Indirect Impacts	Induced Impacts	
Within the Region	\$85,661	\$3,286	\$160,402	\$249,350
Elsewhere in Oregon	\$0	\$207	\$4,582	\$4,790
<b>Total Oregon Impacts</b>	<b>\$85,661</b>	<b>\$3,493</b>	<b>\$164,985</b>	<b>\$254,139</b>




### Key Findings:

- Figures A and B show the economic impact of ARRA OYEI spending. Region 2 spent about \$105,000 in ARRA OYEI funding during the spring and summer months of 2009. This amounts to approximately five percent of the total ARRA OYEI spending statewide. Most of this spending went to pay crew wages, so it is counted as direct economic output and as household income that creates induced impacts. This initial spending generated total economic output of approximately \$254,000 in Oregon. This includes approximately \$86,000 in direct economic output as the LWIB paid wages and purchased goods and services. As this spending circulated throughout the economy, it generated another \$3,500 in indirect impacts as the providers of goods and services paid wages and made purchases to support their production. As workers spent part of their incomes in the local economy, they generated another \$165,000 in induced impacts. The total output includes approximately \$131,000 in personal income.
- Figures B and D break down the types of impacts by geographic area as a result of ARRA spending. Of the total \$254,000 in Oregon impacts, approximately \$249,000, or 98 percent, occurred within the three-county area, and another \$5,000, or two percent, occurred elsewhere in Oregon. The average region in the state captured about 97 percent of the Oregon impacts.
- Figure C shows the ARRA impact on jobs in the region. The IMPLAN model counts essentially no job impacts from this spending, mainly because the OYEI program was a relatively small, short-term program. Forty-two youth participated in the OYEI summer program. Existing staff absorbed the administration of the program, and the participating youth were employed for too short a time to be counted as a new job in the economy. The additional household spending that the program generated was also relatively small and would likely have been absorbed by the existing economy without inducing additional employment.
- Youth wages accounted for about 75 percent of OYEI program spending in this region. Non-wage spending went to mostly to the transportation, tools and materials sectors. While such purchases generate indirect impacts, in this case the regional indirect impacts are small because these sectors purchase few of their inputs from within the region.

# The Economic Impacts of 2009-10 ARRA Expenditures


## OYEI Programs, Spring & Summer 2009

### Region 3: Yamhill, Polk & Marion Counties



**B. Economic output generated by ARRA expenditures by type and area of impact**

Impact Area	Type of Impact			Grand Total
	Direct Impacts	Indirect Impacts	Induced Impacts	
Within the Region	\$159,910	\$1,794	\$115,004	\$276,708
Elsewhere in Oregon	\$0	\$933	\$17,567	\$18,500
<b>Total Oregon Impacts</b>	<b>\$159,910</b>	<b>\$2,728</b>	<b>\$132,571</b>	<b>\$295,208</b>




### Key Findings:

- Figures A and B show the economic impact of ARRA OYEI spending. ARRA expenditures in Region 3 amounted to approximately \$179,000 in the spring and summer of 2009 or 9 percent of statewide ARRA OYEI spending. This spending generated approximately \$295,000 in total economic output in the state of Oregon. This includes \$160,000 in direct economic output as the LWIB paid wages and purchased goods and services. As this spending circulated throughout the economy, it generated another \$3,000 in indirect impacts as the providers of goods and services paid wages and made purchases to support their production. As workers spent part of their incomes in the local economy, they generated another \$133,000 in induced impacts. The total output includes approximately \$195,000 in personal income.
- Figures B and D break down the types of impacts by geographic area as a result of ARRA spending. Of the total economic impacts that occurred in Oregon, approximately \$277,000 (94 percent) occurred within Region 3, and another \$18,500 (four percent) occurred elsewhere in Oregon. Because it is a relatively small economy, Region 3 captured less of the total Oregon impact than the average region in the state (97 percent).
- Figure C shows the ARRA impact on jobs in the region. The IMPLAN model counts essentially no job impacts from this spending, mainly because the OYEI program was a relatively small, short-term program. Sixty-one youths (ages 16-24) participated in the OYEI summer program. Existing staff absorbed the administration of the program, and the participating youth were employed for too short a time to be counted as a new job in the economy. The additional household spending that the program generated was also relatively small and would likely have been absorbed by the existing economy without inducing additional employment.
- Youth wages accounted for about 75 percent of OYEI program spending in this region. Non-wage spending went to mostly to the transportation, tools and materials sectors. While such purchases generate indirect impacts, in this case the regional indirect impacts are small because these sectors purchase few of their inputs from within the region.

# The Economic Impacts of 2009-10 ARRA Expenditures


## OYEI Programs, Spring & Summer 2009

### Region 4: Linn, Benton & Lincoln Counties



**B. Economic output generated by ARRA expenditures by type and area of impact**

Impact Area	Type of Impact			Grand Total
	Direct Impacts	Indirect Impacts	Induced Impacts	
Within the Region	\$171,880	\$965	\$118,200	\$291,045
Elsewhere in Oregon	\$0	\$514	\$16,314	\$16,828
<b>Total Oregon Impacts</b>	<b>\$171,880</b>	<b>\$1,479</b>	<b>\$134,514</b>	<b>\$307,873</b>




### Key Findings:

- Figures A and B show the economic impact of ARRA OYEI spending. Region 4 spent about \$222,000 in ARRA OYEI funding during the spring and summer months of 2009. This amounts to approximately 11 percent of the total ARRA OYEI spending statewide. Most of this spending went to pay crew wages, so it is counted as direct economic output and as household income that creates induced impacts. This initial spending generated total economic output of approximately \$308,000 in Oregon. This includes approximately \$172,000 in direct economic output as the LWIB paid wages and purchased goods and services. As this spending circulated throughout the economy, it generated another \$1,500 in indirect impacts as the providers of goods and services paid wages and made purchases to support their production. As workers spent part of their incomes in the local economy, they generated another \$135,000 in induced impacts. The total output includes approximately \$209,000 in personal income.
- Figures B and D break down the types of impacts by geographic area as a result of ARRA spending. Of the total \$308,000 in Oregon impacts, approximately \$291,000, or 95 percent, occurred within the three-county area, and another \$17,000, or five percent, occurred elsewhere in Oregon. The average region in the state captured about 97 percent of the Oregon impacts.
- Figure C shows the ARRA impact on jobs in the region. The IMPLAN model counts essentially no job impacts from this spending, mainly because the OYEI program was a relatively small, short-term program. Eighty-three youth participated in the OYEI summer program. Existing staff absorbed the administration of the program, and the participating youth were employed for too short a time to be counted as a new job in the economy. The additional household spending that the program generated was also relatively small and would likely have been absorbed by the existing economy without inducing additional employment.
- Youth wages accounted for about 75 percent of OYEI program spending in this region. Non-wage spending went to mostly to the transportation, tools and materials sectors. While such purchases generate indirect impacts, in this case the regional indirect impacts are small because these sectors purchase few of their inputs from within the region.

# The Economic Impacts of 2009-10 ARRA Expenditures

## OYEI Programs, Spring & Summer 2009

### Region 5: Lane County



**B. Economic output generated by ARRA expenditures by type and area of impact**

Impact Area	Type of Impact			Grand Total
	Direct Impacts	Indirect Impacts	Induced Impacts	
Within the Region	\$121,309	\$2,784	\$130,905	\$254,997
Elsewhere in Oregon	\$0	\$726	\$11,450	\$12,176
<b>Total Oregon Impacts</b>	<b>\$121,309</b>	<b>\$3,510</b>	<b>\$142,355</b>	<b>\$267,173</b>

**C. IMPLAN job impacts & summer youth program participants**

Total spending-related job impacts (IMPLAN)	2
Summer 2009 Youth Participants	146

**D. Percent of economic output that stays within this region vs. average for all regions**

Region 5	95%
Average for all regions	97%


### Key Findings:

- Figures A and B show the economic impact of ARRA OYEI spending. Region 5 spent about \$187,000 in ARRA OYEI funding during the spring and summer months of 2009. This amounts to approximately nine percent of the total ARRA OYEI spending statewide. Nearly all of this spending went to pay crew wages, so it is counted as direct economic output and as household income that creates induced impacts. This initial spending generated total economic output of approximately \$267,000 in Oregon. This includes approximately \$121,000 in direct economic output as the LWIB paid wages and purchased goods and services. As this spending circulated throughout the economy, it generated another \$3,500 in indirect impacts as the providers of goods and services paid wages and made purchases to support their production. As workers spent part of their incomes in the local economy, they generated another \$142,000 in induced impacts. The total output includes approximately \$119,000 in personal income.
- Figures B and D break down the types of impacts by geographic area as a result of ARRA spending. Of the total \$267,000 in Oregon impacts, approximately \$255,000, or 95 percent, occurred within the three-county area, and another \$12,000, or five percent, occurred elsewhere in Oregon. The average region in the state captured about 97 percent of the Oregon impacts.
- Figure C shows the ARRA impact on jobs in the region. The IMPLAN model counts essentially no job impacts from this spending, mainly because the OYEI program was a relatively small, short-term program. One-hundred and forty-six youth participated in the OYEI summer program. Existing staff absorbed the administration of the program, and the participating youth were employed for too short a time to be counted as a new job in the economy. The additional household spending that the program generated was also relatively small and would likely have been absorbed by the existing economy without inducing additional employment.
- Youth wages accounted for about 75 percent of OYEI program spending in this region. Non-wage spending went to mostly to the transportation, tools and materials sectors. While such purchases generate indirect impacts, in this case the regional indirect impacts are small because these sectors purchase few of their inputs from within the region.

# The Economic Impacts of 2009-10 ARRA Expenditures


## OYEI Programs, Spring & Summer 2009

### Region 6 & 7: Coos, Curry & Douglas Counties



**B. Economic output generated by ARRA expenditures by type and area of impact**

Impact Area	Type of Impact			Grand Total
	Direct Impacts	Indirect Impacts	Induced Impacts	
Within the Region	\$167,215	\$1,791	\$104,920	\$273,925
Elsewhere in Oregon	\$0	\$474	\$7,166	\$7,640
<b>Total Oregon Impacts</b>	<b>\$167,215</b>	<b>\$2,265</b>	<b>\$112,086</b>	<b>\$281,565</b>



### Key Findings:


- Figures A and B show the economic impact of ARRA OYEI spending. Regions 6 and 7 spent about \$213,000 in ARRA OYEI funding during the spring and summer months of 2009. This amounts to approximately 11 percent of the total ARRA OYEI spending statewide. Nearly all of this spending went to pay crew wages, so it is counted as direct economic output and as household income that creates induced impacts. This initial spending generated total economic output of approximately \$282,000 in Oregon. This includes approximately \$167,000 in direct economic output as the LWIB paid wages and purchased goods and services. As this spending circulated throughout the economy, it generated another \$2,300 in indirect impacts as the providers of goods and services paid wages and made purchases to support their production. As workers spent part of their incomes in the local economy, they generated another \$112,000 in induced impacts. The total output includes approximately \$196,000 in personal income.
- Figures B and D break down the types of impacts by geographic area as a result of ARRA spending. Of the total \$282,000 in Oregon impacts, approximately \$274,000, or 97 percent, occurred within the three-county area, and another \$7,600, or three percent, occurred elsewhere in Oregon. This is the same proportion as the average region in the state.
- Figure C shows the ARRA impact on jobs in the region. The IMPLAN model counts essentially no job impacts from this spending, mainly because the OYEI program was a relatively small, short-term program. One-hundred and twenty-seven youth participated in the OYEI summer program. Existing staff absorbed the administration of the program, and the participating youth were employed for too short a time to be counted as a new job in the economy. The additional household spending that the program generated was also relatively small and would likely have been absorbed by the existing economy without inducing additional employment.
- Youth wages accounted for about 75 percent of OYEI program spending in this region. Non-wage spending went to mostly to the transportation, tools and materials sectors. While such purchases generate indirect impacts, in this case the regional indirect impacts are small because these sectors purchase few of their inputs from within the region.

# The Economic Impacts of 2009-10 ARRA Expenditures

## OYEI Programs, Spring & Summer 2009

### Region 8: Jackson & Josephine Counties

#### A. Economic impacts of ARRA expenditures by type of impact



Type of Impact: Expenditures (Orange), Direct Impacts (Dark Blue), Indirect Impacts (Light Blue), Induced Impacts (Grey)

#### B. Economic output generated by ARRA expenditures by type and area of impact

Impact Area	Type of Impact			Grand Total
	Direct Impacts	Indirect Impacts	Induced Impacts	
Within the Region	\$152,401	\$3,013	\$160,817	\$316,230
Elsewhere in Oregon	\$0	\$302	\$5,895	\$6,198
<b>Total Oregon Impacts</b>	<b>\$152,401</b>	<b>\$3,315</b>	<b>\$166,712</b>	<b>\$322,428</b>

#### C. IMPLAN job impacts & summer youth program participants

Total spending-related job impacts (IMPLAN)	2
Summer 2009 Youth Participants	109

#### D. Percent of economic output that stays within this region vs. average for all regions

Region 8	98%
Average for all regions	97%


### Key Findings:

- Figures A and B show the economic impact of ARRA OYEI spending. Region 8 spent about \$224,000 in ARRA OYEI funding during the spring and summer months of 2009. This amounts to approximately eleven percent of the total ARRA OYEI spending statewide. Nearly all of this spending went to pay crew wages, so it is counted as direct economic output and as household income that creates induced impacts. This initial spending generated total economic output of approximately \$322,000 in Oregon. This includes approximately \$152,000 in direct economic output as the LWIB paid wages and purchased goods and services. As this spending circulated throughout the economy, it generated another \$3,300 in indirect impacts as the providers of goods and services paid wages and made purchases to support their production. As workers spent part of their incomes in the local economy, they generated another \$167,000 in induced impacts. The total output includes approximately \$175,000 in personal income.
- Figures B and D break down the types of impacts by geographic area as a result of ARRA spending. Of the total \$322,000 in Oregon impacts, approximately \$316,000, or 98 percent, occurred within the three-county area, and another \$6,200, or two percent, occurred elsewhere in Oregon. The average region in the state captured about 97 percent of the Oregon impacts.
- Figure C shows the ARRA impact on jobs in the region. The IMPLAN model counts essentially no job impacts from this spending, mainly because the OYEI program was a relatively small, short-term program. One-hundred and nine youth participated in the OYEI summer program. Existing staff absorbed the administration of the program, and the participating youth were employed for too short a time to be counted as a new job in the economy. The additional household spending that the program generated was also relatively small and would likely have been absorbed by the existing economy without inducing additional employment.
- Youth wages accounted for about 75 percent of OYEI program spending in this region. Non-wage spending went to mostly to the transportation, tools and materials sectors. While such purchases generate indirect impacts, in this case the regional indirect impacts are small because these sectors purchase few of their inputs from within the region.

# The Economic Impacts of 2009-10 ARRA Expenditures

## OYEI Programs, Spring & Summer 2009

### Regions 9-14: Eastern Oregon Counties



### Key Findings:


- Figures A and B show the economic impact of ARRA OYEI spending. Regions 9 through 14, made up of the counties of Eastern Oregon, received the largest allotment of OYEI funding, totaling about \$643,000. This amounts to approximately 32 percent of the total ARRA OYEI spending statewide. Most of this spending went to pay crew wages, so it is counted as direct economic output and as household income that creates induced impacts. This initial spending generated total economic output of approximately \$935,000 in Oregon. This includes approximately \$507,000 in direct economic output as the LWIB paid wages and purchased goods and services. As this spending circulated throughout the economy, it generated another \$6,400 in indirect impacts as the providers of goods and services paid wages and made purchases to support their production. As workers spent part of their incomes in the local economy, they generated another \$421,000 in induced impacts. The total output includes approximately \$618,000 in personal income.
- Figures B and D break down the types of impacts by geographic area as a result of ARRA spending. Of the total \$935,000 in Oregon impacts, approximately \$919,000, or 98 percent, stayed within the six-county region, and another \$16,000, or two percent, occurred elsewhere in Oregon. The average region in the state captured about 97 percent of the Oregon impacts.
- Figure C shows the ARRA impact on jobs in the region. The IMPLAN model estimates a total of five full- and part-time job impacts across the six regions. This is a relatively small impact because the OYEI program was a short-term program. Two-hundred and nine youth participated in the OYEI summer program. Existing staff absorbed the administration of the program, and the participating youth were employed for too short a time to be counted as a new job in the economy. The additional household spending that the program generated was also relatively small and would likely have been absorbed by the existing economy without inducing additional employment.
- Youth wages accounted for about 75 percent of OYEI program spending in this region. Non-wage spending went to mostly to the transportation, tools and materials sectors. While such purchases generate indirect impacts, in this case the regional indirect impacts are small because these sectors purchase few of their inputs from within the region.

# The Economic Impacts of 2009-10 ARRA Expenditures

## OYEI Programs, Spring & Summer 2009

### Region 15: Clackamas County

#### A. Economic impacts of ARRA expenditures by type of impact



Type of Impact ■ Expenditures ■ Direct Impacts ■ Indirect Impacts ■ Induced Impacts

#### B. Economic output generated by ARRA expenditures by type and area of impact

Impact Area	Type of Impact			Grand Total
	Direct Impacts	Indirect Impacts	Induced Impacts	
Within the Region	\$50,267	\$591	\$31,669	\$82,527
Elsewhere in Oregon	\$0	\$386	\$4,927	\$5,313
<b>Total Oregon Impacts</b>	<b>\$50,267</b>	<b>\$977</b>	<b>\$36,596</b>	<b>\$87,840</b>

#### C. IMPLAN job impacts & summer youth program participants

Total spending-related job impacts (IMPLAN)	0
Summer 2009 Youth Participants	21

#### D. Percent of economic output that stays within this region vs. average for all regions

Region 15	94%
Average for all regions	97%

### Key Findings:

- Figures A and B show the economic impact of ARRA OYEI spending. Region 15 spent about \$57,000 in ARRA OYEI funding during the spring and summer months of 2009. This amounts to approximately three percent of the total ARRA OYEI spending statewide. Nearly all of this spending went to pay crew wages, so it is counted as direct economic output and as household income that creates induced impacts. This initial spending generated total economic output of approximately \$88,000 in Oregon. This includes approximately \$50,000 in direct economic output as the LWIB paid wages and purchased goods and services. As this spending circulated throughout the economy, it generated another \$1,000 in indirect impacts as the providers of goods and services paid wages and made purchases to support their production. As workers spent part of their incomes in the local economy, they generated another \$37,000 in induced impacts. The total output includes approximately \$60,000 in personal income.
- Figures B and D break down the types of impacts by geographic area as a result of ARRA spending. Of the total \$88,000 in Oregon impacts, approximately \$83,000, or 94 percent, occurred within the three-county area, and another \$5,000, or six percent, occurred elsewhere in Oregon. The average region in the state captured about 97 percent of the Oregon impacts.
- Figure C shows the ARRA impact on jobs in the region. The IMPLAN model counts no job impacts from this spending, mainly because the OYEI program was a relatively small, short-term program. Twenty-one youth participated in the OYEI summer program. Existing staff absorbed the administration of the program, and the participating youth were employed for too short a time to be counted as a new job in the economy. The additional household spending that the program generated was also relatively small and would likely have been absorbed by the existing economy without inducing additional employment.
- Youth wages accounted for 75 percent of OYEI program spending in this region. Non-wage spending went to mostly to the transportation, tools and materials sectors. While such purchases generate indirect impacts, in this case the regional indirect impacts are small because these sectors purchase few of their inputs from within the region.

## Chapter 4 – CONCLUSIONS

The federal government intended that states would spend ARRA funds quickly to maximize the impact on local economies and to meet growing workforce training needs. The flexibility that CCWD gave programs in implementing ARRA programs, and the challenges of the prevailing economic climate, created a unique situation where local programs could experiment with new approaches to serving clients. For this report, we examined program participation and fiscal data, interviewed state and local program staff, and completed data analysis to quantify several short- and long-term impacts. Our study provides a detailed look at both the operation of ARRA-funded programs and the likely impacts of the spending on the Oregon economy, program participants, and program operations.

### ***Program Spending and Participation***

Overall, the data described in earlier chapters present a detailed portrait of WIA and OYEI program participants during tough economic times. Unfortunately, we cannot separately identify changes in caseload composition due to economic conditions, program characteristics, service integration, and differences in data entry procedures. Nonetheless, certain trends bear continued monitoring. For example, our estimate of program service penetration could be routinely evaluated to better understand why regions vary so significantly, and whether the differences suggest changes to program operations. In addition, the extremely wide variation across regions in the prevalence of certain client characteristics could reflect differences in data reporting as much as differences in client characteristics.

### ***WIA Programs***

In general, the data supports program staff statements that ARRA funds were spent quickly, consistent with ARRA goals, given the constraints inherent in implementing a significant program expansion in a short period of time. WIA Adult/DW and Youth programs received \$35.6 million in ARRA funding and spent about 90 percent of that amount by June 30, 2010. The fastest spending occurred in WIA Youth programs (spent 96 percent by June 30, 2010), followed by Adult/DW programs (spent 86 percent by June 30, 2010). ARRA allocations for NEGs amounted to about \$14.8 million, with individual awards distributed throughout the year. About \$5.2 million in ARRA NEG funds was spent by June 30, 2010.

In addition to the new funds, participation also increased significantly in all WIA programs from 2007 to 2009, though most of that increase was due to Oregon's Integrated Service Delivery initiative. The demographic characteristics of participants changed slightly over time, although it is not clear what factors drove the changes.

- In Oregon, about 19 percent of the adult population and 24 percent of the youth population are minorities (either Hispanic or non-white, non-Hispanic). The share of minorities participating in WIA programs was 5 to 10 percentage points higher than these shares for all programs in all three years we examined, likely reflecting the fact that non-white residents disproportionately fall at the lower end of the socioeconomic status and

are disproportionately affected by unfavorable conditions in the broader economy. About 43 percent of WIA Summer participants were minorities, compared with 34 percent of WIA Youth participants in 2009. In NEG programs in 2008, 44 percent of participants were minorities.

- We also measured ARRA spending per capita (i.e., the extent to which ARRA supplemented existing workforce funds) and “service penetration” across regions and programs. With the program target population defined as those living below 200 percent of the federal poverty level, WIA programs across Oregon spent an average of \$15 in ARRA funds in 2009 for each member of the target adult population (ranging from \$9 to \$22 for regions) and \$72 for each member of the target youth population (ranging from \$48 to \$95). Our analysis also indicated that WIA programs across Oregon served 21 percent of the target adult population in 2009 (ranging from 13 percent to 31 percent for regions) and 4 percent of the target youth population (ranging from 2 percent to 6 percent). Identifying appropriate regional goals for these metrics could help to benchmark state and regional performance with respect to resource equity (across regions) and adequacy (resources available relative to need), although more complete fiscal data would be required to establish the benchmarks. Setting appropriate goals will require a better understanding about why these measures vary as they do.

Staff interviews provided detail about how each region served their rapidly increasing caseloads with ARRA funds. We found many similarities across workforce regions. Many staff emphasized the importance of the flexibility that programs had in design, and every region had to cope with the challenge of quickly spending ARRA funds, particularly the Summer Youth programs. Staff from all regions reported that ARRA funding allowed them to deliver programs and services in innovative, locally specific ways. The qualitative results and case studies presented in earlier chapters present ample evidence of the innovative responses to these challenges.

Most interviewees were complimentary of CCWD and the support they received from staff members as they spent ARRA funds. However, they also identified some areas of concern. These included the quality and consistency of basic communication with CCWD staff, the disjointed nature of data tracking and reporting processes across regions, and the effects of the service integration initiative on local autonomy. While CCWD does not control all of these issues (e.g., Department of Labor reporting requirements), and opinions vary across the regions, the comments suggest that the state could benefit from continued efforts by CCWD to streamline data systems, reporting requirements, and communications with local program staff. These efforts, and CCWD’s central role, become especially important in times of dramatic change such as the recent recession. At the same time, LWIA staff expressed appreciation for the flexibility CCWD has historically provided, and feel that flexibility served the state well for ARRA implementation.

### ***OYEI Program***

The total allocation of ARRA funding for OYEI will ultimately amount to about \$9.6 million, distributed between April 2009 and December 2011. During the program’s first two quarters, between April 1 and September 30, 2009, OYEI expenditures amounted to approximately \$2.0 million. From October 1, 2009 through December 31, 2010, another \$6.2 million in expenditures

brought the total to more than \$8.2 million. OYCC plans to spend the remaining \$1.4 million throughout 2011.

OYEI is clearly aligned with the governor's green jobs focus area. More than a quarter of this amount went to the rural counties of eastern Oregon. Most of the funding was used for crew member and crew leader wages, with the remaining amount going toward transportation, tools and materials, and other costs. About 74 percent of OYEI participants were men, and 20 percent were minorities. This is a larger share of men and a slightly smaller share of minorities than participated in WIA Youth programs. Despite the challenges of distributing ARRA funds quickly, the initiative succeeded in using the funding to significantly expand the program in a short period of time.

### ***Statewide Initiatives***

ARRA funding also contributed to two ongoing statewide initiatives: the NCRC program in Oregon and the state's service integration initiative. Some regions have not implemented the NCRC program, in part because businesses are hiring fewer workers because of the recession, but more than one interviewee indicated that ARRA money enabled a stronger roll-out of the program and the creation of more pilot sites than would otherwise have been possible. Interviewee responses about the relationship between ARRA funds and statewide integration efforts were more mixed; it was less clear that ARRA spending significantly affected the integration process.


## ***Short-term Economic Impacts of ARRA Expenditures***

### ***WIA Programs***

In the year ending June 30, 2010, CCWD and LWIAs spent approximately \$35.0 million of ARRA funding on WIA Adult/DW, Youth, and NEG programs and CCWD statewide activities (represented by the orange bar in Figure 4.1). ***As this money flowed through the economy, it generated a total of \$48.8 million in total economic output in Oregon in the year ending June 30, 2010 (see Figure 4.1).*** The total economic impact includes approximately \$27.0 million in personal income (wages, salaries, and proprietor's income), most of which went to local residents who, in turn, likely spent much of the increased income in the local economy.

The ARRA spending also increased employment (or at least additional hours for current employees equivalent to the stated number of full- and part-time jobs). Based on the IMPLAN model, we estimate that the \$35.0 million in spending generated approximately 438 full- and part-time jobs in Oregon in the year ending June 30, 2010. These are jobs that occurred throughout the economy in support of the production generated by the additional spending, but they do not include short-term summer employment for the participants because those jobs were too short-lived to have a measurable impact on employment. However, the 3,859 summer jobs did provide household income to participants, and the impacts of that spending are measured in the model.

**Figure 4.1: Summary of statewide economic impacts of ARRA WIA expenditures**



Source: IMPLAN and ECONorthwest analysis of CCWD data


### **OYEI Program**

In the spring and summer of 2009, OYCC spent approximately \$2.0 million of ARRA money to fund Summer Youth employment programs in most Oregon counties (represented by the orange bar in Figure 4.2). ***As this money flowed through the economy, it generated \$3.0 million in total economic output in Oregon throughout the following year.***

The total economic impact includes approximately \$1.9 million in personal income (wages, salaries, and proprietor’s income), most of which went to participants from disadvantaged backgrounds who likely have a greater propensity to spend locally and quickly than employees funded by ARRA WIA dollars.

As measured by IMPLAN, the initial ARRA OYEI spending generated 16 full- and part-time jobs. These are jobs that occurred throughout the economy in support of the production generated by the additional spending, excluding the short-term summer employment of participants. However, the youth summer employment program did provide household income to participants, and the impacts of that spending are measured in the model.

**Figure 4.2: Summary of statewide economic impacts of ARRA OYEI expenditures**



Source: IMPLAN and ECONorthwest analysis of CCWD data

## **Other Impacts of Job Training**

In addition to short-term economic impacts, we estimated potential benefits for participants who received ARRA services. ***Based on a recent net impact analysis of Washington’s workforce development program, we estimate that total net benefits attributable to the training itself of Oregon’s ARRA workforce expenditures at between \$117 million and \$176 million through June 30, 2010.*** Even the lower end of this range would represent a substantial return on this investment of federal funds. Only a more focused study, as conducted in Washington, would provide more precise estimates tuned specifically to conditions in Oregon.

Another measure of short-term impacts of ARRA-funded youth programs is the extent to which the programs help youth remain engaged or re-engage with educational institutions. To address this outcome, we conducted a high-level analysis of academic engagement for participants in OYEI and WIA Youth programs (while important to individuals’ career prospects, educational engagement was not necessarily a primary program goal for all initiatives).

***We found that, after controlling for observable characteristics, WIA Summer Youth participants were more likely to enroll in high school or college than otherwise similar non-participants if they were enrolled in 12th grade or not enrolled prior to participation, with particularly strong and positive effects on 12th graders in Region 2 and Region 8.*** We found no difference in outcomes for participants who were enrolled in 10th or 11th grade. We also find no statistically significant difference in outcomes for OYEI participants. While largely encouraging—if anything, the programs appear to have a positive impact on enrollment overall—the results do not prove that the programs caused the identified difference in enrollment, and the observed variation across regions warrants further investigation. A more rigorous analysis than was possible within the scope of this project or with the available data would be required to fully address these questions.

## **Final Thoughts**

We view this report as a first look at program implementation using ARRA funds. As of publication, many programs continue to spend their remaining ARRA funds, and the effects of ARRA funding on program operations and on participants will continue to unfold for many years. Of particular interest are longer-term impacts on participants. Additional time and data could provide a robust analysis of the extent to which ARRA participation affected educational attainment and employment. Even if ARRA funds cannot be replaced and existing programs must scale back operations, as seems increasingly possible given the dire fiscal conditions at all levels of government, the Oregon ARRA workforce “experiment” provided valuable information about Oregon’s workforce development system:

First, the local autonomy of Oregon’s LWIBs allowed critical flexibility for programs attempting to respond to often dire and widely varying economic conditions, although some interviewees expressed a desire for more consistent oversight from CCWD. In addition, as the department continues to progress toward more integrated data systems, all stakeholders would benefit from a strong emphasis on consistent fiscal and program data entry that meets mandatory reporting

needs and allows CCWD the ability to understand how the portfolio of workforce development programs operate across the state, including rigorous evaluation of program effectiveness.

Second, our estimates for the economic impacts of ARRA spending apply more or less equally to spending on the same program activities regardless of funding source (e.g., non-ARRA WIA expenditures would have the same dollar-for-dollar impact as ARRA WIA). Thus, the results of our study speak to the broader benefits of the programs analyzed, not just to the impacts of ARRA funds.

Finally, beyond the immediate economic impacts of program spending, ARRA-funded programs provided benefits to participants that will continue to be realized for many years. In particular, we find suggestive evidence of a significant impact of WIA Summer Youth participation on subsequent engagement with education. This finding warrants continued monitoring of youth participant outcomes, but further study of other programs could also prove valuable in convincing policymakers of the value of workforce development initiatives, regardless of the specific funding source.

## APPENDIX A: DESCRIPTION OF WIA PARTICIPATION DATA

CCWD provided WIA participation data in several related data tables, which we combined and aggregated for our analysis. The most important of these tables are described below.

- **Master:** Each person represented in the data has a record in the master table. This record contains a unique identifier as well as demographic and other personal information.
- **Client:** Each person represented in the data has one or more records in the client table. These records contain information relating to a particular relationship between a person and a WIA office, including the source of funding. Client records also include information relating to education, veteran's status, and other personal characteristics. Each client record is associated with a master record.
- **Service:** There is a service record for every service a person receives. These records have start and end dates as well as information on the type of service received. Each service record is associated with a client record.
- **Episode:** *Episode* refers to a more or less continuous period of involvement with the program. In particular, an episode ends when a period of 90 days passes without a new service. We followed this definition when grouping services.

We first linked all services with their associated client records. We then linked client records to their associated master records. For each master record, all associated services were grouped into episodes, using the start and end dates of the services to determine if 90 days had passed since the previous service had ended. For each episode, we defined a main funding source using the criteria below:

- If during the episode the person received any services funded by Summer Youth, then the main fund is "Summer Youth."
- If the first service of the episode was funded by adult or adult ARRA, then the main fund is "Adult."
- If the first service of the episode was funded by WIA Youth or Youth ARRA, then the main fund is "Youth."
- For all other episodes, then the main fund is "Other."
- For "Adult" participants, we further classified episodes by the type of services received. In general, we categorized services based on the first digit of the service code to identify "Core," "Intensive," and "Training" services. We classified core services as the lowest intensity and training services as the highest. Each episode was assigned to the service category representing the highest level of services received during the episode.
- NEG participants for any given year are those individuals with an episode during any part of that year and NEG-funded services at any time during that episode. For example, NEG participants for 2009 include individuals with NEG-funded services during 2009 as well as some individuals with NEG-funded services in 2007, 2008, or 2010, if their 2009 episode extended into those years. In terms of main funding sources, these individuals are nearly all included in the "Adult" and "Other" categories.

## **WIA Youth**

CCWD groups WIA youth participants into three categories: regular formula WIA Youth (including Year-Round and Summer participants), ARRA Summer Youth, and ARRA Year-Round Youth. However, the participant data we analyzed indicated that for many participants, funding for services received did not fall cleanly into a single category. Many youth participants received funding from more than one funding source (e.g., Summer and Year-Round funding or ARRA and formula funding).

For this reason, we grouped WIA youth participants into two categories: Summer Youth (all Summer participants) and WIA Youth (Year-Round participants only). By definition, the Summer Youth participants received services funded with ARRA dollars. Because the data included many individuals whose services were funded by both ARRA and WIA formula sources, and because LWIAs reported no substantive difference between formula- and ARRA-funded Year-Round programs, we did not further classify Year-Round youth by funding source.

Any individual who received Summer Youth funding any time through July 2010 was classified as a Summer Youth participant. Nearly all Summer Youth participants received funding during summer 2009. However, 125 Summer Youth participants received Summer Youth funding in summer 2010 but not in summer 2009. These 125 participants are counted as Summer Youth participants in the tables and charts throughout this report, except in Figure 2.10.

## **APPENDIX B – ACRONYMS**

ARRA - American Reinvestment and Recovery Act  
BLM – Bureau of Land Management  
CBO – Congressional Budget Office  
\*CSC – Community Services Consortium  
CEA – White House Council of Economic Advisors  
CNA – Certified Nursing Assistant  
CNC – Computer Numerical Controlled  
CCWD – Oregon Dept. of Community College and Workforce Development  
DOL – U.S. Dept. of Labor  
DW – Dislocated Worker  
ESL – English as a Second Language  
EWTF – Employer Workforce Training Fund  
ITAs – Individual Training Accounts  
GAO – Government Accountability Office  
GDP – Gross Domestic Product  
GED – General Educational Development  
\*JGI – Job Growers, Inc.  
LWIA – Local Workforce Investment Area  
LWIB – Local Workforce Investment Board  
\*LWP – Lane Workforce Partnership  
NCRCs – National Career Readiness Certificates  
NSC – National Student Clearinghouse  
NEGs – National Emergency Grants  
OJT – On-the-Job Training  
ODE – Oregon Dept. of Education  
OED – Oregon Employment Dept.  
OYCC – Oregon Youth Conservation Corps  
OYEI – Oregon Youth Employment Initiative  
RFP – Request for Proposal  
STEP – Summer Training and Employment Program  
TAA – Trade Adjustment Assistance  
TANF – Temporary Assistance for Needy Families  
\*TJC – The Job Council  
\*TOC/OWA – The Oregon Consortium/Oregon Workforce Alliance  
USDA – U.S. Dept. of Agriculture  
USFS – U.S. Forest Service  
WIA -Workforce Investment Act  
\*WICCO – Workforce Investment Council of Clackamas County  
\*WSI – Worksystems, Inc.

\*For counties included in the LWIAs see chart in Chapter 1, Program Overview, WIA