



# Oregon

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TO: Land Conservation and Development Commission  
FROM: Richard Whitman, Director  
SUBJECT: **Agenda Item 9, August 6-7, 2008 LCDC Commission Meeting**

**INFORMATIONAL BRIEFING FROM THE CITY OF BAKER CITY REGARDING  
BEHAVIORAL BASED LAND USE PLANNING**

The Commission will hear an informational briefing from Donald Chance, the Planning Director for Baker City, on behavioral incentives for land use planning. Two sample chapters of Mr. Chance's manuscript on this subject are included for background. For additional information about this agenda item please contact Darren Nichols at (503) 373-0050, ext. 255, or by e-mail [darren.nichols@state.or.us](mailto:darren.nichols@state.or.us).

**ATTACHMENT:**

**BEHAVIORAL PLANNING: The Theory and Application of Incentive Strategies in Growth Management**



## **BEHAVIORAL PLANNING:**

### **The Theory and Application of Incentive Strategies in Growth Management**

Donald R. Chance, Virginia Tech

#### BOOK CONCEPT

Economists believe that much of human behavior can be explained through the role of incentives, both positive and negative. Behavioral psychologists subscribe to similar research findings, except that they characterize behavior as being motivated by the consequences of our actions. The conditioning climate in which incentives find their power is the particular culture in which we live and work – family, profession, community and nation. When integrated with cultural considerations, incentives can be manufactured for social purpose in an act of soft paternalism that influences behavioral response. Implementation schemes in land planning can take advantage of this dynamic in cultures dominated by competitive individualism where command and control regulatory approaches have historically met with limited success.

*Behavioral Planning* presents a new model of professional land planning practice aimed specifically at improving growth management strategies in America. The behaviorist model is called cultural based incentive planning or CBIP. It directly challenges much of the conventional wisdom within the planning establishment, introducing an aggressive, behavior-based model of practice. It draws upon a number of disciplines with which planning has no substantial heritage of collaboration – applied behavior analysis, environmental psychology, behavioral economics, cultural anthropology and the communication and marketing sciences. Research conclusions from these fields are adapted for planning application in a format designed specifically to bridge the gap between reflective researcher and the reflective practitioner. *Behavioral Planning* provides a new theoretical model for planning professionals, and illustrates that model with over forty-five new principles and applied techniques.

Land planners work within systems, both natural and man-made, but they devise and execute public policy at the human level. Our professional training almost exclusively relates to applied systems management, from transportation considerations and subdivision design to command and control regulation, yet most of us spend our careers as intermediaries in neighborhood controversy, personality conflicts, and dealing with the effects of human behavior on the natural and the human-made environment. We are in the people business yet rarely do we relate to our profession in those terms. For example, when attempting to manage some element of growth, we do not say to ourselves, “What consequences or incentives can be devised that are politically

acceptable and culturally effective to establish the desired behavioral response?" Instead we ask, "What regulation can be legislatively imposed at the state or local level?"

An analogy that every novice whitewater canoeist learns applies here. The current (culture and marketplace forces) is too strong to be out-muscled in a direct confrontation (culturally insensitive planning approaches). Harness that power with better technique (culture sensitive design) to achieve the desired objective, or crash and burn. This book contends that as a profession, we have been smashing-up canoes all across the American landscape for decades, but a better way exists other than constantly sacrificing ourselves to the cultural current. The basic premise of *Behavioral Planning* is to plan based on human nature and the American culture, not ignore them.

CBIP offers planners in the public and private sectors a politically realistic alternative, adaptable to both existing tools and new approaches. The approach was specifically created to reduce the current contentiousness between America's culture of competitive individualism and planning's egalitarian objectives. While applicable to a broad range of environmental management concerns, the text focuses on examples in growth management and traditional land planning functions. Planners, natural resource managers, and policy analysts operating in more conservative environments will find the approach particularly helpful in the fight for relevancy and effectiveness.

The model and techniques developed under CBIP are based on four pillars: cultural sensitivity, behavior analysis, engineered incentive regimes, and the tools of persuasion. The cultural pillar of CBIP is concerned with how a society operationalizes issues such as freedom, equality, and security, which in turn affects land-use behaviors in the areas of privacy, autonomy, and mobility. The book explores these and other American cultural traits and their implications for planning practice by contrasting them against other world cultures and their planning outcomes. By exposing these differences, a foundation is developed for a culturally sensitive planning format better suited to American circumstances.

The second pillar of CBIP is the mechanics of how to engineer effective interventions for behavior change, whether housing decisions by consumers or development deliberations by landowners. It is based on half a century of practice and research in applied behavior analysis. The conclusions and basic principles are deceptively simple, but they have powerful implications for planners searching for more effective approaches.

The third pillar of the model is the design and application of incentives, both positive and negative. When planners hear the word incentives, they tend to think economic inducements through such mechanisms as density bonuses. But by combining an understanding of cultural tendencies with the psychological quirks of human decision-making, the role of incentives can be greatly expanded for planning application. Process, lifestyle, social, behavioral, and technical assistance incentives can be created for various stakeholder groups in the land-use equation. The book considers many incentive strategies, drawing upon, among other areas, the psychological underpinnings of influence and persuasion and incentive theory.

*Behavioral Planning* represents a career long quest to improve the performance of land-use planning practice in America. It is the product of a professional odyssey that spans five states as a practicing planner from Virginia to Oregon, and decades of international reflection. From federal, regional, and local government planning positions;

to development industry trade associations, private consulting firms, and sixteen legislative sessions as a professional lobbyist specialized in environmental and planning related statutes, it is a quest that brought the author back to his beginnings in academia as a professor and researcher in the personal search for results. In short, the book has been more than thirty-five years of painful experience in the making, drawing upon research, field experience and informed speculation.

## BOOK ORGANIZATION AND TABLE OF CONTENTS

The book is organized in three sections. The first section provides context, while the second section presents the model and techniques of CBIP in some detail. The final section of the book is an example of application.

Section I is comprised of an introduction and two chapters. Chapter One explores the performance of American planning and, in particular, growth management, suggesting that a course correction is required in both technique and outlook if the profession is to regain constructive influence in our culture. It provides an early context for the arguments and suggested protocols that follow, and presents five criteria by which to judge regulatory interventions.

Chapter Two provides further context for CBIP by extending the consideration of political culture into the realm of planning performance. To fully comprehend the strategic options for the improvement of growth management practice, state legislative realities must be addressed. These political realities are the limiting factor in establishing traditional models of regional command and control planning systems, forcing the consideration of other modified approaches with a higher degree of political consensus. The author draws upon his 20 years of experience as a professional lobbyist in environmental legislation to characterize in a variety of ways, the legislative culture in which planners find themselves, including political limits and the mechanics of how those limits are easily enforced.

Section II of the book directly addresses the model and techniques of CBIP in four chapters. Chapter Three introduces and describes the fundamental structure and principles of Culture Based Incentive Planning. Readers are provided with a conceptual understanding of the model's basic components and the theory behind its creation to prepare them for the detailed application chapters that follow. The chapter also includes a discussion of where CBIP fits into current planning theory and addresses the question of ethical application.

Chapter Four addresses the first structural pillar of CBIP, the consideration of culture and its implications in planning practice. It explores American cultural traits and contrasts them with other societies in issues related directly to environmental and land-use policy. A variety of studies, surveys, essays and observations are employed to explore American cultural implications in planning. The chapter also exposes readers to cultural theory and provides examples of how to adapt its concepts directly into professional practice.

Chapter Five presents the second pillar of CBIP – applied behavior analysis (ABA). The core of the chapter summarizes the basic conclusions from ABA and then

provides a model with specific techniques and principles for how to adapt ABA to regulatory reform in planning and environmental issues management.

Chapter Six approaches CBIP from the tactical level and addresses its third pillar - specific techniques for the construction of incentive based strategies. In the last decade an explosion of research has been generated in the new field of behavioral economics which is having a profound impact within the discipline. The conclusions, which have strong roots in human motivation and decision-making psychology, have yet to be transferred into planning practice. Chapter Six makes that transfer, transcribing research into basic management principles and techniques for field application in environmental management.

Section III of the book is a demonstration of CBIP principles and process in application. Chapter Seven presents a recent CBIP based analysis conducted for the U.S. Forest Service and Virginia Department of Forestry concerning private forestland fragmentation trends. While a rural lands example, the CBIP principles and process are equally applicable to suburban or urban practice. The chapter is designed to aid the reader's comprehension of how CBIP principles can be applied to a wide variety of management interventions, and to bring into focus in a summary form the many concepts and techniques that had been previously discussed in the book. The book concludes with an appendix of model zoning code and subdivision ordinance language that supports the case study presented in Chapter Seven.

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## SAMPLE CHAPTERS

### Chapter One

#### AMERICAN GROWTH MANAGEMENT – NOBLE ENDEAVOR AND PAINFUL REALITY

##### Introduction

When many East Coast planners think of Oregon, they imagine mist, majestic Douglas Fir forests, and, of course, Portland. While the images are all accurate, two-thirds of the state is predominantly arid high plains, interspersed with isolated mountain ranges, such as the Blues, Strawberries, and Eagle Caps. Located in this rugged landscape is Malheur County with the kind of hauntingly beautiful sagebrush country and high timber that you'd expect in a Client Eastwood western. The amazingly large and desolate jurisdiction served as a killing ground on the Oregon Trail where livestock and people would finally give out. With 94 percent in rangeland, two-thirds in federal ownership, Malheur County is one of the locations where the American government located internment camps for Japanese Americans in a fit of national hysteria in World War II. To this day, it remains largely an isolated and sparsely populated landscape.

In 1977 Malheur County paid me the princely sum of \$12,000 a year to assist in bringing the gospel of Oregon's newly minted growth management program to the state's back forty. The assignment was to develop first generation comprehensive plans, zoning codes, and subdivision ordinances for both the County and four small incorporated towns, two of which had populations under 300. To meet the state-imposed deadline, the planning director, buttressed by a handful of planners on short-term contract, had one year to accomplish the task after the initial Land Conservation and Development Commission guidelines were published. Having just spent several years attempting to sell zoning in the darkest recesses of southern Appalachia as a local planner, I figured how bad could it get? As a former planner with the USDA Forest Service in the South and then as a local government planner in western North Carolina, I had become moderately accustomed to having law enforcement protection at public hearings. My previous salary had been \$9,000 so I assumed that the position was a great opportunity, and it was located in a progressive state, no less. Consider the experience innocence lost.

Thirty years later I can still mark the moment that I started to realize that much of what I had been taught as a planner wasn't particularly effective in the American culture and had ethical overtones in practice. It happened one night at a particularly ugly public hearing in Malheur County. The Oregon state growth management law mandated that every incorporated hamlet in the state have an adopted plan with ordinances to match in

accordance with state guidelines. This even applied to isolated jurisdictions like Adrian and Jordan Valley, Oregon, with populations less than 200. Neither had seen any development in 20 years and now, 30 years later, they still have shown virtually no population growth.

Part of the original concept behind Oregon's Senate Bill 100, in fact, a major factor in how it was politically promoted to local governments, was that the program expected a partnership between local and state governments. It was argued that community self-determination through public involvement was not going to be replaced by state mandate. Instead, broad goals at the state level would guide local performance matched with state financial assistance. Yes, state approval was required of plans and ordinances, but local planners and elected officials would still have the ability to respond to local circumstances and find consensus within their communities through any number of approaches. That was the original political concept, but not the eventual reality.

Sitting isolated at that public hearing in 1978, I was called a communist, a Nazi, and a long-haired college subversive from the 1960s, which struck me as odd since I was a short-haired moderate from conservative Virginia. During the course of this shellacking, I was reminded how the County had received its name. Malheur is French for "bad hour." But I didn't blame the citizens for their anger. In fact, I privately shared it. In the previous nine months, a painstaking community involvement process had been conducted to construct a neighborhood consensus, jurisdiction by jurisdiction, to comply with the State's new planning mandates. These mandates made little sense for remote desert hamlets of 150 people, but working together, people had found reasonable solutions in both plan and ordinance that matched the social and land-use fabric of the area. These micro-communities were proud of the approaches they had engineered, including their first zoning code, a simply administered 20-page document with only three districts. It wasn't much, but it certainly made sense for the circumstances.

The controversy had come in the reaction from the State, and Malheur's citizens and elected officials were furious. State reviews summarily bashed draft plans as wave after wave of local government guidance was informally suggested. Across Oregon, local planners begged for a State presence in the brutal public hearings to explain the positions being taken in Salem. Threats of state imposed building permit moratoriums were being made against local governments throughout eastern Oregon and ultimately imposed in some cases. It slowly became obvious to local elected officials and rural planners that local discretion was to be seriously restricted, and ultimately nearly eliminated, in the interpretation and compliance with the then broad planning goals of the new law. Over time, minimum lot size requirements mandated from the state would climb from 20 acres to 40 acres and eventually reach sizes of as much as 160 acres. Ultimately, twelve years were required before all local jurisdictions were found in compliance with the 1973 law, as regulatory guidance became increasingly autocratic. Fifteen percent of the state's local jurisdictions had refused to even submit plans and ordinances for review seven years after enactment of the law (DeGrove, 1984).

It was in Oregon that I recognized the ethical dilemma of American planning practice and the limited effectiveness of many of our basic tools in a society steeped in competitive individualism. If you truly believed in the principles of community self-determination through various forms of public involvement, how did you reconcile the imposition of a rigorous top-down approach? Moreover, if planners were desperate for

results in their land-use planning practice, would anything but the most restrictive command and control regulatory format work? And in how many states could such a demanding system be politically imposed and sustained?

By any number of measures, Oregon has the most effective, and some would argue, the only effective, state growth management program in the nation. It is the only state with a rigorous enough regulatory format to render a physical difference over time in how the regional landscape actually looks, principally because the program has curtailed rural sprawl. But the achievement has come with a number of limitations and undesirable side effects, not the least of which is that the citizens of the state have twice effectively voted to emasculate the program. While results are measurable and obvious to the experienced planner's eye, they are still modest by comparison, to say, the results of British planning practice, which is exponentially more regulatory in places like the Yorkshire Dales or Lake District.

The pattern is clear in Western European and British planning practice. Aggressive regulatory control does work. How could it not, particularly when applied uniformly across large regions the size of most states. It is a wonderfully easy shortcut to results, if you can get away with it. But, it is only effective in achieving some, not all, planning objectives. It also has serious political, cultural, and economic limitations in America. You cannot control demand by limiting supply, a fundamental flaw in many growth management strategies. Nor can you order farming or forestry to be economically viable through exclusive use zoning. You can't regulate housing to be affordable. And avoiding exaggerated market psychology responses is difficult with even a whiff of enhanced regulation. Most importantly, forcing a narcissistic and fiercely independent society like America to adopt and sustain the highly rigorous controls necessary to achieve real results is nearly impossible, except in communities with elite socio-economic characteristics, or in circumstances where the horse has long since bolted from the barn, as in the case of jurisdictions where the majority of damage has already occurred.

Consider the application of zoning. Many of the aging generation of planners now approaching retirement spent much of their early careers fighting for the establishment of zoning, jurisdiction by painful jurisdiction. The tool was originally designed to separate incompatible land-uses in a time of filthy industries and deplorable air quality, not guide growth, and in the former capacity, it has been highly effective. Some argue convincingly that it has been too effective (Duany, Plater, Zyberk, & Speck, 2000; Jacobs, 1961; Kendig, Connor, Byrd, & Heyman, 1980). As land-use practices have changed with predominately clean industries and office parks, planners have slowly come to understand the role that traditional zoning practice has played in creating separation and sterility. New urbanism is a response to that mistake and a potential extension of it because it locks in rigidity. The basic provisions and institutions of today's American planning regimes come from and are designed for a world that to a significant extent no longer exists. They are largely designed for the culture and land-use dynamics of the 1920s, not the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.

Unfortunately, planners now find themselves in the same situation that the forestry profession finds itself. For 60 years professional foresters, in conjunction with the Ad Council, promoted the evils of forest fires through Smokey Bear. The effective campaign went as far as incidentally restricting the management options of foresters to

use fire as a tool. As knowledge has advanced with the benefit of hindsight, forest management professionals now understand that they have to reintroduce fire back into the western forest ecosystem and engage in certain harvesting regimes to avoid catastrophic burns. That's not an easy sell to Smokey's disciples, the general public.

By comparison, zoning has been embraced across most American communities. Its principal support comes from its power to exclude different socio-economic elements not identical to one's own. Public endorsement of the tool has, at its roots, power to maintain and enhance a privileged status quo, a strong human behavioral preference. Neighborhoods have become sophisticated regarding how to use zoning to protect and enhance private economic investment, while local governments use it as a tool to enhance revenue. These exclusionary zoning themes have now become so prevalent that they are the foundation of the public's support for planning. In short, exclusionary zoning and punitive subdivision requirements now masquerade as growth management.

Consider this pattern of public behavior. Established neighborhoods will nearly always support down zoning below existing densities in their area. They will resist up-zoning efforts to implement a variety of growth management strategies from transit-oriented developments to infill. Voters in small suburban governments, where they have the most political clout, will force excessively low-density residential zoning within their jurisdiction (Fischel, 1995). Rural landowner interests will typically resist extremely large lot-size zoning themes and restrictions on family exemptions or occasional sales. Recent exurban move-ins will endorse punitive large lot requirements, the more exclusive the better. Both groups will challenge rural clustering themes because they can't relate to the market segment, one seeing it as a reduction in its development potential and the other perceiving it as development that it doesn't want. The inevitable outcome of this tug-of-war is a rural minimum lot size of 5, 10, or 20 acres, the worst possible format among the choices.

Culture based incentive planning (CBIP) finds its roots in that Oregon public hearing back in 1978. In a very real sense, its origins come from the frustration of American planners hungry for meaningful results. CBIP rests on the fundamental assumption that current planning practice in America is under performing, so much so that planners must be willing to experiment with alternative models or risk complete irrelevance as a profession in today's evolving culture. To accept the need for CBIP or any other alternative model of practice is to accept the assumption that current technique is failing, or at least seriously flawed. The remainder of this chapter addresses that assumption. It asks how do we judge effectiveness of planning programs, and then applies those tests to the evidence of the last three decades.

### The Test of Performance

Planners, like lobbyists, tend to measure success as the adoption of a new program, not the long-term results generated from that plan, ordinance, or new statute. This natural emotional reaction for those down in the trenches attempting to scratch out a victory can distort open-minded assessments of what has been accomplished. When you spend years completely committed to the development of a new state growth management statute, and you actually accomplish enactment of a bill against all odds, it is difficult not to feel success has been achieved regardless of all those political

compromises and field realities that may ultimately emasculate the effort in future years. When you sacrifice yourself for the passage of a controversial ordinance, not transcribing community adoption as planning performance is almost asking too much. The harsh reality is that passage of any plan, ordinance, or statute is not success except in the most temporal time frame, confusing effectiveness with the occasional political triumph.

Psychologists have long recognized a human behavioral trait that they refer to as "lock-in and lock-out." Once a person has formed an opinion she or he will have a strong tendency to cognitively defend that position in internal thought processes. Since we don't want to seem inconsistent to ourselves, our minds conveniently oblige by filtering incoming information without our awareness. Information that is perceived as supporting an established opinion will be quickly recognized. In other words, we will take notice of it. Information that may challenge that established opinion often won't be noticed in our reflective thoughts, and even if it is, we tend to quickly reject it. In short, we lock-in positions and then lock-out information that contradicts those opinions.

Advertisers and political operatives have recognized this tendency for years. Major consumer manufacturers spend much of their advertising dollars in branding efforts aimed at the young, knowing that once committed, customers are likely to maintain a purchasing pattern for years, if not life. Political campaigns focus on influencing undecided voters and reinforcing the views of voters already committed to a candidate. They rarely attempt to change voters' minds. Political attack ads infuriate voters who are committed to the candidate under attack, reinforcing their commitment, but that is not who those ads are aimed at.

To make matters worse, opinions have a tendency to perpetuate. Humans often fabricate new evidence and reasons in support of opinions by inventing social proof. So what does this have to do with land planning and the perception of performance? Objectivity is hard to maintain in the immediate pressure and pains of a planner's life. The ability to judge performance is complicated by the long time frames and complex systems in which planners operate. They share this dilemma of lack of rapid feedback with several other disciplines, such as forest management and preventative health. Trial and success learning by the individuals in these disciplines can take decades or lifetimes and is always suspect due to the influence of so many potential confounding factors.

Planners face a similar situation. The complexity of factors that can influence the outcome of any given planning policy and the ability to anticipate the un-anticipatable can make a mockery of the term planner. Older planners have the advantage of being able to periodically revisit jurisdictions where they have previously worked. It can be a sobering experience to see the market or political response to a regulatory mechanism put into place decades earlier. One personal example is the unintended destructive consequences of rural large-lot zoning schemes that I was responsible for establishing. A second example is the sheer insignificance of many thoughtfully developed comprehensive plans. Few things are so depressing as seeing a stack of old comprehensive plans on the shelf in a jurisdiction, each representing a different planning effort, and realizing upon review that they all basically say the same thing and bear little resemblance to what actually occurred.

But even reflective observation taken in a historic context can have serious limitations for the planner. Questions always arise about market shifts that have occurred over the horizon beyond immediate comprehension. Nor is it necessarily possible to

fathom all of the other potential realities evoked or missed in the planning effort. What was the true impact, if any, on the quality of life in the neighborhood? Was social equity advanced or retarded by previous program elements? To what extent did the development pattern reflect planning intervention or natural market trends? To speculate on effectiveness, you have to consider the counterfactual – what would have happened without the planning intervention (Burby & May, 1997)? Planning is often not an easy business in which to judge performance, even with visual and quantitative clues.

### Performance Measures

The academic literature on growth management regulatory regimes is largely devoid of any specific discussion of design and application criteria. That is, by what standards should we judge any potential planning tool that we are capable of inventing? Or put another way, what should our design criteria be in planning implementation schemes? What does exist in the literature are proposed objectives for growth management from which you can generally deduce the implied criteria of a given author (Downs, 1989; Knaap & Nelson, 1992; Nelson & Dawkins, 2005). The common thread is a heavy emphasis on the perspectives of local or state government. The prevailing orientation is the assumption that the public interest is essentially the same as the government interest. Hence, the purpose of growth management springs forth from the perspective of traditional governmental objectives and programs. Areas of emphasis include public utility and transportation efficiencies, along with tax policy and local finance concerns. Also included are social service concerns – particularly, affordable housing, issues of gentrification, and economic or racial segregation. Urban form and development practices are a concern, primarily as they relate to the considerations of infrastructure efficiency, public finance, and capturing environmental externalities. These are all areas of the public interest, but it is the public interest narrowly defined as the traditional areas of government concern.

Others challenge the paradigm. They argue that growth management should reflect American culture and strive to enhance a full range of lifestyle options, lending institutional support to market driven preferences (Center, 2000; Garreau, 1995; PERC, 2000; Shaw & Utt, 2000; Staley, 2001; Webster & Wai-Chung, 2003). Under their outlook, the intention of planning is not so much to control markets and engage in visioning, but to enable markets to serve as the organizing force and expression of societal objectives. The perspective is that government interventions should largely be limited to creating market institutions, where possible, to manage public goods and externalities.

Both perspectives, public interest and market enabling, obliquely suggest appropriate criteria by which a planning program can be judged. CBIP blends these considerations in a pragmatic outlook. Under the CBIP model of planning practice that is introduced later in the book, five broad performance criteria are recognized as central concerns: social validity, market sensitivity, technical performance, ethical appropriateness, and the availability of implementation resources. These criteria are value neutral in that they don't assume a certain set of planning objectives. Instead, I suggest that regardless of the goals that you are trying to obtain, the tools that you design should be judged by the following five tests:

## 1) Social Validity and Political Acceptance

As considered in some detail in the next chapter, social validity and political acceptance is the first strategic test. While closely related, the two criteria are not identical. Social validity, a concept of behavior analysis, requires that the target audience embrace, as significant, the goals of the planning intervention and the procedures used in the intervention. It also requires willingness to participate to achieve a successful outcome (Winett, Moore, & Anderson, 1991). All three are required. This is not to say that social validity cannot be manufactured through active issue management. In fact, through the tools of influence, marketing, and public relations campaigns we engage in manufacturing social validity all the time. CBIP as an activist model encourages the manufacturing of social validity to achieve planning objectives.

In a planning context, supporting the goals without supporting the means is not sufficient. One behavior analyst defines social invalidity as, “the behaviors of consumers who not only disapprove of some component in the ongoing program but are going to do something about it,” including not participating or seeking policy change (Baer, 1987). While any planning strategy may have selective acceptance under just the right circumstances, approaches with broad-based social validity are the real objective. Planners can’t all work in liberal enclaves such as a university town. Sufficient behavioral change in the target population has to occur, the interventions continually supported, for it to represent a sustainable solution.

One reason social validity is of paramount importance in planning interventions is the behavioral implications of getting it wrong. Every rule-based constraint that is not widely endorsed will stimulate many individuals to engage in dedicated efforts to circumscribe the system (Geller, 2001a; Jensen, 1998; Levitt & Dubner, 2005). The resistance response stimulates the powers of human ingenuity to find substitutes for what is constrained by going over, under, around, or through the limitation, often inventing new alternatives that did not previously exist or simply by cheating. It generates creative compliance in which rules are not technically broken, but the spirit and scope of the rules are circumvented – the bane of planners everywhere. While such reactions can be expected even in incentive-based formats of regulation, dampening the resistance response is far better than taunting it by ignoring cultural preferences.

Political acceptability is the second branch of this validity test. It is quite possible to have a planning intervention with a high degree of social validity that is not politically acceptable to the legislative or administrative branches of government. It is also common to have the inverse. As important as these considerations are, what may be even more significant is political endorsement at one level of government with rejection at another. This is, of course, a major consideration in land-use planning because local governments derive both their powers and mandates from a state legislature.

Consider, as an example, the latitude of planners and elected officials within the political culture of their local setting. American planners can only be as effective as the local political climate allows them to be. It’s not a matter of political courage but of operational reality if you are to maintain effectiveness and credibility. Planners in general do not make decisions; they make recommendations. Local elected officials are influenced in day-to-day project review and zoning deliberations by the political culture

of their jurisdiction far more than state mandate. These individuals, as elected representatives, are not only subject to community pressure; they embody the local political culture of their area. One example is a 1980 Oregon study in which 1,046 applications for residential development in state mandated exclusive use farm zones were analyzed. Researchers found that 90 percent of the applications in the 12 counties reviewed were approved, and 81 percent of the approvals were illegal under existing state law (DeGrove, 1984). These results occurred in a state that has the most restrictive farm and forestland provisions in the nation.

While social validity and political acceptability are often not aligned, in American culture both normally have to be present for a successful planning intervention. Without political acceptance few planning programs can be initiated. Without social validity in our market-based economy, too many opportunities arise to circumvent program elements. Housing consumers can simply cross jurisdictional lines to meet their desires, gated communities can become the norm, and drivers can sit in horrendous congestion rather than give-up their independence and lifestyle preferences. In the final analysis, if you believe in the concept of sustainability, planning programs must have both broad social validity and political acceptance to be effective.

## 2) Market Sensitivity

The second of the five tests by which to judge a planning approach is market sensitivity. Market sensitivity as a design criteria in planning programs, involves two considerations. The first is that market response must be anticipated in the design of any planning strategy. To ignore and not legitimately accommodate a range of market preferences in some effective format, invites planning failure. That is not to imply, however, that preferences can't be either strengthened or weakened through a variety of mechanisms, including the employment of behavioral incentives that constitute the foundation of CBIP.

Among industrialized nations, American society has embraced the model of an unfettered modern market economy more strongly than any other. Jeremy Rifkin, in his comparative analysis with European cultures, claims that, "Americans may be the only pure capitalists left in the world" (Rifkin, 2005a). The concepts of neo-classical economics are now so deeply embedded in the culture that they have been adopted as the principal organizing paradigm for the society. Regardless of the degree to which you accept this current guiding paradigm, it is embedded in the beliefs and values of the culture, so much so that market economy principles have permeated nearly every realm of public policy deliberation from health care delivery to Social Security.

One of the fundamental weaknesses of today's command and control growth management model in America is community and market response. In a culture accustomed to market choice and the largely unrestricted exercise of personal freedom, American society is reluctant to accept and enforce the kind of absolute regulatory restrictions necessary to make current growth management models work. Unanticipated market responses to growth management practice are legendary, as are regulatory attempts to correct the problem.

When Montana imposed a 20-acre threshold for subdivision review, rural subdivision activity in the state took a decided preference toward 20-acre lots. As

legislators were finally preparing to eliminate this aberrant incentive, the state had a land rush of speculative subdivision activity that created a multi-decade supply of 20-acre lots in some jurisdictions.

The Portland growth management boundary partially provoked growth to migrate across state lines into Vancouver, Washington. Builders responded to consumer preferences by continuing to build at low densities within the growth boundary, consuming land at a faster pace than anticipated and creating an exclusionary cost effect. The city reacted by imposing minimum density standards and waiving public hearings to circumvent neighborhood opposition to the imposed density increases.

One documented measure of market performance in American planning can be found in a myriad of hedonic econometric housing studies. These studies have investigated the relationship of land-use controls to price impacts, homeownership rates, market shifts, development industry response and political fragmentation. Most scholars recognize that all land-use controls effect in some way the cost, availability, and spatial pattern of housing (Fischel, 1990; Kelly, 2004; Luger & Temkin, 2000; Malpezzi, 1996; Phillips & Goodstein, 2000). William Fischel, in his meta-analysis of hedonic studies, concluded:

“Land use controls, especially overall growth control programs, are important constraints on the land market. This in turn affects housing values, especially in suburban and exurban communities. Growth controls and other aggressive extensions of land use regulations probably impose costs on society that are larger than the benefits they provide. The higher housing prices associated with communities that impose growth controls are more likely the result of wasteful supply constraints than benign amenity production” (Fischel, 1990).

Stephen Maplezzi sums up one of the key dilemmas in surveying the current literature with its various methodologies and potential agendas when he states, “No one would be, or should be surprised at a finding that regulations raise housing prices. What is at issue is how much they raise prices, compared with any benefits they confer” (Malpezzi, 1996). Some spatial and price impacts are intentional, such as exclusionary zoning, while others are unintended consequences of growth management techniques gone awry. Of particular concern in the design of the next generation of growth management programs is the impact of program elements on the residential housing market since it comprises a major share of the nation’s built environment (Danielsen, Lang, & Fulton, 1999; Koebel, 1990). As Danielsen, Lang, and Fulton comment, “There exists tough social equity issues that remain mostly unresolved by the Smart Growth movement.” Those difficult issues of social equity and spatial development have a rich heritage in the literature.

Various studies have cataloged the different cost factors that land-use regulation represents in housing costs (Downs, 1991; Luger & Temkin, 2000; U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1991). Anthony Downs classified costs into three broad categories: direct restrictions on housing supply, direct cost increases, and delay-causing requirements. In a recent study conducted by the Center for Urban Policy Research at Rutgers University for the New Jersey Department of Community Affairs, researchers devised a methodology that separated excessive requirements from those

necessary to achieve basic community goals (Luger & Temkin, 2000). Utilizing a combination of builder surveys and an economic regression model examining seventy communities, they determined that excessive regulation in New Jersey added an average of eight percent (\$10,000 to \$20,000) to the cost of a new house. However, when finance and builder related multipliers were included, the cost increase rose to \$40,000 to \$80,000 per house.

Similar findings have been replicated in a significant number of other studies in which a variety of econometric models have been tested (Katz & Rosen, 1987; Knaap, 1985; Malpezzi, 1996; Pollakowski & Wachter, 1990; Schwartz, Hansen, & Green, 1984; Schwartz & Zorn, 1988; Segal & Srinivasan, 1985; Shilling, Sirmans, & Guidry, 1991; Vaillancourt & Luc, 1985). Katz and Rosen analyzed 64 communities in the San Francisco Bay area, finding that housing in growth controlled communities was 17 to 38 percent more expensive than comparable communities in the same market with more moderate regulatory structures (Katz & Rosen, 1987). In a 1990 study, Polakowski and Wachter found similar price effects on the housing market of 10 to 30 percent in a study of the Montgomery County, Maryland, growth management program (Pollakowski & Wachter, 1990).

In addition to the direct cost implications of growth management to housing affordability, there are also questions of the interconnectedness of market components, regional governance, and growth shifting. It has long been known that urban residential growth is a migratory phenomena (Nelson, 1988; Rusk, 1999). In one representative California study, scholars concluded that 500,000 housing units were either not built or displaced to another jurisdiction as a result of growth management policies (Levine, 1999).

When reviewed collectively, the hedonic econometric housing studies, along with planner experience, raises a number of fundamental problems with current growth management practices. The literature clearly infers that new home costs directly influence other segments of the housing market, including rents and the price of pre-existing homes. The empirical literature also indicates that in closed markets with high regulatory barriers, competition declines among housing construction interests. Small builders are driven from the market and large, well capitalized firms increase their market share (Luger & Temkin, 2000). While many factors can contribute to affordability, including interest rates, finance mechanisms, and input costs, the role of any given planning scheme has to be considered. Market sensitivity faults documented in research are not likely to be resolved without a shift in growth management design strategy.

The second and related consideration for planners, as relates to market sensitivity, concerns the design of market-based planning institutions. Scholars widely acknowledge that markets fail in the provision of public goods and the management of externalities (Dolsak & Ostrom, 2003; Laffont & Martimort, 2002; Olson, 1965). Regulatory reform, as discussed in detail in Chapter Six, suggests that planning institutions can in some circumstances be redesigned to provide price feedback where traditional markets mechanisms are now failing. One important design challenge for planners is to attempt to align the incentives that drive self-interested behavior in individuals with community-wide goals. Planners are capable of both influencing existing market outcomes through incentive based strategies and in creating new market oriented mechanisms for the management of public goods and externalities.

Another way to characterize this consideration is that planners don't have to be passive bystanders to perceived market forces. They are capable of competing but are subject to the same market tests. To make that transition requires a shift in self-image from referees of market transactions involved with regulatory controls to just another team in competition in an open market economy. Superior product and creative institutional design can transform markets and human behavior when they capture the preference of consumers in an environment of choice. The exercise is both one of advanced design and marketing.

Planners must compete in both idea and product in a market-oriented environment. It is a legitimate test. To achieve sustainability, a given planning strategy must ultimately have social validity, and such validity is difficult to accomplish in America through top-down regulatory fiat. Consumer choice in America is now considered near sacrosanct, almost a basic human right. Planning schemes that attempt to restrict or deny market preferences are pitting themselves against powerful and unrelenting social forces. The alternative is to compete in the open marketplace with superior product and lifestyle visions aggressively marketed. Creative design of planning institutions must also incorporate market mechanisms. For sure, it is a different way of thinking for the profession. Planners currently see themselves in the role as a sort of social and environmental protectorate, the land use conscience of a society, attempting to manage for externalities in a market economy. But what if we played by a different orientation, an orientation readily accepted in society as manufacturers and marketers of a certain line of products and services?

### 3) Technical Performance

Technical performance is the third test for planning programs. Scores of potential growth management goals exist from issues of community character, urban form, and housing choice, to public service delivery and environmental management. A given tool needs to be effective and the explanation for its application accepted as legitimate. Too often, planning interventions do not accomplish their intended purposes, or they are imposed, at best, under questionable logic.

Serious technical performance issues exist in a broad variety of planning tools. Most of these tools have their place when matched to a specific set of circumstances supported by careful design. However, the widespread indiscriminate application of traditional planning mechanisms with little beneficial affect needs to be challenged. Barry Cullingworth, the recently deceased preeminent British planner, noted in his comparative analysis of American, British, and Canadian planning models that after years of residence in America he "could see little that was common between the standard descriptions of American planning and what was happening" (Cullingworth, 1993).

Consider, for instance, the standard planning approach taken to conserve rural resource lands and open space character. Large lot zoning formats and exclusive use districts are often producing the inverse of desired results (Arendt, 1994, 1999). Another example of technical mischief are street standards that are often generating sterile community environments, restricting design innovation, and resulting in unnecessary environmental consequences (Duany et al., 2000; Jacobs, 1961; Kendig et al., 1980).

It is becoming more apparent that flaws in technical performance are resulting in certain policy failures beyond issues of social validity and market sensitivity. Recent interview research by Helen Jarvis in Portland, Seattle, and San Francisco illustrates the limits of purely design-based thinking, planning strategies based on the concept of compact, self-contained neighborhoods as a structural solution to reduce automobile dependence and other common planning objectives (Jarvis, 2003). Jarvis interviewed 60 randomly selected dual worker married couples with children in the three cities. Half resided in the suburbs, and the other half lived in mixed use, pedestrian friendly, urban village configurations near the central core.

Her conclusions challenge conventional thinking. The complexity of accommodating a two-career family with children ultimately overrides localized living for urban villagers. Even when people have a stated preference for and select compact, self-contained neighborhoods, their travel behavior is significantly influenced by both the demands and desires of modern life. When jobs change or children attend off-site private schools and activities, both common occurrences, house location stays the same, but travel patterns adjust. The pedestrian features of the urban village are used primarily, often exclusively, as a weekend amenity. These effects, along with market resistance, are the dynamics that are undermining the effectiveness of the urban village design strategies like those of Portland, Oregon. Jarvis concludes that design can undoubtedly affect human behavior, but planning strategies based primarily on community configuration ignore numerous social and behavioral considerations that may be more effectively approached in other ways.

#### 4) Ethical Appropriateness

The fourth test for any planning program is ethical appropriateness. Economic success has its privileges and should be recognized in planning practice, but ethical limits exist. Arguably, planners should not engage in the design or management support of highly exclusionary growth management regimes, an increasingly common practice in a number of local jurisdictions. Such regulatory regimes can exist in the traditional areas of race or economic class, but also in urban and suburban policy actions taken against rural interests. Imposing development requirements with the unstated agenda of simply making development more expensive so as to retard residential growth is difficult to justify with a straight face and clear conscience.

State-imposed growth management policies that extract open space values from rural landowners in the name of protecting agricultural or forestry resources are also ethically questionable forms of urban elitism. Rural open space and recreation values are, in fact, a far more salient issue in most settings than the protection of commodity production values. But we need to be clear about the true values under consideration and the issue of who pays and who benefits. Planning tools should and can constitute equitable approaches for such societal objectives without imposing an unfair burden on the politically weak. In an ethical sense, the test of a technique is its equitability and social justifiability, not whether it's a "taking." The American Planning Association and many planners celebrated the Kelo case conclusion on condemnation practice. The cultural response to that decision has been overwhelmingly negative with federal and

state condemnation statutes being legislatively amended across the nation. The issue is the perception of fairness, not legal authority.

At a deeper level, the planning profession faces a more fundamental ethical conflict. How does it rectify a commitment to the public's right to self-determination in a participatory democracy with a rigorous top-down planning regime? Unless the community at large truly supports both the goals and the regulatory approach, an ethical dilemma exists. Planning regimes need to be designed to avoid this and other ethical conflicts.

## 5) Implementation Resources

The final test of any planning program format is the adequacy of implementation resources. Often, advocated growth management tools are impractical for large segments of the local planner community. The majority of the American land base falls under the planning purview of small town and rural county planning offices. Growth management tools for these jurisdictions must be designed for their particular circumstances, including formats that are embraced by lay planning boards, widely accepted within the rural culture, and capable of implementation within the technical and monetary restraints of the planning office.

Across America these front-line planning offices are generally under staffed and under funded, commonly filled by individuals from other disciplines called upon to serve multiple duties. They tend to be highly vulnerable and controversial positions in the community. We perform no favors for the capable individuals who fill these positions when we offer them transfer of development rights programs and complex form-based development codes as the solutions to their dilemma. Effective planning schemes for the majority of the American land base need to be as simple and cost efficient as possible, with strategies that lend themselves to self-implementation. Culturally sensitive approaches that rely on behavioral tendencies and market preferences are potential formulations.

### Planning Performance in America

Five design criteria have now been suggested to judge the performance and appropriateness of a given planning intervention. The remainder of this chapter and the next will consider American land planning outcomes against these stated design criteria as a context for the CBIP model that is introduced in Chapter Three.

The effectiveness of growth management programs and even basic planning tools have been criticized for some time (Altshuler, 1965; Jacobs, 1961). John Friedmann, one of America's preeminent planning theorists, may have expressed the feelings of many planners when he wrote, "Speaking as an American, I would say that official planning in my own country is largely a farce" (Friedmann, 1997). As the empirical evidence mounts, the suspicions of a growing number of field professionals are being increasingly validated – outcomes do not reflect planning objectives.

The single most surprising result of a thorough literature review in planning performance is that little empirical research has been conducted, until quite recently, to measure program effectiveness against stated program goals (Anthony, 2004; Carruthers,

2002; Kelly, 2004; Nelson & Dawkins, 2005). And these limited results, in general, are certainly depressing. Only in the areas of housing cost impacts, jurisdictional fragmentation, and market shifts have there been substantial research. While individual issue studies exist and personal speculation and observation abound in the literature, rigorous analysis of broader system performance has only recently been attempted. Eric Kelly, who arguably provides the most comprehensive analysis of growth management practice in America, noted this in his 2004 edition of *Managing Community Growth*:

“What has been surprisingly missing from later literature is any sort of comprehensive policy examination of growth management programs in general and how those programs affect the communities that adopt them. That deficiency was noted repeatedly in papers offered at a conference on research needs in the field.”(Kelly, 2004)

Nelson and Dawkins also note the lack of comprehensive program analysis. Recent review of 131 growth management programs around the nation uncovered that, “only three included a detailed examination of the land value impact of the urban containment boundary, and only 12 included a detailed analysis of housing price effects”(Nelson & Dawkins, 2005).

It may be that rigorous quantitative analysis will never be capable of providing the system-wide assessments that we seek beyond specific questions such as housing mix, cost, or density impacts. Highly complex systems that can vary widely across jurisdictions and time, elements such as the quality of urban form and lifestyle satisfaction that are difficult to quantify, and limited data sets all handicap quantitative research in planning program effectiveness. These studies do contribute, however, to a broader mosaic of understanding. In particular, three areas of quantitative analysis helpfully illuminate the larger picture: spatial analysis studies on rates of sprawl, housing related hedonic regression analysis that was cited earlier, and survey research.

Qualitative evaluations can also contribute to an assessment of planning performance. In some capacities they may be superior to their quantitative counterparts because they can often capture important nuisances that do not lend themselves to rigorous measurement. Qualitative feedback can also be much quicker. An observant field planner will sense the response of the development community and political review process long before it appears in analytic data. Equally, the development community often possesses a hypersensitivity to consumer preferences and market response that defies formalized market research and delayed data analysis. Sometimes those gut judgments are wrong, but more often, they will be an accurate predictor.

Donald Schon identifies this consideration in his argument that practitioners possess a “knowledge-in-practice,” but that knowledge is difficult to capture, as the competent practitioners usually know more than they can articulate. He later identifies a crisis of confidence in professional planning knowledge, a crisis which he attributes in part to the way in which universities view knowledge, suggesting a marriage of the reflective researcher with the reflective practitioner (Schon, 1983). John Forester’s communicative planning theory also finds its roots in trying to extract the essence of the practitioner’s world (Forester, 1989). Case studies, planner observations, and visual

assessment likely offer a clearer picture of what may or may not work in many circumstances.

### The Quantitative Evidence

The rate of sprawl is one broad measure of land planning effectiveness. Between 1982 and 1997 the amount of urbanized land in the U.S. increased 47 percent, but the nation's population grew only 17 percent (Fulton, Pendall, Nguyen, & Harrison, 2001). Metropolitan density declined 15.7 percent during this time period with the rate of decentralization accelerating. This same study found that only six percent out of the nation's 281 metropolitan areas became more dense during the study period, largely metropolitan areas with high rates of foreign-born residents repopulating urban cores or areas hemmed in by natural features, such as mountain ranges or coastlines and federal lands, such as the National Forests. Interestingly, regression analysis shows that states that had required growth management programs suffered a greater loss of density during the 15-year period. Metropolitan areas in California, Nevada and Arizona, all non-growth management states, dominated the list of those that gained density during the period.

In a similar study, Jerry Anthony utilized National Resources Inventory data from the USDA to analyze sprawl rates in 49 states at three time points: 1982, 1992 and 1997 (Anthony, 2004). His findings, while slightly different from the Fulton study, revealed and confirmed similar results. In the eleven growth management states, urban land increased by an average of 49 percent, while urban densities decreased by 9.5 percent. In states without growth management programs, urban land increased by 37 percent, and densities decreased by an average of 16 percent. Neither the presence nor duration of growth management programs had a statistically significant effect in reducing urban sprawl. Georgia, Florida, Washington, and Oregon, all growth management states, increased urban land by 30 to 75 percent, and with the exception of Washington, all experienced declines in urban density. In contrast, Nevada, Arizona, Utah, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas and Nebraska all had modest increases in urban density while increasing the urban land base.

Pendall, in an earlier study, found that only three states; California, Maryland and Arizona, maintained or increased their historic population density during the 80's and 90's (Pendall, 1999). All other states had a density decline in their metropolitan areas as growth occurred. He found that the population density of the average acre of land converted to urban use during the 10-year period was only 40 percent of the existing urban average in 1982. If the 1982 average density had been maintained during the ensuing decade, a 25 percent reduction in rural land conversion nationwide would have been realized.

In a similar vein, John Carruthers studied 283 metropolitan counties in 15 states from 1982 through 1997 (Carruthers, 2002). The comparative analysis looked at the performance of various state growth management programs. The study concluded that California's planning mandate had led to lower overall urban densities and higher property values with no effect on the total spatial extent of land urbanized. Florida's program had suffered a significant increase in the spatial extent of urbanized land, as had Georgia's, which has also resulted in a decrease in urban density and an increase in

property values adjusted for other factors. Washington's program had no significant statistical effect in any parameter studied. Only Oregon's program has led to greater densities, but it has not successfully reduced the spatial extent of urbanized land over the study period.

Lopez and Hynes developed a national sprawl index that measures rates of decentralization in 330 metropolitan areas between 1990 and 2000. They found a 2 to 1 ratio of urban areas increasing in rates of sprawl over the decade (Lopez & Haynes, 2003). Their study also identified that 88.6 percent of U.S. metropolitan land area qualified as low-density tracts under their definition. John Landis, in an assessment of the effectiveness of growth controls, analyzed seven mid-sized California cities during the 1980s. His conclusion was that the programs were largely irrelevant, suggesting that in the long run, "careless growth control may be much worse than no growth control" (Landis, 1992). Similar conclusions are surfacing from growth management research aimed at the rural and farm sectors. In other words, ineffectual large lot planning formats, the traditional approach to rural growth management, have fueled the spatial extension of residential development further into the landscape (Diaz & Green, 2001; Esrza & Carruthers, 2000; Richardson, 2000).

The significance of these studies is that they reflect a time period nationwide during which growth management efforts and basic planning controls became far more widespread and rigorous. If current planning formats were working reasonably well in the American culture, the conclusions from these studies should reflect it. They do not. They suggest the opposite, at least in the context of controlling sprawl and increasing densities. One potential explanation is that widely advocated growth management practices don't function technically. Examples of highly rigorous regulatory formats performing well in the context of development, both from America and overseas, render this an unlikely explanation if you dismiss cost impacts in the housing market. A second explanation is that political and social acceptance of programs rigorous enough to work is not widespread in the American culture. Existing research and observations from the field suggest that this later explanation is more likely, requiring alternative design of effective growth management tools that are politically acceptable and socially valid.

Another area of quantitative analysis that provides insight into the current state of planning performance is survey research. Public perception of planners, the planning process, and attitudes toward growth are all instructive, as are surveys related to housing preferences and neighborhood selection when considering likely market response. Surveys also help document the public inconsistencies between values and behaviors that planners routinely observe.

A nationwide survey that the Center for Economic and Civic Opinion at the University of Massachusetts conducted in 2006 indicates that Americans are fundamentally unhappy with today's planning results, but they are conflicted between a strong commitment to private property rights on the one-hand and a desire for planning controls. Some 83 percent of suburban Americans do not want new development in their communities. Over 60 percent believe that their local government does only a fair-to-poor job regarding planning and zoning issues, while 70 percent believe that the relationships between elected officials and developers render the approval process unfair. This later result is, among other things, a strong indication that most Americans understand little of either the planning process or legal restraints under land-use law. It

also reflects American's suspicion of government, a cultural trait that will be explored in Chapter Four.

It would be a mistake to interpret these results as a growing commitment by the general public to support sustainable planning strategies. Instead, they appear to support rigorous land-use control of their neighbors driven by self-interest, not a broader understanding and commitment to communitarian objectives that includes a wholehearted endorsement of restrictions on their own personal behavior for the greater public benefit. Combined with other cultural findings, an emerging picture represents a key dilemma for planners. American society continues to fiercely protect private property rights while at the same time pushing more strongly for personal entitlement in the name of the public interest. The sense of community obligation deteriorates as the learned and reinforced behavior of reciprocation continues to decline in the culture. At this junction, one must remember that one of the key tests for effective planning programs is social validity, which requires willing and direct participation in the planning intervention. If public support for a given planning regime is based on restricting others so that some may have exclusive enjoyment of a given land-use experience, the strategy is inherently conflicted. As Jonathan Levin notes in his analysis of exclusionary zoning, it restricts the ability of urban areas to transform themselves over time and perpetuates the forces of sprawl in both urban and rural settings (Levine, 2006).

Surveys on housing preferences further illustrate this conundrum. Survey research in both America and Europe shows a preference for low-density, single-family detached housing, particularly in small town and rural settings within striking distance of larger metropolitan resources, but it also shows a desire to protect rural landscapes. By way of example, one survey conducted in Great Britain associated with the House Beautiful New Homes Awards program determined that 63 percent of respondents felt that new homes should go in redeveloped urban areas. However, only 11 percent of the 500 respondents said they would choose such a town center location (NOP, 1997).

The results from location preference studies have been relatively consistent on both sides of the Atlantic. A Florida based study considering the market acceptance rate of New Urbanist designs found a distinct preference for less centralized and less dense locations when adjusting for family status, income, age, and education (Audirac & Smith, 1992). Single-family home occupants are less likely to want to move than apartment occupants, and attached unit occupants show a decided preference to move into single-family detached housing in decentralized locations.

Similar results have been found in two recent British studies, but transferability of results must be tempered due to different cultural experiences with terms such as single-family residence. The English are accustomed to far higher suburban densities than the average American and have less aversion to attached housing. Having said that, residential preferences tend toward suburban locations, larger lots, and larger homes. Higher density central locations and their associated public amenities do appeal to a significant minority of the marketplace in these English studies, averaging 20 to 25 percent of the population (Heath, 2001; Senior, Webster, & Blank, 2004). Such locations and project configurations appeal most to the young, childless, and single.

American survey research in New Urbanist designs also offers some hope that while the marketplace currently shows a decided preference for low density, single-family formats, a significant market segment desires more land-use friendly designs.

Moreover, once exposed to the well-conceived alternatives, the market can be moved. Research indicates that residents have a stronger sense of community in urban village formats than traditional subdivision designs based on 17 specific physical characteristics. Likewise homes in neo-traditional projects appreciate 20 percent faster than comparable neighborhoods of traditional design (Carlton, 2006; Kim & Kaplan, 2004). Many factors indicate that market demand for higher density formats is, in fact, greater than generally believed and that supply has been artificially constrained (Levine, 2006).

From a planning strategy perspective it must be remembered that housing preferences are not necessarily fixed. Preferences can change over a person's lifecycle. They can also be marginally modified by personal experience, project exposure and marketing. Achieving the desired results, however, will require a fundamental change in both strategy and tactic. Consider that exurban areas are the fastest growing development format in America, and the fundamental reason people choose such a living experience, as determined by survey research, is that they desire to live in a rural environment. Other structural factors, such as cost, employment, or safety, have little effect (Crump, 2003b).

### The Qualitative Evidence

If one dares to rely on simple observation to suggest that current planning formats are failing, than it is hard to escape reaching certain conclusions from the evidence of the last 50 years. One thing above all else has struck me, and a number of my aging colleagues, about our multi-state experiences as planners. Taking into account differences in regional architecture, growth pressures, and native landscapes, we can't see any significant difference in the land development patterns from state to state, regardless of the planning system in place. Only in Oregon does a discernable visible difference exist on a large regional basis, and that difference is subtle and not always beneficial.

In my lifetime, almost every regionally important American landscape and metropolitan area that I know with some intimacy has undergone and continues to undergo a destructive transformation. Effective planning could have mitigated many of these impacts while still accommodating growth. This failure is not for lack of effort. A small army of dedicated planners, wave after wave, has been undertaking the task in nearly all of these regions. But our strategies and tools, it would appear, have been poorly suited to the culture and market forces.

The Washington, D.C. metropolitan area and Northern Virginia, including such areas as Fairfax County with one million in population, have become a transportation and land-use nightmare, almost unrecognizable in less than a lifetime. Areas that were vacation destinations for Washingtonians during the 1950s are now commuter communities for the metropolitan area. Virtually no rural visual separation exists from Richmond, Virginia, to Portland, Maine, as suburban expansion feathers to exurban development and back to urban concentration.

The Chesapeake Bay and rich farmlands of the Delmarva Peninsula have been hammered with the Eastern Shore hanging in the balance. Further south, the Carolinas have badly sprawled, both in urban and rural contexts. Their magnificent coastal shoreline is a mere shell of its former wild self. The baby boom retirement wave, when it hits, will likely finish off all but the preserved National Seashores and wildlife refuges of

this coastal resource. All of Florida and the sprawl juggernaut of Atlanta, Georgia, are painful visual reminders of ineffectual growth management practices.

The Puget Sound basin has oozed from the Canadian border to Portland, Oregon, constrained only by the National Forests and corporate timberlands of the Cascades. Even the mighty Cascade crest has not stopped the sprawl that has long since slipped over the passes into Eastern Washington. Seattle is in transportation gridlock, a mere memory of its compact and demure past urban glories. Today, the area approaches transportation lockdown nearly twenty-four hours a day from Olympia to Everett, an all too common experience in metropolitan areas across America.

The Texas Transportation Institute's 2005 Urban Mobility Report analyzed 85 metropolitan areas across the nation concluding that between 1982 and 2003 every area studied, regardless of population size and transportation investment, experienced more severe congestion lasting a longer period of time. The same report found that only four metropolitan areas (Anchorage, Pittsburgh, New Orleans, and Tulsa) had succeeded in growing highway capacity at a faster rate than travel growth over the twenty-one year time period.

California's growth experience of the last half-century can only be described as heartbreaking. Even the wild and open landscapes of the inner mountain west are being vigorously transformed by exurban and recreational home development. The rural expanses of Montana, Utah, Idaho, Colorado, New Mexico, and Arizona have all undergone fundamental and uncomplimentary conversions in the last two decades. The Colorado front-range has seen low-density suburban sprawl extend from Denver to Fort Collins, and only the Douglas County land conservation effort has prevented a complete merging to the south with Colorado Springs. Across the nation only the better designed large-scale planned communities constitute an improvement in growth accommodation.

When planning is making a contribution, whether public or private sector, it contributes to the generation of compact villages and thriving urban areas that are stimulating, diverse, and support the human spirit. Open space resources compliment the daily living experience, and the built environment is pedestrian friendly and developed at a human scale. The housing experience is affordable, attractive, and integrated across incomes. The delivery of public services is efficient, and a strong sense of community prevails. When planning is under-performing, bordering on the irrelevant, it would appear that you get America.

Land planning in America, both town and county, is arguably the only significant category of environmental management in which major advancements in a system-wide context have not been achieved in the past 35 years. Since 1970, the nation's population has grown forty-five percent, yet significant empirical improvements have been achieved in air quality, water quality, hazardous waste management, and applied natural resource management in most, but not all subcategories of concern (EPA, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c; Lomborg, 2001). In contrast, land planning measures of performance in America, both in a quantitative and qualitative context, have suffered major declines as the population has expanded at increasingly lower densities (Carruthers, 2002; Duany et al., 2000; Fulton et al., 2001; Orfield, 2002; Urban Land Institute, 1999). America in the next 45 years can anticipate the addition of 125 million people, the fastest growth rate among major industrialized nations. The challenges that the planning profession faces are nothing short of Herculean. Meeting that challenge will require new planning institutions and

implementation models that address issues of social validity, market sensitivity, technical performance, and ethical application.

## Chapter Four

### CULTURE AND PLANNING

One way to comprehend the American land-use planning experience is to consider American culture and its interplay with the nation's land-base and development heritage. Land-use patterns and development preferences reflect cultural traits. Cultural conventions, including the values underlying personal and collective behaviors, influence landscapes, planning regimes, and the public response to those regimes. The public perception of density, neighborhood design, and architecture is impacted by cultural norms and values. As Joan Iverson Nassauer reports in her work on landscape ecology, "Landscapes are a concrete, public statement of culture" and "cultural conventions and customs directly affect what people notice, find interesting, and prefer about the landscape" (Nassauer, 1992; Nassauer, 1995).

Implicit in this argument is that the development patterns of American society are not a product of centralized government planning and policy gone awry or an engineered result cleverly conceived by business interests and sold to an unwitting general public, although both of these factors are present. More accurately, they are a publicly driven, bottom-up creation - the embodiment of a set of values with imagery and symbolism that is manifested in administrative and judicial land-use policy, as well as, landowner and consumer behavior.

If culture provides at least a partial explanation for how planning programs evolve and how publics react to them, then program design will benefit from a closer nexus with cultural traits. By better understanding cultural values, planners are capable of making more reasoned adjustments in practice that will enhance social validity and political acceptance.

The concept of culture has defied a uniform definition in the social sciences. Anthropologists tend to assign to the term a broad and inclusive definition, encompassing social relations and a way of life, while sociologists and political scientists focus on values, symbols, attitudes and norms (Benedict, 1934; Thompson, Ellis, & Wildavsky, 1990). Social conventions and cultural variations can exist in multiple dimensions - geographic, political, socio-economic, demographic and professional.

There are management implications for planning in all these dimensions, often where they have to be considered simultaneously in program design. This chapter addresses a number of specific cultural considerations in American planning by looking at several of these dimensions.

#### Grid-Group Typology and Cultural Theory

It is important to introduce a concept that will find direct application throughout the remainder of this book. That theoretical construct is cultural theory. It finds its early roots in sociology and the later work of Mary Douglas, a cultural anthropologist (Douglas, 1978, 1982, 1996). Most recently it has been advanced in work related to applied political science (Ellis, 1993; Lockhart, 1999; Thompson et al., 1990; Wildavsky,

1994). Grid-Group typology and cultural theory is relatively young by the standard of major theories, having been first created in its modern state about thirty years ago. Heretofore, it has not been extended as a tool in land planning and is relatively unknown in the profession.

For planners applying a culturally sensitive approach, the grid-group typology provides a utilitarian framework or systems outlook to organize behavioral based land-use strategies. The format provides an effective way to understand and characterize the various elements of American culture, and in particular, it helps to identify the likely behavioral response of each of four major cultural groups to various planning interventions, their preferences and perceptions.

The grid-group typology, first created by Douglas, recognizes four major and distinct political cultures: Competitive Individualism, Egalitarianism, Hierarchicalism, and Fatalism (Douglas, 1978). The focal point of the typology is an explanation of the modes of social control in a society and how individuals align themselves into various cultural camps based on that consideration. In providing a framework on regulatory cultures, the theory goes to the heart of political preferences and outlook. Under the construct of the theory, these four categories capture the range of human preferences and justifications that constitute cultural outlook in the area of social control.

Advocates of the theory maintain that every society in the world can be characterized by these four cultural subsets, and while a given society can be dominated by any one of them, societies have all four groups present. In fact, a case can be made that no healthy society can thrive without the unique contributions that three out of the four groups have to offer. The expansive free market benefits of competitive individualism cannot function without the regulatory oversight, market rules and legal systems of hierarchy and the bureaucracies that it spawns. The egalitarian preference and contribution of non-hierarchical social support networks, cannot sustain a society without the structure of top-down management or dynamism of market forces. Without the coalition of egalitarian support for small group self-management and competitive individualism's disdain for hierarchical control, participatory democracy is at risk. Three of the four individual political cultures provide contributions that the others cannot produce. As Lockhart notes, "In this sense, societies tend to be multi-cultural" (Lockhart, 1999).

The four culture types are derived from a typology based on two social dimensions or pattern of social relations. The first is the degree that an individual subscribes to and respects externally imposed prescriptions in the form of institutional controls, regulations, and hierarchical relationships (Grid). The more one subscribes to grid-based controls on behavior, the more one concedes individual autonomy by adhering to their assumed station in life and supporting a regulatory based society.


The second dimension is the extent that an individual desires to be socially affiliated with others or incorporated into bounded units (Group). Social control through group affiliation is a form of social-psychology power whereby group members can manipulate behavior in the creation and application of strong group boundaries. The stronger the desire for social group affiliation by an individual, the more one submits to social group norms and the less the individual autonomy.

Both social dimensions, grid and group, create boundaries and restrict individual autonomy to the extent that the individual endorses one or both, but each does so in a

different way that results in different political cultures. The two dimensions, grid and group, when combined generate only four distinct social relation outlooks, although variations can be identified in each of the major groups (see Illustration 4).

### Competitive Individualists

Competitive individualism is the dominant culture in America, reinforced by social norms, institutions, and government policy. As a political culture, competitive individualism cuts across political parties, religious and nonsectarian affiliations, races, regions, and the bipolar characterizations of conservatives and liberals. American LIVES, Inc., a market research and opinion polling firm, estimated in more than a decade of extensive profile surveys, that competitive individualism, roughly translated by the firm as “Moderns,” constituted 48 percent of the adult population in 1999 (Ray & Anderson, 2000). American LIVES recognize four sub-groups within the classification: business conservatives (8 percent of public), conventional moderns (12 percent of public), striving center (13 percent of public) and alienated moderns (15 percent of public).



**Illustration no. 4 – Grid/Group Typology**

Competitive individualists harbor weak feelings for group membership and its accompanying sense of social obligation to the collective (Group), and they are suspicious or rebellious against institutional authority or external prescription (Grid). They prefer a society that functions largely under self-regulation by private social contract and market enforced discipline. They do not like externally imposed limits. Community intervention, either governmental or nongovernmental, is endorsed only as a necessary limitation to allow markets to function and societies to maintain basic order. As

Thompson and others have noted, in the individualistic subculture, “all boundaries are provisional and subject to negotiation” (Ellis, 1993; Thompson et al., 1990).

Competitive individualists, practicing a form of economic conservatism, believe that society should be organized around competitive principles, free market enterprise, and the invisible hand of Adam Smith, principles that they believe also apply to the practice of democracy. Self-interested behavior is the expected and desired norm, elevated to the principle of social welfare maximization under neo-classical economics. As such, competition and wealth accumulation is embraced as a cultural objective in the name of societal material progress. Consumption is a continuous source of personal fulfillment, a viewpoint so committed to by competitive individualists, that they have a difficult time conceiving of an alternative perspective. In the realm of competitive individualism, the natural environment is a bountiful resource to be employed for human enrichment, not conserved for future generations or other outlooks.

Competitive individualism in America has strong roots that have been supported by historic events that span the very creation of the nation to the present day. Early settlers rejected the hierarchical culture of Europe and feared the power and restraints of centralized institutions. Wilderness settlement patterns that extended for 200 years through the westward expansion required and reinforced self-reliance and independence, and a national self-image of rugged individualism. The nation’s founding principles as embodied in the Constitution and Bill of Rights were Lockonian in philosophy, representing an anti-authority consensus and strong embeddedness of the sanctity of private property and personal freedom. Those with a commitment to a hierarchical social culture were largely marginalized or migrated out of the country. Successive emigrant waves over time have attracted those with the individualist sub-culture orientation in the pursuit of the American Dream, reinforcing and re-energizing the competitive individualist orientation.

As substantiated in polling profiles, the concepts of freedom and equality have a specific meaning for the competitive individualists that varies from other sub-cultures (Ellis, 1993). Equality means equal access to compete, that is, equality of process under the law and opportunity to engage in economic pursuit, not equality of results. It is an attitude embodied in the American idiom, sink or swim. The definitional outlook has specific implications in areas such as affirmative action, income equality, tax policy, and local concerns such as exclusionary zoning and housing affordability. The equal opportunity to compete legitimizes the results of both those that win or lose in the game, but it also embodies equal justice and fairness before the law. Freedom is interpreted as the freedom to pursue self-interest, freedom of speech and freedom of religion.

The American LIVES polling results in the area of values, attitudes and opinions for Moderns strongly correlates with the predictions and observations of the grid-group typology for competitive individualists (Ray & Anderson, 2000). They found that among the political subcultures, moderns were the most likely to support financial materialism and give success a high priority in life, while they were the least altruistic, idealistic and relationship oriented of the major groups. They do not support the Religious Right, are cynical about politics, and prefer to put their wealth on display in a conspicuous manner – big houses on big lots.

Competitive individualists perceive risk primarily as an enterprising opportunity and fear potential outcomes that could limit freedom of self-interest (Rippl, 2002).

Personal security for the political sub-culture comes in self-reliance, independence, and not being beholden to others. The implications for land planning in America are many as the outlook translates into a strong desire for autonomy, mobility, and freedom of action with minimal government restraint.

### The Egalitarians (Communitarians)

Egalitarianism is the principal rival to competitive individualism in America. Market analysis by American LIVES and Paul Ray has a closely aligned values culture that they describe as the cultural creatives (Ray & Anderson, 2000). They place the psychographics profile at 26 percent of the American adult public. Demographically, the core group of egalitarians has a disproportionately large percentage of women at 66 percent. Egalitarians tend to be educated professionals who hold strong views on intolerant behavior. Ray notes in their marketing research that among all political subcultures, they have the strongest desire to rebuild neighborhoods and create a sense of community with a response rate of 90 percent. They also hold pro-environment values, believe in voluntary simplicity, and more than other groups, tend to be activists.

The egalitarian social outlook prefers group affiliation and strong group boundaries. Egalitarians believe in voluntary small group affiliation where decision-making is by group consensus and collaboration, resulting in a hypothetical social solidarity. As such, participation, process, and a strong civil society are of pivotal importance to the political sub-culture. As Richard Ellis notes, "Egalitarians condemn individualism for isolating the individual from the community, dimming the sense of collective purpose, damming the springs of civic virtue, and creating unconscionable inequalities" (Ellis, 1993).

Like competitive individualists, egalitarians are resistant and suspicious of certain institutional controls (Grid), particularly in America. With the competitive individualists, egalitarians have formed an anti-authority political cultures coalition in America that dates to the debates between the Founding Fathers. Where individualists fear hierarchical control because of the risk to engage in unencumbered self-interested behavior, egalitarians fear the imposition of social privilege, inequalities, and a stratified society enforced by hierarchical institutions. Their desired society is based on cooperation, not competition, and is also free of hierarchy and privilege.

One of the basic weaknesses in the construct, however, is its inability to claim legitimacy in leadership – a ship without a pilot and often more than one rudder. Without authority to exercise control over others, the construct of hierarchicalism, or the organizing principle of competitive markets in a collective free-for-all of self-interested behavior (individualism), egalitarianism faces a practical management dilemma in complex industrialized societies. Despite this limitation, egalitarianism has manifested itself in a form that successfully challenged the political culture of competitive individualism during several eras of American history: Jacksonian populism; the cultural backlash to the Gilded Age – progressivism; the New Deal era; and the War on Poverty and the civil rights movement of the 1960s (Ellis, 1993).

Egalitarians perceive social progress not so much as wealth accumulation, but as social equity and solidarity. They would define equality in terms of not only access, but also of results. The concept of freedom is largely the freedom to participate directly in the

democratic process, not by proxy (Ellis, 1993). They are disenchanted with materialism, status, and self-interested behavior. They oppose risks that may heighten social stratification or constitute perceived dangers to large groups of people or future generations (Rippl, 2002). As such, they see nature as fragile, a resource to be protected and preserved, and adhere to the concept of sustainability.

From a planner's perspective the following marketing research conclusions are particularly salient. Egalitarians prefer older, authentic architecture, established neighborhoods with ample trees, and significant privacy. They prefer walkable communities and open space, and believe that master planned communities can effectively re-create community. They do not like status display homes, prefer hidden residences, internal and external privacy in design, and eclectic decoration styles that reflect understatement but high quality (Ray & Anderson, 2000). With conspicuous consumption endorsed by many competitive individualists, conspicuous virtue is the hallmark of egalitarians. Toyota's Prius hybrid, for example, which is not cost effective for the consumer, was intentionally designed to be a distinctive symbol of personal enlightenment.

### The Hierarchical Subculture

The Hierarchical subculture, sometimes referred to as traditionalism, subscribes to a higher level of social control by both group process and institutional direction. In its purist form, it is a philosophy that sees societies rationally organized into vertical collectives based on expertise, talent, and collective contribution. In this fashion, social welfare is maximized through strong external prescription and collective sacrifice of individual freedom. It is a cultural outlook concerned with the creation and preservation of expertise and order, one that often sees a market-based process as too haphazard, chaotic, and in need of control (Lockhart, 1999). It is also the foundation of bureaucratic forms of governance in the belief of benevolent paternalism and the power of experts to provide needed guidance, and as such, it is the basis for many government interventions.

In America, the hierarchical sub-culture defies political and ideological stereotypes. American LIVES, in their psychographics surveys, have found that the group is just as likely to be liberal or centrist as culturally conservative on many issues. Their work indicates that traditionalists constituted 24 percent of the adult American public in 1999, down from nearly 50 percent around World War II. Only 8 percent of the population can be classified as both religious conservatives and business conservatives. As a group they cross political parties and are strongly pro-environment. They see the natural and social worlds as requiring careful management, deferring to the limits recommended by *experts*. As a group in America they tend to be concentrated in small towns and rural areas and harbor a nostalgic desire for stable communities and a feeling of certainty (Ray & Anderson, 2000).

Because of American cultural sensitivities, the use of the terms hierarchical or traditional can evoke certain negative images that can be misleading when considering the political subculture. The dominant political cultures of Britain and Europe fall within the classification - highly secular, humanist societies with strong pro-environment values. The highly successful land planning systems of Britain and Western Europe are built and supported on their hierarchical subcultures.

In America, the classification has never represented a serious challenge to the predominate culture of competitive individualism supported by the anti-authority fears of egalitarians. As such, America has never had the strong hierarchical institutions and values of England, Europe or even Canada. It is not by random chance, for instance, that of the four societies, only America did not evolve a nationalized non-profit health care system.

### Fatalism

When people find themselves controlled by institutions and excluded from group civic engagement or membership, they are relegated to a fatalist political sub-culture. The fatalist has little individual autonomy and no ability to influence the decision-making mechanisms that controls his or her life. The institutions of slavery, totalitarian states, and life within certain communist regimes would be examples of this political sub-culture. Today, it constitutes a small element in the American cultural scene, although certain disadvantaged elements of American society subject to the nation's more serious social injustices, could arguably be included in the classification.

### Grid –Group Typology and Planning

American political core values are often described as liberty, equality, individualism, democracy, pragmatism, free market enterprise, the rule of law under the Constitution, and a concern for limited government (Devine, 1972; Huntington, 1981). Robin Williams in his seminal book, *American Society: A Sociological Interpretation*, approaches a characterization of American culture from a slightly different perspective, blending political and sociological observations into central traits that you would expect in a society dominated by competitive individualism (Williams, 1960).

“American culture is organized around the attempt to actively master rather than passively accept. This tendency reveals itself through a positive encouragement of our desires, a stress on the positive nature of power, an approval of egocentrism, and other characteristics through which we assert ourselves.”

“American culture is more concerned with the external world of things and events, with the palpable and immediate, than the inner experience of meaning and effect. The emphasis is more on manipulation than on contemplation.”

“American culture tends to be open rather than closed. It emphasizes change, flux, movement; its central personality types are adaptive, accessible, outgoing, and assimilative.”

“American culture values horizontal interpersonal relationships above vertical relationships: peer relations, not superior-subordinate relations; equality rather than hierarchy.”

“American culture emphasizes individual personality rather than group identity and responsibility” (Williams, 1960).

American society, while hardly homogeneous, does harbor a set of commonly held cultural beliefs, values, and attitudes that dominate in public policy outcomes. For American planning the dominance of competitive individualism and its coalition with egalitarianism in forming an anti-authority bias, have major implications in the design of effective planning implementation schemes. Those implications can be categorized under four headings: 1) American optimism and its implications in a sense of entitlement, 2) the American expression of security in land development patterns, 3) American mobility, and, 4) antagonism toward hierarchal power.

### American Optimism and Sense of Entitlement

In comparison to other cultures, America is a particularly optimistic society. We believe in and perpetuate the legend of the American Dream, that with hard work and talent our society of unbounded equal access allows individuals to achieve whatever level of success they choose. Seventy-one percent of Americans believe that most people who don't get ahead should not blame the system, but themselves. In eight separate nationwide surveys conducted between 1987 and 1997, 60 to 68 percent of Americans disagreed with the statement that hard work offers little guarantee of success (Washington, Kaiser, & Harvard, 1998). In contrast only 40 percent of Europeans believe that the poor have a chance to escape poverty. A majority of Europeans, except in the United Kingdom, believe success is outside of their control. For example, this belief is held by 68 percent of adult Germans (Inglehart, 1990).

Success in American society has increasingly been defined as material accumulation, financial independence, and power – an assumed formula for happiness and fulfillment. Combined with the mythology of the American Dream, the definition of success has resulted in a number of behavioral aberrations. American optimism, fueled by popular media images of success that permeate nearly every venue of mass communication, has been transformed in the general public's mind from an achievable objective to a near birth right or sense of entitlement. In recent surveys, 68 percent of American teens assumed that one day they would be wealthy, while more than 60 percent of college students seriously expected to be millionaires (Washington, Kaiser, & Harvard, 2005).

As the sense of entitlement grows in American culture it has specific ramifications for land planning. Political leaders, motivated by election prospects, are abhorrent to suggest conservation strategies given previous public reactions to calls for personal sacrifice. Americans have never liked being told there are limits. American political campaigns are constructed around images of opportunity, personal advancement and optimism, not natural constraints or restrictions. Cheap gasoline and unfettered highways are considered to be, when they occur, not a pleasant result of current supply and demand circumstances, but a near fundamental right by major elements of the American public.

These same dynamics are at play for planners in an American society steeped in a sense of entitlement. When individuals perceive a sense of entitlement, for instance, the right to develop their property without restriction in the pursuit of the American Dream, they will interpret it as unfair that these activities may be restricted. Equally, existing

neighborhoods will perceive it as unfair that open space is converted or roads become more congested due to growth because of their sense of entitlement. Given the cultural traits of optimism and entitlement, planning interventions in America need to be framed in terms of expanded opportunity or enhanced lifestyle, not appeals to self-sacrifice. In some circumstances, the design of planning tools, such as zoning and subdivision ordinances, should avoid the creation of a sense of entitlement. Just as many employers are now eliminating permanent salary increases, replacing them with the concept of potential annual bonuses based on performance, so too do planners have to explore how to more effectively manage the endowment effect and a growing sense of entitlement in land regulation.

### American Expression of Security

In a culture with the dominant outlook of competitive individualism, personal security is found in self-reliance, or as Jeremy Rifkin notes, exclusivity, not community (Rifkin, 2005b). To obtain self-reliance implies a scramble for wealth since one can't rely on the European model of communitarianism as an insurance policy. In the act of self-preservation to obtain wealth, individuals operate at a competitive advantage when given increased freedom of action and adaptive mobility, and they will feel threatened when opportunity is restricted. In America, making money and preserving assets has always been more than blind ambition, it has also been about self-preservation.

These cultural attitudes that have manifested themselves in various forms of governmental policy and land-use law, have ramifications in planning practice. America's self-interested culture is conflicted between an anti-authority bias that permits the unencumbered pursuit of personal wealth and the desire for governmental controls to protect or enhance that wealth once acquired. Land planners are often caught in the middle. Communities, on occasion, are now generating demands for governmental action that exceed their own cultural support for hierarchical controls.

These same security implications in a competitive individualist society often manifest themselves in a general disengagement from community. In European society freedom and security are found in community, which is quite the opposite of American culture. If it is every man, woman, and child for themselves, the family becomes the principal, if not the only, unit of social support, and community engagement and responsibilities take a distant back seat. These feelings of disengagement, in turn, feed the taste for exclusivity and privacy in housing development patterns. Housing exclusivity becomes a symbol of independence and refuge from a hostile society, in which one is always in competition rather than being cradled in community embeddedness and social support.

### American Mobility, Hyper-Activity and Lifestyle Complexity

Dr. Dean Ornish, a pioneer in heart disease research who has explored the role of community embeddedness and social support systems in human health, reports asking audiences as large as three thousand people, "How many of you can say all four of these statements are true?" (Ornish, 1997)

- You live in the same neighborhood in which you were born and raised and most of your old neighbors are still there.
- You've been going to the same church or synagogue for at least ten years and most of your fellow congregants from ten years ago are still there.
- You've been at the same job for at least ten years and most of your coworkers from ten years ago are still there.
- You have an extended family living nearby whom you see regularly”

He reports no more than three or four hands will go up in the audiences of several thousand people, including those held in rural communities. As he acknowledges, most of the hands would have gone up in the 1950s.

American society, which has always been marked by dynamism, has changed in the last half-century as hyper-activity and mobility have become the norm. Americans will on average move every six to seven years, with housing now conceived by most Americans as primarily an investment vehicle with little emotional attachment. It is a house, not a home. The average American worker spends far more time on the job than British or European counterparts; ten more weeks a year than the average German worker (Mishel & Bernstein, 2001).

Lifestyle complexity for the average American is reflected in high average daily trips per household with suburban residences generating six to ten trips per day. Dual career families with active households find it nearly impossible to coordinate housing location with daily activities without resorting to excessive use of the automobile. Even two income households with an established preference for pedestrian oriented urban villages have been shown to have little reduction in weekday car usage (Jarvis, 2003).

The issue and solution is less one of supportive urban design than it is in the lifestyle preferences and learned behaviors of Americans. While enhanced design can contribute to the opportunity for neighborliness, a developed sense of community is strongly rooted in the enduring social relations and history that an individual has in the broader community outside of the immediate family. America's modern version of an individualist nomadic lifestyle linked to a frenetic pace, inherently impacts both planning process and planning outcome. The best designs can only provide an environment for sense of community - they cannot ensure it. That outcome lies more with the chosen lifestyles of residences.

European culture has a rich heritage of community connection and leisure time social outreach that is supported by an orientation toward quality of life more so than standard of living. American culture does not. Simply providing the physical environment, a retrofit task of unimaginable proportions, is not going to transform the current addiction of certain American subcultures to economic motion over social connection and deep play, especially that observed in the competitive individualist outlook.

The issue of mobility also impacts public outlook and debate on community improvements, impact fees, and thinly veiled efforts at cost shifting. Who better to blame for community under-funding of infrastructure and who better to charge than the politically absent future buyers of new homes? The building community concedes to impact fees, basically a tax on mobile Americans who make the mistake of buying a new

home as opposed to an existing home, not because there is equity in the approach when examined closely, but because of political realities for the industry.

### Self-interest and Antagonism toward Hierarchical Power

America's dominant political culture of competitive individualism has strongly embraced the paradigm of neo-classical economics, which in turn has enshrined self-interest as a near virtue, not a character flaw. Combined with a historical antagonism toward government institutions, the two themes have blended together with cultural implications in altruistic behavior, consumerism, and private property rights.

American society has a general resistance to government controls, unless it is perceived that such controls can be utilized to advance or protect one's own self-interests. Consider that in Gallup and Pew national surveys taken since 1987, 60 to 70 percent of Americans agree strongly or somewhat agree that government controls too much of their daily lives (Washington et al., 1998). In Gallup polls taken since 1965, six out of ten Americans believe that big government represents the largest threat to the nation, while only 25 percent believe that it is big business, and 11 percent believe that it is big labor (Washington et al., 1998). Only an average of 30 percent of the American public polled from 1966 through 1998 trusts the government to usually do the right thing, and in polls conducted since 1980, 59 to 65 percent of the American public agree with the statement that the government has gone too far in regulating businesses and interfering with the free enterprise system (Washington et al., 1998).

A fierce commitment to private property rights plays a particularly important role in American culture. A recent example is the public and political reaction to the 2005 *Kelo v. New London* U.S. Supreme Court decision on eminent domain. In July of 2005 polling indicated that 68 percent of the American public was opposed to the taking of private property by eminent domain for any purpose. By November of 2005 after the details of the decision had become more widely reported, 81 percent of the public opposed the use of eminent domain (Saint, 2006). Five states enacted legislation in 2005 curtailing the power of eminent domain by local governments in response to the Supreme Court decision. In 2006, 42 of the 43 states that had gone into session had bills introduced to curtail eminent domain powers and 12 states passed and enacted such laws (NCSL, 2006). The core of America's land-use, real estate, and corporate law, centers on the protection and judicature of real and intellectual property rights.

The implications to land-use planning in a culture immersed in an ethic of self-interested behavior and resistance to government controls are substantial. Command and control planning formats that are rigorous enough to be effective are typically resisted, both politically and by the open market reactions of the general public. Planning formats that offer a full range of options, in short, choice, linked to creative behavioral incentives and consequences are likely to be better received than attempts at complete restriction. But there are limits. Incentive based regulatory approaches in the American culture will likely never be as efficient or as effective as the culturally accepted hierarchical approaches of Britain and Western Europe.

## Grid-Group Typology and a Cross-Cultural Perspective of Planning

Since the grid-group typology is theoretically universal across all cultures and nations, it offers another application in planning. By comparing dominant national cultures against planning regimes, insight can be gained into what works where and why. One potential clue to improved performance in America is that in other developed economies similar planning formats are employed, often with radically superior results. Why the different results, for instance, between American and Great Britain given our shared heritage of law and basic command and control orientation? The answer likely lies in the base culture and the sensitivity of any given planning strategy or intervention to that culture. Indeed, a significant number of technically appropriate solutions have proven unworkable in American practice because the cultural climate has either been missed entirely or is under appreciated.

Unlike American culture, the British and European societies have particular histories and dominant values that are hierarchical and egalitarian in nature. Where the American Dream implies equal opportunity to pursue individual financial success, European culture emphasizes community relationships and obligations, and a long-established respect for authority. Jeremy Rifkin describes European culture in contrast to American society as one that, "Emphasizes community relationships over individual autonomy, cultural diversity over assimilation, quality-of-life over the accumulation of wealth, sustainable development over unlimited material growth, deep play over unrelenting toil, universal human rights and the rights of nature over property rights, and global cooperation over the unilateral exercise of power"(Rifkin, 2005b).

The American interpretation of egalitarianism under the grid-group typology suggests not only an orientation toward community relationships, but also a suspicion of institutional controls. That interpretation may be colored by the unique history of egalitarianism in America and may be an overstatement of the true views on the government's role under the sub-culture in other nations. The purity and strength of views suggested under the grid-group typology is also more likely with political elites than the general citizenry, and likely intensifies in the individual as citizen activism increases (Coughlin & Lockhart, 1998). Regardless, egalitarianism in Great Britain and Europe has combined forces with hierarchical social and political systems to render a cultural consensus on the nature of governance. The sub-culture with the least amount of moral authority within European society is competitive individualism. Great Britain straddles this divide between America and Europe with a slightly stronger element of competitive individualism in the English culture, but it is still significantly constrained by American standards.

To fully appreciate the role that dominant political cultures play in planning outcomes consider the contrast between American and Great Britain practice. Land planning practice in Great Britain consistently yields results that are unequaled almost anywhere in America if judged by physical outcome. England as a physical subset of Great Britain is somewhat smaller than Oregon with a population that is 25 percent greater than California. It is nine times more densely populated than America and triple the European average density. It is, in fact, one of the most densely populated nations in the world. Yet they have largely succeeded in maintaining rural character and bucolic landscapes between urban concentrations. Rural villages and mid-size towns across the

nation tend to have compact form and distinct edges, far more physically noticeable than any urban growth boundary program in America. Their eleven National Parks and forty designated Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty constitute nearly one fifth of England and Wales. Amazingly, the first of these designations did not begin until 1951, and all are in private ownership of 90 percent or more, managed through a combination of independent park authorities and local Council planning regimes at a level of regulatory stringency that is unimaginable in American society.

Urban development is compact and green belt separation between urban concentrations nearly sacred except in those areas where they specifically desire to accommodate growth. Metropolitan densities are three to four times that of America, while suburban densities are four times as dense (Newman & Kenworthy, 1989). Growth pressure is accommodated but specifically directed to desired jurisdictions and regions by national planning schemes coordinated through Council plans. New residential construction units are specially allocated at the national level to regional areas by hierarchical planning formats based on five-year projections. By national guidance, 60 percent of all new development is directed to urban renewal and Brownfield sites, whereby the performance of local planners and Councils is closely monitored under a national reporting system to ensure that planning goals are met. National planning objectives based on the greater public interest routinely trump local resistance.

The English Heritage program has listed over 500,000 structures, nearly 1 in 40, in a non-voluntary secret process with secret criteria under which the building owner has no appeal after receiving one of three restrictive designations to protect the architectural heritage of the building. Listed properties average a 25 percent increase in market value as a result of receiving the designation (Burden, 2005). In addition, there are 10,000 areas of special archeological or historic interest designated with special planning protections including some of substantial size such as the Yorkshire Dales Special Barn District.

England strongly promotes pedestrianism in both urban and rural environments. The nation maintains nearly 140,000 miles of trails, including 200 designated Long Distance Paths of national status. The 2002 Open Countryside Act opened most private moorlands above a certain elevation to public access. Nearly 25 percent of all journeys in Great Britain are made entirely on foot and 78 percent of journeys under one mile are walked (Ramblers, 2006). In 1998, 27 percent of the population found it unnecessary to own a car (National, 1997).

To achieve the effects described above, Great Britain relies heavily on a rigorous command and control planning format mixed with an integrated program of incentives, subsidies, and extensive use of public/private partnerships. The 1947 Town and Country Planning Act essentially nationalized development rights and the increased property values that the permitting of development entails. England has no "taking issue" since private development rights do not exist in most circumstances. There is also a broad acceptance that land development is a public issue, not a private matter.

As the Anglo-American planner, Barry Cullingworth, has noted in his comparative analysis of the planning atmospheres in the two countries, "American planning is largely a matter of anticipating trends, while in Britain there is a conscious effort to bend them in publicly desirable directions" (Cullingworth, 1993). He makes an interesting observation that goes to the heart of the two respective cultures. In hierarchical and egalitarian Britain, planning is clearly focused on advancing the broader public

interest while in the competitive individualist society of America, the system is more often focused on preventing or resolving conflict between private interests through zoning separation and land-use law dispute resolution. America's system is far more legalistic than Great Britain's or Europe's with our appeal rights and extensive case law. In Great Britain, planners and elected officials control the land-use system. In America that power is more likely directed to judicial process in the exercise of balancing private property rights with the public interest.

The British have a far greater respect for authority than Americans, placing trust and resources in the bureaucracy, matched by a demand for a high standard of professionalism and accountability. A rural English Council planning staff would typically have 20 to 40 planners specialized in their respective areas of responsibility, subject to periodic training at Council expense. Public deference is extended to the expertise of these planners with much of the decision-making authority lying directly with them. While in America, the same setting may have a staff of 2 to 5 people. In contrast to English planners, American planners are largely advisory, with administrative and judicial appeals present for even the most minor issues.

It is not being argued here that British and Western European planning formats need to be adopted in America to achieve results. Quite to the contrary, it is being suggested that at their foundation, they are not readily transferable between cultures. For the English to achieve the results that they do requires the imposition of regulatory regimes that would likely never be tolerated in American culture. They are generally successful in their planning programs, unlike American practice, because their strident hierarchical approaches coincide with dominant cultural values, contributing to a high level of social validity and political sustainability. That is, their planning systems are calibrated to dominant cultural traits to obtain results. Hierarchical social and political systems that are grounded in traditionalism and egalitarianism emphasize community responsibilities more than individual rights. As Barry Cullingworth notes about British practice, "Most planning applications, for example, are sub-judice until they have been decided. Thus neither the press nor the public are informed of them" (Cullingworth, 1993).

That is the antithesis of America's dominant political culture of competitive individualism. And yet at its core, American planning practice has attempted to impose the same fundamental approach as that employed in Great Britain and Western Europe. Planning practice around the world tends to be hierarchical in nature, particularly at the implementation stage. Applied in America practice, planners have inherently been conflicted with the society's political culture of competitive individualism. Possibly more than any other factor, the failure as a profession to recognize this potential cultural divide has handicapped planning performance in the United States.

I suspect, without any quantitative evidence to support the position, that a majority of American land planners harbor a hierarchical cultural bias, but that the profession also contains a healthy subculture of egalitarians. Those of us that have chosen environmental and land development issues as our primary career interest, seem to place a particular emphasis on planning processes that render well-ordered, rational and comprehensive decisions. We have a desire for natural landscapes and urban form to be orderly, attractive, and managed on a sustainable basis, all in a society dominated by competitive individualism that conspires against hierarchical planning formats. The

model that we can most strongly relate to and that has been readily developed in planning practice is a command and control hierarchical scheme based on comprehensive-rationality. At its core, this is the British and European model. American planners attempt to reconcile and legitimize a top-down approach in an individualist culture through the application of egalitarian oriented processes in public involvement, often disingenuously. In American culture, the approach has resulted in a train wreck of either weak and ineffectual regulatory schemes with market overrides, or programs characterized by low social validity and political instability. In some cases, both have been achieved simultaneously.

### Conclusion

When planning interventions are conceived with sensitivity to cultural influences, they dramatically increase their power to persuade. When they are based solely on normative goals and lack grounding in cultural values and behavioral tendencies, their ability to influence preferences will be seriously handicapped. Cultural sensitivity under CBIP suggests the following principles:

- There exists a certain latitude of change that is possible within cultural attitude zones. Program elements should be devised that avoid an obvious and identifiable confrontation with cultural tendencies. In some cases, that may mean clearly staying within current boundaries of cultural convention to maintain social validity. In others, diplomacy and calculation in technique are required when cultural evolution is the objective. The extent of change that can be engineered is expanded by the framing of the argument, effective issue management techniques in communications and public relations, demonstration projects, and by the redesign of planning institutions. On rare occasions, events can stimulate an entire paradigm shift.
- To achieve cultural sensitivity as a specific design criteria suggests that some American planning institutions need reconsideration. Among those potential institutional changes, none may be more fundamental than a sector shift for the planning profession. It just may be that the only truly effective planning scheme in American culture is one that is fundamentally different from the models of other nations - private as opposed to public. In general, planners in the last four decades have chosen to define their profession as principally a public sector enterprise. Dispel that perspective and a new strategic approach emerges. There is nothing to prevent the American land planning profession from transforming itself into the nation's development profession using economics and the model of capitalism to influence public behavior. And there is nothing that says development can't be undertaken professionally as a non-profit or low margin exercise as, for instance, health care is practiced in other nations. The core of capitalist societies is market-based competition. Planners are more than capable of institutionally

transforming development practices by offering a new model of competition into the land development marketplace – planners as the nation’s premier and trend-setting developers. Such a change in outlook requires modifications in how we define the profession and how that new definition is institutionalized in planning education.

- Designing for the American culture implies a related set of institution changes that compliments a stronger private sector role for the profession. Those institutional changes could be described as the engineering of a modified public interest model for planners as was suggested in the previous chapter. CBIP, in fact, has at its core one vision of that modified public interest model, replacing the current concept of a public planner as expert and facilitator in interventions for the public interest with an alternative role of open advocacy and market-based competition by the profession. This implies potentially making public planning director positions an elected office. It also suggests that in the American culture, the concept of zoning and other forms of land-use regulation should be framed as retained *public* property rights, managed in trust by government. By shifting the societal conception of the role of planning so that people internalize the concept of public goods as a private entitlement collectively retained, as opposed to planning as simply government regulation, the role of planning may become better calibrated to the American cultural outlook.
- By interpreting much of the conflict that occurs in American planning as cultural conflicts between competing ideologies, it may be possible to coordinate customized approaches for each of the individual political sub-cultures. For example, ordinance provisions and non-regulatory planning mechanisms can be customized to cater to cultural predispositions, whether of the dominant or co-dominant political cultural groups. By avoiding a monolithic characterization of national culture, recognizing the influence of other political subcultures, it is at least theoretically possible to design planning interventions that follow multiple pathways, each designed to appeal to a separate cultural audience if the circumstances warrant such an approach.

One case example of this type of approach is provided in Chapter Seven. A rural planning regime, that includes zoning and subdivision ordinance provisions, is customized along two separate formats to appeal to politically and behaviorally different cultural elements in the community. This type of advanced cultural profiling is already applied in the private sector in community design considerations. There is recognition in psychographic profiling, for example, that egalitarians have fundamentally different housing and community preferences than either competitive individualists or hierarchists. Ladera Ranch, a planned community in Orange County, California with 16,000 residents, is engaged in this type of sub-culture design and marketing format. Various villages within the larger project were customized specifically in terms of site design, architecture

and marketing format to appeal to the distinct political cultures recognized under the grid-group typology.

Terramor, one of the Ladera Ranch's village divisions, was specifically designed for the egalitarian sub-culture, emphasizing solitude, authenticity, and environmental values. It featured Craftsman-style architecture, with its propensity for private nooks and crannies, hidden entrances and a commitment to detail and high quality workmanship practiced in an understated fashion. Green building design was also emphasized in energy conservation and selection of materials. In contrast, other villages at Ladera Ranch were designed for hierarchials and competitive individualists featuring conservative colonial style architecture with large family rooms for the former group, and status-oriented display houses for the latter sub-culture. The intention was to socially engineer community at the village level by both cultural and physical design, maximizing long term consumer satisfaction and, of course, market success. Antidotal evidence indicates that the various political sub-cultures did, in fact, somewhat unwittingly separate themselves by village type in their purchasing decisions, and that stronger social networks and sense of community resulted, with less neighborhood friction and a higher level of resident satisfaction (McCrummen, 2006).

Some may take exception to the degree of social engineering involved in a project like Ladera Ranch, but to do so is to replace one value system with another. From the public's perspective, the quality of planning can be measured by the degree to which their life satisfaction is enhanced in the gratification of their wants and needs. The intellectual exercise for planners is to create a physical and social environment that the public desires, while simultaneously accomplishing any number of other planning objectives. The consideration and management of cultural preferences is a cardinal component of the equation.

Cultural conventions can and do change, particularly if people can make the connection between the values of their cultural orientation and the new lifestyle, landscape formula, or regulatory option being offered. Often the consumer decisions that people make are based on what product is available, whether as a result of community design or ordinance provision, and they do not necessarily reflect their true preference. It cannot be assumed that market preferences expressed in a survey reflect embedded preferences based on intransigent values or basic human nature. They may just as likely be a reflection of cultural conventions that can be moved by advanced product design and marketing that is consistent with underlying values.