1	BEFORE THE LAND USE BOARD OF APPEALS
2	OF THE STATE OF OREGON
3	AH EEN D. MANE TEDDY DEDDY
4 5	AILEEN P. KAYE, TERRY BERRY, and RICHARD VAN PELT,
6	Petitioners,
7	1 contents,
8	VS.
9	MADION COUNTY
10 11	MARION COUNTY, Respondent,
	кегропиет,
12 13 14 15	and
14	
15	MATTHEW SWISHER and DONNA SWISHER,
16	Intervenors-Respondents.
17 18	LUBA No. 2008-190
19	EODITIO. 2000 170
20	ORDER ON
21	MOTION TO DISMISS
22	
23	MOTION TO INTERVENE
24	Matthew Swisher and Donna Swisher, the applicants below, move to intervene on the
25	side of the respondent in this appeal. There is no opposition to the motion, and it is granted.
26	FACTS
27	The southern and western boundary lines of intervenors' property abut Spong's
28	Landing Park. It was brought to the county's attention that the previous owners of
29	intervenors' property had constructed a fence that encroached onto park property. The
30	encroachment was not discovered upon the subsequent sale to intervenors. The fence as i
31	stands encloses approximately 6,135 square feet of park property.
32	The board of commissioners (BOC) held a public hearing regarding the matter or
33	October 1, 2008. The BOC determined that it was in the public interest to convey the strip of
34	land along the park's northern boundary line to intervenors. The BOC issued Order No. 08

- 1 143 on October 6, 2008 approving the sale of the property for a sum of \$5,000. This appeal
- 2 followed.

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MOTION TO DISMISS

- As relevant here, LUBA's jurisdiction is limited to land use decisions. ORS
- 5 197.825(1). Respondent argues that the BOC's decision does not fall within the statutory
- 6 definition of "land use decision" provided in ORS 197.015(10)(a)(A). According to the
- 7 county, the BOC's decision was rendered pursuant to ORS 275.330(2).³ The county asserts
- 8 that in making its decision to convey property under ORS 275.330(2), the county was not
- 9 required to apply any of the land use standards set out at ORS 197.015(10)(a)(A). See n 2. It

"Except as provided in ORS 197.320 and subsections (2) and (3) of this section, the Land Use Board of Appeals shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review any land use decision or limited land use decision of a local government, special district or a state agency in the manner provided in ORS 197.830 to 197.845."

- "(A) A final decision or determination made by a local government or special district that concerns the adoption, amendment or application of:
 - "(i) The goals;
 - "(ii) A comprehensive plan provision;
 - "(iii) A land use regulation; or
 - "(iv) A new land use regulation[.]"

"In addition to the methods described in subsection (1) of this section, lands that have been set aside for county forest, public park or recreational area may be alienated, sold or conveyed, in part or in whole, by the public body upon a finding that it is in the best interest of the public. Upon a determination that an alienation, sale or conveyance is in the public interest, the lands set aside may be sold at public or private sale, or other lands may be taken in exchange and set aside for park or recreational purposes. When a sale, an alienation or conveyance takes place, the proceeds shall be held for maintenance and improvement of existing park and recreation lands or future acquisition of lands to be set aside for park or recreational purposes."

¹ ORS 197.825(1) provides:

² ORS 197.015(10)(a) defines a land use decision to include the following:

³ ORS 275.330(2) provides:

follows, the county argues, that the challenged decision is not a land use decision that is subject to LUBA's review, and this appeal should be dismissed.

A decision "concerns" the application of a comprehensive plan or land use regulation if (1) the decision maker was required by law to apply its comprehensive plan or land use regulations as approval standards, but did not, or (2) the decision maker in fact applied plan provisions or land use regulations. Dorall v. Coos County, 53 Or LUBA 32, 34 (2006) (citing Jaqua v. City of Springfield, 46 Or LUBA 566, 574 (2004)). In Many Rivers Group v. City of Eugene, 25 Or LUBA 518, 523 (1993) we concluded that we did not have jurisdiction to review a decision regarding the ownership and management of a park. That decision was rendered pursuant to ORS 275.330. However, in reaching that conclusion in Many Rivers Group, we noted that petitioners did not argue that the county was required to apply its comprehensive plan or land use regulations and petitioners did not identify any applicable comprehensive plan or land use regulation standards. Id. at n 3. In the present appeal, petitioners identify a comprehensive plan objective that they contend the county should have applied.

The Marion County Comprehensive Plan (MCCP) includes a number of Parks and Recreation Policies, beginning at MCCP II F-3. The MCCP also includes a number of Parks and Recreation Objectives, beginning at MCCP II F-9. The Parks and Recreation Objective for Spong's Landing Park appears at MCCP II F-10. That MCCP Objective states:

"Acquire 10 acres adjacent to Spongs Landing and further develop the park to include additional trails, paths, open play fields, and nature studies."

The MCCP objective involved here is very specific. It directs the county to acquire an additional 10 acres of land adjacent to Spong's Landing Park. While it may be that the Objective simply does not apply at all to a decision to *sell* Spong's Landing Park property, we believe the Objective could reasonably be interpreted to prohibit a sale of Spong's Landing Park property, particularly if the sale of Spong's Landing Park property would make it more difficult to acquire the 10 acres referenced in the Objective. Stated differently, the

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scope of the MCCP Spong's Landing Park Objective is sufficiently ambiguous that its applicability to the challenged decision is not clear.

Petitioners, during oral testimony at the October 1, 2008 public hearing, argued that the MCCP calls for the county to acquire a 10-acre addition to Spong's Landing Park and that selling Spong's Landing Park property conflicts with the comprehensive plan. Record 17. A letter from Friends of Marion County dated October 1, 2008 specifically cites and quotes the MCCP Spong's Landing Park Objective quoted above. Record 43. As far as we can tell, the county did not respond that the cited MCCP Objective does not apply to the challenged decision and did not take the position that the challenged conveyance of 6,135 square feet of Spong's Landing Park property is consistent with that Objective.

We agree with petitioners that the challenged decision falls within the statutory definition of "land use decision" in ORS 197.015(10)(a)(A)(ii). Petitioners identified a MCCP Objective that certainly could be interpreted to apply to a decision to sell 6,135 square feet of Spong's Landing Park property and could be interpreted to prohibit a decision to sell Spong's Landing Park property. The county did not respond to petitioners' argument or provide any basis for us to conclude that the cited MCCP Objective does not apply. Given these circumstances, we conclude that the challenged decision is a land use decision and that we have jurisdiction to review the decision. It also seems very likely that the county's decision will have to be remanded to allow the county to adopt an explanation for why the county interprets the Spong's Landing Park Objective to apply or not to apply to a decision to sell Spong's Landing Park property. If the Spong's Landing Park Objective does apply to a decision to sell Spong's Landing Park property, the county will need to determine whether the challenged sale of Spong's Landing Park property is consistent with that objective.

The county's motion to dismiss is denied.

BRIEFING SCHEDULE

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2	If the county does not voluntarily move to remand the challenged decision for
3	additional findings, the petition for review shall be due 21 days from the date of this order.
4	The respondent's and intervenors-respondents' brief shall be due 42 days from the date of
5	this order. The Board's final opinion and order shall be due 77 days from the date of this
6	order.
7	Dated this 18 th day of February, 2009.
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13	Michael A. Holstun
14	Board Member