1. DISEASE REPORTING

1.1 Purpose of Reporting and Surveillance

1. To detect waterborne disease (WBD) outbreaks that can be controlled with public health measures (boil water alert, pool closure).
2. To confirm the etiology of WBD outbreaks, thereby guiding treatment and control measures to prevent further exposures and additional cases of illness.
3. To assess whether implemented control measures are effective in stopping further transmissions.
4. To expand current understanding of the transmission, pathogenesis and community impact of illness caused by WBD agents.
5. To identify new WBD agents, hazards, or gaps in the water safety system.

1.2 Laboratory and Physician Reporting Requirements

Health care providers are legally obligated under Oregon Administrative Rule 333-018-0000 to report cases of many of the WBD pathogens including: Campylobacter, Cryptosporidium and Cyclospora, Shiga toxin-producing E. coli, Giardia, Legionella, Shigella, and Vibrio. In addition to individual case reporting, health care providers are also obligated to report, day or night, any disease outbreaks and any uncommon illness of potential public health significance. Reports are made to the local health department (LDH).

Laboratories are required by law to report results indicative of the reportable diseases listed above. Reporting within 24 hours (including weekends and holidays) is required for Vibrio cholerae. Reporting within one working day is required for infections with Campylobacter, Cryptosporidium, Cyclospora, Shiga toxin-producing E. coli, Giardia, Legionella, Shigella, and Vibrio species (other than cholera).

Read more about the Oregon reporting requirements.

1.3 Local Health Department Reporting and Follow-Up Responsibilities

Report suspected WBD outbreaks to Public Health Division (PHD) epidemiologist on call (971-673-1111) within 24 hours of receiving a report of a suspected outbreak. An epidemiologist from Acute and Communicable Disease Prevention (ACDP) will be assigned to review the situation with you and assist if there is agreement that an investigation is warranted.
1. Interview cases and conduct environmental field visits. If waterborne transmission is suspected insure the field visit includes an Environmental Health (EH) Specialist with the appropriate experience (drinking water, pool or spas, built environment). In many cases, the best team will be from multiple disciplines.

2. Facilitate collection and transport of specimens to the Oregon State Public Health Laboratory.

3. Implement public health measures to control further spread; Exposures from drinking water, recreational waters, or aerosolized inhalational exposures require different control measures. Consult with EH.

4. Complete outbreak summary reporting in the Outbreaks database.

In some settings, such as in the midst of a widespread outbreak, resources will not allow investigation of every single case report. In those situations, potential triggers for investigation include: evidence of severe illness (deaths, or hospitalizations), large numbers of cases suggesting ongoing transmission, or a vulnerable population affected.

Report suspected harmful algae blooms (HABs) or suspected illnesses or symptoms that could be associated with a bloom to the OHA HABs program (971-673-0400).

Single cases of chemical exposure, wound infection (e.g., Vibrio skin infection) and other illnesses, (e.g., Naegleria infections) that are epidemiologically linked to water exposure as well as aquatic facility-related health events (e.g., chemical mixing accidents or air quality problems) are also of interest to us.

1.4 Confidentiality

Data about individuals collected for outbreak investigations are strictly confidential under Oregon law (OAR 333-019-0005) and official OHA policy. For this reason, data collection is the sole responsibility of either state or local public health officials and must never be delegated to a third party unless that third party is obligated to maintain confidentiality under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), or similar protective legislation.

2. THE DISEASE AND ITS EPIDEMIOLOGY

Waterborne disease (WBD) outbreaks can be categorized by etiologic agent (multiple agents rarely co-occur though it has happened), type of water (drinking, recreational), and means of water contamination.

During recent years, Oregon Public Health Division (PHD) has received between zero to two reports of WBD outbreaks yearly, involving a few to upwards of hundreds of ill persons. In 2014, there were two waterborne outbreaks and 7 reports of illness suspected to be related to HABs. This is similar to the national rate of reported WBD outbreaks, although the true burden of WBD is likely many times higher.
Known agents causing waterborne outbreaks in Oregon include *Campylobacter*, *Cryptosporidium*, norovirus, shiga toxin-producing *E. coli*, *Giardia*, and hepatitis A. In 2013 a large drinking water outbreak of *Cryptosporidium* occurred in a municipal water system.

### 2.1 Etiologic Agents, Descriptions of Illness and Incubation Periods

WBD agents may cause gastrointestinal, skin, or less commonly respiratory or systemic illness. As a result symptoms may include abdominal cramps, vomiting, diarrhea (bloody or non-bloody), hives, rashes, irritated eyes, sore throat, pneumonia, or systemic illness. Etiologic agents of WBD outbreaks can be grouped into four general categories (see Compendium for an overview of agents and symptoms):

1. **Bacteria** include *Shigella*, shiga toxin-producing *E. coli* [e.g., *E. coli* O157:H7], *Campylobacter*, *Salmonella Typhi* other *Salmonella* serotypes, *Vibrio cholerae*, and other *Vibrio* species causing gastrointestinal symptoms. Certain other less common agents such as *Francisella tularensis*, *Legionella*, *Leptospira*, and species of *Mycobacterium* and *Pseudomonas*.

2. **Viruses** include *hepatitis A* virus, norovirus and historically poliovirus. Cases usually present with gastrointestinal symptoms.

3. **Parasites** include *Cryptosporidium*, *Giardia* and *Cyclospora* which cause gastrointestinal symptoms, invasive amoeba (e.g., *Naegleria* causing meningitis), *Schistosoma* (causing schistosomiasis), and endemic trematodes causing cercarial dermatitis (*swimmer’s itch*).

4. **Noninfectious agents** include cyanobacteria (blue green algae) toxins, copper, nitrates, and various chemicals that contaminate flood waters. Symptoms depend on the agent.

### 2.2 Reservoirs

Most microbial contaminants are due to fecal contamination of water. Humans are the reservoir of *Shigella* species, *hepatitis A* virus, *Salmonella Typhi* (typhoid), *Vibrio cholerae* (cholera), norovirus, and other viruses such as rotavirus and poliovirus. Humans can also carry and have caused waterborne outbreaks due to shiga toxin-producing *E. coli*, *Cryptosporidium* and *Giardia*.

Animals and birds are the primary reservoirs of *Campylobacter jejuni*, *Cryptosporidium*, shiga toxin-producing *E. coli*, *Francisella tularensis*, *Giardia*, leptospires, schistosomes, and *Salmonella* species, and can contaminate recreational water, typically with feces. Wild or domestic animal carcasses can also contaminate water.

Drinking water systems can become contaminated at the source, or if wells or pipes (the distribution system) are breached and surface water enters. Water treatment failures can also result in illness. Human sewage can also contaminate natural bodies of water.

There are environmental reservoirs for *Legionella* species, non-cholera *Vibrio*, non-tuberculosis *Mycobacterium* species, schistosomes, amoeba, and algae.
Legionella, species of Mycobacterium, and Pseudomonas thrive in biofilm which adhere to plumbing or other surfaces.

WBD can result from an altered aquatic environment such as excess added chlorine, added copper sulfate, or altered water pH. Exposure may be through inhalation of aerosolized water or volatilized chemicals. Intentional water contamination could occur.

2.3 Modes of Transmission

By definition, WBD agents are transmitted through water, although many WBD agents are also transmitted through other routes, such as food, animal contact, or direct person-to-person. Typical route of entry is through ingestion or skin contact, less commonly by inhalation or intra nasally. A WBD outbreak may initially be investigated as a foodborne outbreak until water exposure is recognized or vice versa.

WBD outbreaks can be grouped into four general types of water exposure:

1. Recreational water, treated, this includes swimming pools, interactive fountains, water slides, spas, whirlpools, and hot tubs.
2. Recreational water, untreated (or wild), includes lakes, rivers, streams, hot springs, and ocean beaches.
3. Drinking water (also used for showering or bathing) includes tap water, well water, bottled water, and contaminated water served as ice or in a beverage.
4. Other water exposures include decorative or display fountains, grocery store misting devices, cooling towers, and agricultural or industrial water.

2.4 Incubation Period

Variable depending on agent.

2.5 Period of Communicability

The communicable period of those infected with bacteria, viruses or parasites varies. See agent-specific guidelines.

The Compendium of Waterborne Diseases is also helpful to focus the investigation.

2.6 Treatment

Though treatment of cases varies with the etiologic agent, most WBD diarrheal illnesses require only adequate hydration. Treatment recommendations for some specific WBD agents would be the same as for foodborne infections and can be found in: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Diagnosis and Management of Foodborne Illnesses A Primer for Physicians and Other Health Care Professionals. MMWR 2004;53 (RR04):1–33. 
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/rr5304a1.htm
2.7 Susceptibility/Immunity

There is general susceptibility to WBD agents. Vaccines are available for a few agents that have the potential to be waterborne (e.g., hepatitis A, cholera, typhoid, polio). Infants and persons with lowered gastric acidity may be infected with lower inoculum of some bacteria. Infants, the elderly, immunosuppressed persons, and sometimes persons with chronic medical conditions are more likely to suffer serious illness from diarrheal agents.

3. CASE DEFINITIONS, DIAGNOSIS AND LABORATORY SERVICES

A waterborne disease (WBD) outbreak is an incident in which 1) two or more epidemiologically-linked persons experience a similar illness after exposure to the same water source and 2) epidemiologic evidence implicates the water as the likely source of the illness.

3.1 Confirmed Case Definition

Any outbreak of an infectious disease, chemical poisoning, or toxin-mediated illness where water is indicated as the source by an epidemiological investigation.

The implicated water in a WBD outbreak may be drinking water, recreational water, water not intended for drinking (e.g., water used for agricultural purposes or in a cooling tower) or water of unknown intent. The route of exposure may be ingestion, inhalation, intranasal, or contact. The agent associated with the WBD outbreak may be a microbe, chemical, or toxin. Water testing to demonstrate contamination or identify the etiologic agent is preferred, but not required for inclusion as an outbreak. Chemicals (including disinfection by products) in drinking or recreational water that cause health effects either through water exposure or by volatilization leading to poor air quality are included.

Waterborne disease (WBD) outbreaks may or may not be laboratory confirmed. In general, confirming the specific etiologic agent in an outbreak requires detecting the agent in clinical specimens from at least two ill persons.

3.2 Services Available at the Oregon State Public Health Laboratories

Laboratory testing for multiple agents on all outbreaks is prohibitively expensive. Consulting PHD epidemiologists to develop “a differential diagnosis” based on case histories is, therefore, required prior to submitting clinical specimens for analysis.

OSPHL can test clinical specimens from patients for many waterborne bacterial or parasitic agents and norovirus. They also confirm bacterial and parasitic agents tested commercially, and are able to speciate or subtype isolates of Salmonella, Legionella, Shigella, and shiga toxin-producing E. coli.

In outbreak situations involving unusual agents, additional testing may be available through Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Consult with PHD Epidemiology prior to collecting specimens to assure proper handling (971-673-1111). Different test kits are used for different agents (e.g., specimens
for enteric bacteria are collected using transport medium while specimens for parasites are collected using preservative).

OSPHL also has the capability to test water specimens for many bacterial pathogens, when indicated, in the context of an outbreak investigation. Collection of environmental samples must follow established protocols. OSPHL will not test water for norovirus or for parasites. Water testing for *Legionella* may be available with special arrangements.

For additional information regarding testing clinical and water specimens at OSPHL Guide to Services

Note that OSPHL requires all clinical specimens have two patient identifiers, a name and a second identifier (e.g., date of birth) both on the specimen label and on the submission form. Due to laboratory accreditation standards, specimens will be rejected for testing if not properly identified. Also include specimen source and collection date. Having obtained specimens in the outbreak investigation, it is extremely unsatisfying to be unable to obtain results due to incorrect or

### 3.3 Laboratory Testing of Water

There are other environmental labs that test environmental samples from lakes and other water bodies for suspected freshwater biotoxins (HABs – harmful algae blooms). If the water is a drinking water source, consult with the State Drinking Water program (971-673-0405) for testing. Analyses are available for microcystins, anatoxin-a, saxitoxins, and cylindrospermopsin. In situations where people have symptoms but tests for the four biotoxins are negative, additional testing may be available through CDC. For guidelines specific to HABs and sampling techniques as well as a list of labs, visit: [Oregon HAB Sampling and Testing](#)

### 4. ROUTINE CASE INVESTIGATION

Waterborne disease (WBD) outbreaks can be detected through Notifiable Conditions reporting, bacterial isolate sub-typing and molecular analysis in the laboratory, citizen complaints, and syndrome surveillance systems. Investigations will vary greatly depending on the source: drinking water, building water system, treated recreational water, natural waters, etc. If public health resources are limited, focus activities on investigating outbreaks that meet the following criteria: severe symptoms, large numbers affected, ongoing transmission, vulnerable population affected, or possible contaminated commercial product (e.g., bottled water).

Note there are special investigations for even single cases of legionellosis involving a healthcare facility (hospital, long term care).

#### 4.1 Epidemiological Evaluation

Interview the case (or parents) and others who may be able to provide pertinent information.

**Collect data using a standardized method to characterize the cases**
• Who is reporting illness: Age, Sex, Address, Occupation?
• What is the symptom profile? Vomiting, diarrhea, fever, rash, abdominal cramps. Ask about all symptoms in a standard way. How long is the illness lasting?
• Are there ≥ 2 individuals with the same symptoms and onset dates close in time?
• How many individuals appear to be infected? Gather contact information (name and phone) for others they know are reporting illness.
• What are the common activities and water consumption history in the 7 days prior to illness? Use the case reporting form risk/exposure questions if you have a known pathogen.
• Does the individual have a history of travel in the last 30 days? If so, collect dates, locations and mechanisms of travel, use of pool, hot tubs, or other recreational water exposures.
• Is there a definable population at risk for whom immediate control measures might help mitigate disease?
• Is there evidence of severe illness (hospitalization or death) that could reasonably be expected to be communicable or from a common environmental source?

Confirm the existence of an outbreak
Local health jurisdictions should consider a number of questions, including the following:

• Are there persons from different households with illness following exposure to the same water or who visited the same recreational facility?
• Are illness signs and symptoms, along with the incubation period and symptom duration, consistent with an illness resulting from the reported exposure?
• Are all the illnesses similar and consistent with a WBD agent?
• Is the number of illnesses more than what would be expected in this group of people and in the population as a whole?
• Are there common exposures other than water (e.g., food, personal or occupational contact) that could explain transmission?
• Does the demographic information (age, ethnicity, etc.) suggest a common source?

Make a "best guess" as to the cause of the illness using the Compendium of Waterborne Diseases.

4.2  Environmental Evaluation
The goals of the joint epidemiologic and environmental outbreak investigation are to identify the infectious agent, the mode of transmission, the water source, and the source of the contamination. Determine whether the suspected facility is
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licensed or regulated and by whom. If drinking water is suspected, determine whether it is a public water system.

Consider the likely infectious agent based on symptoms and incubation period. Consider likely modes of transmission for that agent to focus the environmental investigation. Source of exposure might also suggest an agent (e.g., fresh water organism or marine organism). For example: *Legionella* – may be hot tub, drinking water, ventilation. *Giardia* – may be water related, or person to person. *Shigella* – may be food or water related, or in recreational water venue specialists. Many pathogens should be removed by adequately functioning treatment and disinfection systems.

As appropriate, obtain the following additional information:

1. Were there any unusual circumstances or practices operative just before the outbreak began that could have contaminated water?
2. Were any staff ill during the incubation period of the suspect WBD agent? When did they become ill? With which water sources did they work?
3. Do the staff ingest or have body contact with the water they work with?

Get a copy of written procedures, if any. Inquire about disinfection practices: agents used, length of time and frequency with which they are applied. Assess showering and toileting facilities and accessibility in the facility, as well as availability of soap, paper towels, and alcohol-based hand sanitizer.

5. **Controlling Further Spread**

   Implement immediate control measures based on the likely WBD agent and source.

   Depending on circumstances, immediate control measures may include a boil water order, hyperchlorination of a pool, flushing plumbing, posting warnings at a lake, closing a facility, recalling a commercial product like bottled water, or issuing a press release to advise citizens who may develop symptoms.

   Treatment (prevention) of *Cryptosporidium* in treated venues is largely proactive. By the time one knows the pool is infected, it has generally been more than a week since exposure and it has likely treated itself through disinfection, ultraviolet light and filtration. Once the water is contaminated with crypto, it won’t show up in a victim until 7-10 days later; treatment of the pool or closure is likely pointless. The exception is where we can show illnesses over time, or when multiple pools are involved.

   Develop a fact sheets and a press release if transmission is expected to be widespread.

5.1 **Education**

   For outbreaks due to confirmed or strongly suspected communicable waterborne diseases, provide basic information about the benefits of scrupulous hand
hygiene, and recommend ready access to sinks with soap and warm water and alcohol-based hand sanitizer, as appropriate.

For recreational water outbreaks use this opportunity to promote healthy swimming behavior. Pool hopping is common and educational activities should involve all pools in the jurisdiction.

Do not enter swimming areas when ill with vomiting or diarrhea.

Do not let children ill with vomiting or diarrhea enter swimming areas even if they have special swim diapers or swim pants.

Don’t swallow water unless it is intended for drinking.

Use proper diapering and give children frequent bathroom breaks.

Wash hands after using the toilet or changing diapers.

Shower with soap before swimming in pools.

During an outbreak, some jurisdictions have excluded diapered children from water recreation facilities. Generally, a more aggressive public media campaign has shown improved success where local park and pool managers, day care institutions, and other common areas of congregation work to inform the public of potential problems and educate the public not to enter the water for two weeks after any incidents of diarrhea.

Specified control measures may need to be re-initiated or expanded and may also include pool maintenance training or notifying state or federal regulatory agencies. If the outbreak is in a treated water venue, check with your pool resource person to see if further treatment is necessary and what it should be. Automatically closing the pool will push possibly ill bathers to other pools, expanding the problem. Sometimes, though, it does make sense to close, require special prophylactic disinfection treatment of a pool(s) and may make sense to prohibit certain populations from entering a recreational water venue (i.e. young diapered children).

Showering after swimming in a treated venue will remove any chloramine and in natural bodies of water will reduce the risk of swimmer’s itch, and rinse off any fecal material.

Instruct people to only use safe sources for drinking water, including during recreational activities. If water quality is uncertain, boil or chemically treat water before using it for drinking, rinsing uncooked foods, or brushing teeth.

Review work, school and daycare restrictions for anyone symptomatic with diarrhea and remember there are additional restrictions on STEC cases.

If contaminated water in turn contaminates food (e.g., produce washed in bacteria-contaminated water, shellfish with _Vibrio_), the investigation is considered a foodborne outbreak.
6. TEST HYPOTHESIS WITH AN ANALYTICAL STUDY

1. Determine if initial interviews and the number of affected persons will support an epidemiologic study that compares groups of ill and well persons.

2. Get as complete a list as possible of all the people who likely shared exposure; lists can be obtained from an event organizer or from reservation lists.

3. Obtain information about the specific source of water (e.g., utility company). Ensure storage tanks are inspected for signs of entry or contamination.

4. Develop a refined questionnaire to systematically collect information on symptoms and exposures. Consult with PHD Epidemiologists.

5. Administer the questionnaire to as many people as possible, both sick and well, as soon as possible after the first cases are reported. It is important to remember that people’s memories may become less reliable over time.

6. After finalizing a case definition, analyze the data to obtain the following:
   - Demographic profile: the number of cases by age group and sex.
   - Symptom profile: the percentage of cases with vomiting, diarrhea, bloody diarrhea, fever, abdominal cramps, jaundice, respiratory symptoms, rash, and any other symptoms.
   - Epidemic curve: the number of cases by time of onset of symptoms.
   - Event attack rate: the number of cases divided by the total number of people exposed. Event attack rate can only be calculated if the total number of people attending is known.
   - Median incubation period: the time it takes 50% of the cases to get sick after exposure to the WBD agent. The median incubation period can only be calculated if the time of exposure is known.
   - Water-specific attack rate: the percentage of people who became ill after specific water exposure.

REFERENCES

1. CDC toolkits for waterborne outbreak investigation include extensive case/control interview forms, sample case tracking line lists (add columns for symptoms reported), environmental health outbreak investigation surveys for swimming pools, and sample notification letters.

2. US Environmental Protection Agency – Microbiology – water-related issues, waterborne disease, regulations http://www.epa.gov/microbes/

3. US Environmental Protection Agency – Office of Ground Water and Drinking Water – consumer site for ground water and drinking water information, regulations http://water.epa.gov/drink/


5. US Environmental Protection Agency - Mycobacteria Health Advisory
UPDATE LOG

November 2015 – Updated into new template. (June Bancroft, Leslie Byster)
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