1	BEFORE THE LAND USE BOARD OF APPEALS							
2	OF THE STATE OF OREGON							
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4	BILL BURNESS AND KATIE BURNESS,							
5	Petitioners,							
6								
7	VS.							
8								
9	DOUGLAS COUNTY,							
10	Respondent,							
11								
12	and							
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14	GREAT AMERICAN PROPERTIES LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,							
15	Intervenor-Respondent.							
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17	LUBA No. 2010-032							
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19	ORDER							
20	MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES							
21	Intervenor-respondent (intervenor) moves for an award of attorney fees pursuant to							
22	ORS 197.830(15)(b), which provides:							
23	"The board shall * * * award reasonable attorney fees and expenses to the							
24	prevailing party against any other party who the board finds presented a							
25	position without probable cause to believe the position was well-founded in							
26	law or on factually supported information."							
20	law of on factuary supported information.							
27	As we explained in Wolfgram v. Douglas County, 54 Or LUBA 775, 775-76 (2007):							
28	"Under ORS 197.830(15)(b), a position is presented 'without probable cause'							
29	where 'no reasonable lawyer would conclude that any of the legal points							
30	asserted on appeal possessed legal merit.' Contreras v. City of Philomath, 32							
31	Or LUBA 465, 469 (1996). In applying the probable cause analysis LUBA							
32	'will consider whether any of the issues raised [by a party] were open to							
33	doubt, or subject to rational, reasonable, or honest discussion.' <i>Id.</i> The party							
34	seeking an award of attorney fees under the probable cause standard must							
35	clear a relatively high hurdle and that hurdle is not satisfied by simply							
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36 37	showing that LUBA rejected all of a party's arguments on the merits. <i>Brown</i> v. City of Ontario, 33 Or LUBA 803, 804 (1997)."							

Thus, attorney fees are warranted under ORS 197.830(15)(b) where the prevailing party demonstrates that no reasonable lawyer would present any of the "positions" that the party against whom fees is sought presented on appeal.

In the present case, the challenged decision approves a 34-lot subdivision on rural land. Petitioners advanced four assignments of error, with numerous subassignments of error, arguing that the county's decision was inconsistent with applicable subdivision criteria. Intervenor argues that none of petitioners' challenges were presented with probable cause to believe the position was well-founded in law or on factually supported information.

As noted, to avoid attorney fees, petitioners need identify only one "position" that satisfies the probable cause standard. In response to the motion for attorney fees, petitioners argue that their position regarding compliance with the county's Land Use and Development Ordinance (LUDO) 4.100.3 was subject to rational, reasonable, or honest discussion. We agree with petitioners.

LUDO 4.100.3 requires in relevant part that the subdivision "provide for the continuation of major and secondary streets existing in adjoining subdivisions." Petitioners noted that the plat from an adjoining subdivision appears to show a road stubbed to the subject property's northeastern boundary, and argued that the county erred in failing to require continuation of the road into the proposed subdivision, as required by LUDO 4.100.3. Intervenor responded in part that the issue of compliance with LUDO 4.100.3 was not raised below and thus was waived under ORS 197.763(1). Petitioners, however, identified places in the record where that issue was raised with sufficient specificity, and we rejected intervenor's waiver challenge. On the merits, we held that the county's finding that no roads are stubbed to the property boundary is supported by substantial evidence. The evidence both parties relied upon was the adjoining subdivision's plat, which indeed depicted a road ending in a turnaround that touched the property line with the subject property, and could be construed as being stubbed to the property line. However, based in part on plat text

1	indicating	that	the	roads	depicted	on	the	plat	were	intended	to	"benefit	this	plat,"	we
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- 2 concluded that a reasonable person could conclude from the plat that the apparently stubbed
- 3 road is an internal road that is not intended to be a connecting road with adjoining properties.
- 4 Accordingly, we denied that subassignment of error.

5 The subdivision plat at issue was ambiguous regarding whether the depicted road was 6 stubbed to the property line and was intended to be a connecting road to adjoining 7 subdivisions, or whether it was an internal road. Reasonable lawyers could disagree about 8 whether LUDO 4.100.3 applied to require continuation of the road that ended at the subject 9 property's boundary. The ambiguous evidence on that point made compliance with LUDO 10 4.100.3 an issue that was subject to rational, reasonable, or honest discussion. Therefore, 11 intervenor has not demonstrated that all of petitioners' positions were presented without 12 probable cause to believe the position was well-founded in law or on factually supported

## COSTS

The county has not filed a cost bill. Therefore, LUBA will return the petitioners' deposit for costs to petitioners.

Dated this 12th day of January, 2011.

information. The motion for attorney fees is denied.

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22 Board Member