

BUREAU of LABOR & INDUSTRIES

BEFORE THE COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES OF THE STATE OF OREGON

In the Matter of:

Case No. 37-16

Frehoo, Inc. dba Stars Cabaret &

Steak House.

AMENDED

FINDINGS OF FACT

ULTIMATE FINDINGS OF FACT

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

and

OPINION ORDER

Pamela Colburn, Lisa Heinzman-Myers, Jon Herkenrath, Randy Kaiser, Todd Mitchell, and Jeff Struhar, individually, under ORS 659A.030(1)(g),

Respondents.

SYNOPSIS

The Agency established by a preponderance of the evidence that that Respondent Frehoo, Inc. ("Frehoo"), an adult entertainment club featuring nude female dancers. subjected a 15-year-old female dancer to unlawful sexual harassment by Frehoo's customers in violation of ORS 659A.030(1)(b) and OAR 839-005-0030(5), (7). The forum also concluded that Respondents Jon Herkenrath and Todd Mitchell aided and abetted the unlawful sexual harassment. ORS 659A.030(1)(g). Respondents Pamela Colburn, Lisa Heinzman-Myers, Randy Kaiser, and Jeff Struhar are not liable as aiders and abettors. The forum awarded the aggrieved person \$1,000,000 in compensatory damages for the mental and physical suffering she experienced as a result of the unlawful conduct. The forum also ordered Respondents Frehoo, Herkenrath, and Mitchell to cease and desist from continuing to violate laws pertaining to discrimination because of sex and sexual harassment in the workplace. ORS 659A.050(2), (4).

Following issuance of the Final Order in this matter, the order was appealed to the Oregon Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded as to BOLI's conclusion that Respondents Randy Kaiser, Todd Mitchell and Jeff Struhar aided and abetted the unlawful sexual harassment of the aggrieved person and were joint and severally liable for the unlawful employment practice. *Frehoo, Inc., dba Stars Cabaret & Steak House, v. BOLI*, 319 Or App 548, 564-65, 510 P3d 888, 898 (2022) rev den 370 Or 789, 524 P3d 957 (2023). On remand, the forum addressed the issues identified by the court.

NOTE: The procedural history of this case is extensive and includes the ALJ's lengthy rulings on several motions filed by the parties. For ease of reading, all procedural facts, pre-hearing motions, and rulings on those motions are included as Appendix A to this Final Order. Appendix A immediately follows the "Order" section of this Final Order that bears the Deputy Commissioner's signature.

IMPORTANT: The Judicial Review Notice that customarily follows the "Order" section of Final orders may be found on the last page of this Final Order.

The above-entitled case came on regularly for hearing before Kari Furnanz, designated as Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") by Brad Avakian, Commissioner of the Bureau of Labor and Industries for the State of Oregon. The hearing was held on November 9-10, 14-18, 29-30, December 1-2, 5-7, 2016, in Conference Rooms A and B of the Oregon Employment Department, WorkSource Tualatin Office, 7995 SW Mohawk Street, Tualatin, Oregon. Closing arguments were held on December 21, 2016, at the W. W. Gregg Hearing Room of the Oregon Bureau of Labor and Industries, which was then located at 800 NE Oregon Street, Portland, Oregon.

The Bureau of Labor and Industries ("BOLI" or "the Agency") was represented by Chief Administrative Prosecutor Jenn Gaddis and Administrative Prosecutor Cristin Casey, employees of the Agency. Anthony Reiner, Joel Shapiro and Janis Puracal, attorneys for the Aggrieved Persons, were present throughout the hearing. Respondents were represented by Courtney Angeli and Angela Ferrer, attorneys at law. Respondents

Jon Herkenrath, Randy Kaiser, Todd Mitchell and Jeff Struhar were present for the majority of the hearing, but Herkenrath and Struhar were not present on some hearing dates due to illness.

The Agency called the following witnesses¹ to testify in person: Maria Perez, Rafael Colin, Chad Opitz (direct), Chris Lynch, Madelyn Brown, Jessica Ponaman, Dr. Jon Conte, AP1, and AP2. The Agency called the following witnesses to testify by telephone: Steven Toth, Cynthia Herring, Amy, Ashley, Melanie, Davey, Chad Opitz (rebuttal).

Respondents called the following witnesses to testify in person: Maria Perez, Chad Opitz, AP1, Casey, Jon Herkenrath, Dante, Ursula, James Marquardt, Megan, Moses, Frank Richard Mangrum, Dr. Kevin McGovern, Sarah, Coni, Tony, Bob Stewart, Randy Kaiser, Jennifer, Jeff Struhar, Taylor, and Todd Mitchell. Respondents called the following witnesses to testify by telephone: Amy, Karen, Alexa, Tammy, Angelina Spencer, Tim, Belen, Brittany, Hal, and Leslie.

The forum received into evidence:

- a) Administrative exhibits X1 through X157 (submitted or generated prior to hearing), and X158 through X193 (submitted or generated during or after hearing);
- b) Agency exhibits A1-A19, A21-A32, A33a, A34a, A37-A49, portions of A50 (pp. 1, 4, 16 only), portions of A50a (pp. 5, 6, 7 only), A51-A52, A55, A57-A58, A60-A63, A67, A71-A75, A86-A87, and A90-A93;

¹ Pursuant to interim protective orders issued by the ALJ in this case, the aggrieved persons will be referred to throughout this document as AP1 and AP2. Additionally, employees/workers and former employees/workers of Frehoo and other adult entertainment establishments will be referred to by their first names only, with the exception of the named respondents in this case.

c) Respondents' exhibits R6-R8, R9, R13-R14, R18-R19, R22-R30, R32, R38, R39-R40, R44, portions of R45 (pp. 18, 109-112, 130-134 only), R46-R48, R49-R58 (for the limited purpose of identifying them as records that Dr. McGovern reviewed), R59, R61, R63-R64, R66-R69, R74-R75, portions of R76 (pp. 144-148, 162 only), R81, R85, R87-R93, R96, R99, R105, R107, portions of R109 (pp. 3 and 4 only), R110-R111, R113-R114, R116, R117, R120, R126 (for the limited purpose of showing that it was part of the Agency's investigation), R131-R132, R134-R135, R137, R142, R143, R147, R148 (p. 1 only), R149-R151 and R156 (for impeachment purposes only).

Having fully considered the entire record in this matter, I, Jessica Giannettino Villatoro, Deputy Commissioner of the Bureau of Labor and Industries, hereby make the following Findings of Fact (Procedural and on the Merits), Ultimate Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Opinion, and Order.²

FINDINGS OF FACT - THE MERITS

Description of Respondents

1) At all times material herein, Respondent Frehoo, Inc. ("Frehoo") was an Oregon domestic business corporation. Stars Cabaret and Steakhouse was an assumed business name doing business at 4570 SW Lombard, Ave., Beaverton, Oregon, which was owned and operated by Frehoo.³ Frehoo operated as an adult entertainment club for approximately 20 years until it filed for bankruptcy in the summer of 2016. (Amended

² The Ultimate Findings of Fact required by OAR 839-050-0370(1)(b)(B) are subsumed within the Findings of Fact – The Merits.

³ Throughout this document, "Frehoo" will be used to refer to both Frehoo, Inc., the corporate entity, and the club called "Stars Cabaret and Steakhouse," which operated in Beaverton, Oregon. References to "Stars" are meant to refer to all Stars-named clubs, unless otherwise specified.

- 2) Randy Kaiser, Todd Mitchell and Jeff Struhar all own shares of corporations that have ownership interests in Frehoo. Although some other individuals have ownership interests, Kaiser, Mitchell and Struhar are often referred to as the "owners" of Frehoo by people familiar with the club.⁴ (Amended Answer; Testimony of Kaiser; Hearing Record)
- 3) Kaiser, Mitchell and Struhar have ownership interests in other adult entertainment clubs using the "Stars" business name, including locations in Bend, Salem and Tualatin, Oregon. The other Stars clubs are owned by corporate entities that are separate from Frehoo. Although an owner was assigned primary oversight responsibility for each of the Stars clubs, the three owners also made collective decisions to revise existing policies or adopt new policies at Frehoo. (Ex. A46; Testimony of Kaiser, Colin)
- 4) Mitchell was the owner who provided management oversight of both Frehoo and the Stars club in Tualatin, and is also the corporate secretary for Frehoo. He holds a bachelor's degree in business administration from Temple University. Before he went into business with Kaiser and Struhar, he managed large adult entertainment clubs in Colorado for eight years. During the 2012-2014 time period, Mitchell spent approximately 15 hours per week, every other week, on site at Frehoo during the school year. He only spent 5-10 hours per week at the club the other weeks. He spent less time at the club during the summer. He was not involved in hiring the entertainers who performed at the club. (Amended Formal Charges; Amended Answer; Testimony of Colin, Kaiser, Mitchell)

⁴ Any mention of an "owner" or the "owners" of Frehoo in this Final Order is intended to refer to Kaiser, Mitchell and Struhar, collectively.

- 5) Kaiser performed administrative and accounting functions for Frehoo and other Stars clubs, and also addressed legal issues that arose. He was involved in procuring licenses, such as the liquor licenses with the OLCC. Kaiser is the owner primarily responsible for overseeing the Stars club in Bend, Oregon. After he moved to Bend in 2003, Kaiser did not have management responsibilities for Frehoo. Kaiser was not a corporate officer of Frehoo, but is listed as Frehoo's registered agent. Kaiser was involved with the other owners in making policy decisions, but did not take on the responsibility for putting policies at Frehoo into place. He received questions about the Frehoo club regarding matters such as accounting entries or legal issues. For example, when BOLI's Wage and Hour Division came to Frehoo to conduct an onsite compliance review on October 1, 2014, the manager on duty contacted Kaiser and, at Kaiser's direction, the manager asked the investigators to wait until Kaiser arrived. During the time period from 2012 to 2015, Kaiser was not often present on the premises of Frehoo. He primarily divided his time between the club in Bend and a Stars business office in Tualatin, traveling back and forth between the two locations each week. (Amended Formal Charges; Exs. A46, A52; Testimony of Kaiser, Perez, Colin)
- 6) Struhar was the corporate president of Frehoo. His involvement with Frehoo consisted of addressing technical issues, such the number of tables required by OLCC, remodeling and design work. He was the owner in charge of overseeing the Stars Salem location. Struhar conferred with Kaiser and Mitchell "on some level" about "global policy," but did not play any part in the day-to-day operations of Frehoo. (Testimony of Kaiser, Colin, Struhar)

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7) Jon Herkenrath started working for Stars in 2010 as a valet. About three months after he was hired, he began performing security duties. He then worked as a part-time or swing shift manager for a period of time. About a year later, in 2012, he became a day manager, serving in that position until 2014. For a period of time, he was moved to the Stars Bridgeport location for about nine months, then returned to Frehoo. In February or March of 2014, Herkenrath was promoted to the position of regional manager. As regional manager, he served as the general manager of both the Beaverton and Bridgeport clubs. He was the regional manager until Frehoo closed in July of 2016. (Testimony of Herkenrath)

Description of Frehoo Club Operations

- 8) Frehoo was an adult entertainment club that featured female entertainers who performed nude dancing. Alcohol and food were served to the club's customers. The club owners wanted Frehoo to be a premium gentleman's club and attempted to build an "experience" for their patrons. Frehoo sought to attract high-end clientele, such as men with disposable incomes and expense accounts, including CEO's, celebrities, recording artists and professional athletes. Managers greeted customers upon arrival and asked what kind of experience the customers were seeking, which could include things like viewing nude dancers on a stage, watching a dancer who performed with hula hoops, arranging for a private dance, or having an entertainer sit with the customer at a table. (Testimony of Herkenrath, Mitchell, Kaiser)
- 9) The women who danced at Frehoo were viewed as "professional entertainers" in an "erotic" and "sexually charged" business. (Testimony of Kaiser)

- 10) The documents provided to women applying to work as a dancer at the club sometimes described the position as a "dancer" and "entertainer." Dancers/entertainers did the following activities throughout the course of their work:
 - Danced on stage for two songs at a time in a rotation set by the DJ. Dancers were expected to remove the clothing from either their top or bottom by the end of the first song, and had to be fully nude at the conclusion of the second song.
 - Performed private dances for customers in the VIP lounge area while partially nude or topless.
 - If over the age of 21, drank alcoholic drinks, including shots of alcohol, purchased for them by customers.
 - Sat down and conversed with customers.
 - Entertainers could also be "bought off the floor," meaning that a customer would pay for a dancer to be removed from the stage dancing rotation to spend the rest of her shift with the customer.

The entertainers who made the most money for the "house" had their own group of customers. Some entertainers used websites, text messages or business cards to provide information to customers about themselves, where they worked and their schedules. (Ex. R64; Testimony of Amy, Herkenrath, Sarah, AP2)

11) There was a separate area for "VIP" (private) dances in which a customer could pay to have an entertainer perform a private dance. In the VIP dance area, there were several chairs separated by black sheer curtains. Lighting in the VIP area was dimmer than in the rest of the club. There was a podium next to the entrance of the VIP area where a security person was usually stationed. The charges for VIP dances were posted on a sign outside the VIP area. (Ex. A50, p. 1; Testimony of Herkenrath, AP2)

- 12) Entertainers performed using a "stage name" that was different than their real name. (Exs. R61, R64; Testimony of Colin, Megan, Herkenrath, Sarah, Mitchell, Taylor)
- managers were responsible for everything that happened in the club. All managers carried keys to the club and were told to "operate the club like you own it." Frehoo also employed or engaged the services of security guards, bartenders, waitresses, cooking staff, DJs, and "door girls" who greeted customers upon entry to the club and checked their identification. "Door girls" were not present during all hours that the club was open, but worked during the club's busier times. (Testimony of Tim, Herkenrath)
- 14) Security guards or managers were supposed to walk dancers out to the parking lot at the end of a dancer's shift so that dancers did not leave the club with a customer. (Testimony of Herkenrath)
- 15) The diagram attached to this Final Order as Appendix B accurately depicts the layout of the club. (Exs. A51, A90, A93; Testimony of Herkenrath, Megan)
- 16) Inside the dancer dressing room, there was a door to a small "featured entertainer's room" ("FE room"). The FE room was locked and only the managers had keys to access it. The FE room was used by featured entertainers visiting the club and also when the women came to the club to sell dancer costumes. (Ex. R67; Testimony of Tim; Coni; Leslie)
- 17) Frehoo had a sexual harassment policy posted in the dancer dressing room and in other areas of the club which stated:

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"Stars Cabaret

"COMPANY POLICY REGARDING SEXUAL HARASSMENT

"Stars Cabaret does not tolerate any form of discrimination or harassment of its personnel due to race, color, religion, sex, national origin or marital status.'

"If any person feels that he or she is in an uncomfortable position, i.e. having suggestive comments made to he or she [sic], or touched in an unwelcome or in appropriate [sic] manner, that person has an obligation to report such a situation to the owners of the business.

"The manner to report such offenses is as follows:

- "1. Write a letter and mail to PO Box 2249, Beaverton, OR 97075
- "2. Telephone one of the following owners:
 - a. Randy Kaiser XXX-XXX-XXXX
 - b. Todd Mitchell XXX-XXX-XXXX
 - c. Jeff Struhar XXX-XXX-XXXX

"If you do not have a personal conversation with one of these owners, you should try another until you actually talked with an owner. Please do not leave messages and assume that the problem has been communicated.

"3. Write a letter or telephone Stars' corporate attorney, Jim Neill, at XXX-XXXX or c/o Davis Wright Tremaine, * * *, Portland, OR 97201.

"If you sincerely want to make Stars a desirable place where we can all be successful, you must take the initiative to ensure we maintain our standards. Anonymous letters cannot be considered, because if an incident takes place, we, the owners, must investigate and take appropriate action. This policy applies to both employees and independent contractor entertainers.

DATE ISSUED: JULY 25, 2002"

(Ex. A6, p. 17 (emphasis in original); Testimony of Kaiser)

18) The "corporate attorney" identified in the sexual harassment policy as a person to be contacted to report sexual harassment died in 2010. (Testimony of Kaiser)

- 19) Posters with information and warnings about human trafficking were posted in various areas of the club. (Testimony of Herkenrath)
- 21)⁵ Frehoo initially implemented written policies in a handbook in 2003, but the Stars businesses stopped applying those after a period of time. However, the written policies, many of which no longer applied, were still handed out in a packet issued to new dancers in 2014. The club had rules that were sometimes verbally explained to dancers when they were hired. Among other things, the rules prohibited prostitution and the touching of dancers by customers. If a customer touched a dancer, the dancer was expected to give the customer a "friendly warning" to stop. Security guards and managers could intervene if the "no touching" rule was violated. Customers could be "86'd" (banned) from the club for violating the rules. (Ex. R64; Testimony of Kaiser, Herkenrath, Colin)
- 22) A document authenticator is a device that can be used to detect whether a driver's license or ID is authentic. An authenticator costs about \$2,000. Frehoo did not use a document authenticating device to verify the authenticity of licenses and IDs until November of 2014. Before Frehoo purchased the device, Kaiser was aware that some clubs were using the device. (Ex. A6; Testimony of Kaiser, Colin)
- 23) Prior to late 2014, Frehoo employed entertainers who were minors between the ages of 18 and 21. The OLCC did not permit minors working as entertainers to access certain areas of the club where people were drinking alcohol. In late 2014, Frehoo stopped hiring minor entertainers. (Testimony of Colin; Kaiser; Herkenrath; Ex. A91)

⁵A Finding of Fact #20 was inadvertently omitted in the original Final Order. This Amended Final Order has kept the original numbering of the Findings of Fact due to the parties' referencing specific Findings of Fact in the parties' exceptions to the Proposed Order.

24) On July 7, 2014, an OLCC inspector received a complaint that a minor entertainer was walking around freely throughout Frehoo when she was not performing. On August 19, 2014, undercover OLCC inspectors observed a 19-year-old minor entertainer sit out in the open inside the club for approximately three to four minutes and noticed that she was allowed to be in a prohibited area when she was not performing. The 19-year-old was issued a citation for being a minor in a prohibited area. Frehoo received a notice of warning for allowing a minor entertainer to be in a prohibited area. (Ex. A91; Testimony of Herkenrath)

Prostitution Involving Frehoo's Former Manager, Steve Toth

- 25) From the first part of 2011 until November 2012, Steve Toth served as the general manager of Frehoo. Prior to that time, he worked for other Stars clubs for a number of years performing management and security duties. After he worked at Frehoo, he was transferred to the Stars Bridgeport location to serve as the general manager. (Testimony of Kaiser)
- 26) Toth was arrested on December 10, 2013. Kaiser first learned of the arrest when he received a morning telephone call from Toth from the Washington County Jail. Toth told Kaiser that he was arrested because he had sex with a woman who had a fake ID. Toth said that the woman came into the club and did not have the right ID. Toth said that he and the woman met again and had sex on the side of the road and in his apartment. Toth also told Kaiser that the police were alleging that there had been sex in the FE room. At the time, Kaiser did not understand that there was a connection between the woman with the fake ID and the allegations of sex in the FE room. Later that day, Kaiser learned more information after receiving a call from a civic business leader and

reading news on the internet. He immediately called Mitchell and Struhar, who were on vacation in Hawaii. Prior to Toth's arrest, Frehoo had not received any complaints that Toth was involved in prostitution. (Testimony of Colin, Kaiser)

- 27) On or about December 11, 2013, a letter was prepared at Kaiser's direction informing Toth that his employment was terminated. (Ex. R63; Testimony of Kaiser)
- Toth later admitted that he arranged for AP1, a 13-year-old girl, to perform sexual acts for Frehoo's customers in exchange for money in the FE room on Frehoo's premises. Herkenrath saw AP1 in the club with Toth. He was comfortable with AP1's presence in the club and assumed that Toth either knew her age or had checked her ID. Toth pled guilty to sodomy in the second degree, sex abuse in the first degree and compelling prostitution based on his conduct with AP1. He also pled guilty to promoting prostitution after he arranged for three dancers to leave Frehoo's premises with customers. He is serving a 15-year prison sentence for those crimes and is required to register as a sex offender for the rest of his life. (Testimony of Toth; Ex. A17)
- 29) Attorneys for Frehoo hired a private investigator to investigate the allegations involving Toth. After receiving information from the investigation, Frehoo concluded that there was not a prostitution problem at the club and there was just "some manager that was off the rails." (Testimony of Kaiser)
- 30) After Toth's misconduct was discovered, Frehoo implemented a policy requiring two managers or employees to examine a new dancer's ID and "sign off" that they had done that so there would be "more than one person's word on that." This new policy was not consistently followed. (Ex. R64; Testimony of Kaiser, Herkenrath)

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31) AP2 was born in Russia. Her mother adopted her from a Russian orphanage when she was 11 years old and brought her to the United States. It took her approximately three years, until she was 14 years old, to learn the English language. She speaks with a Russian accent. (Ex. A29; Testimony of AP2, Opitz)

At the time AP2 applied to work at Frehoo, she was 15 years old and had 32) been staying in the apartment of a man named Anthony Curry for several weeks. Before meeting Curry, she had run away from a medical facility and had been living with gang members on the streets of Portland. She met Curry while she was waiting at a bus stop. She had no belongings with her except for the clothes she was wearing and \$80 in her pocket. Curry drove by the bus stop twice and then asked her to get in the car. When AP2 first met Curry, he was nice to her and told her that he knew a lot about business. He said he could show her how to make money, and took her to his apartment. Curry provided AP2 with food, clothing and marijuana. Curry forced her to have sex with him and became angry when she said she did not want to have sex. After she was with Curry for about two weeks, he told her about women who danced in nightclubs to make money. He told her that he respected women who made money and that they were "the real queens." He had been providing AP2 with everything and she felt pressure to make money. Curry trained AP2 to be an exotic dancer and gave AP2 a book that discussed techniques for seducing men. Curry also posted AP2's photo on several websites advertising for "outcall" dates in which a woman meets a man for sexual intercourse at his location, but AP2 did not ever go on an outcall date. (Exs. A29; Testimony of AP2, Opitz)

- 33) Curry purchased a counterfeit Oregon identification card for AP2. An identification card is a "standalone" form of identification, meaning that it is accepted by itself without supporting documentation. The ID card included a date of birth of "12-05-92" and represented that it was issued on "4-17-2013." The difference between the date of birth and the issue date is less than 21 years after the date of birth, which indicates that the ID card was made for a person who was under 21 years of age (a minor) on the issue date. AP2's fake ID card differs from an authentic Oregon identification card issued to minors in the following ways:
 - The photo of AP2 was on the left side of the ID card, but should have been on the right side.
 - There should have been a red border around the photo, but there was not.
 - There should have been language in a red border around the photo stating that she was "under 21 until" followed by the date on which she was to turn 21.
 - There was no space after the comma that followed her last name.
 - There was no comma between the name of the city and state.
 - It lacked a reflective surface that varied in color when viewed from different angles or with a black light.

At the hearing, Frehoo's former security guard and manager, Dante, testified that there were "definitely little things" on AP2's ID that he would have questioned. (Exs. A33A, A34A; Testimony of Colin, AP2, Stewart, Dante)

- 34) The first time AP2 attempted to use the fake ID to enter an adult entertainment club, a bouncer tried to "scan" it and said that it did not "go through" because it was a fake ID. (Testimony of AP2)
- 35) AP2 danced nude at two other adult entertainment clubs before working at Frehoo. She first danced at Jags Clubhouse in North Portland for approximately one

⁶ This is not the actual date of birth of AP2.

week, and then danced at Dolphin II in Beaverton three times. Curry drove her to these clubs for each audition and shift that she worked. AP2 used the fake ID to apply to work at the other clubs. She also used the ID to apply for work at the Sunset Strip club after she stopped working at Frehoo. Curry told AP2 that she should not show the fake ID to anyone unless she was asked because he did not want to risk someone discovering that it was fake. (Testimony of AP2, Opitz)

- 36) AP2 auditioned at Frehoo on August 14, 2014, and was hired to work as a dancer. (Ex. A45; Testimony of Herkenrath)
- 37) Before auditioning, AP2 first called Frehoo to ask about the audition process. When she entered the club, there was no one at the door and she walked over to talk to the bartender. The bartender directed her to a manager named "Jon." She presented herself to the club as an experienced dancer. AP2 changed into dancing clothes in the dancer dressing room and then auditioned on stage. She removed her clothing on both the top and the bottom, and was fully nude at the end of the audition. She understood from Curry and her prior dancing experiences that she had to be fully nude at the end of two songs. Customers left tips for AP2 during her audition. (Testimony of AP2)
- 38) After AP2's audition, another manager (Dave) asked AP2 for her ID and made a copy of it. That was the first time anyone at Frehoo had asked to see her ID. Dave also gave AP2 papers to fill out. He did not review the rules listed in the paperwork with her. She quickly signed the documents. (Ex. R64; Testimony of AP2)
- 39) Aside from the time Manager Dave checked her ID after she auditioned, AP2 was only asked for her ID on two other occasions at Frehoo: (1) when she ordered

a shot of alcohol from a bartender during one of her shifts and (2) once by a manager named Casey. Frehoo's general manager, Herkenrath, never reviewed AP2's ID. (Testimony of AP2, Casey, Herkenrath)

- 40) On the first night that AP2 worked after her audition, a security guard showed her around the club, but did not explain any rules to her. She learned how to perform from Curry and by watching what other dancers did. (Testimony of AP2)
- 41) AP2 performed nude dancing at Frehoo approximately seven times from August 14-22, 2014. She performed using the stage name "Isis." (Ex. A45; Testimony of AP2, Herkenrath)
- 42) During AP2's shifts at Frehoo, she dressed in "stripper clothes" consisting of underwear and a bra, or lingerie. She wore high heels that were almost seven inches tall. Most of AP2's shifts lasted for eight or nine hours. She worked one night for about 12 hours when the club was very busy hosting several bachelor parties. She was the last dancer to leave for the night on a couple of occasions. At times, AP2 went to the dressing room to take a breath and rest. (Testimony of AP2)
- 43) AP2 danced nude on stage during each shift she worked at Frehoo. She did not want to be on stage and was uncomfortable. She saw customers looking at her and felt like they were thinking disgusting, sexual things about her. She also saw a "curly haired' manager and a "bald bouncer" watch her dance, which made her feel awkward. She observed other dancers touching their body and bending down to show their "private parts." AP2 imitated some of the things she witnessed the other dancers doing, including touching her breasts, buttocks and the side of her neck when she dances. She had to swallow her pride while doing this and felt that it was really hard. She felt awkward and

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uncomfortable when she made contact with the staff and bartenders. (Testimony of AP2)

- AP2 also performed VIP dances during each shift. Each VIP dance lasted 44) for the length of one song. On a busy night, she performed about 10 VIP dances, and about five or six VIP dances on a slower night. She made more money if she performed more VIP dances. (Testimony of AP2)
- The men who paid AP2 to perform VIP dances were bigger and older than 45) her, and were consuming alcohol. Some customers touched her and tried to get her to sit on their laps. Some tried to get their hands inside her underwear and tried to get her to touch them inside of their pants. She tried to stop the men from doing these things by telling them that it is not allowed and to let her just do her dance. It was hardest to deal with "drunk" or "tipsy" customers. She felt disgusted during the VIP dances, and had to ignore her feelings to get through the dances. In spite of the conduct she experienced during VIP dances, she felt that the VIP dances were better than dancing on stage because she did not have to be nude and take her clothes off in front of so many people. (Testimony of AP2)
- AP2 "smoked weed" (marijuana) before each shift she worked at Frehoo to help her get through the experience. (Testimony of AP2)
- During her shifts, AP2 also "worked the floor" in the main table area by 47) meeting with customers to get them to buy her a drink and to get them to pay for a VIP dance. One customer, a man in his 60's, gave her \$50 to sit on his lap. She did this for about one minute and was uncomfortable. She told him, "No, let me just sit next to you." On different occasions, this same man gave her money for just being close to him. When she received tips while working on the floor, she put the money in her bra or underwear.

AP2 worked one busy evening when Frehoo hosted bachelor parties. During a bachelor party, she saw lots of money "flying everywhere," lots of drunk people and lots of dancers who ordered drinks, danced, and were "going crazy." She felt that about half of the men were drunk and did not know how much they were spending. Each bachelor would sit in a chair on stage. Four or five entertainers danced closed to the bachelor, pulled his necktie, hugged him, rubbed his hair, and had him put money inside their clothing. AP2 did not participate in the dances with bachelors and did not want to be there. (Testimony of AP2)

- 49) Working at Frehoo was a challenge for AP2. She knew that she had to be nude and act seductive in front of random people, including "creepy people" who she felt violated her rights and grabbed her. When she was under the influence of marijuana or alcohol, it was easier to push aside her emotions. She felt like a "sex robot" doing favors and dances. She swallowed her pride. (Testimony of AP2)
- 50) Curry picked up and dropped off AP2 in his car in the Frehoo parking lot each time that she worked. Curry told AP2 that she was at the club to make money, and that she should keep to herself and not socialize. He told her to focus on the customers and make money. He told her that she should make \$800-900 per night. She came close to that number, but was not ever able to make that much money. AP2 put the money she made at Frehoo in a wallet. When she got back to Curry's apartment, he told her that he would hold the money for her. (Testimony of AP2)
- 51) AP2 believed that performing at Frehoo was something she was required to do to please Curry. She hated it, but thought it was the only way to please Curry. She

followed her out the door and convinced her to stay. He told her that everything would be okay and that she could make it through it. (Testimony of AP2)

52) AP2 did not complain about the conduct she experienced at Frehoo because she did not believe it would help. She did not call for security to help her during

walked out the apartment door many times to try to leave Curry. She wanted to call her

mother but did not know how to start the conversation. When she tried to leave, Curry

52) AP2 did not complain about the conduct she experienced at Frehoo because she did not believe it would help. She did not call for security to help her during the VIP dances because she thought she would not be asked to perform VIP dances if she complained. (Testimony of AP2)

Discovery that AP2 was a Missing Child

- 53) Shortly after AP2 began working at Frehoo, a bartender named Amy noticed a missing child posting on Facebook. Amy recognized the missing child as the dancer "Isis" and felt sick to her stomach. When Amy came into work that day, she immediately showed the Facebook posting to her manager, Dave, and to Melanie, who agreed that the missing child was Isis. Amy also called Mitchell. (Testimony of Amy)
- 54) Mitchell called Herkenrath and asked him to confirm whether the missing child on the website worked at Frehoo, and Herkenrath confirmed that she did. Mitchell instructed Herkenrath to call Det. Opitz. (Testimony of Mitchell)
- 55) Det. Opitz received a call from Herkenrath on August 25, 2014. Herkenrath told him that a missing child on a website was "possibly dancing" at the club. Herkenrath directed Opitz to the missing child website, and Opitz noted that there was a 15-year-old girl missing from the Portland area. Opitz asked Herkenrath for a copy of the photograph of AP2's ID and he picked up copies of AP2's paperwork from the club on August 26, 2014. (Testimony of Opitz)

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her on August 30, 2014, pretended to be a manager at Frehoo and asked her to come in to work a shift. (Testimony of Opitz)

57) AP2 stopped performing at Frehoo after she started receiving the messages

Det. Opitz attempted to contact AP2 on her cell phone. He connected with

- 57) AP2 stopped performing at Frehoo after she started receiving the messages from Det. Opitz asking her to come into work. Curry thought the messages were weird and accused AP2 of having sex with the men at the club. He told her she was not going to go back there. AP2 later learned the text messages were from Det. Opitz. (Testimony of AP2)
- 58) On September 5, 2014, Det. Opitz spoke to Tony from the Sunset Strip, another adult entertainment club in the Beaverton area. Tony told Det. Opitz that a dancer named Isis had auditioned and would be back the next day. (Testimony of Opitz)
- 59) On September 6, 2014, Det. Opitz and other Beaverton police detectives arrested Curry as he was dropping off AP2 at Sunset Strip. AP2 was later reunited with her mother. (Testimony of Opitz, AP2)
- 60) After AP2 was back at home with her mother, she was ashamed to tell her mother that she had danced nude in front of customers. She still has dreams and flashbacks about taking her clothes off and being nude, and having customers touch her. AP2 finds it hard to live life as a regular teenager. She does not feel like she can go on normal dates with boys and often wonders if they want to "grab" her and take advantage of her. She finds it hard to build relationships with people. (Testimony of AP2)

- 61) Sex trafficking⁷ is a growing problem in the United States. (Testimony of Spencer)
- COAST is an umbrella organization of ACE National, a trade organization for the adult entertainment club industry. COAST arranges for programs throughout the country that provide training by federal agents on how to recognize indicators of sex trafficking. The trainings include discussions of what constitutes human trafficking under federal law. With respect to minors under the age of 18, there does not need to be proof of force, fraud or coercion. The trainings also address the differences between real and fake IDs. (Testimony of Spencer)
- 63) Struhar was contacted by a co-founder of COAST in August of 2013. After some conversations and meetings, Kaiser contacted Angelina Spencer, one of the co-founders of COAST, on September 6, 2013, and told her that he was interested in having a COAST training in the Portland area. Kaiser and Spencer communicated more than a dozen times after that to attempt to set up a COAST program in Portland. There were some delays in the process when a federal agent in Portland moved office buildings and due to federal worker furloughs during a government shutdown, as well as due to the discovery of AP2 in Frehoo. The first training was held in Portland in October of 2014. Kaiser paid the expenses for the training. Stars and other clubs were represented at the

⁷ The forum takes official notice under OAR 839-050-0320 that, among other things, sex trafficking involves the illegal sexual exploitation of another person for financial purposes. See, e.g. ORS 163.266 (describing the crime of "trafficking in persons"); see also Black's Law Dictionary 1126 (10th ed. 2014) (defining "human trafficking")

Credibility Findings8

meeting. A second COAST training was held in Portland in October of 2015. At the time of the hearing, Kaiser and Spencer were in the process of scheduling another Portland event.

In an email dated December 12, 2013, discussing Toth's arrest, Spencer asked Kaiser "what type of age verification procedures did you have in place?" Kaiser did not answer this question when he responded to the email. In an email from Spencer dated September 10, 2014, following the discovery of AP2, Spencer suggested that Frehoo "move forward * * * with age verification in your clubs * * * and work toward cleaning up this mess with a good plan." (Ex. A75; Testimony of Kaiser; Spencer)

64) AP2 was generally a credible witness. She was attentive when listening to questions and was forthcoming about the difficulties she has encountered in her life, as well as emotionally difficult situations she experienced before and after working at Frehoo.

Aside from appearing nervous at times, her demeanor did not change significantly when she was cross examined by Respondents' counsel.

On one occasion, AP2's testimony at hearing differed from her signed and sworn written interrogatory answers in that her interrogatory responses stated that a bouncer intervened or stepped in when a customer touched her inappropriately, but she testified at hearing that no one assisted her. She explained her different answers by stating that

⁸ The forum notes that witnesses testified that rumors "fly pretty fast" through the workplace. *See, e.g.* Testimony of Brittany. The forum has given little weight to testimony about rumors and events that were not directly witnessed, and instead bases the conclusions in this Final Order on the testimony of credible eyewitnesses. Additionally, credibility findings were not made for witnesses whose testimony related primarily to the claims of AP1 and that the ALJ determined was inadmissible or unnecessary for purposes of the claims regarding AP2.

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she was given many papers to sign and did not read them closely enough before she signed them. Accordingly, the forum did not credit her testimony on this issue. To the extent AP2's testimony was slightly different than interview summaries prepared by detectives or investigators, the forum noted that she did not prepare the summaries, nor did she review and approve the contents of those summaries. The forum also did not find significant discrepancies as to relevant issues of fact when comparing AP2's hearing testimony with the interview summaries prepared by detectives or investigators. (Testimony of AP2; Exs. R25, R29)

and Hour Compliance Specialist), Colin (BOLI Civil Rights Investigator⁹), Herring (Beaverton police detective), Lynch (Portland Operations Manager for BOLI's Civil Rights Division), Brown (Beaverton police detective), Ponaman (Intake Manager for BOLI's Civil Rights Division), Karen (Frehoo cocktail waitress), Coni (former owner of costume business), Leslie (owner of costume business), Taylor (dancer), and Struhar (Frehoo owner). However, numerous witnesses testified that they did not think it was possible that criminal activities could have occurred on the premises. This testimony was credited as opinion testimony and was considered by the forum. However, the opinion testimony was often outweighed by credible testimony from witnesses who observed or experienced the criminal conduct. For example, testimony from witnesses who did not believe prostitution could have taken place in the FE room was outweighed by credible evidence that it in fact occurred. (Testimony of Opitz, AP1, Toth)

⁹ Colin has also served in other positions for BOLI, including work as a Training Development Specialist and in an out-of-class assignment as an Administrative Prosecutor. His work on this case was primarily in the capacity of his role as a Civil Rights Investigator.

- 66) Steve Toth's admission that he arranged for AP1 to engage in prostitution activities out of Frehoo's FE room was credible because it was consistent with AP1's credible testimony and resulted in his felony convictions. Additionally, his testimony about how Frehoo's business generally operated and the fee structure was consistent with that of other credible witnesses. However, in almost all other respects, Toth was not a credible witness because he showed strong personal bias against Frehoo and its owners. Toth also admitted that he attempted to obtain money from Frehoo in exchange for an agreement to not communicate with BOLI. Accordingly, his testimony was not given any weight whenever it conflicted with credible evidence. (Ex. R99, Testimony of Toth)
- 67) Witness Ashley testified by telephone on behalf of the Agency. Beginning in 2012, she worked at Stars as a dancer on two different occasions. Ashley had an obvious bias against Frehoo because she was terminated by Jon Herkenrath. Additionally, the details in her testimony (such as mentioning a manager named "Jay") were at odds with information provided by other credible witnesses. As well, she testified about a woman who danced with the name of "Jazmyn" before AP1 worked there and used the name "Jazmyn." Accordingly, it is not clear which performer named "Jazmyn" Ashley was describing in her testimony. Based on the inconsistencies between the testimony of Ashley when compared to testimony from more credible witnesses, the forum concludes that her testimony had little evidentiary value. (Testimony of Ashley)
- 68) The forum did not find Melanie to be a credible witness in light of other credible testimony and evidence that Melanie was not honest or truthful. (Ex. R147; Testimony of Taylor)

- 69) Davey was generally a credible witness in describing the layout and atmosphere of the club, and was candid about admitting some of his personal struggles. However, his testimony that one of the dancers was a prostitute was not credited because he did not actually observe prostitution activities and instead based his statements on rumors he heard from others. (Testimony of Davey)
- 70) Bartender Amy's testimony describing the layout of the club, about finding a missing child posting on Facebook and about notifying Dave and Todd Mitchell was credible. (Testimony of Amy)
- 71) The testimony of Det. Opitz was credible and the forum has credited his testimony in its entirety, except for his testimony about the thinness/thickness of AP2's fake ID that differed from his testimony at Curry's criminal trial. (Testimony of Opitz)
- 72) Casey was generally credible, but he had a tendency to exaggerate details in favor of Respondents. At the time of the hearing, he was employed at the Stars' Bridgeport location. His testimony sounded rehearsed and suggested a natural bias in favor of Respondents. On direct examination by Respondents' counsel, Casey acted with confidence and certainty when he testified that AP2's fake ID looked "real." He further stated that he was familiar with various forms of identification and could remember what the ID's of "all the girls" looked like. However, on cross examination, his demeanor changed and he could not recall details regarding various dancer ID's. He also could not recall the hair color of one of the regular dancers and did not remember whether AP2 spoke with an accent. Accordingly, the forum did not credit his testimony that AP2's identification appeared to be "real." (Testimony of Casey)

- 73) AP1 credibly testified about the layout of the club and that Toth arranged for her to engage in prostitution in the FE room.¹⁰ (Testimony of AP1)
- 74) Tammy credibly testified that she had never been in a romantic relationship with Kaiser and that he had never waived dance fees on her behalf. (Testimony of Tammy)
- 75) Herkenrath was not a credible witness for several reasons. He frequently left out information or shaded the facts to make himself appear in a better light. Although he appeared comfortable and friendly when questioned by Respondents' attorney, he fidgeted during cross examination when confronted with questions that exposed the inconsistencies in his testimony and prior statements.

Respondents attempted to portray Herkenrath as a hero for discovering that AP2 was a missing child and reporting this to police. However, Amy, a bartender, was the person who actually noticed a missing child post about AP2 on Facebook and brought it to Herkenrath's attention. Herkenrath only called the police after discussing it with another manager and Mitchell.

Additionally, Herkenrath was not forthcoming and cooperative with the Beaverton police investigating the sex trafficking of AP1 and AP2. Although he claimed that he told an officer that he had seen AP1 at the club, there was no evidence that any officer was aware of that fact and that was a significant fact that an officer would have noted. Det. Opitz testified that this information would have been helpful at the criminal trial of Moreno-Hernandez regarding the prostitution of AP1 on Frehoo's premises. When asked by BOLI

¹⁰ It was not necessary to evaluate the remainder of AP1's testimony for credibility purposes as the claims involving her resolved after the hearing concluded. See Procedural Finding of Fact #69.

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investigators if he had ever seen AP1 in the club, instead of simply answering "yes," Herkenrath responded that he had not seen her "in a working capacity." Although Herkenrath confirmed that AP2 had worked at Frehoo when he spoke to Mitchell, he told Det. Opitz that a missing child was "possibly" working there. When Det. Opitz asked for the club's video surveillance which might show AP2's presence at the club, Herkenrath provided a grainy and blurry photograph instead of the actual video footage to the police. At hearing, he testified that he was not asked for video. However, it is illogical that he would not have understood that the actual video footage would have been more useful to a police investigation than the poor quality photograph he provided to the police.

Herkenrath also claimed that AP2 looked and acted like an adult when she auditioned and worked at the club, but he referred to her as a "little girl."

Furthermore, Herkenrath exaggerated when describing the club's enforcement of rules, describing rules as "black and white" and saying that there was "zero tolerance" for prostitution. In contrast, numerous witnesses described that warnings were given to customers who broke club rules, instead of removing them from the club. Customer Wheeler was allowed to return after he had been 86'd (banned from the club). As well, a dancer was rehired after being fired for potential prostitution activities. Finally, Toth was not fired by Mitchell when he allowed an employee to leave with a customer, Wheeler. Contrary to Herkenrath's testimony, credible evidence demonstrated that the rules at the club were not strictly enforced. In conclusion, the forum has given no weight to Herkenrath's testimony except when it was corroborated by other credible evidence. (Testimony of Herkenrath, Amy, Opitz, Mitchell, Jennifer)

- 76) Dante (former security guard and manager) credibly testified about how the club generally operated during his employment (early 2013-July 2014) and as to what the rules were when he worked there. He also testified credibly after reviewing a copy of AP2's ID that there were "definitely little things" on the ID that he would have "been questioning." (Testimony of Dante)
- 77) Ursula, a bartender at Frehoo, was generally credible when describing the club's operations and atmosphere, and that portion of her testimony was credited by the forum. However, with respect to Ursula's testimony that AP2 appeared to be older, the forum finds Ursula had an incentive to say that because she has an OLCC license and served AP2 a shot of alcohol. Additionally, Ursula had a personal bias in favor of Frehoo in that she described the owners and employees as being like a "family" to her. (Testimony of Ursula)
- 78) James Marquardt, a former OLCC employee, was called by Respondent to testify regarding his experience reviewing ID's for OLCC and to discuss the training he provided to OLCC permittees.

His testimony addressed the standards used for checking ID's to ensure that alcohol was not served to minors. However, his testimony did not establish that he had expertise as to the standard for checking IDs in the adult entertainment business to protect minors from sex trafficking and sex abuse. Also, the OLCC does not have authority over whether a business may hire a minor. Rather, the OLCC is responsible for determining if minors working in establishments are confined to the separate areas that minors are permitted to be in.

Additionally, Marquardt was hired by Respondents to testify on their behalf, giving him an inherent bias to provide testimony that supported their case. His expertise was further called into question when he could not articulate what to look for to determine if an ID was forged during his cross examination. Based on the foregoing reasons, his testimony was not credited when it conflicted with more credible evidence. (Testimony of Marquardt)

- 79) The testimony of Megan was credible as to the general operations of the club, but she did not have specific knowledge of what AP2 actually experienced. (Testimony of Megan; Ex. R13)
- 80) Moses testified credibly as to how the club generally operated and what he personally observed and witnessed. (Testimony of Moses; Ex. R90)
- 81) Mangrum, a private investigator hired by Frehoo, was generally a credible witness, although he was unable to recall some details about the prostitution "stings" he conducted. (Testimony of Mangrum)
- 82) Belen, a bartender, was a credible witness, but she worked from 2010 to 2013, so would not have had the opportunity to observe the club's operations during the time AP2 worked there. (Testimony of Belen)
- 83) Spencer is the founder of COAST who interacted with Kaiser to arrange Portland trainings on the topic of sex trafficking. She had an obvious bias in that her goal was to promote a positive image of the adult entertainment industry and to promote the work of COAST as an organization. However, the forum finds that she credibly described her communications with Kaiser to arrange COAST trainings. (Testimony of Spencer)

- 84) Dancer Sarah was generally a credible witness as to the atmosphere and environment at Frehoo. However, throughout her testimony she added unsolicited editorial comments to make a point that she was proud of working for Frehoo and wanted to show that she performed honorable work. Her unprompted interjections demonstrated an inherent bias in favor of Frehoo. Accordingly, those comments were not credited by the forum. (Testimony of Sarah)
- 85) Brittany worked as a dancer and door girl for Frehoo in 2012. Accordingly, she did not have an opportunity to observe the conditions in the workplace when AP2 worked there. Brittany's testimony was not credited when it conflicted with credible evidence relevant to the time period that AP2 performed at Frehoo. (Testimony of Brittany)
- 86) Hal was a manager at Frehoo during 2011 and 2012. Because Hal did not have an opportunity to observe the conditions in the workplace when AP2 worked there, his testimony was not credited when it conflicted with credible evidence relevant to the time period that AP2 performed at Frehoo. (Testimony of Hal)
- 87) Bob Stewart credibly testified as to what he observed when he reviewed AP2's ID on behalf of Respondents in that his testimony was generally consistent with the observations of Colin, who reviewed the ID on behalf of the Agency. However, Stewart was treated as a fact witness, not as an expert witness. (Testimony of Stewart)
- 88) Manager Tim testified that dancers "routinely" received hiring paperwork that they completely filled out, signed and dated. However, this testimony conflicted with hiring documents that were incomplete and unsigned. Tim also claimed that the written rules were consistently enforced but that testimony conflicted with the testimony of other

witnesses. In particular, Kaiser testified that many of the written rules were out of date and not enforced. (Testimony of Lynch, Tim, Kaiser)

- 89) Both the Agency and Respondents offered expert witnesses on the extent of the harm suffered by AP2. Neither of those witnesses had full access to information that would be relevant to rendering a credible opinion. The Agency's expert, Dr. Jon Conte, had not been provided with documents that he said, "could be useful," including sworn testimony from the criminal trial and the summaries of BOLI interviews. Respondents' expert, Dr. Kevin McGovern, conducted a more comprehensive document review, but did not have an opportunity to speak with AP2 personally. Given that each expert lacked access to information that they agreed could be useful, their testimony had little evidentiary value and was given minimal weight by the forum. (Testimony of Conte, McGovern)
 - 90) Randy Kaiser was a credible witness except in two respects.

First, Kaiser's expressions of concern for the welfare of sex trafficking victims by referencing club policies and his involvement with COAST training was undercut by his statement that he would "think twice" before reporting that there was a minor in the club to the police. His credibility on this issue was further weakened when he said that "reporting comes at a price" and that Frehoo was a "victim of a fraud."

Second, Kaiser's testimony that he "never thought or even dreamed that there could be a problem of prostitution" at Frehoo was inconsistent with the fact that he had arranged for private investigators to conduct undercover "stings" to determine if prostitution was occurring at the club. There were also posters on the wall throughout Frehoo discussing the topics of human trafficking and prostitution, which also suggests

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at least some awareness of the possibility that these activities could occur in the club. (Testimony of Kaiser, Herkenrath)

- 91) Todd Mitchell was credible except in his insistence that Toth did not engage AP1 in prostitution activities at Frehoo. The forum did not believe this testimony because of Mitchell's awareness of the evidence to the contrary, including Toth's criminal conviction for committing this conduct. (Testimony of Mitchell, Toth)
- 92) Witness Jennifer (dancer name Tru) was not a credible witness. At the hearing, she contradicted prior statements she made to Det. Opitz regarding a dancer named Jewell and sexual acts she claimed to have witnessed other dancers performing in exchange for money. Additionally, with respect to the incident when Jennifer left Frehoo's premises with Wheeler, every witness described the incident differently. The forum concludes that there is no credible version of what actually occurred with the exception of the following facts which are generally agreed upon by all witnesses to the incident:
 - One evening, Jennifer left Frehoo with Wheeler before the end of her scheduled shift as a "door girl."
 - Toth was aware of this, and permitted Jennifer to leave with Wheeler.
 - The incident occurred during the time when Toth worked as the general manager at Frehoo.
 - Immediately after the incident, Jennifer told Mitchell that after she left the club with Wheeler, Wheeler "whipped out his penis and asked for oral sex."
 - Wheeler was "86'd" (banned) from Frehoo and could not come to the club for a period of time.
 - Although Toth allowed Jennifer to leave with a customer before her shift ended, Mitchell did not terminate his employment. Instead, Toth was transferred to a management shift at the Stars Bridgeport location.

(Testimony of Jennifer, Opitz, Mitchell, Toth)

93) Witness Tony is the kitchen/daytime manager at the Sunset Strip club. He testified that he accepted AP2's fake identification at the Sunset Strip and also asserted

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that he overheard a police officer say that AP2's ID was "one of the best" fake ID's he had ever seen. However, Tony struggled to recall his interaction with AP2 and could not provide any identifying information about the police officer who allegedly commented about the ID. Additionally, while testifying, he did not appear to be paying attention or listening carefully to the questions. Accordingly, his testimony had only minimal evidentiary value and has been given little weight compared to the testimony of more credible witnesses.

The Agency attempted to introduce into evidence the audio recording of 94) BOLI's interview of Nathan Wheeler, a frequent customer of Frehoo and the owner of another adult entertainment club in the Portland area. The ALJ listened to a substantial portion of the audio of the recording and determined that Wheeler was not credible for several reasons. First, the tone of Wheeler's voice and his demeanor (including the liberal use of profanity and laughter) appeared to be more akin to bragging and exaggeration of his sexual exploitations, rather than someone who seriously listened to the investigators' questions and attempted to answer honestly. Second, his statements concerning the circumstances of him leaving Stars with dancer "Tru" contradicted the statements of other witnesses. Third, he said that he had a hangover on the day he was interviewed. Fourth, he had been 86'd (banned) from Frehoo by Mitchell, giving him an inherent bias against Frehoo and Mitchell. Finally, Respondents' counsel was unable to cross examine him because he did not appear to testify at the hearing. Any statements made by Wheeler were not credited unless they were consistent with other credible evidence. (Ex. A28; Testimony of Mitchell)

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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

- 1) At all times material herein, Frehoo was an "employer" as defined in ORS 659A.001(4).
- 2) At all times material herein, Frehoo, Herkenrath, and Mitchell were individuals and "person[s]" under ORS 659A.001(9)(a) and ORS 659A.030(1)(g).
- 3) Frehoo subjected AP2 to sexual harassment in violation of ORS 659A.030(1)(b), OAR 839-005-0021, OAR 839-005-0030(1)(a)(A), OAR 839-005-0030(1)(b) and OAR 839-005-0030(7).
- 4) Herkenrath and Mitchell aided and abetted Frehoo in this unlawful employment practice in violation of ORS 659A.030(1)(g).
- 5) The Deputy Commissioner of the Bureau of Labor and Industries has jurisdiction of the persons and of the subject matter herein and the authority to eliminate the effects of any unlawful practices found. ORS 659A.800 to ORS 659A.865.
- 6) Pursuant to ORS 659A.850 and ORS 659A.855, the Deputy Commissioner of the Bureau of Labor and Industries has the authority under the facts and circumstances of this case to issue an appropriate cease and desist order. The orders to cease and desist continuing to violate laws pertaining to discrimination because of sex and sexual harassment in the workplace are an appropriate exercise of that authority. Additionally, the Deputy Commissioner of the Bureau of Labor and Industries has the authority under the facts and circumstances of this case to award compensatory damages to the aggrieved persons resulting from Respondents' unlawful practices. The sum of money awarded assessed against Respondents in the Order below is an appropriate exercise of that authority.

OPINION

INTRODUCTION

Frehoo hired a 15-year-old girl to perform sexually suggestive nude dances to entertain its customers – conduct that she was legally incapable of consenting to under Oregon law. Frehoo attempts to avoid liability by arguing that AP2 deceived Respondents and that Frehoo was the "victim of a fraud." However, AP2 was the victim, not Frehoo. When AP2 walked into Frehoo, she was a child under pressure from Curry, a sex trafficker, to perform nude dances at adult clubs and make money. Frehoo created a sexually charged entertainment business and its owners were aware of the potential for sex trafficking in adult clubs, yet they failed to employ basic measures to ensure that only consenting adults were hired as dancers.

In its Amended Formal Charges, the Agency alleges that AP2 was subjected to sexual harassment in violation of ORS 659A.030(1)(b), OAR 839-005-0030(1)(a), and OAR 839-005-0030(1)(b). The Agency further alleges that Respondents Colburn, Heinzman-Myers, Herkenrath, Kaiser, Mitchell and Struhar committed unlawful employment practices in violation of ORS 659A.030(1)(g) by aiding and abetting Frehoo in the commission of all unlawful employment practices found herein.

SEXUAL HARASSMENT

OAR 839-005-0030(1)(b) defines hostile work environment sexual harassment as:

"Any unwelcome verbal or physical conduct that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to have the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with work performance or creating a hostile, intimidating or offensive working environment."

The conduct must be sex-based. OAR 839-005-0030(1).

Based on the above, the Agency's prima facie case in a hostile environment case consists of the following elements: (1) Frehoo was an employer subject to ORS 659A.001

to 659A.030; (2) Frehoo employed AP2; (3) AP2 is a member of a protected class (sex); (4) AP2 was subjected to unwanted conduct because of her sex; (5) the unwelcome conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to have the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with AP2's work performance or creating a hostile, intimidating

or offensive work environment for AP2; and (6) AP2 was harmed by the unwelcome

conduct. See, e.g., In the Matter of Charles Edward Minor, 31 BOLI 88, 100 (2010).

Employment Status of AP2

Frehoo admits that it is an employer. For purposes of this case, Respondents do not dispute that AP2 was employed by Frehoo as a dancer. (Ex. X93)

Because of Sex

Frehoo hires women to perform sexually charged nude dances for male customers. The conduct AP2 experienced was because of her sex (female).

Unwelcome Conduct

AP2 was a minor at the time she performed at Frehoo. Under Oregon law, a person under the age of 18 is "incapable of consenting to a sexual act." ORS 163.315(1)(a). Also, it is illegal to use a person who is less than 18 years of age in a display of sexually explicit conduct. ORS 163.670(1); 163.665(1). The definition of "sexually explicit conduct" includes "actual or simulated * * * [I]ewd exhibit of sexual or other intimate parts." ORS 163.665 (3)(f). Oregon also prohibits exhibiting an obscene performance to a minor. ORS 167.075(1). Therefore, as a matter of law, AP2 was incapable of consenting to the sexual acts and exotic dancing she performed for Frehoo's customers. Furthermore, AP2 credibly testified that this conduct was unwelcome. (See Findings of Fact – The Merits, ##43, 45-49) Accordingly, the Agency sustained its burden

of proving that the conduct was unwelcome.

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Sufficiently Severe or Pervasive

The standard for determining whether harassment based on an individual's sex is sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile, intimidating or offensive working environment is "whether a reasonable person in the circumstances of the complaining individual would so perceive it." OAR 839-005-0030(2); In the Matter of Columbia Components, Inc., 32 BOLI 257, 276 (2013). Under this standard, the forum examines the conduct AP2 experienced from the perspective of a reasonable 15-year-old girl in those circumstances. The forum concludes that a reasonable young woman of that age would have found the performance of nude dancing for older men to be sufficiently severe to create a hostile, intimidating and offensive working environment, and AP2 credibly testified that she perceived it in that manner. In particular, she credibly testified about the hostility and intimidation she experienced when she had to perform nude on stage and during private dances for men. She also explained how she was intimidated, humiliated and demeaned when the men touched her without her consent during private dances.

Harm to AP2

As described in greater detail below, AP2 was harmed by the harassment she experienced at Frehoo. AP2 suffered mental and physical suffering the entire time she worked there, and her life continues to be impacted by the harassment she experienced at Frehoo.

Conclusion

The Agency has proved all of the elements of a prima facie case for a hostile work environment sexual harassment case.

LIABILITY OF FREHOO FOR HARASSMENT OF AP2

The Agency contends that Frehoo is liable for the sexual harassment of AP2 under OAR 839-005-0030(5) (harassment by supervisor, no tangible employment action) and OAR 839-005-0030(7) (harassment by non-employees).¹¹ The forum analyzes each of those theories of liability below.¹²

A. Harassment by Non-Employees

Under Frehoo's business model, female dancers such as AP2 performed sexually suggestive nude dances for the entertainment of its customers. Frehoo is liable for the sexual harassment committed by non-employees if Frehoo or one of its agents "knew or should have known of the conduct unless [Frehoo] took immediate and appropriate corrective action. In reviewing such cases the [forum] will consider the extent of the employer's control and any legal responsibility the employer may have with respect to the conduct of such non-employees." OAR 839-005-0030(7).

Knew or Should Have Known

As indicated above, Frehoo earned revenue by hiring female entertainers who agreed to engage in conduct of a sexual nature. Due to AP2's age and her inability to consent, this conduct was unwelcome. Therefore, the key inquiry for this portion of the analysis is whether Frehoo "knew or should have known" she was only 15 years old and, thus, lacked the ability to consent. There was no evidence that anyone at Frehoo actually

¹¹ See Procedural Finding of Fact # 63.

¹² In the Proposed Order, the ALJ concluded that Respondents did not violate OAR 839-005-0030(5). For the reasons set forth below, this Final Order reverses that decision. Since the ALJ's analysis of OAR 839-005-0030(7) was extensive and includes some of the same elements as a claim for OAR 839-005-0030(5), the claim under OAR 839-005-0030(7) will be addressed first to avoid unnecessary repetition.

"knew" that AP2 was underage until the bartender, Amy, showed the missing child Facebook posting with AP2's picture to Herkenrath. Therefore, Frehoo was not aware that the nude dancing and other sexual conduct she experienced from customers was "unwelcome." Accordingly, the forum must determine if Frehoo "should have known" that it was employing a 15 year old girl to dance nude on stage and perform sexually suggestive private dances for male customers.

"Should have known' includes 'constructive knowledge' and 'constructive notice." *Murrayhill Thriftway, Inc.,* 20 BOLI at 153 n.13. These terms were defined by the forum in *In the Matter of Wing Fong,* 16 BOLI 280, 292 (1998). "Constructive knowledge" was defined as "if one by exercise of reasonable care would have known a fact, he is deemed to have had constructive knowledge of such a fact; e.g. matters of public record." *Id.* (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 314 (6th ed. 1990)). "Constructive notice" was defined as:

"Such notice as is implied or imputed by law * * *. Notice with which a person is charged by reason of the notorious nature of the thing to be noticed, as contrasted with actual notice of such thing. That which the law regards as sufficient to give notice and is regarded as a substitute for actual notice."

Id. The forum further stated that an employer is liable when "upon reasonably diligent inquiry," it "should have known" of the harassment. Id. (internal quotations omitted).

At the time AP2 auditioned to dance as an entertainer for Frehoo in August of 2014, at least one of the owners (Kaiser) knew of the prevalence of sex trafficking in the United States through his interactions with Spencer of COAST, an organization affiliated with owners of adult entertainment clubs. Posters with warnings about human trafficking were hanging on the walls throughout the club. Frehoo also had knowledge that its former manager, Toth, had arranged for a 13-year-old girl to perform acts of prostitution on

Frehoo's premises with its customers.

In this case, AP2 used a false last name and the fake ID given to her by Curry to apply to work at Frehoo. AP2's fake ID had many markings on it that were different from what would appear on a proper Oregon identification card. For example, although the birthdate and issue date reflected that the ID was issued to a minor, the placement of the photo, background color and omission of "under 21" language were inconsistent with an ID issued to an Oregon minor. There were also problems with the spacing between words, and the ID lacked the reflective surface that appears on legitimate Oregon IDs. Dante, a former security guard and manager, testified that there were "definitely little things" on AP2's fake ID that he would have questioned. Moreover, the use of an authenticating machine would have also exposed that the fake ID was not real.¹³ Significantly, when AP2 used the fake ID at one club, a bouncer tried to "scan" it and it did not "go through." Had Frehoo's employees reviewed the ID carefully or if Frehoo used an authentication machine, it would have been clear that AP2 could not prove that she was at least 18 years old. In other words, "upon reasonably diligent inquiry," Frehoo "should have known" that AP2 could not consent to the sexual conduct she experienced at Frehoo. Frehoo's entertainers were subjected to conduct that in most workplaces would be unwelcome sexual harassment, yet it did not take necessary steps to make sure that it was hiring women who were old enough to consent to such conduct. Therefore,

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¹³ The forum has previously noted that an employer has an obligation to use current technology to prevent sexual harassment. See, e.g. In the Matter of Robb Wochnick, 25 BOLI 265, 284 (2004) (when employees received voluminous offensive emails, "an employer's principal obligation is to use whatever current technology is available to block patently inappropriate [email] and reduce the volume of offensive junk mail"). See also Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F3d 528, 540-41 (2006) (finding that a prison failed to respond adequately to "pervasive" inmate sex abuse directed towards female corrections officers when, among other things, it did not install equipment used by other prisons as corrective measures).

the forum concludes that Frehoo "should have known" of the sexual harassment of AP2.

Corrective Action to Prevent Harassment of Underage Dancers Such as AP2

An employer is not responsible for harassment that it "should have known" about if it took "immediate and appropriate corrective action." OAR 839-005-0030(7). Frehoo contends that after the sexual abuse of AP1 on Frehoo's premises was discovered, it terminated Toth's employment and implemented a policy requiring two employees to "sign off" that they had verified the ID of new dancers. Frehoo had a form in the packet given to new hires for managers to sign, indicating that they had checked identification. Notably, the copy of this form in the file of AP2 and other dancers does not contain signatures showing that this actually occurred. Also, AP2's ID was only checked by one manager after she auditioned. Additionally, although she danced for at least six shifts after her audition, her ID was only checked again by a bouncer and bartender. The evidence established that Frehoo did not consistently implement the policy to have two employees check a person's ID. Accordingly, that was not an "immediate and appropriate corrective action" following the discovery that Toth had subjected 13-year-old AP1 to acts of prostitution on Frehoo's premises.

Respondents argued that its sexual harassment policy was a means of protecting its entertainers from sexual harassment. The forum finds Frehoo's policy to be inadequate to prevent sexual harassment for the following reasons:

- Entertainers were expected to tell customers who touched them inappropriately that the customer should stop doing so.
- The written policy was issued on July 25, 2002, and was never updated.
- There was no evidence that Frehoo provided sexual harassment training to its managers, employees and entertainers. See, e.g. Madray v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 208 F3d 1290, 1298 (11th Cir 2000). ("A policy is 'defective' if those

responsible for its enforcement lack training and knowledge sufficient to recognize, prevent and correct workplace discrimination."); *Clark v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.*, 400 F3d 341, 350 (6th Cir 2005) (an effective policy includes training regarding the policy).¹⁴

- The written policy directed individuals to make complaints to a post office box, Frehoo's owners (none of whom were regularly onsite¹⁵) and Frehoo's former attorney (deceased since 2010). In addition, although the cell phone numbers of Kaiser, Mitchell and Struhar were listed on the policy, the policy stated that individuals reporting harassment "should not leave messages and assume that the problem has been communicated." See, e.g. Madray v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 208 F3d 1290, 1298 (11th Cir. 2000) (finding a policy adequate in part because "designated, appropriate company representatives were accessible to * * * store employees"); Wilson v. Tulsa Junior College, 164 F.3d 534, 541 (10th Cir 1998) (policy inadequate when employees were directed to make complaints to an official who was "located in a separate facility" and was not available at night or on weekends).
- Given that Respondents had never received a complaint of sexual harassment, there is no evidence that the written policy was actually effective in "promptly correcting" any harassment which may have occurred.

Moreover, Frehoo cannot avoid liability due to AP2's lack of a complaint. Notably, a teenager does not have the same abilities or confidence as an adult to make a complaint of sexual harassment. See, e.g. E.E.O.C. v. V & J Foods, Inc., 507 F3d 575, 578 (7th Cir 2007) (recognizing the difference between experienced adult employees and the "understanding of the average teenager"); E.E.O.C. v. KarenKim, Inc., 698 F3d 92, 101 n.3 (2d Cir 2012). Given that AP2 was 15 years old at the time she worked at Frehoo, it was not unreasonable for her to fail to make a complaint under Frehoo's harassment policy.

¹⁴ Although federal law similar to Oregon's civil rights laws is not binding on the forum, federal decisions can be instructive in construing and applying similar state law. *See In the Matter of Kenneth Wallstrom*, 32 BOLI 63, 92 (2012).

¹⁵ In any given week, Mitchell was physically present on Frehoo's premises an average of 15-20 hours per week, at most. Kaiser and Struhar provided management oversight in Bend and Salem, respectively, and only occasionally visited the club.

In conclusion, Respondents did not take "immediate and appropriate corrective action" to prevent the hiring and sexual harassment of underage dancers. Accordingly, the Agency has sustained its burden of proving that Frehoo is liable for the sexual harassment of AP2 by Frehoo's customers.

B. Harassment by a Supervisor

OAR 839-005-0030(5) applies when there was "sexual harassment by a supervisor with immediate or successively higher authority" over the employee. Frehoo's managers required AP2 to dance nude in front of Frehoo supervisors, employees and customers as a condition of her employment. She also felt uncomfortable and awkward when a curly haired manager stared at her while she danced. Accordingly, the Agency has established that she was harassed by Frehoo's supervisors. Frehoo is liable for supervisory harassment under OAR 839-005-0030(5) if it knew or should have known of the harassment.

There is a presumption that Frehoo "should have known of the harassment" by a supervisor unless the Frehoo can demonstrate:

- "(A) That [Frehoo] exercised reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct any sexually harassing behavior; and
- "(B) That [AP2] unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to otherwise avoid harm."

OAR 839-005-0030(5)(b); see also In the Matter of Murrayhill Thriftway, Inc., 20 BOLI 130, 153 (2000) ("There is a presumption that the employer 'should have known,' unless the employer can prove [the] two-pronged affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence"). As discussed in the previous section, Frehoo did not take reasonable care to prevent the harassment of underage women and, even if Frehoo had done so, it was not unreasonable for AP2, a 15-year-old girl, to fail to complain. Accordingly, Frehoo did not

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sustain its burden to prove the elements of the affirmative defense and it is also liable under OAR 839-005-0030(5) for the sexual harassment of AP2.

LIABILITY OF INDIVIDUAL RESPONDENTS FOR AIDING AND ABETTING

ORS 659A.030(1)(g) provides that it is an unlawful employment practice "[f]or any person, whether an employer or employee, to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts of this chapter or to attempt to do so."

When an individual assists a business entity in violating a provision of ORS chapter 659A, the individual can be liable under ORS 659A.030(1)(g). The legislature enacted the provision that is now in ORS 659A.030(1)(g) in 1949. Or Laws 1949, ch 221, § 5. At that time, "aid and abet" meant to "[h]elp, assist, or facilitate the commission of a crime, promote the accomplishment thereof, help in advancing or bringing it about, or encourage, counsel or incite as to its commission." Black's Law Dictionary 91 (4th ed 1951); see Allison v. Dolich, 321 Or App 721, 726, 518 P 3d 591, 595 (2022) (explaining that "[o]ne who aids and abets is one who assists another to commit an act" and concluding the owner and member in that case could be liable because they "assisted the LLCs by making the decisions that enabled the violations")16. Specifically, the legislature intended to impose liability on key decision-makers for a business entity, who make decisions that result in the business violating a person's rights under ORS chapter 659A. Allison, 321 Or App at 726 ("the legislature's intention was that the persons directing the business-entity employer's unlawful conduct can be held individually liable under ORS 659A.030(1)(g)"). Consistent with that approach, the forum has found that corporate

¹⁶ In *Allison*, the court did not define the entire universe of what is actionable under ORS 659A.030(1)(g). It held that a person can be liable for assisting another to violate one of the statutes in ORS chapter 659A.

officers and owners who commit acts rendering the corporation liable for an unlawful employment practice may be found to have aided or abetted the corporation's unlawful employment practice. *In the Matter of Hey Beautiful Enterprises, Ltd., and Kimberly Schoene*, 34 BOLI 80, 97 (2015). See also *In the Matter of Crystal Springs Landscapes, Inc.*, 32 BOLI 144, 166437 (2012); *In the Matter of Dr. Andrew Engel, DMD, PC*, 32 BOLI 94, 137 (2012); *Cyber Center; Inc.*, 32 BOLI at 35.

Colburn and Heinzman-Myers

Respondents Colburn and Heinzman-Myers were previously dismissed from this matter in the ALJ's interim order of November 8, 2016, which granted a portion of Respondents' motion for summary judgment. (See Procedural Finding of Fact #51, affirming the ALJ's summary judgment ruling dismissing Colburn and Heinzman-Myers as parties).

Kaiser, Struhar and Mitchell

The Oregon Court of Appeals remanded to the forum on Kaiser, Struhar, and Mitchell's liability under ORS 659A.030(1)(g). For the reasons set forth below, the forum finds that neither Kaiser nor Struhar aided and/or abetted the sexual harassment of AP2. However, the forum finds that the preponderance of the evidence establishes that Mitchell aided and/or abetted the sexual harassment of AP2.

Kaiser and Struhar

Kaiser and Struhar were uniformly referred to as "owners" of Frehoo at hearing. Both, together with Mitchell, made policies for the business. Kaiser also performed administrative and accounting functions for Frehoo and addressed legal issues as they arose. Kaiser oversaw the operations of the Bend Stars club. Struhar was Frehoo's

corporate president and tended to technical issues and facility issues for Frehoo. Struhar was also responsible for overseeing the operations at the Salem Stars club. Neither Kaiser nor Struhar had a regular presence at Frehoo.

The preponderance of the evidence does not show that either Kaiser or Struhar were aware of AP2's employment as a dancer or were in a position to direct or to control the operations of Frehoo during the period of AP2's employment. Because the evidence failed to show that Kaiser or Struhar assisted Frehoo's sexual harassment of AP2, the Agency has not sustained its burden in proving that either Kaiser or Struhar aided and/or abetted the sexual harassment of AP2.

Mitchell

Witnesses also referred to Mitchell as an "owner" of Frehoo. Mitchell oversaw the operations and management at Frehoo. He also served as Frehoo's corporate secretary.

Mitchell has significant experience in the adult entertainment industry and previously managed large adult entertainment clubs. He was involved in developing policies for Frehoo. Mitchell was regularly onsite at Frehoo. He delegated the supervision of Frehoo's daily operations to Herkenrath. However, Mitchell maintained control over the club as a whole. For example, when a bartender recognized AP2 as the child listed as missing in a Facebook post, she contacted Mitchell. Mitchell then contacted Herkenrath and directed him on what steps to take.

Because Mitchell participated in developing policies for Frehoo, he would have been aware of the age-verification policy adopted after the owners learned that Toth had arranged for AP1, a 13-year-old girl, to perform sexual acts for Frehoo's customers in exchange for money at Frehoo. Despite the seriousness of those prior crimes by a

Frehoo manager at Frehoo and despite Mitchell's oversight and presence at Frehoo, he did virtually nothing to ensure that key Frehoo policies were followed by the managers.

In particular, Mitchell chose not to take specific steps to ensure that Frehoo managers were following Frehoo's age verification policy. As a result, no manager reviewed AP2's identification prior to her audition, during which she danced on stage and removed her clothing until she was fully nude. One manager asked for AP2's identification after her audition and made a copy. However, that manager failed to note the obvious flaws with AP2's ID that should have led to him question the ID's authenticity. Further, there was no "sign off" on AP2's hiring paperwork showing that AP2's ID was examined by Herkenrath or any other Frehoo employee before AP2 began working as a dancer. Mitchell's decision not to ensure that age-verification steps were followed—under the circumstances of this case—assisted Frehoo's violations.

Despite the past crimes at Frehoo, Mitchell also did not require that Frehoo have a sufficient sexual harassment policy or ensure that rules about customer's not touching dancers were enforced. Mitchell must have known about the no-touching rule. And because Mitchell was at Frehoo regularly, he knew how the VIP room was setup. The lighting was dim, there were curtains, and security was at the entrance not inside the room. AP2 was regularly subjected to unwanted suggestive comments by Frehoo customers, as well as unwanted touching. No member of management or security ever intervened. By allowing the VIP room to be setup as it was and not enforcing a sufficient sexual harassment policy, Mitchell assisted Frehoo's violations.

Given his experience and the recent history of AP1 at the club, Mitchell should have known of the likely consequences of failing to enforce the age-verification policy,

Herkenrath¹⁷

abetted the sexual harassment of AP2 by Frehoo's customers.

Herkenrath was physically present on Frehoo's premises when AP2 came in to audition and during other shifts that she worked. At that time, he served as the general manager of the club and admitted that general managers were responsible for anything that happened in the club. Despite this responsibility, he never once checked AP2's ID nor confirmed that any other person carefully reviewed her ID. Given the nature of Respondents' business, verifying the age of a prospective nude dancer is essentially the only means of making sure a woman is capable of consenting to engage in public sexual conduct. Accordingly, as Frehoo's general manager responsible for the club's operations, Herkenrath made it "easier" and "less difficult" for the harassment of AP2 to occur and, thus, he facilitated unlawful sexual harassment¹⁸. Accordingly, the Agency sustained its burden to prove that Herkenrath aided and abetted the harassment of AP2 by Frehoo's

¹⁷ Herkenrath did not seek review of the original BOLI decision and so the forum has not revisited this section.

¹⁸ The conclusion that Herkenrath aided and abetted the sexual harassment of AP2 was not part of the remand order of the Oregon Court of Appeals. As such, the conclusion that Herkenrath is jointly and severally liable for the damages resulting from the unlawful employment practice by Frehoo remains the same in this Amended Final Order.

DAMAGES

The Formal Charges seek damages for "emotional and physical suffering" in the amount of "at least \$4,000,000" for each of the two aggrieved persons. Pursuant to ORS 659A.850, the Commissioner of the Bureau of Labor and Industries has the authority to award money damages for emotional, mental, and physical suffering sustained. *In the Matter of Leo Thomas Ryder dba Leo's BBQ Bar & Grill*, 34 BOLI 67, 76 (2015). *See also Fred Meyer, Inc. v. Bureau of Labor*, 39 Or App 253, 263, 592 P2d 564, 570 (1979), *rev den* 287 Or 129 (1979). The commissioner has the authority to fashion a remedy adequate to eliminate the effects of unlawful employment practices. *Leo's BBQ*, 34 BOLI at 76.

In determining an award for emotional and physical suffering, the forum considers the type of discriminatory conduct, and the duration, frequency, and severity of the conduct. It also considers the type and duration of the mental distress and the vulnerability of the aggrieved persons. An aggrieved person's testimony, if believed, is sufficient to support a claim for mental suffering damages. *In the Matter of Dr. Andrew Engel, DMD, PC*, 32 BOLI 94, 141(2012), *citing In the Matter of From the Wilderness*, 30 BOLI 227, 290 (2009).

Through AP2's credible testimony, the Agency proved that AP2 experienced emotional and mental suffering as a result of the sexual harassment by Frehoo's customers. During the time AP2 was performing at Frehoo, she was only 15 years old. While she danced fully nude on stage, she believed that the customers were thinking disgusting, sexual things about her. She felt awkward and uncomfortable interacting with

the staff and did not want to be there. While performing private dances, she had to defend herself from inappropriate touching by older men who were under the influence of alcohol. Some of the men tried to get their hands inside her underwear and wanted her to touch them inside of their pants. She found it necessary to consume marijuana and alcohol to help push aside her emotions and get through the experience. She felt like a "sex robot."

After the police apprehended Curry and AP2 was reunited with her mother, she was ashamed to tell her mother that she had danced nude in front of customers. When she first returned home, she saw a therapist for about three months, but was uncomfortable talking to a stranger about her feelings and what happened. She still has dreams and flashbacks about taking her clothes off and being nude in front of people, and about having customers touch her. AP2 finds it hard to live life as a regular teenager. She does not feel normal on dates with boys and often wonders if they want to "grab" her and take advantage of her.

In determining the appropriate amount of mental and physical suffering damages, "this forum has long held that Respondents must take Complainants 'as they find them." In the Matter of Kara Johnson dba Duck Stop Market, 34 BOLI 2, 37 (2014), appeal pending. The actual amount depends on the facts presented by each aggrieved person. See, e.g., In the Matter of Melissa and Aaron Klein dba Sweetcakes by Melissa, 34 BOLI 102, 127-28 (2015), appeal pending (one Complainant awarded \$60,000 and second Complainant awarded \$75,000 for public accommodation discrimination based on their sexual orientation); In the Matter of Andrew W. Engel, DMD, 32 BOLI 94 (2012) (Complainant subjected to harassment based on her religious belief suffered anxiety, stress, insomnia, gastrointestinal problems and weight loss requiring medical treatment

awarded \$350,000); *In the Matter of From The Wilderness, Inc.*, 30 BOLI 227 (2009) (Complainant subjected to verbal and physical sexual harassment for two months before being fired and then retaliated against after termination suffered panic attacks requiring medical treatment awarded \$125,000); *In the Matter of Maltby Biocontrol, Inc.*, 33 BOLI 121 (2014) (Complainants subjected to racially hostile environment including assault, threats with a firearm, racial epithets and retaliation for reports to police suffered fear, sleeplessness and physical injuries requiring medical treatment awarded \$50,000 and \$100,000 each); *In the Matter of Charles Edward Minor*, 31 BOLI 88, 105 (2010) (Complainant subjected to verbal and physical sexual harassment including respondent striking her in the head with his fist suffered anxiety, reclusiveness and fear awarded \$50,000).

Although AP2 was not harassed at Frehoo over a number of months or years, the forum finds that the harm suffered by AP2 is more severe than in any previous case presented to this forum due to her young age and the public, sexually explicit, and exploitative nature of the harassment. The Agency and Respondents submitted briefing showing a wide range of amounts awarded to sexual harassment victims, including awards spanning from a couple hundred thousand dollars to \$1 million. (See Procedural Finding of Fact #65). The Agency's briefing also discussed amounts awarded to individuals who were sexually abused as children which exceeded \$1,000,000. *Id.*

Taking all of these factors into consideration, the forum concludes that \$1,000,000 is an appropriate award to compensate AP2 for her emotional and physical suffering. This amount is awarded to AP2 due to the harm she suffered as a result of the harassment at Frehoo, and is not based on any harm that she may have suffered as a result of other

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ADDITIONAL RELIEF REQUESTED BY THE AGENCY

In its Amended Formal Charges, the Agency asked that Respondents be ordered to cease and desist from continuing to violate laws pertaining to discrimination because of sex and sexual harassment in the workplace. The Agency also requested that Respondents be enjoined from violating sex discrimination and sexual harassment laws. BOLI's Deputy Commissioner is authorized to issue an appropriate cease and desist order reasonably calculated to eliminate the effects of any unlawful practice found. ORS 659A.850(4). Among other things, that may include requiring a respondent to:

- "(a) Perform an act or series of acts designated in the order that are reasonably calculated to:
 - "(A) Carry out the purposes of this chapter;
 - "(B) Eliminate the effects of the unlawful practice that the respondent is found to have engaged in, including but not limited to paying an award of actual damages suffered by the complainant and complying with injunctive or other equitable relief; and
 - "(C) Protect the rights of the complainant and other persons similarly situated[.]"

The forum finds the Agency's requested cease and desist order to be appropriate relief in this case.

EXCEPTIONS TO THE PROPOSED ORDER

AGENCY'S EXCEPTIONS

The Agency filed exceptions to the Proposed Findings of Fact – The Merits, Proposed Opinion, and Proposed Findings of Fact - Procedural, which are addressed below.

Agency Exceptions to Proposed Findings of Fact – The Merits

The Agency first requested that additional facts be included in the Order and,

secondly, raised exceptions to specific findings made by the ALJ.

A. Additional Findings of Fact¹⁹ Requested by the Agency

The Agency presented a list of 11 facts separated by bullet points that the Agency contends should be inserted into the Final Order. The numbers listed below correspond to the order in which the bullet points were presented in the Agency's Exceptions.

- 1. The requested additional facts duplicate those contained in Finding of Fact # 5, and the forum declines to add the Agency's suggested language.
- 2. Finding of Fact #3 has been supplemented to reflect that Kaiser, Mitchell and Struhar also collectively made decisions about policies at Frehoo.
- 3. The requested additional facts duplicate those contained in Finding of Fact # 88 which states that "credible evidence demonstrated that the rules were not strictly enforced." The forum declines to add the Agency's suggested language.
- 4. The forum declines to add the Agency's requested language regarding the testimony of Amy, the bartender. Amy's testimony did not demonstrate that she was certain about the timing of some events. For example, when Amy was asked when she saw the missing child Facebook posting, she responded, "It was within -- it was within a day or two. I mean, she was in there. I feel like it was within a day or two of AP2 being in there." The forum declines to make a finding based on this equivocal testimony.
- 5. The forum also declines to adopt the language requested by the Agency in Bullet Point 5 as it is dependent upon Amy's uncertain testimony regarding the timing of events and Respondents' unreliable paperwork. Amy testified that the police came to

¹⁹ To be concise, references to "Findings of Fact – The Merits" will simply state "Findings of Fact." When procedural findings of fact are referenced, it will state "Findings of Fact – Procedural."

Frehoo on the "same day" she made a report to management about the missing child Facebook posting. The Agency requests that the forum rely on Respondents' daily logs to conclude that Amy worked additional shifts with AP2 after her report. However, given the inconsistencies in the accuracy of Respondents' paperwork, the forum is unable to make a conclusion as to the exact date when Amy discovered the Facebook posting and reported it to management.

- 6. Finding of Fact # 28 has been supplemented to clarify that Toth's guilty plea for promoting prostitution involved three dancers at Frehoo and the remainder of his crimes involved his conduct towards AP1.
- 7. Findings of Fact ## 28 and 73 establish that AP1 was the victim of Toth's crime of compelling prostitution in the FE room on Frehoo's premises. The forum declines to add the Agency's requested language.
- 8. Some of the information the Agency requests in this bullet point is contained in Finding of Fact # 75. For the sake of completeness, continuity and context, Finding of Fact # 28 is amended to note that when Herkenrath saw AP1 in the club with Toth, he was comfortable with her being there and assumed that Toth either knew her age or had checked her ID.
- 9. The requested additional facts are repetitive of those contained in Finding of Fact # 26. The forum declines to add the Agency's suggested language.
- 10. The requested additional facts are repetitive of those contained in Findings of Fact ## 39 and 77. The forum declines to add the Agency's suggested language.
- 11. Finding of Fact # 5 has been supplemented to clarify that, "at Kaiser's direction," Frehoo's manager requested that BOLI investigators wait until Kaiser arrived

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B. The Agency's Exceptions to Proposed Findings of Fact

The Agency also raised exceptions to specific Proposed Findings of Fact made by the ALJ in the Proposed Order. The numbers listed below correspond to the Proposed Findings of Fact.

The Agency first takes issue with the statement that Kaiser "did not have 5) responsibility for implementing policies at Frehoo." However, Kaiser credibly testified that he did not take on "any responsibility for implementation of policies" at Frehoo. To "implement" means "to carry out: accomplish, fulfill * * * esp: to give practical effect to and ensure of actual fulfillment by concrete measures." Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 1134 (unabridged ed 2002). The record is clear that Kaiser did not "give practical effect to" policies at Frehoo and "ensure * * * by concrete measures" that policies such as the "two-person ID check" were actually carried out and accomplished. The definition of "implement" is consistent with the remainder of Kaiser's testimony and with that of Frehoo's other owners in that Kaiser helped enact policies for Frehoo, but he himself did not take measures to put those policies into place. Aside from communicating to someone at Frehoo that there was a new policy, he did not take on "any responsibility for implementing policies." Nevertheless, to avoid any confusion in the factual record, the word "implementing" has been removed and the Finding of Fact has been modified to clarify Kaiser's role with respect to policy revisions at Frehoo.

With respect to the second part of the Agency's exception, this Finding of Fact has been modified to indicate that Kaiser directed Frehoo's manager to request that BOLI investigators wait until Kaiser arrived before completing an onsite review.

- 14) This Finding of Fact has been modified to clarify the reasons for walking dancers out to their cars. The phrase "were not permitted" was removed because, although there was testimony that there was a "rule" against dancers and employees leaving with customers, that rule was not consistently enforced. (Finding of Fact #28)
- 23) This Finding of Fact was modified to clarify that the OLCC does not permit minors to access certain areas of the club where alcohol is served.
- 26) The forum declines to modify this Finding of Fact in response to the Agency's exception. Mitchell and Kaiser were informed that on one occasion that Toth allowed Tru to leave the club with Wheeler and that she subsequently reported that she was upset when Wheeler asked her for a sexual favor. Toth's conduct in allowing Tru to leave was against the club's stated policy. However, the forum is unable to draw an inference that Tru's complaint about Wheeler was a complaint that "Toth was involved in prostitution."

The Agency's Exceptions to Credibility Findings

The Agency's exceptions to the Credibility Findings are denied because the Findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record. *See Wallstrom, Kenneth*, 32 BOLI 63, 92-93 (2012) ("exceptions to the ALJ's credibility findings are denied because those findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record"); *Gordy's Truck Stop, LLC.*, 28 BOLI 200, 216 (2007) ("an ALJ's credibility findings are accorded substantial deference and absent convincing reasons for rejecting those findings, they are not disturbed").

The Agency's Exceptions to the Proposed Opinion

The Agency first contends that Frehoo should be found liable under OAR 839-005-

0030(5) for sexual harassment by a supervisor. In addition, the Agency asserts that Kaiser, Mitchell and Struhar should be found liable as aiders and abettors under ORS 659A.030(1)(g). For the reasons discussed in the Opinion section above, the forum agrees with the Agency and the Exceptions to the Proposed Opinion are granted.

The Agency's Exceptions to Proposed Findings of Fact - Procedural

The Agency's exceptions to the Findings of Fact – Procedural are denied.

RESPONDENTS' EXCEPTIONS

Respondents filed exceptions to the Proposed Findings of Fact – The Merits, Proposed Conclusions of Law/Opinion, and Proposed Findings of Fact – Procedural, which are addressed below.

Respondents' Exceptions to Proposed Findings of Fact – The Merits

Respondents raised exceptions to specific Proposed Findings of Fact contained in the Proposed Order. The letters and numbers below correspond to the letters and numbers used in Respondents' Exceptions.

- I.A. Respondents' Exception I.A. is denied because the requested language is not material to the forum's analysis of the claims asserted on behalf of AP2.
- I.B. The forum grants Respondents' Exception I.B. Finding of Fact #23 has been amended to cite to Herkenrath's testimony.
- I.C. The forum grants Respondents' Exception I.C. Finding of Fact #22 has been amended to remove the phrase "in the Portland area."
- I.D. Respondents' Exception I.D. is denied because Finding of Fact # 24 is pertinent to Frehoo's enforcement of rules pertaining to minors.
 - I.E. Respondents' Exception I.E. is denied because the requested language is

not material to the forum's analysis of the resolution of the claims of AP2.

- I.F. Respondents' Exception I.F. is denied. Kaiser knew that prostitution occurred inside the club after Toth's arrest and conviction. Kaiser's denial of that fact is not credible. See Findings of Fact ## 26, 28, 29.
- I.G. Respondents' Exception I.G. is denied. The requested new language does not accurately reflect the record and does not add information pertinent to the forum's analysis.
- I.H. Respondents' Exception I.H. is denied. The requested new language does not add information pertinent to the forum's analysis.
- I.I. Respondents' Exception I.I. is granted in part to: (1) replace "93" with "92" as the year of the date of birth on AP2's fake ID; (2) replace the word "background" with "border;" and (3) include additional explanation about the issue date on the fake ID. The remainder of the exception is denied as it either inconsistent with credible evidence on the record or requests that the forum add information that is not pertinent to the forum's analysis of the claims at issue.
- I.J. The forum denies Respondents' Exception I.J. AP2 testified that Curry argued with the bouncer who scanned her ID and said that it did not go through, and that it was a fake ID. After Curry complained and asked to see the manager, the manager told the bouncer, "Okay. Just let them come in." The fact that a manager at another club allowed AP2 to enter that club when her ID was rejected by a machine scanner has no bearing as to whether she could legally be hired as a nude dancer at Frehoo.
- I.K. The forum denies Respondents' Exception I.K. The requested language is repetitious of language in Finding of Fact # 35 stating that AP2 used the fake ID and was

hired by other clubs.

- I.L. The forum denies Respondents' Exception I.L. The requested language is repetitious of language in Finding of Fact # 37 stating that AP2 "presented herself to the club as an experienced dancer." Additionally, although witnesses testified that they did not know AP2 was underage, the forum is unable to conclude that "no one at Stars" knew her actual age.
- I.M. The forum denies Respondents' Exception I.M. The requested language is repetitious of language in Finding of Fact # 37 stating that AP2 "presented herself to the club as an experienced dancer."
- I.N. The forum denies Respondents' Exception I.N. The sentences Respondents seek to strike are supported by AP2's credible testimony about how she felt while working at Frehoo, not her outward appearance.
- I.O. The forum denies Respondents' Exception I.O. as Finding of Fact # 48 describes the conditions AP2 was exposed to while working at Frehoo and it states that she did not participate in the bachelor party dances.
- I.P. The forum denies Respondents' Exception I.P. Although witnesses testified that they were not aware of her relationship with Curry, the forum is unable to conclude that "[n]o one working at Stars was aware" of her situation.
- I.Q. The forum denies Respondents' Exception I.Q. AP2 credibly testified: "And I knew that there wouldn't be anyone to really help me. It was, like, my battle to fight* * * I just didn't see -- I didn't find any purpose on telling it because I didn't feel like it would be any -- any help or any different." Respondents misunderstand the forum's credibility finding (Finding of Fact # 64) regarding the inconsistency between the interrogatory

response and hearing testimony. Finding of Fact # 64 described AP2's inconsistent statements as to whether someone intervened to help her when a customer touched her inappropriately; that Finding did not address why AP2 did not make a complaint.

- I.R. The forum denies Respondents' Exception I.R. There was conflicting testimony as to how attentive and responsive security and management personnel were to requests for assistance with customers.
- I.S. The forum denies Respondents' Exception I.S. As previously stated when discussing the Agency's exceptions, the record is not clear as to the date Amy discovered the Facebook posting and reported it to management.
- I.T. The forum denies Respondents' Exception I.T. The record is not clear as to the date Amy reported the Facebook posting and, thus, the forum is unable to conclude whether that is the same date Herkenrath called Det. Opitz.
- I.U. The forum denies Respondents' Exception I.U. as the requested language does not relate to the harm AP2 suffered based on her experiences at Frehoo. Indeed, Respondents' suggest that AP2 is better off having been subjected to the humiliating experience of dancing nude and being sexually harassed while working for Frehoo. The forum declines to make that conclusion.
- I.V. The forum denies Respondents' Exception I.V. for the same reasons Exception I.U. was denied.

Respondents' Exceptions to Proposed Conclusions of Law/Proposed Opinion

The forum denies all of Respondents' exceptions to the Proposed Conclusions of Law and Proposed Opinion for the reasons discussed in the Opinion section above, with one exception. The phrase "the sex trafficking and harassment of AP1" has been

removed and replaced with the words: "that Toth had subjected 13-year-old AP1 to acts of prostitution on Frehoo's premises."

Respondents' Exceptions to Proposed Credibility Findings

Respondents' exceptions to the Credibility Findings are denied because the Findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record. See Wallstrom, 32 BOLI at 92-93 (2012); Gordy's Truck Stop, LLC, 28 BOLI at 216 (2007).

Respondents' Exceptions to Proposed Damages and Additional Relief

A. Manner of Payment

Respondents object to the portion of Proposed Order section which contains instructions for the method of payment. Since that section does not violate the order of the bankruptcy court, this exception is denied.

B. Allocation of Damages

Respondents contend that ORS chapter 659A does not authorize joint and several liability and, therefore, the forum should allocate damages based on contribution to harm. This exception is denied. The forum's long term precedent establishes that aiders and abettors are jointly and severally liable. See, e.g., In the Matter of Blue Gryphon, LLC, and Flora Turnbull, 34 BOLI 216, 238 (2015); Engel, Dr. Andrew, DMD, PC, 32 BOLI 94, 137 (2012); Allied Computerized Credit & Collections, Inc., 9 BOLI 206, 218 (1991).

C. Cease and Desist Order Against Frehoo

Respondents argue that Frehoo is not operational and, thus, the forum should not issue a cease and desist order against it. The forum has previously declined to award nonmonetary relief when the evidence established that such remedies "would be a futile exercise of the forum's authority" because an employer "is no longer doing business in

Oregon" and "there is no indication in the record that [the employer] has any intention of resuming business in Oregon in the future." *In the Matter of Maltby Biocontrol, Inc.*, 2014 BOLI 121, 157 (2014). Unlike the situation in *Maltby*, the record in this matter does not conclusively establish that Frehoo has "no intention of resuming business in Oregon in the future." Therefore, this exception is denied.

D. Cease and Desist Order Against Herkenrath

Respondents similarly object to a cease and desist order against Herkenrath for the same reasons as they objected to the cease and desist order against Frehoo. This exception is denied for the same reasons as the previous exception was denied.

E. BOLI's Authority to Award Emotional Distress Damages

Respondents contend that BOLI lacks the authority to award emotional distress damages. In short, Respondents assert that the phrase "actual damages" was inserted into ORS 659A.850(4)(a)(B) in 2007 to apply to housing discrimination cases only, and was not intended to apply to cases involving employment discrimination. The forum disagrees with Respondents' position for several reasons.

First, Respondents' argument is inconsistent with a plain reading of the statute, which does not differentiate between employment discrimination and housing discrimination cases. The remedies in ORS 659A.850(4)(a)(B) apply to "any respondent found to have engaged in any unlawful practice alleged in the complaint." (Emphasis added). "Unlawful practice' means any unlawful employment practice or any other practice specifically denominated as an unlawful practice in [ORS chapter 659A]." (Emphasis added) "[L]egislative history cannot substitute for, or contradict the text of, [a] statute." White v. Jubitz Corp., 347 Or 212, 219 P3d 566 (2009); see also State v. Gaines,

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346 Or 160, 173, 206 P.3d 1042 (2009) ("When the text of a statute is truly capable of having only one meaning, no weight can be given to legislative history that suggests—or even confirms—that legislators intended something different."); see also State v. Tyson, 243 Or App 94, 99, 259 P3d 64, 66, rev den, 351 Or 401 (2011). Given the clear language in the statute, Respondents' interpretation of legislative history cannot overcome the authorization of an award of "actual" damages.

Second, even if legislative history were to be considered, it does not advance Respondents' argument. Respondents erroneously assert that the statute was "originally enacted in 2001." However, Respondents' position ignores the fact that the statute at issue was part of 2001 revisions reorganizing most of former ORS chapter 659 into the current ORS chapter 659A. This was not an original enactment. "[L]egislative history is most useful when it is able to uncover the manifest general legislative intent behind an enactment." Matter of Comp. of Muliro, 359 Or 736, 753, 380 P3d 270 (2016) (internal quotations omitted). The revisions at issue were part of House Bill (HB) 5352 (2001) an overall restructuring of Oregon's civil rights statutes. Ex. F to Judiciary Subcommittee on Civil Law, HB 2532, February 5, 2001 (written testimony of former BOLI commissioner Jack Roberts) The Oregon Law Commission (OLC) proposed HB 5352 to reorganize and consolidate the civil rights statutes enforced by the Oregon Bureau of Labor and Industries into one chapter - ORS chapter 659A. Id. It aimed to put Oregon's civil rights laws "into more logical order, address unclear or inconsistent language relating to enforcement procedures, and make the statutes easier for the reader to understand and use." Ex. G to Judiciary Subcommittee on Civil Law, HB 2532 (Oregon Law Commission's Report on the Civil Rights Statutes, 11/17/200). The OLC "endeavored to fix the substance." Id.

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²⁰ At the time of the decision in Williams v. Joyce, the pertinent part of ORS 659.010(2) stated:

practice found, addressed to a respondent requiring him to:

organization problems" that existed in the civil rights laws "without changing the

rights statutes without changing the substance, there were some changes of substance

made. For example, the statute prohibiting discrimination against workers applying for

workers' compensation benefits was amended to indicate that the "section applies only

to employers who employ six or more persons." Compare ORS 659.410 (1999) to

659A,040(1),(2) (2001). However, there is no indication in the legislative history that the

legislature intended to change the statute involving remedies to remove the ability to

award actual damages. It has long been understood that BOLI's Commissioner has the

authority to award damages to a person who has been aggrieved by an unlawful

employment practice. Williams v. Joyce, 4 Or App 482, 504, 479 P2d 513, 524 (1971)

(concluding that former ORS 659.010(2)²⁰ gave BOLI's Commissioner the right to award

damages for mental suffering); Fred Meyer, Inc., 39 Or App at 260 (upholding Williams

and noting that the legislature had amended the statute after the Williams decision but

did not exclude emotional distress damages as a permissible remedy). See also Gaudry

v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 48 Or App 589, 617 P2d 668 (1980) (affirming award

of damages for mental anguish, humiliation and frustration); Schipporeit v. Roberts, 93

Or App 12, 15 (1988) (confirming that BOLI's Commissioner had the authority to award

"(2) 'Cease and desist order' means an order * * * issued to eliminate the effects of any unlawful

Although the overall purpose of the statutory revisions was to reorganize the civil

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"(a) Perform an act * * * reasonably calculated to carry out the purposes of ORS 659.010 to 659.110,

eliminate the effects of an unlawful practice found, and protect the rights of the complainant and other persons similarly situated * * *.

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damages, including damages for mental distress); aff'd, 308 Or 199, 778 P2d 953 (1989).

F. Respondents' Right to a Jury Trial

Therefore, this exception is denied.

Respondents assert that an award for emotional distress damages would deprive Respondents of a right to a jury trial under Article I, section 17 of Oregon's Constitution. This exception is denied for the reasons set forth in Finding of Fact – Procedural # 29.

G. Amount of Damages

Respondents disagree with the amount of damages, arguing that the award is excessive. The forum denies this exception for the reasons set forth in the Opinion section. The forum also disagrees with Respondents' argument that the award for damages is somehow related to other harm AP2 suffered in her life based on the conduct of other individuals not associated with Frehoo. Given AP2's young age of 15 and the significant harm she suffered due to the sexual harassment at Frehoo (including dancing nude on stage and being groped by older male customers), \$1,000,000 is an appropriate award of emotional distress damages for the harm caused by Respondents. OAR 839-005-0030(5).

ORDER

Α. NOW, THEREFORE, as authorized by ORS 659A.850(2) and ORS 659A.850(4), and to eliminate the effects of the violations of ORS 659A.030(1)(b), ORS 659A.030(1)(g), OAR 839-005-0021, OAR 839-005-0030(1)(a)(A), OAR 839-005-0030(1)(b), OAR 839-005-0030(5) and OAR 839-005-0030(7) by Respondents Frehoo, Inc., Jon Herkenrath, and Todd Mitchell and as payment of the damages awarded, the Deputy Commissioner of the Bureau of Labor and Industries hereby orders Respondents

APPENDIX A

FINDINGS OF FACT - PROCEDURAL

Labor and Industries, filed a verified complaint with the Agency's Civil Rights Division

("CRD") alleging that Frehoo, Inc. dba Stars Cabaret & Steak House employed two female individuals under the age of 16 and that the conditions of employment for the minors

On July 27, 2015, Brad Avakian, Commissioner of the Oregon Bureau of

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(Ex. A3)

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constituted sexual harassment under OAR 839-005-0030, in violation of ORS 659A.030(1)(b). (Ex. A1) The Commissioner's complaint was amended on January 4, 2016, to add 6 2) the following additional parties as Respondents: High Life, LLC

> MJ10, Inc. NPC Concepts, LLC

JMS Holdings, Inc.

IHAT, Inc.

NIMBY, LLC

NPC Properties, LLC

RGK Holdings, Inc. fka Phoenix Holdings, Inc.

SCS2, Inc. DBA Stars Cabaret ... At The Capitol

SCTO, Inc. DBA Stars Cabaret .. Bridgeport

SHM Holdings, Inc. Weston Court Properties, LLC

W.T.H., Inc. DBA Stars Cabaret ... In The Cascades

Additionally, the following individuals were named as aiders and abettors, citing "ORS 659A.030(1)(b)(g)":

Pameia Colburn Lisa Heinzman-Myers Jonathan Herkenrath Randy Kaiser

Todd Mitchell Jeff Struhar

On February 3, 2016, the Agency's Civil Rights Division issued a Notice of Substantial Evidence Determination ("SED") in which it found substantial evidence of an unlawful employment practice (sex harassment), in violation of ORS 659A.030(1)(b) and an unlawful employment practice (aiding and abetting of unlawful sex harassment), in violation of ORS 659A.030(1)(g) with respect to both female minors identified in the Commissioner's complaint. (Ex. A8)

4) On March 29, 2016, the Agency submitted a Request for Hearing to the forum. (Ex. X1)

5) On March 31, 2016, the Agency issued Formal Charges. The caption in this case listed Frehoo, Inc. dba Stars Cabaret & Steak House ("Frehoo") as the only corporate Respondent. Following the identification of Frehoo as a party, the entities named in the SED were listed, each preceded by the acronym "aka." The individuals named as aiders and abettors in the SED were also identified as Respondents.

The Formal Charges alleged that Respondents discriminated against both aggrieved persons²¹ in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment, in violation of ORS 659A.030(1)(b), former and current OAR 839-005-0021(1), (2) and former and current OAR 839-005-0030. The Formal Charges also alleged that all of the individual Respondents "aided, abetted, incited, compelled and/or coerced acts forbidden under ORS chapter 659A, specifically the unlawful practices alleged here, and [are] individually liable for violations alleged herein as an aider and abettor pursuant to ORS 659A.030(1)(g)." The Formal Charges sought "[d]amages for emotional and physical suffering for each aggrieved person in the amount of at least \$4,000,000." The Formal Charges did not include the names of the individuals for whom damages were being sought. (Ex. X2)

- 6) On March 31, 2016, the forum issued a Notice of Hearing stating the time and place of the hearing as August 2, 2016, beginning at 9:30 a.m., at BOLI's Portland, Oregon office. Together with the Notice of Hearing, the forum sent a copy of the Formal Charges, a multi-language warning notice, a document entitled "Summary of Contested Case Rights and Procedures" containing the information required by ORS 183.413, a document entitled "Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA) Notification, and a copy of the forum's contested case hearing rules, OAR 839-050-000 to 839-050-0445. (Ex. X2, X2a-X2f)
- 7) The Agency filed a motion for protective order on April 5, 2016, seeking to protect "Personal Identifying Information" ("PII") of the Aggrieved Persons. A prehearing telephone conference was held on April 13, 2016, to discuss the Agency's motion for protective order. During the conference, all parties agreed to the following:
 - The Agency's Motion for Protective Order should be granted, and the definition of PII contained in footnote 1 of the Agency's motion was appropriate.
 - The sample form of protective order emailed by Respondents' attorney on April 11, 2016, was acceptable, subject to appropriate revisions to adapt the order to this forum and to the specifics of this case.

 $^{^{21}}$ An "aggrieved person" is "a person on whose behalf the complaint is filed" by the Commissioner. OAR 839-050-0020(5)(b).

- Should Respondents' counsel need to disclose the aggrieved persons' PII, pursuant to a factual investigation and/or discovery process in this case, Respondents' counsel will retain written acknowledgements signed by each and every individual to whom a disclosure of said personal identifying information was made. The written acknowledgment will reflect that the individual has read the protective order and agrees to abide by its terms.
- A draft of the Protective Order was provided to the parties. The Agency requested revisions to the document. After the Agency conferred with Respondents' attorney, a revised document was emailed to the ALJ and the requested changes were incorporated into a Protective Order.

The interim Protective Order was issued on April 27, 2016, which contained the following definition of PII:

"Any written document or electronic data that does, or purports to, provide information concerning: the aggrieved person's name, address or telephone number; the aggrieved person's driving privileges; the aggrieved person's Social Security number or tax identification number; the aggrieved person's citizenship status or alien identification number; the aggrieved person's current employment status, employer or place of employment; the identification number assigned to the aggrieved person by the person's employer; the name of the aggrieved person's parent or legal guardian; any identifying information of the aggrieved person's depository account at a 'financial institution' or 'trust company,' as those terms are defined in ORS 706.008, or a credit card account; the aggrieved person's signature or a copy of the aggrieved person's signature; the aggrieved person's electronic mail name, electronic mail signature, electronic mail address or electronic mail account; any photographs of the aggrieved person; or the aggrieved person's date of birth."

(Exs. X3, X5, X9)

- 8) On April 18, 2016, Respondents filed a document titled Acceptance of Service. (Ex. X6)
- 9) On April 20, 2016, all Respondents jointly filed an answer through Courtney Angeli, attorney at law. Respondents raised numerous affirmative defenses, including:

"5. There was no negligence by Stars or any of Respondents on which to premise any theory of liability. Following the discovery of Toth's unauthorized, criminal conduct, Stars engaged in heightened efforts to ensure that minors did not access the premises. Immediately upon learning of the allegations related to Aggrieved Person #1, Stars' ownership demanded that two separate club employees examine any new applicant information. In addition, upon entry onto

"8. As to Aggrieved Person #2, who danced at Stars in Beaverton fewer than six days, to the extent the claim is that she was harassed by a supervisor, none of Respondents is liable because (1) there was no tangible employment action taken against her; (2) Stars was unaware of Aggrieved Person #2's age or any offensiveness of the environment to her in light of her age; (3) Stars was reasonably diligent in ensuring that underage dancers did not perform at Stars clubs and the Beaverton club specifically; (4) Stars took immediate and appropriate corrective action by promptly reporting Aggrieved Person #2 to authorities as soon as it learned of her potentially being underage; and/or (5) Aggrieved Person #2 unreasonably failed to take advantage of preventive opportunities for addressing the conduct, in that she knowingly misrepresented her age and presented false identification in violation of Oregon law to secure the opportunity to dance at Stars, and in that she never reported to anyone at Stars that she was subject to unwelcome conduct. OAR 839-0050-0030(5).

- "9. As to Aggrieved Person #2, who danced at Stars in Beaverton fewer than six days, to the extent the claim is that she was harassed by coworkers or agents of Stars, none of Respondents are liable because they did not know nor should they have known of any sexually harassing conduct and, as soon as Stars had reason to believe that Aggrieved Person #2 was underage and might potentially be offended or presumptively find any sexual conduct 'unwelcome,' Stars notified authorities and excluded her from any further entry on the premises. OAR 839-0050-0030(6).
- "10. As to Aggrieved Person #2, who danced at Stars in Beaverton fewer than six days, to the extent the claim is that she was harassed by non-employees /patrons, none of Respondents are liable because they did not know nor should they have known of any sexually harassing conduct and, as soon as Stars knew that Aggrieved Person #2 was underage and might potentially be offended or presumptively find any sexual conduct 'unwelcome,' Stars notified authorities and excluded her from any further entry on the premises. OAR 839-0050-0030(7).

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"12. Respondents are not liable to Aggrieved Person #2 because no action by an employer was directed at her 'because of sex,' and thus the basic requirements of ORS 659A.030(1)(a) are not satisfied. The theory of liability seems to be that Stars took insufficient steps to prevent minors from accessing the premises, and that the presence of a minor on the premises of a gentlemen's club is, by itself, an exposure of the individual to sexual harassment. This, however, is a theory about employer conduct that is based on age, not sex. The fact that the

environment and nature of the entertainment is sexual does not mean that it is inherently a hostile working environment, particularly as such entertainment activities are Constitutionally protected in Oregon.

- "13. Respondents are not liable to Aggrieved Person #2 because her alleged exposure to the conditions of dancing at Stars was not unwelcome nor was it subjectively offensive: She knowingly misrepresented her age and used false identification to obtain access to the premises, did not object to the premises or any conduct therein, and, on information and belief, sought and obtained access to similar establishments prior to and after applying to be an adult entertainer at Stars.
- "14. Any unwelcome conduct experienced by Aggrieved Person #2 during the six or so days she danced at Stars was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute a hostile working environment.
- "15. Stars is not liable to Aggrieved Person #2 for any damages she sustained because she took action that caused her to experience such conduct and/or her damages should be eliminated or reduced for her failure to mitigate the harm, both by presenting false identification to evade the mechanisms intended to prevent her entry on the premises, and by failing to report to anyone at Stars that she experienced unwelcome conduct or behavior. Respondents further deny that any of them, or any conduct for which they are vicariously liable, caused the amount of damages alleged."

(Ex. X7)

10) On April 28, 2016, the ALJ issued an interim order which stated:

"It has come to my attention that Respondents sent copies of the following documents to me by email and hand delivery, but those documents were not sent to the attention of BOLI's Contested Case Coordinator:

- Respondents' Request for Informal Discovery, Unopposed Motion Requesting 60-Day Hearing Set Over, and Proposing a Case Scheduling Conference;
- Answer and Defenses to Formal Charges and Notice of Hearing; and
- Motion to Dismiss.

"The Agency filed a Motion for Default on April 26, 2016, which asserts that the Answer was not timely filed. The deadline for filing a response to that motion is May 3, 2016. I will issue a ruling on the Agency's motion after the response is filed, or the response time has passed, whichever occurs first.

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"Because a ruling on the Motion for Default might also impact whether Respondents' motions are considered to be on file with the forum, I will not be ruling on those motions at this time. The administrative law judge is unable to issue a ruling on motions unless they are filed with the forum. OAR 839-050-0040(1); OAR 839-050-0020(15).

"The parties are reminded to direct all filings to the following address:

Bureau of Labor and Industries ATTN: Contested Case Coordinator 1045 State Office Building, 800 N.E. Oregon Street, Portland, OR 97232-2162

IT IS SO ORDERED"

(Ex. X10)

11) The Agency filed a Motion for Default on April 26, 2016, asserting that Respondents were in default because an Answer was not filed with BOLI's Contested Case Coordinator by the due date of April 20, 2016. Respondents filed a response to the Agency's motion on April 29, 2016, and asserted that the Answer was submitted for filing on time at the correct address, although the envelope contained the name of the assigned ALJ instead of the Contested Case Coordinator. The forum issued an interim order regarding the Agency's motion on May 2, 2016, which stated, in pertinent part:

"[A] document is filed with the Forum either on the date the Forum receives the document, or on the date postmarked on the properly addressed document, whichever is earlier." OAR 839-050-0040(1). "Forum" means the Administrative Law Judge assigned to preside over the contested case proceeding and the Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner who signs the final order.' OAR 839-050-0020(15). The rule goes on to state that the address of the Forum is: 'Bureau of Labor and Industries, ATTN: Contested Case Coordinator, 1045 State Office Building, 800 N.E. Oregon Street, Portland, OR 97232-2162.'

"The envelope containing the Answer was sent to the correct street address and included the name of the assigned ALJ (a person who is included in the definition of the 'Forum'), but did not include the words 'Contested Case Coordinator.' Nevertheless, the envelope containing the Answer was stamped:

1 'RECEIVED BY CONTESTED CASE 2 COORDINATOR 3 April 20, 2016 4 **BUREAU OF LABOR** AND INDUSTRIES' 5 "Under these circumstances, the Forum 'receive[d]' the Answer on that date 6 and it was timely filed. Therefore, the Agency's motion is DENIED. The Answer will be placed in the Forum's file and the record will reflect that it was filed on April 7 20, 2016." 8 (Exs. X8, X13, X14) 9 After Respondents filed documents with BOLI's Contested Case Coordinator duplicating documents previously sent to the attention of the ALJ, an interim 10 order was issued on May 4, 2016, which stated as follows: 11 "To avoid any potential confusion regarding the date of filing, this interim order notifies the parties that the filing date of the following documents was April 12 29, 2016: 13 Respondents' Request for Informal Discovery, Unopposed Motion Requesting 60-Day Hearing Set Over, and Proposing a Case 14 Scheduling Conference 15 Respondents' Motion to Dismiss. 16 "April 29, 2016, is the date that should be used for calculating the time for responding to these motions." 17 (Ex. X15) 18 On May 6, 2016, the ALJ issued an Interim Order explaining the 19 requirements for filing motions and other documents, which notified the parties that all documents needed to be submitted in writing to BOLI's Contested Case Coordinator. The 20 ALJ also issued an Interim Order requiring the parties to file case summaries which identified witnesses and exhibits two weeks in advance of the date set for hearing. (Exs. 21 X19, X20) 22 The Agency filed a request for clarification of the ALJ's Interim Order re Agency's Motion for Default on May 4, 2016. Respondents submitted a filing in opposition 23 to the request for clarification on May 5, 2016. On May 10, 2016, an interim order was issued which stated, in pertinent part: 24

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'The Agency requests that the Forum [provide] clarification and guidance on filings addressed and mailed directly to an ALJ, and advise whether its ruling in Green Thumb has been over-turned or remains good law. The Agency also further requests that the Forum provide clarification as to despite an administrative law judge's order expressly dictating otherwise, or whether a document is 'received' by the Forum only when stamped

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whether a document is "received" by the Forum when actually received by the Administrative Law Judge (or Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner). "Received by Contested Case Coordinator." Agency Request for Clarification, pp. 8-9. Respondents submitted a response to

"1 The Ruling in Green Thumb Has Not Been Overruled and Remains Good Law, But it Does Not Apply to the Facts at Issue in the Agency's Motion for Default.

the Agency's request on May 5, 2016. The following addresses the questions

"The Green Thumb case was not cited in the interim order ruling on the Agency's motion for default because it does not apply to this situation. In an effort to be brief, the interim order did not include a lengthy discussion of the ways in which Green Thumb contrasts with the situation in this case. Upon review of the Agency's request, it seems that it would be helpful to elaborate on the differences between the situation in Green Thumb and this case. Thus, a description of how this case differs from Green Thumb is discussed below.

"First, the procedure for filing the document at issue in Green Thumb (Exceptions to the Proposed Order) is governed by OAR 839-050-0380. That administrative rule does not apply to the filing of Respondent's Answer in this case.

"Second, the ruling in Green Thumb concerned whether the Agency had demonstrated 'good cause' for an extension of time to file their Exceptions after the due date had passed. The interim order in this case examined whether the Answer was filed with the Forum under OAR 839-050-0040 and OAR 839-050-0020(15), not whether Respondents should be afforded an extension of time under OAR 839-050-0050.

"Third, the Agency attempted to file the document in Green Thumb by mail, but it was (1) marked with insufficient postage, (2) 'not mailed to the address where exceptions must be mailed,' and (3) not received by the Contested Case Coordinator on the due date. By contrast, Respondents' Answer in this case was submitted by hand delivery and (1) arrived at the correct physical address on the due date. (2) was addressed to the ALJ, who is included in the definition of the 'Forum,' and (3) a stamp on the envelope and on the document itself stated that it

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23 24 was 'received' by the Contested Case Coordinator on the due date. Additionally, the envelope containing the Acceptance of Service was marked in the same manner as the envelope containing the Answer, and it was previously accepted for filing. The combination of these unique factors²² demonstrated that the Answer was filed on time with the Forum in accordance with the requirements of OAR 839-050-0040 and OAR 839-050-0020(15).

"Finally, in Green Thumb, the 'written directions' that were not followed were contained in the 'Exceptions Notice' which advised the parties of the requirements of 'ORS chapter 183 and OAR 839-050-0380.' There is no indication that additional instructions were added by the ALJ beyond the already applicable legal Similarly, the Notice of Hearing in this case referenced the applicable rules and advised the participants of their rights, as required by ORS 183.413 and 183.415. In this case, there was no order issued by the ALJ which contained 'instructions' which differed from the applicable rules. Moreover, the Notice of Hearing states that the Answer 'must be mailed or hand-delivered to the Contested Case Coordinator' and it is undisputed that the Contested Case Coordinator actually received the document, as evidenced by the 'received' stamp on the envelope and the Answer itself, as opposed to the Exceptions in Green Thumb which were not received. Based on the specific set of circumstances and the wording of the applicable rules (which differed from the rule at issue in *Green* Thumb), the Answer in this case was 'filed with the Forum' on the due date. For this reason also, the ruling in the Green Thumb case did not affect the timeliness of the Answer in this case.

"Put simply, *Green Thumb* involved a different type of document, different administrative rules²³ and different facts than those at issue in the Agency's Motion for Default. Thus, although the ruling in *Green* Thumb remains good law, it does not apply to the situation in this case and, therefore, the motion for default was denied.

"2. The Remainder of the Agency's Questions are Not at Issue in this Case.

"The ruling on the Agency's Motion for Default applied the relevant legal authority to the specific facts at issue in that motion. The Agency's Request for Clarification raises a number of questions that do not apply to the facts of this case,

²² Neither this ruling, nor the interim order ruling on the Agency's Motion for Default, is intended to set a precedent establishing that a document is timely filed when only one of these factors exists. As explained below, the ALJ is unable to issue a ruling on a hypothetical set of events.

²³ Notably, the rule for filing exceptions specifically requires the document to be filed "with the administrative law judge *through the Contested Case Coordinator.*" OAR 839-050-0380(4)(emphasis added). Similarly, motions must be submitted to the ALJ "through the Contested Case Coordinator." OAR 839-050-0150. The rules do not contain similar language regarding the filing on an Answer and the ALJ is unable to insert language that has been omitted. See ORS 174.010.

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and seem to be hypothetical situations that may or may not arise in the future.²⁴ It is understandable that the Agency would like clarity on those matters. However, the ALJ's role is limited to the 'consideration of all issues *properly before the presiding officer in the case and the correct application of law to those facts*.' ORS 183.417(8) (emphasis added). Therefore, the ALJ is unable to issue a ruling on matters not at issue in this case.

"Conclusion

"For all the foregoing reasons, the Agency's Request for Clarification is GRANTED IN PART, and DENIED IN PART as reflected in the discussion above."

(Exs. X16, X17, X21)

- 15) On May 12, 2016, a prehearing conference was held at the request of the parties to discuss the case schedule. An interim order was issued on May 16, 2016, regarding rulings made during the conference, which stated, in pertinent part:
 - "* * After receiving input from the parties, the following rulings were made regarding the case schedule:
 - Unless a different time period is provided below or in a subsequent interim order, all parties shall have 14 days to respond to all motions. This includes any motions currently pending at this time.
 - All discovery must be exchanged and any discovery motions must be filed by <u>July 29, 2016</u>. The parties are encouraged to file motions earlier than this date if it becomes clear that they are unable to reach an agreement on particular issues.
 - All dispositive motions, including motions for summary judgment and/or motions to dismiss, must be filed no later than <u>September 16, 2016</u>.
 - Responses to dispositive motions must be filed by October 7, 2016.
 - Case summaries must be filed by October 25, 2016.
 - The hearing in this matter is set to begin on <u>Tuesday</u>, <u>November 8</u>, <u>2016 at 9:00 a.m</u>. The hearing will be in recess on Friday, November 11, 2016, due to the Veteran's Day holiday, and will resume <u>Monday</u>, <u>November 14</u>, <u>2016</u>, until

²⁴ It is understandable that the parties would like some clarity regarding these questions raised by the Agency. However, when situations are not directly addressed in BOLl's contested case rules, Final Orders or other applicable legal authority, they can only be addressed on a case-by-case basis by applying the existing rules to the facts of the case.

(Exs. X11, X23)

16) On May 11, 2016, Respondents filed a motion to dismiss, remove or transfer. Respondents also filed a "second" motion to dismiss, remove or transfer on May 24, 2016. The Agency responded to the motions on May 25, 2016. An interim order ruling on Respondents' motions was issued on May 31, 2016, which stated as follows:

The hearing will be held at the <u>Office of Administrative Hearings, located at 7995 S.W. Mohawk Street, Entrance B, Tualatin, Oregon</u>. Additionally, the forum will use a court reporter to make the official record of the hearing.²⁵"

"INTRODUCTION

it concludes.

"On May 11, 2016, Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss, Remove or Transfer. Respondents filed a Second Motion to Dismiss, Remove or Transfer on May 24, 2016. In both motions, Respondents assert that Commissioner Avakian is not an impartial decision maker because he is the Complainant in this matter and has made public statements about the case. Respondents also argue that BOLI's prosecutorial and adjudicative roles were not adequately separated when the Contested Case Coordinator signed a declaration relied upon in the Agency's Motion for Default. For those reasons, Respondents contend that the matter should be dismissed or, alternatively, the case should be removed or transferred to circuit court.

"The Agency filed a response to both motions on May 25, 2016. First, the Agency states that the Deputy Commissioner, not BOLI's Commissioner, will be issuing the Final Order in this matter. Second, the Agency argues that the actions of the Contested Case Coordinator do not violate due process. Finally, the Agency contends that there is no legal authority to transfer or remove the case to circuit court.

"DISCUSSION

"The matters raised in Respondents' motions all revolve around concerns that there should be an unbiased decision maker and that there are inadequate procedural due process protections. Procedural due process requires a decision maker to be free of actual bias; Respondents have the burden of demonstrating an actual bias. See Teledyne Wah Chang v. Energy Facility Siting Council, 298 Or 240, 262 (1985), citing Boughan v. Board of Engineering Examiners, 46 Or App 287, 611 P.2d 670, rev den 289 Or 588 (1980).

²⁵ The ALJ may also make an electronic recording of the hearing, but the court reporter's transcript will be the official record.

"Most of Respondents' arguments expressed concern about the fairness of the Commissioner acting as both the Complainant and the person who would be issuing the Final Order in this matter. In response, the Agency states that the Deputy Commissioner, not Commissioner Avakian, issues Final Orders when a Commissioner's Complaint has been filed. (Ex. 1 to Agency's Resp.); In the Matter of Blachana, LLC, 32 BOLI 211 (2012) (BOLI's Commissioner filed the complaint under ORS 659A.825(1)(b), then delegated the ultimate decision-making authority in the case to the Deputy Commissioner, who signed and issued the Final Order). There is no evidence on the record to suggest that the Deputy Commissioner has an actual bias towards Respondents.

"Respondents also argue that BOLI's prosecutorial and adjudicative roles were not adequately separated when the Contested Case Coordinator signed a declaration in support of the Agency's Motion for Default, which was ultimately denied in an interim order. Respondents express concerns that the Contested Case Coordinator 'strongly and misleadingly implied that [she] had never personally received Respondent's Answer, when in reality, she had. Respondent's Motion, p. 5, emphasis in original) Regardless of whether Respondents' characterization of the Contested Case Coordinator's actions is correct or not, there is no evidence that she acted with an actual bias towards Respondents when signing the declaration. Moreover, the Contested Case Coordinator is not a decision maker in this matter.

"Accordingly, Respondents have not met their burden in establishing that the decision maker in this case has an actual bias towards them. Therefore, both of their motions are DENIED."

(Exs. X22, X24, X 25, X26)

17) On June 7, 2016, Respondents filed a motion seeking an extension of time until June 20, 2016, to respond to request for informal discovery received from Complainant. Respondents needed the additional time to obtain responses from several individual Respondents who reside out-of-state. The Agency did not object. On June 8, 2016, the ALJ issued an interim order granting Respondent's request for extension of time. Respondents filed a second unopposed motion seeking additional time to respond to Complainant's request on June 14, 2016, which was granted in an interim order dated June 15, 2016. (Exs. X28 - X31)

²⁶ Respondents assert that the Contested Case Coordinator is a "witness" in this case because she signed a declaration in support of the Agency's motion for default. However, the Agency's motion for default was denied and is no longer at issue.

 $^{^{27}}$ Actually, the Contested Case Coordinator stamped "received" on an envelope addressed to the ALJ, not the Contested Case Coordinator.

18) On June 23, 2016, Respondents filed a Motion for 60-Day Hearing Set Over because one of their attorneys had a trial date that conflicted with the hearing and due to the need for more time to review the volume of discovery that was produced to Respondents by the Agency. The Agency timely filed an objection to the motion on July 5, 2016, asserting that Respondents' stated reasons did not constitute "good cause" for a postponement. Respondents filed a "supplemental motion" on July 6, 2016, arguing that the Agency's discovery responses were inadequate. On July 7, 2016, the ALJ issued an interim order ruling on Respondents' motion which stated, in pertinent part:

"INTRODUCTION

"This matter was initially set for hearing to begin on August 2, 2016. On April 29, 2016, Respondents filed an unopposed motion to postpone the hearing by 60 days. A prehearing conference was held on May 12, 2016, to address the postponement motion and other matters. Chief Administrative Prosecutor Jenn Gaddis and Administrative Prosecutor Cristin Casey appeared on behalf of the Agency. Attorneys Anthony Reiner and Joel Shapiro appeared on behalf of Aggrieved Person # 1 and Aggrieved Person # 2. Attorneys Courtney Angeli and Matt Scherer appeared on behalf of Respondents.

During the prehearing conference, the participants discussed the amount of discovery, as well as conflicts with their work and personal schedules which could impact their availability for a hearing in this case. Respondents' counsel indicated that they had recently received approximately 17,000 pages of material from the Agency. All of the scheduling conflicts were taken into consideration and the hearing was rescheduled to begin on November 8, 2016. All parties indicated that this date was acceptable and the only mention of a potential issue with the date was that it was Election Day.

"DISCUSSION

"Pursuant to OAR 839-050-0150(5), a party who seeks to postpone the hearing must demonstrate 'good cause' to move the hearing date. The following factors are to be considered when making this determination:

- (A) Whether previous postponements have been granted;
- (B) The timeliness of the request;
- (C) Whether a participant has previously indicated it was prepared to proceed;
- (D) Whether there is a reasonable alternative to postponement; for example, submitting a sworn statement of a witness; and

(E) The date the hearing was originally scheduled to commence.

OAR 839-050-0150(5)(a).

"The forum applies the above-referenced factors to this case as follows:

- (A) The hearing in this matter was previously postponed once.
- (B) The current postponement request is being made several months in advance of the November 8, 2016, hearing date.
- (C) Everyone who attended the prehearing conference held on May 12, 2016 -- including counsel for Respondents -- stated that they were prepared to proceed with a hearing on November 8, 2016.
- (D) There may be reasonable alternatives to address Respondents' concerns about discovery short of postponing the hearing, e.g. extending the current discovery deadline. It is unclear whether the parties have thoroughly explored other options.
- (E) The hearing was originally scheduled for August 2, 2016. Respondents' request that the hearing be postponed until January 2017 is five months after the original hearing date.

The following ruling takes these considerations into account.

"First, the trial conflict of Matthew Scherer, one of Respondents' attorneys, does not constitute 'good cause' to move the hearing date. It appears that the conflicting trial date was set prior to the prehearing conference held on May 12, 2016, and Respondents were given the opportunity to discuss all potential scheduling conflicts at that time. In their supplemental motion, Respondents state that the conflicting trial date 'had not been placed on Mr. Scherer's calendar at the time of the prehearing conference.' Even if that is the case, the date conflict was not brought to the forum's attention until the second postponement motion was filed June 23, 2016. Therefore, Respondents have not demonstrated 'good cause' for a postponement for this reason.

"Second, there is insufficient information on the record at this time to support a showing of 'good cause' to postpone the hearing due to the volume of discovery and/or discovery disputes. The volume of discovery was discussed at the prehearing conference and the parties also indicated that they anticipated filing discovery motions. These factors were taken into consideration when scheduling case deadlines and the hearing date. Respondents' motion and supplemental motion reference discovery disputes and their efforts to hire additional personnel to manage the discovery. However, it is unclear whether these issues could have been anticipated at the time of the prehearing conference. Importantly, an analysis

of 'good cause' involves a showing of 'an excusable mistake or a circumstance over which the participant had no control.' OAR 839-050-0020(16). Respondents have not sustained their burden of proof in showing that there is 'good cause' to reset the hearing due to an 'excusable mistake' or new circumstances 'over which [Respondents] had no control.'

"Respondents have the ability to file a discovery motion and/or a motion to extend the discovery deadline if they believe that the Agency's discovery responses are inadequate. Those options have not yet been explored and the record is incomplete as to those potential issues. The record before the forum at this time does not demonstrate 'good cause' to reschedule the hearing. Respondents' motion and supplemental motion are DENIED."

(Exs. X32 - X35)

- 19) On July 20, 2016, the ALJ issued an interim order granting Respondents' motion filed on July 19, 2016, seeking an extension of time to respond to requests for informal discovery received from Complainant, which was not opposed by the Agency. (Exs. X39, X40)
- 20) On July 15, 2016, the Agency submitted a Motion to Compel Respondents to Conform Their Interrogatories to OAR 839-050-0200(6), asserting that "it remains unclear to the Agency how many interrogatories Respondents have actually served." On July 18, 2016, Respondents filed a Motion to Stay Briefing on Agency's Motion to Compel, arguing that Respondents believed the issues in dispute were capable of resolution. On July 29, 2016, Respondents submitted a timely response to the Agency's Motion to Compel. The ALJ issued an interim order ruling on the Agency's motion on August 3, 2017, which stated, in pertinent part:

"DISCUSSION AND RULING

"OAR 839-050-0200 states: 'The administrative law judge has the discretion to order discovery by a participant in an appropriate case.' At the outset, it is worth noting that the motion filed by the Agency does not request that the ALJ issue an order requiring Respondents to produce discovery. Rather, it appears more like a protective order pursuant to OAR 839-050-0150(8) in which the ALJ makes a predetermination as to whether information should be produced. It is not clear that the ALJ has the authority to make a ruling along the lines of what the Agency requests, essentially ruling in advance as to whether the informal discovery sent to the Agency by Respondents meets the requirements of OAR 839-050-0200(6).

"Instead, BOLI's rules provide for the parties to 'informally' exchange discovery without the involvement of the ALJ, and then to move for a motion to compel 'formal' discovery. See 839-050-0200(1), (8). Since Respondents have not yet filed a motion asking the forum to require the Agency to provide 'formal' discovery, the parties are in the 'informal' phase of discovery. Thus, there is

nothing for the forum to rule on at this point. Accordingly, the Agency's motion to compel is DENIED.

"Since Respondents filed a timely response to the Agency's motion, their motion to stay briefing is moot and is, therefore, DENIED.

"OBSERVATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS

"In order to assist the parties in moving forward with discovery, it appears that the parties could benefit from some observations, which are made solely for the purpose of assisting the parties and do not constitute an order to provide discovery.

"Because Respondents did not initially number their interrogatories and some appear to contain compound questions, it is understandable that there is some confusion between the parties. BOLI's rules do not specifically require interrogatories to be numbered, but that can be useful in determining how many have been issued.

"The response filed by Respondents is helpful in understanding Respondents' perspective as to how many interrogatories were promulgated by Respondents. All parties seem to agree that 175 interrogatories may be issued by Respondents. Respondents present alternative calculations of the amount of interrogatories they have promulgated as either 94 (using Respondents' method of calculation) or 138 (the Agency's method). The record before the forum at this time does not include a similar calculation from the Agency which disputes that Even if one assumes that the interrogatories in offered by Respondents. Respondents' first and second requests for informal discovery contained discrete subparts (which does appear to be the case), then there were 138 issued prior to Respondents' third request for informal discovery. Accordingly, it is difficult to understand the Agency's refusal to answer additional interrogatories. Nevertheless, since Respondents have not filed a motion to compel, the forum will not issue an order requiring the Agency to respond. In the Matter of Dr. Andrew Engel, DMD, PC, 32 BOLI 94, 97(2012) (declining to order that discovery be provided when respondents had not filed a motion for discovery order). The forum suggests the parties do the following:

The parties should begin with the assumption that 138 interrogatories were issued in Respondents' first and second informal requests. The first interrogatory in the third request appears to be the 139th interrogatory. (Unless briefing on a future motion to compel persuasively demonstrates that 138 is the incorrect number of interrogatories in the first and second informal request, the forum will assume that the third informal request began with interrogatory 139.)

At any time prior to the discovery motion deadline, Respondents may file a
motion to compel the Agency to respond if they believe they have not
received adequate responses. If necessary, Respondents may also file a
motion requesting permission to issue additional interrogatories.

- In responding to a motion to compel filed by Respondents, the Agency should be prepared to offer an explanation as to why Respondents' calculations as to the number of interrogatories are incorrect. The Agency should also offer its own alternative calculation so that the forum has a more specific understanding as to why the Agency disagrees with Respondents' version.
- The parties should keep in mind that when the forum is ruling on motions requesting depositions, the forum must determine whether 'other methods of discovery are so inadequate that the participant will be substantially prejudiced by the denial of a motion to depose a particular witness.' OAR 839-050-0200(3). Accordingly, Respondents' ability to obtain information from interrogatories will likely be a factor in ruling on those motions.

The observations and suggestions above should not be considered a ruling from the forum, but are merely offered to assist the parties in moving forward. If it would be helpful, the ALJ can be available for another telephone conference to discuss the matter."

(Exs. X37, X38, X44, X47)

21) During a prehearing telephone conference held on July 18, 2016, the parties and the ALJ discussed potential modifications to the existing case deadlines. After the conference, the parties indicated by email that they had reached an agreement to modify the case schedule as follows:

07/25/16	All informal discovery requests exchanged
08/08/16	All responses to informal discovery requests due
08/15/16	Motions to Compel filed
08/22/16	Responses to Motions to Compel filed

The ALJ issued an interim order on July 27, 2016, adopting the revised schedule. (Ex. X42)

22) On August 22, 2016, the ALJ issued an interim order amending the interim order issued on August 2, 2016, which ruled on Respondents' Motion to Dismiss, filed on April 29, 2016. The Agency responded to the motion on May 5, 2016. On July 12, 2016, Respondents filed a supplemental memorandum in support of their motion to dismiss. The Amended Interim Order re Respondents' Motion to Dismiss stated, in pertinent part:

Motion to Dismiss Individual Respondents Named as Aiders and Abettors

"Respondents also move to dismiss all of the individuals named as aiders and abettors, arguing that the Formal Charges do not allege facts which indicate how those Respondents aided or abetted the alleged harassment of the aggrieved persons. In support of their argument, Respondents rely on cases interpreting Oregon's Rules of Civil Procedure, which do not apply to this administrative proceeding. Instead, OAR 839-050-0060(1)(b) contains the standard for the sufficiency of a charging document and requires that a charging document contain a 'short and concise statement of the matters that constitute the violation.' *See also* ORS 183.415(3)(d) (adequate notice of an agency action must include a 'short and plain statement of the matters asserted or charged'). Respondents have not argued that the allegations in the Formal Charges fail to meet the applicable standard.²⁸

"Therefore, Respondent's motion to dismiss all of the individuals named as aiders and abettors is DENIED."

(Exs. X12, X18, X36, X47, X62, X74)

- An interim order was issued on August 5, 2016, granting Respondents' Motion to File Exhibit Under Seal and for a Protective Order, which was filed on August 3, 2016. The motion indicated that Exhibit D to Respondents' Motion to Dismiss, Abate, Substitute and/or Postpone contains Personal Identifying Information as defined in the forum's Interim Protective Order issued April 27, 2016. Specifically, Respondents indicated that Exhibit D contains the names and copies of signatures of the Aggrieved Persons. The Agency did not oppose the motion. The forum found that Respondents' description of the information in Exhibit D was Personal Identifying Information as defined in the forum's Interim Protective Order issued April 27, 2016. Accordingly, Respondents received permission to file Exhibit D under seal. (Exs. X49, X51)
- 24) On August 8, 2016, an interim order was issued granting the Agency's Motion for Protective Order Concerning Confidential Oregon Employment Department Records, filed July 22, 2016, asserting that it intended to disclose documents Bates numbered 019547-019830 ("OED Documents"). The Agency asserted that the

²⁸ As with all BOLI contested cases, the participants may address whether the Formal Charges meet the standard set forth in OAR 839-050-0060(1)(b) and ORS 183.415(3)(d) before a Final Order is issued. See, e.g. In the Matter of Hamilton, Grant and Leslie dba MacGregors, 33 BOLI 209, 217 (2014) (examining whether there was adequate notice in the charging document when determining whether prejudgment interest could be awarded).

documents were confidential and exempt from disclosure pursuant to ORS 657.665(1). Respondents did not oppose the motion. The ALJ's interim order stated, in pertinent part:

"The forum has reviewed [in camera] the OED Documents submitted by the Agency and agrees that the OED Documents are confidential under ORS 657.665(1). Since there is not a discovery motion pending, the forum is not issuing an interim order requiring that the OED Documents be produced. If/when the OED Documents are produced, Respondents are prohibited from making the OED Documents available or disseminating OED Documents to anyone other than Respondents' legal counsel in this matter. At the conclusion of this matter, all documents or electronic data containing OED Documents, whether or not found relevant or admitted into evidence (including all copies of OED Documents) are to be sealed within the records of this matter, returned to the Agency, or destroyed."

(Exs. X41, X54)

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On August 9, 2016, Respondents filed two motions: (1) a Motion to Seal 25) and Designate as "Confidential" Exhibit D to Respondents' Response in Opposition to Agency Motion to Compel Respondents to Conform Their Interrogatories to OAR 839-050-0200(6); and (2) Motion to File Motion to Compel and Accompanying Exhibits Under Seal and Designate as "Confidential." The motions indicated that these documents contain Personal Identifying Information as defined in the forum's Interim Protective Order issued April 27, 2016. The ALJ issued an interim order on August 11, 2016, which stated, in pertinent part:

"Although the Agency's time for responding to these motions has not passed, it appears that it will be beneficial to the parties to have a ruling issued on this matter now so that documents can be served and filed. The Agency may still file responses to these motions and this ruling may be revisited, if necessary.

"The forum finds that Respondents' description of the information in the motions filed by Respondents on August 9, 2016, appears to be Personal Identifying Information as defined in the forum's Interim Protective Order issued April 27, 2016. Accordingly, Respondents have permission to file these documents under seal and serve the same on the Agency subject to the Interim Protective Order.

"Any documents submitted for filing under seal should be placed in a separate envelope with a label that prominently states: CONFIDENTIAL - TO **BE FILED UNDER SEAL.**

"Respondents' motion is GRANTED."

(Ex. X63)

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26) On August 16, 2016, the forum issued an interim order ruling on Respondents' motion to depose Det. Opitz, which was filed on July 29, 2016. The Agency filed a response opposing the motion on August 5, 2016. Both parties provided information to the forum on August 9, 2016, in response to the interim order of August 8, 2016. The forum's interim order stated, in pertinent part:

"In a BOLI Contested Case proceeding, the ALJ's authority to issue an interim order allowing depositions is limited and is not as extensive as that provided in civil rules of procedure governing trial court proceedings. See, e.g., ORCP 39A ('any party may take the testimony of any person, including a party, by deposition upon oral examination'); FRCP 30(a)(1) ('A party may, by oral questions, depose any person, including a party, without leave of court,' subject to certain exceptions). BOLI's administrative rule, OAR 839-050-0200(3), provides:

'Depositions are strongly disfavored and will be allowed only when the requesting participant demonstrates that other methods of discovery are so inadequate that the participant will be substantially prejudiced by the denial of the motion to depose a particular witness.'

"Respondents assert that they would suffer substantial prejudice if they are unable to depose Det. Opitz because (1) he was 'deeply involved in the investigations related to both of the Aggrieved Persons'; (2) Respondents expect that he will testify at the hearing; and (3) Respondents will not have the opportunity to question him prior to the hearing and, because he is not a party, 'Respondents are unable to discover this information through interrogatories or requests for admission.' [They] also assert that they 'must have an adequate opportunity before hearing to thoroughly question him about his recollection of the events, much of which will not appear in documents subject to subpoena.'

"In response to the interim order of August 8, 2016, Respondents indicated that several efforts were made to speak to Det. Opitz informally. Although Det. Opitz appeared to be willing to speak to Respondents informally, the Beaverton City Attorney's office said that they would rather have any discussion with Det. Opitz take place pursuant to a subpoena and a deposition.

"In response to the interim order of August 8, 2016, the Agency provided the following regarding Det. Opitz:

- Police reports authored by Det. Opitz re Aggrieved Person # 1 (Bates Nos. 017115-017144, 017251-017253, 017279-017285, 017292-017297)
- Police reports authored by Det. Opitz re Aggrieved Person # 2 (Bates Nos. 017173-017181)
- Police reports authored by others describing Det. Opitz's investigation activities
- Transcript of Trial Testimony of Det. Opitz in Moreno-Hernandez Trial (re Aggrieved Person # 1) (Bates Nos. 017769-017931)

- Courtroom Log for the Trial of Moreno-Hernandez (re Aggrieved Person # 1), reflecting that Det. Opitz testified under oath as follows:
 - o From 10:57 a.m. − 11:59 a.m. on September 11, 2014 (Bates No. 000050)
 - o From 1:23 p.m. − 1:46 p.m. on September 11, 2014 (Bates Nos. 000050-000051)
 - From 1:53 p.m. 3:07 p.m. on September 11, 2014 (Bates Nos. 000051-000053)
 - From 3:19 p.m. 3:35 p.m. on September 11, 2014 (Bates No. 000053)
- Audio Recording of Det. Opitz's testimony in the trial of Moreno-Hernandez (re Aggrieved Person # 1) (Bates Nos. . 000281-000323)
- Transcript of Trial Testimony of Det. Opitz in Anthony Curry Trial (re Aggrieved Person # 2) (Bates Nos. 018314-018377)
- Courtroom Log for the Trial of Anthony Curry (re Aggrieved Person # 2), reflecting that Det. Opitz testified under oath as follows:
 - o From 10:16 a.m. 11:23 a.m. on June 2, 2015 (Bates No. 000394)
 - From 3:30 [p.m.] 4:55 p.m. on June 4, 2013 (Bates Nos. 000388-000389)
 - From 9:23 a.m. 10:38 a.m. on June 5, 2015 (Bates Nos. 000391-000392)
- Audio Recording of Det. Opitz's testimony in the trial of Anthony Curry (re Aggrieved Person # 2) (Bates Nos. . 415-429, 597-615, 623-639)
- There are also references to videotaped interviews that Opitz participated in, although it is not clear if Respondents were provided with a copy of those interviews.

"A recent BOLI Final Order addressed a Respondents' motion to depose a witness who was not a complainant or aggrieved person. See In the Matter of Klein, Melissa and Aaron dba Sweetcakes by Melissa ('Sweetcakes'), 34 BOLI 102 (2015), appeal pending. In Sweetcakes, the forum found that Respondents did not demonstrate the need to depose the witness (Cheryl McPherson), stating:

- "* * Respondents are typically provided with notes from investigative interviews of witnesses. Neither the Agency nor Respondents have provided information as to whether that occurred in this case. However, unless Respondents did not receive the usual investigative notes of the Agency's interview with Cheryl McPherson or no such notes exist because McPherson was never interviewed, I deny Respondents' request to take her deposition."
- *Id.* at 151. There do not appear to be any BOLI Final Orders authorizing the deposition of a non-party witness.

"As illustrated above, the information provided to Respondents in this case (police reports and sworn testimony of Det. Opitz regarding both Aggrieved

Persons) was extensive and likely significantly more detailed than the 'usual investigative notes' discussed in *Sweetcakes*. Respondents have not articulated any specific information that is missing from the police reports and trial testimony that they need to obtain from Det. Opitz. Given the policy set forth in OAR 839-050-0200(3) disfavoring depositions and the precedent set in the *Sweetcakes* case, the forum is unable to conclude that Respondents will be 'substantially prejudiced' if they cannot depose Det. Opitz.

"Respondents' motion is DENIED."

(Exs. X46, X52, X53, X70)

27) On August 22, 2016, the forum issued an interim order ruling on Respondents' motion to depose AP1 and AP2, which was filed on July 29, 2016. The Agency filed a response opposing the motion on August 5, 2016. Both parties provided information to the forum on August 9, 2016, in response to the interim order of August 8, 2016. The forum's interim order stated, in pertinent part:

"In a BOLI contested case proceeding, the ALJ's authority to issue an interim order allowing depositions is limited and is not as extensive as that provided in civil rules of procedure governing trial court proceedings. See, e.g., ORCP 39A ('any party may take the testimony of any person, including a party, by deposition upon oral examination'); FRCP 30(a)(1) ('A party may, by oral questions, depose any person, including a party, without leave of court,' subject to certain exceptions). BOLI's administrative rule, OAR 839-050-0200(3), provides:

'Depositions are strongly disfavored and will be allowed only when the requesting participant demonstrates that other methods of discovery are so inadequate that the participant will be substantially prejudiced by the denial of the motion to depose a particular witness.'

"Respondents assert that they would suffer substantial prejudice if they are unable to depose the Aggrieved Persons because the amount of damages requested for each Aggrieved Person (\$4 million) 'necessarily implies the existence of harm that goes far beyond that suffered by most victims of employment discrimination.' Respondents describe the information they would need to obtain as follows:

'Respondents must have an adequate opportunity before hearing to fully ascertain not only the nature of the Aggrieved Persons' alleged experiences at Stars Cabaret & Steak House, but also how those experiences might have interacted with other contributing sources of physical and emotional harm that may have been present in their lives. To do this effectively, Respondents must have the opportunity to thoroughly question each Aggrieved Person about not only the events alleged in the Formal Charges, but also other potential events that may have affected the Aggrieved

Person' physical and emotional state, whether by contributing to the alleged harm they suffered or by mitigating the damages they incurred. Such events may have occurred not only during the time periods alleged in the Formal Charges, but also before and after those periods, and Respondents will be unable to fully assess the nature of the Aggrieved Persons' damages without such an opportunity.'

"As indicated above, in order for respondents to demonstrate the need to take a deposition, they must show that 'other methods of discovery are so inadequate that the participant will be substantially prejudiced by the denial of the motion to depose a particular witness." OAR 839-050-0200(3). The forum has previously noted that Respondents 'must first attempt to gain the information via sworn statements through interrogatories." In the Matter of Blachana, LLC, 32 BOLI 220, 224 (2013), affirmed Blachana, LLC v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 273 Or App 806, 359 P3d 574 (2015). In Blachana, the forum stated that the respondents could renew their motion to depose witnesses '[i]f the Agency is uncooperative in responding to interrogatories or if Respondents can demonstrate that the information it has obtained from the interrogatories will substantially prejudice Respondents in the absence of a deposition * * * ." Id.

"Based on BOLI's rule and the *Blachana* precedent, it was necessary to determine what discovery had been requested and exchanged on the issue of the Aggrieved Persons' damages. Accordingly, an interim order was issued on August 8, 2016, asking Respondents to provide the forum with a 'copy of all interrogatories and requests for admission that Respondents issued which address the issue of damages, along with the Agency's answers to those interrogatories and requests for admission.' In response, Respondents provided copies of Interrogatory Nos. 21, 22, 31-52, 57 and 135, along with the Agency's responses. Respondents also provided copies of Request for Admission Nos. 1, 2, 22, 46, 83 and Requests for Production Nos. 17 and 18, along with the Agency's responses to those requests.

"The interim order of August 8, 2016, also invited the Agency to submit copies of police reports and transcripts that had been provided to Respondents in discovery. In response to the forum's request, the Agency provided the following documents:

- Police reports authored by Det. Opitz re Aggrieved Person # 1 (Bates Nos. 017115-017144, 017251-017253, 017279-017285, 017292-017297)
- Police reports authored by others describing Det. Opitz's investigation activities
- Transcript of Testimony of Aggrieved Person # 1 in Moreno-Hernandez Trial (Bates Nos. 017561-017608)
- Courtroom Log for the Trial of Moreno-Hernandez reflecting that Aggrieved Person # 1 testified under oath as follows:
 - From 1:49 p.m. 2:11 p.m. on September 10, 2014 (Bates No. 000044)

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- o From 2:27 p.m. − 2:59 p.m. on September 10, 2014 (Bates Nos. 000045)
- Audio Recording of the testimony [of] Aggrieved Person # 1 in the trial of Moreno-Hernandez (Bates Nos. 000232-000244)
- Police reports authored by Det. Opitz re Aggrieved Person # 2 (Bates Nos. 017173-017181)
- Transcript of Trial Testimony of re Aggrieved Person # 2 in Anthony Curry Trial (Bates Nos. 018912-019035)
- Courtroom Log for the Trial of Anthony Curry reflecting that Aggrieved Person # 2 testified under oath as follows:
 - o From 10:09 a.m. 10:58 a.m. on June 4, 2015 (Bates No. 000385)
 - From 11:12 a.m. 11:57 a.m. on June 4, 2015 (Bates Nos. . 000385-000386)
 - From 1:45 p.m. 2:36 p.m. on June 4, 2015 (Bates Nos. 000386-000387)
- Audio Recording of the testimony of Aggrieved Person # 2 in the trial of Anthony Curry (Bates Nos. 000556-000576, 000578-000587)
- There are also references a videotaped **REDACTED** interview of Aggrieved Person # 2, although it is not clear if Respondents were provided with a copy of that interview.
- The documents also suggest that Respondents were provided with copies of medical records of the Aggrieved Persons.

"The information provided by the Agency is quite extensive and includes testimony and statements from both of the Aggrieved Persons about events that took place at the Beaverton Stars which are the subject of the Formal Charges. These documents also contain detailed, descriptive statements from each Aggrieved Party about their whereabouts and activities during the time period immediately before and after they were at the Beaverton Stars location. The amount of information provided in these documents is more detailed than what is usually exchanged in a BOLI civil rights case. Nevertheless, the forum recognizes that Respondents likely have a need for additional relevant information that was not covered in the criminal investigations and trials. Of the discovery requested by Respondents on the issue of damages, the Agency provided substantive answers (either in written narrative responses or by referring to documents produced in discovery) to Interrogatory Nos. 21, 22, 31-35, 37-41, and 43-51, but objected on the grounds of 'overbreadth and relevance' to Interrogatory Nos. 36 and 42, and objected to Interrogatory No57 on the basis of relevance.29 The Agency also objected to Interrogatory Nos. 47, 52 and 135 on the grounds that they were 'overbroad,' along with other objections. The Agency answered Request for Admission Nos. 1, 22, 46 and 83, and indicated that it had provided all information

²⁹ The observations in this ruling are made solely for the purpose of ruling on Respondents' motion requesting depositions. When ruling on the pending motions to compel filed August 15, 2016, the forum may conclude that additional discovery needs to be provided.

within its possession in response to Requests for Production Nos. 17 and 18.

"Respondents have adequately demonstrated that, before requesting depositions, they first attempted to obtain discovery through the use of interrogatories. Accordingly, the forum must determine if (1) the Agency was 'uncooperative' in its responses or (2) 'if Respondents can demonstrate that the information it has obtained from the interrogatories will substantially prejudice Respondents in the absence of a deposition.' *Blachana*, 32 BOLI at 224.

"Analysis of the Agency's Level of Cooperation

"The Agency responded to virtually all of the requests about damages, aside from the objections noted above. The interrogatories with objections and the responses to those interrogatories were:

'Interrogatory³⁰ 36: With respect to each condition of Aggrieved Person #1 state any other causes of emotional distress in the Aggrieved Person's life.' 'The Agency objects to this interrogatory, on the basis of overbreadth and relevance.'

'Interrogatory 42: With respect to each condition of Aggrieved Person #2 state any other causes of emotional distress in the Aggrieved Person's life.' 'The Agency objects to this interrogatory, on the basis of overbreadth and relevance.'

'Interrogatory 47: Identify any person whom believed [sic] to have knowledge or information concerning each type of element of damages and relief for which the Agency intends to seek relief at the trial of this case, and state separately which respect [sic] to each such person any and all facts, knowledge and information each such person is believed to have, on behalf of Aggrieved Person #1.'

'The Agency objects to this interrogatory as overbroad. To the extent that the Agency can accurately respond: all persons with knowledge of the case, that the Agency has been able to identify, are contained within the previously provided discovery. To the extent that Respondents are requesting the Agency's potential witness list in this matter, the Agency has not begun constructing such a list at this time. At such time as the list is finalized, ordered to be provided to a case summary, the Agency will provide its witness list.'

'Interrogatory 52: Identify any person whom believed [sic] to have knowledge or information concerning each type of element of damages and

³⁰ The quoted language is taken from the Agency's responses provided to the forum by Respondents, and possibly may differ from the exact wording of Respondents' original interrogatories.

relief for which the Agency intends to seek relief at the trial of this case, and state separately which respect [sic] to each such person any and all facts, knowledge and information each such person is believed to have, on behalf of Aggrieved Person #2.'

'The Agency objects to this interrogatory as overbroad. To the extent that the Agency can accurately respond: all persons with knowledge of the case, that the Agency has been able to identify, are contained within the previously provided discovery. To the extent that Respondents are requesting the Agency's potential witness list in this matter, the Agency has not begun constructing such a list at this time. At such time as the list is finalized, ordered to be provided to a case summary, the Agency will provide its witness list.'

'Interrogatory 57: Did Aggrieved Person #1 receive restitution from Steven Toth pursuant to O.R.S. § 137.106? If so, provide all information relevant to such restitution.'

'The Agency objects to this interrogatory, on the basis of relevance. Any restitution ordered in connection to the criminal liability of Respondents' manager Steve Toth, for his crimes against Aggrieved Person #1, is irrelevant to the liability of Respondents or damages sought for their unlawful conduct against Aggrieved Person #1.'

'Interrogatory 135: Describe all verbal communications between either of the Aggrieved Persons and any employee of the Agency – including the Commissioner – between 2012 and the present regarding or referring to the possibility that the Aggrieved Persons would file and civil or administrative action. The description should include the date, persons present, and the substance of the conversation.'

'The Agency objects to this interrogatory as to form because it contains multiple subparts.

- '(a) Aggrieved Person #1: The Agency objects to this request as it is overbroad, vague and requests information not generally relevant to the factual matters alleged in this case. The agency objects to this request to the extent it requests information subject to work-product and/or attorney-client information.
- '(b) Aggrieved Person #2: The Agency objects to this request as it is overbroad, vague and requests information not generally relevant to the factual matters alleged in this case. The agency objects to this request to the extent it requests information subject to work-product and/or attorney-client information.'

"Almost all of the objections to these interrogatories include an objection on the basis of relevance. 'Any discovery request must be reasonably likely to produce information that is generally relevant to the case.' OAR 839-050-0200(7).

"Interrogatory Nos. 36 and 42 request information about other causes of emotional distress. The forum has previously found that medical records close in time to the events in the case 'contained information generally relevant to the issue of Complainant's entitlement to damages for emotional, mental, and physical suffering.' *In the Matter of Dr. Andrew Engel, DMD, PC*, 32 BOLI 94, 97 (2012). Accordingly, Respondents are entitled to information about other potential causes of emotional distress in the time period near the events in this case. For purposes of this case and due to the ages of the Aggrieved Persons, the forum finds that Respondents are entitled to responses within the time period of one year prior to the events in the Formal Charges up until present day.

"Interrogatory Nos. 47 and 52 ask for the names of witnesses to the damages sought by Aggrieved Person #2. 'Discovery may include but is not limited to * * * [d]isclosure of names and addresses of witnesses expected to testify at the hearing.' OAR 839-050-0200(2)(a). Accordingly, Respondents are entitled to this information and should not have to wait until the Agency files its case summary two weeks prior to the hearing.

"Interrogatory No. 57 requests information about whether Aggrieved Person # 1 received restitution from Steven Toth, the former employee at Stars who was convicted of crimes relating to his conduct involving Aggrieved Person # 1. Accordingly, because Toth's conviction may relate to his conduct while acting as an employee at the Beaverton Stars, the requested information satisfies the relevancy standard set forth in OAR 839-050-0200(7).

"The Agency's objections to Interrogatory No. 135 are consistent with the forum's precedent establishing that communications with the Agency's staff about the prosecution of a case are privileged. See In the Matter of Columbia Components, Inc., 32 BOLI 257, 265 (2013) (notes made by the case presenter³¹ were privileged under the work product doctrine); In the Matter of Logan International, Ltd., 26 BOLI 254, 257-58 (2005) (the Agency did not have to produce interviews specifically conducted by the case presenter). Thus, Respondents are not entitled to this information.

"As discussed above, Respondents were entitled to receive some information that the Agency refused to provide. Accordingly, the Agency is instructed to provide responses to Interrogatory Nos. 36, 42,32 47 and 52 no later than August 30, 2016. If the Agency fails to provide those responses, Respondents may request a telephone conference to address the matter and, if necessary, this ruling will be revisited.

³¹ Currently, administrative prosecutors perform the duties that used to be carried out by case presenters.

³² Answers to Interrogatories 36 and 42 can be restricted to the time period of one year prior to the events described in the Formal Charges up until the present day.

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"Respondents also assert that they will be substantially prejudiced if they are not able to question the Aggrieved Persons about their damages in a deposition, relying on the case of Melissa and Aaron Klein dba Sweetcakes by Melissa ('Sweetcakes'), 34 BOLI 102 (2015), appeal pending. In Sweetcakes, the Agency had identified '178 types of alleged harm' in response to the respondents' interrogatories. Id. at 195. The ALJ made the following ruling regarding the respondents' request to depose the complainants:

'I have reviewed prior BOLI Final Orders in which damages were awarded for emotional and mental suffering and find that this case stands well apart from all its predecessors in the exhaustive list of harms alleged by Complainants for which the Agency seeks damages. No other case comes even remotely close. In defending themselves, Respondents have a right to inquire into each type of harm alleged by Complainants to determine the extent of the harm and whether Complainants' physical, mental, and emotional suffering was caused, at least in part, if not in whole, by events and circumstances that were unrelated to Aaron Klein's ORS 659A.403 violation. Based on the sheer number and variety of types of alleged harm, there is no practical way Respondents can accomplish an effective inquiry using interrogatories. I find that Respondents will be substantially prejudiced if they are not allowed to depose Complainants.'

Id. at 196 (emphasis added). By contrast, in this case there is a 'practical way' for the Agency to provide information about the alleged harm by answering the Additionally, Respondents have already interrogatories discussed above. received documents with testimony and statements describing how the Aggrieved Persons were living and their activities immediately before and after their work at the Beaverton Stars. Accordingly, if the Agency supplements their interrogatory answers as instructed above, Respondents should not be substantially prejudiced if they are unable to depose the Aggrieved Persons.

"Given the policy set forth in OAR 839-050-0200(3) disfavoring depositions and BOLI's precedential cases, the forum is unable to unable to conclude that Respondents will be 'substantially prejudiced' if they cannot depose Aggrieved Person # 1 and Aggrieved Person # 2.

"With the exception of the instruction to supplement the answers to Interrogatories 36, 42, 47 and 52 set forth above, Respondents' motion is DENIED."

(Exs. X45, X52, X53, X73)

On August 10, 2016, Respondents filed a document titled Motions to Reconsider the Denial of Respondents' Motions to Dismiss so the Tribunal May Apply the

Correct Legal Standards. The filing consisted of two motions: (1) a motion requesting reconsideration of the forum's interim order of August 1, 2016; and (2) a motion requesting reconsideration of the forum's interim order of May 31, 2016. The Agency submitted a timely response to the motions on August 24, 2016. On August 25, 2016, an interim order was issued which stated as follows, in pertinent part:

"MOTION NO. 1 RE INTERIM ORDER ISSUED AUGUST 1, 2016

"Respondents first assert that the interim order of August 1, 2016, incorrectly cites to a portion of the case of *OR-OSHA v. CBI Servs., Inc.*, 356 Or 577, 341 P3d 701 (2014), which discusses the interpretation of a delegative statutory term, not an inexact term. On August 22, 2016, the forum issued an Amended Interim Order replacing the *OR-OSHA* citations with references to *Bergerson v. Salem-Keizer Sch. Dist.*, 341 Or 401, 411, 144 P3d 918 (2006), which states that an agency's interpretation of inexact terms is to be reviewed 'to ensure that it is consistent with the legislature's intent.' The forum also notes that the correct standard was used and discussed in the Interim Order of August 1, 2016, as follows:

"To determine the meaning which should be given to this inexact phrase, this forum must ascertain what the Legislature meant by using it." *In the Matter of Mini-Mart Foodstores, Inc., an Oregon Corporation, Respondent*, 3 BOLI 262, 274 (1983). See also J.R. Simplot, 340 Or at 198 (an interpretation of an inexact term is reviewed "to determine whether the agency's action effectuated the legislative policy, as evidenced by the text and context of the statute.").'

The interim order of August 1, 2016, examined legislative intent to ascertain the meaning of the statute. Since the applicable administrative rule is consistent with that intent, no further modifications to the Interim Order of August 1, 2016, are necessary.

"Second, Respondents also assert that the Interim Order of August 1, 2015, is inconsistent with the Final Order in the case of *In the Matter of Maltby Biocontrol, Inc.*, 33 BOLI 121 (2014). As Respondents point out, one of the complaints in *Maltby* was filed by Oregon's Attorney General. The administrative rule at issue in this case (OAR 839-003-0100(2)) applies to complaints filed by the Commissioner, not the Attorney General. Accordingly, the forum's ruling does not conflict with the *Maltby* decision.

"Third, Respondents assert that the phrase 'in the same manner as' is an exact term, not an inexact term. However, none of the cases cited by Respondents indicate that it is an exact term, meaning that it has 'relatively precise meaning.' Springfield Educ. Ass'n v. Springfield Sch. Dist. No. 19, 290 Or 217, 223, 621 P2d 547, 558 (1980). For the reasons set forth in the Interim Order of August 1, 2016, the forum declines to change its ruling that the statute contains an 'inexact' term.

"The remainder of Respondents' arguments essentially request that the forum reconsider the analysis of the applicable statutes and regulation. For the reasons explained in detail in the interim order of August 1, 2016 and the amended interim order of August 22, 2016, the forum declines to change its ruling.

"Motion No. 1 is DENIED.

"MOTION NO. 2 RE INTERIM ORDER ISSUED MAY 31, 2016

"Motion No. 2 asks the forum to reconsider the Interim Order of May 31, 2016, denying Respondents' motion to dismiss, transfer or remove this matter due to the risk of 'bias and prejudgment.' The vast majority of this motion appears to question the Agency's evidence that the Deputy Commissioner will be issuing the Final Order in this case. However, the arguments are merely speculative and the forum declines to revisit its analysis in the interim order of May 31, 2016.

"The only new evidence put forth by Respondents is in the form of an email from the Deputy Commissioner to members of BOLI's staff with the subject line 'Additional coverage regarding Stars/pimps.' Ex. A to Respondent Motion, p. 1. The email has links to two news articles from oregonlive.com summarizing criminal proceedings for individuals convicted of crimes based on their conduct involving the Aggrieved Persons.

"Procedural due process requires a decision maker to be free of actual bias; Respondents have the burden of demonstrating an actual bias. See Teledyne Wah Chang v. Energy Facility Siting Council, 298 Or 240, 262 (1985), citing Boughan v. Board of Engineering Examiners, 46 Or App 287, 611 P.2d 670, rev den 289 Or 588 (1980). The forwarded news articles indicate that some of the criminal conduct occurred at one of Respondents' establishments, but do not discuss further details related to the Formal Charges. The email forwarding these articles does not establish that the Deputy Commissioner is 'personally biased against' Respondents. See Samuel v. Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners, 77 Or App 53, 60, 712 P2d 132, 137 (1985), rev den, 300 Or 704 (1986), and rev den, 302 Or 36 (1986).

"Accordingly, the motion is also DENIED.

"NOTICE TO THE PARTIES

"The forum notes that both the Agency and Respondents have each submitted ancillary documents with titles such as 'supplemental' motion, motion for 'clarification,' or motion to 'reconsider.' Although the forum has made substantive rulings on some of these motions, those filings are not specifically covered in BOLI's contested case rules and have started to impact the efficiency of the contested case process. Absent unusual circumstances, the forum does not

³³ Because this provision does not apply to ORS 659A.825, it is not necessary to examine whether the Washington County cases "alleg[e] the same matters" as the Formal Charges.

intend to entertain these extraneous motions in the future and will issue interim orders denying such motions before the opposing party responds. If the parties disagree with a ruling made in an interim order, they will have the opportunity to address that by filing exceptions after the Proposed Order is issued pursuant to OAR 839-050-0380."

(Exs. X62, X79, X80)

29) On August 3, 2016, Respondents filed a document titled Motion to Dismiss, Abate, or Substitute Parties and/or Postpone the Action. The Agency filed a timely response opposing the motion on August 17, 2016. All of the arguments raised in Respondents' motions relate to civil complaints filed in Washington County Circuit Court on July 7, 2016, on behalf of AP1 and AP2. Each Complaint for Damages was filed by a guardian ad litem on behalf of each aggrieved person. On August 25, 2016, the ALJ issued an interim order which stated, in pertinent part:

"MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

"Respondents contend that BOLI's jurisdiction over the matters alleged in the Formal Charges 'ceased when the Aggrieved Persons filed their civil actions in Washington County.' Their motion is based on several provisions of ORS chapter 659A and various other legal and public policy doctrines.

"A. ORS 659A.820(3)

"Respondents first cite to ORS 659A.820(3)(a) which states that 'a complaint may not be filed under *this section* if a civil action has been commenced in state or federal court alleging the same matters.' (Emphasis added). Immediately prior to the subpart cited by Respondents, the statute makes clear that it pertains to '[a]ny person claiming to be aggrieved by an alleged unlawful practice.' ORS 659A.820(2). It does not apply to complaints filed by the Commissioner, which are governed separately by ORS 659A.825. Accordingly, because the complainant in this case is the Commissioner, ORS 659A.820 does not apply and this argument requires no further analysis.³³

"B. <u>ORS 659A.870(1)</u>

"Respondents next assert that ORS 659A.820(3)(a) should be extended to apply to Commissioner's complaints, relying on ORS 659A.870(1). That statute specifically refers to 'the right of the person to file a complaint with the Commissioner * * * under ORS 659A.820 with respect to the matters alleged in the civil action.' ORS 659A.870(1). The statute specifically mentions ORS 659A.820

(BOLI complaints filed by aggrieved persons) without reference to ORS 659A.825 (BOLI complaints filed by the Commissioner). Notably, when the legislature wanted to refer to both ORS 659A.820 and 659.825 together, it did so. See, e.g., ORS 659A.835(1) ('after the filing of any complaint under ORS 659A.820 or 659A.825, the Commissioner * * * may investigate the complaint'); ORS 659A.835(2) ('The Commissioner shall commence an investigation of any complaint filed under ORS 659A.820 or 659A.825 * * *'); ORS 659A.855(2)(a) (if a complaint 'is filed under ORS 659A.820 or 659A.825' alleging housing law violations, the commissioner may assess specified civil penalties). The forum will not insert ORS 659A.825 into 659A.830(1) when the legislature omitted it. ORS 174.010.

"Accordingly, the forum finds Respondents' argument is without merit and declines to extend the reach of ORS 659A.820(3)(a).

"C. ORS 659A.830(1)

"Respondents next rely on ORS 659A.830(1), asserting that 'the legislature intended for a BOLI administrative action to cease upon the filing of a civil action 'alleging the same matters' even if the administrative action was filed <u>before</u> the civil action.' (Emphasis in original). The portion of ORS 659A.830(1) relied on by Respondents states:

'[A]II authority of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Labor and Industries to conduct investigations or other proceedings to resolve a complaint filed under ORS 659A.820 ceases upon the filing of a civil action by the complainant alleging the same matters that are the basis of the complaint under ORS 659A.820.'

As previously stated, the legislature clearly referred to both ORS 659A.820 and 659A.825 when it intended to do so. However, it did not include ORS 659A.825 in ORS 659A.830(1). Therefore, as previously stated, the forum will not insert ORS 659A.825 into ORS 659A.830(1) when it has been omitted.

"D. Legislative Policy of ORS Chapter 659A

"Respondents also argue that 'dismissal is still appropriate because the relevant provisions in ORS Chapter 659A paint a clear picture of legislative policy: The legislature did not wish for civil and BOLI proceedings to proceed simultaneously.' The forum agrees that the legislature appeared to have that intention with respect to claims filed by aggrieved persons under ORS 659A.820. However, as previously stated, ORS 659A.825 is conspicuously absent from all of the statutes which seek to prevent BOLI administrative proceedings and court cases from proceeding simultaneously.

"E. 'Public Policy and a Host of Legal Doctrines'

"Respondents contend that allowing this case to 'continue would violate public policy and a host of legal doctrines developed to prevent duplicative litigation and multiple recoveries.' Importantly, Respondents' motion to dismiss is based on an alleged lack of subject matter jurisdiction, which is grounds for dismissal under OAR 839-050-0150(1)(a). It is questionable as to whether these legal theories actually deprive the forum of subject matter jurisdiction and, thus, for that reason the motion may not be well taken. Notwithstanding the procedural basis for the motion, the theories discussed in Respondents' motion do not support dismissal for the reasons described below.

"1. Res Judicata

"[C]laim preclusion" as that term is typically used, formerly known as *res judicata*, prohibits a party from relitigating a cause of action against the same defendant involving the same factual transaction as was litigated in the previous adjudication, *if there has been a final judgment in the first action.*' *Krisor v. Lake Cty. Fair Bd.*, 256 Or App 190, 193, 302 P3d 455, 457 (2013), *rev den*, 354 Or 61 (2013) (emphasis added), quoting *Drews v. EBI Companies*, 310 Or 134, 139-40, 795 P2d 531 (1990). Because no final judgment has been entered involving the parties in this case, this doctrine does not apply.³⁴

"2. <u>Election of Remedies</u>

"The Oregon Supreme Court has recently explained the doctrine of election of remedies as follows:

'* * The doctrine of election between inconsistent remedies does not require an election before the entry of judgment. A party need only choose between or among inconsistent remedies, not inconsistent claims or theories of recovery. ORCP 16 C; see also Colonial Leasing Co. v. Tracy, 276 Or 1193, 1196–97, 557 P.2d 639 (1976) ("Ordinarily an election is not made until a judicial proceeding has gone to judgment on the merits."). Accordingly, subject to the limiting principles discussed above, when it comes to an election of remedies, the choice is for the claimant to make, not the defendant or the court.'

Evergreen W. Bus. Ctr., LLC v. Emmert, 354 Or 790, 805–06, 323 P3d 250 (2014) (emphasis added). Since the doctrine only applies to a choice a claimant may need to make *before* judgment has been entered, it does not bar the current case

³⁴ Because there has been no final judgment, it is not necessary to examine the other elements needed to establish claim preclusion.

³⁵ Because the doctrine does not apply, it is not necessary to examine the Agency's argument that the Formal Charges and the July 2016 lawsuit "involve neither the same parties, nor the same claims."

"3. Prohibition Against Multiple Recoveries

"The theory of preventing multiple recoveries is a policy decision which is sometimes adopted by the legislature, and sometimes it is not. See, e.g. White v. Jubitz Corp., 347 Or 212, 223, 219 P3d 566, 572 (2009) (when interpreting ORS 31.580, the court concluded that 'the legislature did not preclude "double recovery" of collateral source benefits'). When such a provision is not included in the statute, it will not be inserted. ORS 174.010.

"4. Another Action Pending

"Respondents assert that there is a requirement to dismiss an action 'when another action is pending involving the same or substantially the same parties, subject matter, and remedies.' However, the cases cited by Respondents do not support their contention that this doctrine 'requires' dismissal of an administrative proceeding. On the contrary, the Oregon Court of Appeals has supported the continuation of administrative proceedings when there is related litigation, noting:

The [Insurance] Division has primary responsibility for enforcing the Insurance Code, a duty which prompted the present proceeding. Any type of violation which involves two or more entities is likely to result in associated litigation between them, which in turn is likely to encompass issues which are before the Division in an administrative proceeding. In some instances, the party seeking recovery may rely on the very statute upon which administrative disciplinary action is predicated. To hold that the Division had to delay its consideration of the disciplinary matter pending the outcome of related litigation would frustrate its enforcement efforts. The existence of a prior court determination that a statute was or was not violated could complicate the agency's task significantly. Logically, it makes more sense to stay the litigation pending interpretation of a statute by the agency with expertise in the area, which is charged by law with construing, expressing and enforcing legislative policy. We conclude that there was no abuse of discretion in denying the stay in this case.'

Bonneville Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ins. Div., Dep't of Commerce, 53 Or App 440, 448, 632 P2d 796, 801 (1981). See also Sawyer v. Real Estate Agency, 268 Or App 42, 55, 342 P3d 104, 112 (2014) (upholding administrative law judge's denial of motion to stay proceedings to revoke real estate license while criminal charges were pending). Therefore, this argument also does not support the dismissal of the Formal Charges.

"5. Avoiding Inconsistent Judgments

"Respondents also contend that there is a risk of inconsistent judgments if the Washington County civil lawsuits are amended to add employment claims on behalf of the Aggrieved Persons. That has not yet occurred. Moreover, any actions in the trial court are outside of the jurisdiction of this forum and would need to be raised in that venue. Accordingly, this argument also does not warrant dismissal of the Formal Charges.

"6. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

"The Oregon Supreme Court has recently described this legal theory as follows: 'The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies generally provides that "[j]udicial review is only available after the procedure for relief within the administrative body itself has been followed without success." *Miller v. City of Portland*, 356 Or 402, 418, 338 P3d 685, 694 (2014), quoting *Mullenaux v. Dept. of Revenue*, 293 Or 536, 539, 651 P2d 724 (1982). Since the doctrine applies to 'judicial review' by a court, not administrative contested case proceedings, it is not grounds for dismissing the Formal Charges in this case.

"7. Conclusion

"Since the various legal theories discussed above do not support dismissal, the motion to dismiss is DENIED.

"MOTION TO ABATE

"As previously stated, the Oregon Court of Appeals has held that administrative proceedings need not be stayed pending related court proceedings. See, e.g. Sawyer, 268 Or App at 62 (ALJ did not err in denying petitioner's motion to stay the proceedings while a criminal case was pending); Bonneville Auto. Ins. Co., 53 Or App at 448 (finding no abuse of discretion in denial of motion to stay Insurance Division case).

"Accordingly, this motion is also DENIED.

"MOTION TO SUBSTITUTE PARTIES

"Respondents also request that the forum remove the Commissioner as the complainant in this case and add the Aggrieved Persons pursuant to OAR 839-050-0170(1) and (5). In support of this argument, Respondents point to various legal theories, such as 'real parties in interest' and the right to due process, but provide no legal briefing to show how those theories might require the forum to substitute parties.

"Respondents also assert that they have a right to a jury trial under Article I, § 17 of the Oregon Constitution, citing to the recent case of *Horton v. OHSU*, 359 Or 168, __ P3d ___ (2016). Article I, § 17 of the Oregon Constitution states:

'In all civil cases the right of Trial by Jury shall remain inviolate.'

In *Horton*, the Oregon Supreme Court addressed the issue of a cap on damages and overruled precedent which 'impose[d] a substantive limit on the legislature's authority to define the elements of a claim or the extent of damages available for a claim.' *Id.* at ___, *38. However, more applicable to this case, the court affirmed cases that 'establish that Article I, section 17 guarantees litigants a procedural right to have a jury rather than a judge decide those common-law claims and defenses that customarily were tried to a jury when Oregon adopted its constitution in 1857, as well as those claims and defense that are "of like nature." In other words, if a cause of action allowed for a jury trial at the time the Oregon Constitution was adopted in 1857, then a person filing the same cause of action in court today also has a right to a jury trial.

"However, there is no constitutional entitlement to a jury trial as to the claims under ORS chapter 659A alleged in the Formal Charges, as there was not a right to a jury trial for such claims in 1857. See, e.g., Wincer v. Ind. Paper Stock Co., 48 Or App 859, 863, 618 P.2d 15 (1980). See also In the Matter of Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc., 27 BOLI 242, 245 (2006), 36 citing Cornelison v. Seabold, 254 Or 401, 404-05 (1969); Williams v. Joyce, 4 Or App 482, 501 (1971); Fred Meyer, Inc. v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 39 Or App 253 (1979); City of Portland v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 61 Or App 182, 193 (1982).

"Accordingly the motion to substitute is also DENIED.

"MOTION TO POSTPONE

"Respondents also move to postpone the case, essentially relying on most of the arguments made in support of their other motions.

"For the same reason discussed in ruling on the motions above, the motion to postpone is also DENIED."

(Exs. X50, X71, X81)

30) The Agency filed a Motion to Compel discovery on August 15, 2016. Respondents responded to the motion on August 22, 2016. On September 7, 2016, an interim order was issued ruling on the motion which stated, in pertinent part:

³⁶ This Final Order was reversed on other grounds in *Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Bureau of Labor and Industries*, 348 Or 159, 230 P3d 518 (2010).

1 "LEGAL STANDARD 2 'Any discovery

'Any discovery request must be reasonably likely to produce information that is generally relevant to the case.' OAR 839-050-0200(7). In determining whether a request is 'reasonably likely to produce information that is generally relevant to the case,' it is important to take note of the claims and defenses in the case.

"Discrimination/Sexual Harassment

"The Formal Charges allege that 'Respondents' discriminated against both Aggrieved Persons in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment, in violation of ORS 659A.030(1)(b), former and current OAR 839-005-0021(1), (2) and former and current OAR 839-005-0030. ORS 659A.030(1)(b) states, in pertinent part, that it is an unlawful employment practice '[f]or an employer, because of an individual's * * * sex * * * to discriminate against the individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.' OAR 839-005-0021 states:

- '(1) Employers are not required to treat all employees exactly the same, but are prohibited from using sex as the basis for employment decisions with regard to hiring, promotion or discharge; or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment such as benefits and compensation.
- '(2) Discrimination because of sex includes sexual harassment, discrimination based on pregnancy, childbirth and medical conditions and occurrences related to pregnancy and childbirth.'

OAR 839-005-0030 states:

'Sexual Harassment in Employment

- '(1) Sexual harassment is unlawful discrimination on the basis of sex and includes the following types of conduct:
- '(a) Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or other conduct of a sexual nature when such conduct is directed toward an individual because of that individual's sex and:
- '(A) Submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of employment; or
- '(B) Submission to or rejection of such conduct is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting that individual.

- '(b) Any unwelcome verbal or physical conduct that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to have the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with work performance or creating a hostile, intimidating or offensive working environment.
- '(2) The standard for determining whether harassment based on an individual's sex is sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile, intimidating or offensive working environment is whether a reasonable person in the circumstances of the complaining individual would so perceive it.
- '(3) Employer proxy: An employer is liable for harassment when the harasser's rank is sufficiently high that the harasser is the employer's proxy, for example, the respondent's president, owner, partner or corporate officer.
- '(4) Harassment by Supervisor plus Tangible Employment Action: An employer is liable for sexual harassment by a supervisor with immediate or successively higher authority over an individual when the harassment results in a tangible employment action that the supervisor takes or causes to be taken against that individual. A tangible employment action includes but is not limited to the following:
- '(a) Terminating employment, including constructive discharge;
- '(b) Failing to hire;
- '(c) Failing to promote; or
- '(d) Changing a term or condition of employment, such as work assignment, work schedule, compensation or benefits or making a decision that causes a significant change in an employment benefit.
- '(5) Harassment by Supervisor, No Tangible Employment Action: When sexual harassment by a supervisor with immediate or successively higher authority over an individual is found to have occurred, but no tangible employment action was taken, the employer is liable if:
- '(a) The employer knew of the harassment, unless the employer took immediate and appropriate corrective action.
- '(b) The employer should have known of the harassment. The division will find that the employer should have known of the harassment unless the employer can demonstrate:
- '(A) That the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct any sexually harassing behavior; and

- '(B) That the aggrieved person unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to otherwise avoid harm.
- '(6) Harassment by Co-Workers or Agents: An employer is liable for sexual harassment by the employer's employees or agents who do not have immediate or successively higher authority over the aggrieved person when the employer knew or should have known of the conduct, unless the employer took immediate and appropriate corrective action.
- '(7) Harassment by Non-Employees: An employer is liable for sexual harassment by non-employees in the workplace when the employer or the employer's agents knew or should have known of the conduct unless the employer took immediate and appropriate corrective action. In reviewing such cases the division will consider the extent of the employer's control and any legal responsibility the employer may have with respect to the conduct of such non-employees.
- '(8) Withdrawn Consent: An employer is liable for sexual harassment of an individual by the employer's supervisory or non-supervisory employees, agents or non-employees, even if the acts complained of were of a kind previously consented to by the aggrieved person, if the employer knew or should have known that the aggrieved person had withdrawn consent to the offensive conduct.
- '(9) When employment opportunities or benefits are granted because of an individual's submission to an employer's sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or other sexual harassment, the employer is liable for unlawful sex discrimination against other individuals who were qualified for but denied that opportunity or benefit.'

"Aiding and Abetting

"The Formal Charges allege that all of the individual Respondents 'aided, abetted, incited, compelled and/or coerced acts forbidden under ORS chapter 659A, specifically the unlawful practices alleged here, and [are] individually liable for violations alleged herein as an aider and abettor pursuant to ORS 659A.030(1)(g)."

"ORS 659A.030(1)(g) provides that it is an unlawful employment practice '[f]or any person, whether an employer or an employee, to aid, abet * * * the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this chapter or to attempt to do so.' 'Person' includes 'individuals.' ORS 659A.001(9)(a). 'Aiding and abetting, in the context of an unlawful employment practice, means to help, assist, or facilitate the commission of an unlawful employment practice, promote the accomplishment thereof, help in advancing or bring it about, or encourage, counsel or incite as to

its commission.' *In the Matter of Maltby Biocontrol, Inc*, 33 BOLI 121, 151 (2014) (internal citations omitted).

"ANALYSIS OF THE AGENCY'S MOTION

"Agency's First Informal Request for Discovery

"INTERROGATORIES FOR RESPONDENT FREHOO, INC.

"Discovery Requested and Objection:

'INTERROGATORY NO. 3: Describe any and all circumstances in which a person under the age of 18 was or may have been on any premises, owned or operated by Respondents, between 2012 and the present.

'RESPONSE: Frehoo objects to this interrogatory on multiple grounds. First, insofar as this interrogatory seeks information about the presence of underage individuals at properties or business other than the one (Stars Cabaret & Steak House) in which BOLI claims Aggrieved Person #1 or #2 worked, it is not reasonably likely to produce information that is generally relevant to the case. Second, the request calls for Frehoo to speculate about how a minor "may have been" on the premises of Stars Cabaret & Steak House, which is not reasonably likely to produce information that is generally relevant to the case. Third, because the Formal Charges allege only sex discrimination and include no claim for age discrimination or any other claim for which age is a material element, this interrogatory seeks information that is not reasonably likely to produce information that is generally relevance to the case. Subject to and without waiving these objections, Frehoo incorporates by reference its responses to Interrogatory No. 2, above, and Interrogatory No. 9, below.'

"Analysis and Ruling:

"In its motion, the Agency asserts that this information is relevant because any minors present at or employed in 'Respondents' places of business' may have also been subjected to sexual harassment in the workplace. Respondents make two primary arguments in response. First, they assert that discovery regarding 'minors' and age-related questions are irrelevant to the allegations of sex discrimination. Second, they object to discovery about any Stars-related entities other than Freehoo/Beaverton, which is the only corporate Respondent named in the case.

³⁷ In this document, "Freehoo/Beaverton" refers to Respondent Freehoo, Inc. dba Stars Cabaret & Steak House, Inc., which conducted business in Beaverton, Oregon.

"The Aggrieved Persons were minors at the time of the events alleged in the Formal Charges, and their status as minors is a focus of the Agency's allegations. Accordingly, this question is relevant for that reason. However, the interrogatory was directed only to Freehoo and there are no other corporate entities or establishments named in this case. Accordingly, Freehoo/Beaverton is directed to answer this interrogatory, but may limit its response to Freehoo/Beaverton.

"B. INTERROGATORIES FOR RESPONDENT PAMELA COLBURN

"Discovery Requested and Objection:

'INTERROGATORY NO. 5: Describe the nature of your relationship with each named respondent, including but not limited to whether the relationship was business, romantic, and/or sexual?

'RESPONSE: Respondent Colburn objects to this request as overbroad and as seeking information that is not reasonably likely to produce information that is generally relevant to this case. If the Agency narrows this request so that it relates to the claims and allegations regarding Aggrieved Person #1 or Aggrieved Person #2, Respondent Colburn who does not participate in any manner in the operation of Stars Cabaret & Steak House—will consider responding further.'

"Analysis and Ruling:

"Colburn is identified in the Formal Charges as an owner of Freehoo/Beaverton. More specifically, the Agency indicates in its motion that Colburn owns shares of corporations that own Freehoo/Beaverton. With the exception of Herkenrath, who is identified as a 'manager' at Freehoo/Beaverton and Stars-Bridgeport, it appears that the other individual Respondents are also owners of either Freehoo/Beaverton or another Stars-branded entity.

"Respondents argue that this request seeks highly personal, irrelevant information. The Agency asserts that this information is relevant to show a systematic practice of sexual harassment in the workplace and because there has been evidence of 'Respondent-owners having romantic relationships with employees.' Since all of the named individual Respondents are either owners or a manager, it is not clear how a romantic or sexual relationship between these individuals is pertinent to this case, which involves alleged harassment of the Aggrieved Persons, who performed as dancers. Accordingly, the Agency's request for this information is DENIED.

"Discovery Requested and Objection:

'INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Describe any and all romantic and/or sexual

relationships that took place between you and any employee or independent contractor affiliated with Respondents, including the name of the individual, the dates of the relationship, and the individual's role in Respondents' business.

'RESPONSE: Respondent Colburn objects to this request as overbroad, failing to describe the information sought without sufficient specificity to allow for a meaningful response, and as seeking information that is not reasonably likely to produce information that is generally relevant to this case. Respondent Colburn has never met Aggrieved Person #1 or #2, and there is no allegation that she had or attempted to have a romantic or sexual relationship with either of them. If the Agency narrows this request so that it relates to the claims and allegations regarding Aggrieved Person #1 or Aggrieved Person #2, Respondent Colburn—who does not participate in any manner in the operation of Stars Cabaret & Steak House—will consider responding further.'

"Analysis and Ruling:

"Respondents' objection that the request is overbroad is well taken. However, if an individual Respondent had a sexual relationship with a dancer at Freehoo/Beaverton during the time periods of the events in the case, that may be evidence of the workplace culture at Freehoo/Beaverton. Thus, it is reasonably likely to produce information that is generally relevant to the allegations of aiding and abetting in that it may show if a Respondent 'helped, assisted, or facilitated the commission of an unlawful employment practice, promoted the accomplishment thereof, helped in advancing or bringing it about, or encouraging, counsel or inciting as to its commission.' *Maltby*, 33 BOLI at 151.

"Accordingly, Colburn³⁸ is directed to answer whether she had a romantic or sexual relationship with an employee or independent contractor at Freehoo in the years 2012-2014.

"C. INTERROGATORIES FOR RESPONDENT LISA HEINZMAN-MYERS

"Discovery Requested and Objection:

'INTERROGATORY NO. 5: Describe the nature of your relationship with each named respondent, including but not limited to whether the relationship was business, romantic, and/or sexual?

'RESPONSE: Respondent Heinzman-Myers objects to this request as overbroad and as seeking information that is not reasonably likely to produce information that is generally relevant to this case. If the Agency

³⁸ As indicated below, this ruling applies to each Interrogatory No. 6 directed to the individual Respondents.

narrows this request so that it relates to the claims and allegations regarding Aggrieved Person #1 or Aggrieved Person #2, Respondent will consider responding further. Subject to these objections, Respondent Heinzman-Myers states that she has never been employed by Stars Cabaret & Steak House and has never had any active role in its operation.'

"Analysis and Ruling:

"See Analysis and Ruling as to Colburn Interrogatory No. 5, which is incorporated herein in its entirety.

"Discovery Requested and Objection:

'INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Describe any and all romantic and/or sexual relationships that took place between you and any employee or independent contractor affiliated with Respondents, including the name of the individual, the dates of the relationship, and the individual's role in Respondents' business.

'RESPONSE: Respondent Heinzman-Myers objects to this request as overbroad and as seeking information that is not reasonably likely to produce information that is generally relevant to this case. Respondent Heinzman-Myers has never met Aggrieved Person #1 or #2, and there is no allegation that she had or attempted to have a romantic or sexual relationship with either of them. If the Agency narrows this request so that it relates to the claims and allegations regarding Aggrieved Person #1 or Aggrieved Person #2, Respondent Heinzman-Myers—who does not participate in any manner in the operation of Stars Cabaret & Steak House—will consider responding further. Without waiving and subject to these objections, Respondent Heinzman-Myers states that she has never been employed by Stars Cabaret & Steak House and has never had any active role in its operation.'

"Analysis and Ruling:

"See Analysis and Ruling as to Colburn Interrogatory No. 6, which is incorporated herein in its entirety.

"D. INTERROGATORIES FOR RESPONDENT JON HERKENRATH

"Discovery Requested and Objection:

'INTERROGATORY NO. 5: Describe the nature of your relationship with each named respondent, including but not limited to whether the relationship was business, romantic, and/or sexual.

'RESPONSE: Respondent Herkenrath objects to this request as overbroad and as seeking information that is not reasonably likely to produce information that is generally relevant to this case. If the Agency narrows this request so that it relates to the specific allegations and claims regarding the alleged employment of Aggrieved Person #1 or Aggrieved Person #2 at Stars Cabaret & Steak House, Mr. Herkenrath will consider responding further.'

"Analysis and Ruling:

"See Analysis and Ruling as to Colburn Interrogatory No. 5, which is incorporated herein in its entirety."

"Discovery Requested and Objection:

'INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Describe any and all romantic and/or sexual relationships that took place between you and any employee or independent contractor affiliated with Respondents, including the name of the individual, the dates of the relationship, and the individual's role in Respondents' business.

'RESPONSE: Respondent Herkenrath objects to this request as overbroad and as seeking information that is not reasonably likely to produce information that is generally relevant to this case. There is no allegation that Mr. Herkenrath had or attempted to have a romantic or sexual relationship with either Aggrieved Person #1 or #2; the allegations about Aggrieved Person #2's interactions with Mr. Herkenrath as described in Mr. Lynch's notes of her interview (Bates Nos. 001032-1041) do not describe him having behaved inappropriately towards her or anyone else. She does not describe, for example, him using his management authority coercively (Q: Did you tell him what times you wanted to work? A: Yes. She would ask him if she could come in and Jon would say yes.") Aggrieved Person #2 also describes that she is not aware of any managers dating dancers. If the Agency narrows this request so that it relates to the allegations concerning conduct by Respondent Herkenrath toward Aggrieved Person #1 or Aggrieved Person #2, Respondent will consider responding further.'

"Analysis and Ruling:

"See Analysis and Ruling as to Colburn Interrogatory No. 6, which is incorporated herein in its entirety.

"E. INTERROGATORIES FOR RESPONDENT RANDY KAISER

"Discovery Requested and Objection:

'INTERROGATORY NO. 3: When did you first learn about Aggrieved Person #1's employment, or alleged employment, at Stars-Beaverton?

'RESPONSE: Prior to the Agency's charge of discrimination, Respondent Kaiser had not had any discussion in which anyone contended that Aggrieved Person #2 was "employed" by Stars Cabaret & Steak House.'

"Analysis and Ruling:

"The Agency requested that a response be provided as to Aggrieved Person #1, instead of Aggrieved Person #2. After the Agency filed its motion, Respondents amended this response to correct a typographical error. Therefore, this request is now moot.

"Discovery Requested and Objection:

'INTERROGATORY NO. 5: Describe the nature of your relationship with each named respondent, including but not limited to whether the relationship was business, romantic, and/or sexual?

'RESPONSE: Respondent Kaiser objects to this request as overbroad and as seeking information that is not reasonably likely to produce information that is generally relevant to this case. If the Agency narrows this request so that it relates to the allegations concerning conduct by Respondents toward Aggrieved Person #1 or Aggrieved Person #2, Respondent Kaiser will consider responding further.'

"Analysis and Ruling:

"See Analysis and Ruling as to Colburn Interrogatory No. 5, which is incorporated herein in its entirety.

"Discovery Requested and Objection:

'INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Describe any and all romantic and/or sexual relationships that took place between you and any employee or independent contractor affiliated with Respondents, including the name of the individual, the dates of the relationship, and the individual's role in Respondents' business.

'RESPONSE: Respondent Kaiser objects to this request as overbroad and as seeking information that is not reasonably likely to produce information that is generally relevant to this case. To his knowledge, Respondent

Kaiser has never met Aggrieved Person #1 or #2, there is no allegation that he had or attempted to have a romantic or sexual relationship with either of them, and Aggrieved Person #1 was never, in any event, an "employee or independent contractor affiliated with Respondents." If the Agency narrows this request so that it relates to the allegations concerning conduct by Respondents toward Aggrieved Person #1 or Aggrieved Person #2, Respondent will consider responding further.'

"Analysis and Ruling:

"See Analysis and Ruling as to Colburn Interrogatory No. 6, which is incorporated herein in its entirety.

"F. INTERROGATORIES FOR RESPONDENT TODD MITCHELL

"Discovery Requested and Objection:

'INTERROGATORY NO. 3: When did you first learn about Aggrieved Person #1's employment, or alleged employment, at Stars-Beaverton?

'RESPONSE: Prior to the Agency's charge of discrimination, Respondent Mitchell had not had any discussion in which anyone contended that Aggrieved Person #2 was "employed" by Stars Cabaret & Steak House.'

"Analysis and Ruling:

"See Analysis and Ruling as to Kaiser Interrogatory No. 3, which is incorporated herein in its entirety.

"Discovery Requested and Objection:

'INTERROGATORY NO. 5: Describe the nature of your relationship with each named respondent, including but not limited to whether the relationship was business, romantic, and/or sexual?

'RESPONSE: Respondent Mitchell objects to this request as overbroad and as seeking information that is not reasonably likely to produce information that is generally relevant to this case. If the Agency narrows this request so that it relates to the allegations concerning conduct by Respondents toward Aggrieved Person #1 or Aggrieved Person #2, Respondent Mitchell will consider responding further.'

"Analysis and Ruling:

"See Analysis and Ruling as to Colburn Interrogatory No. 5, which is incorporated herein in its entirety.

"Discovery Requested and Objection:

'INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Describe any and all romantic and/or sexual relationships that took place between you and any employee or independent contractor affiliated with Respondents, including the name of the individual, the dates of the relationship, and the individual's role in Respondents' business.

'RESPONSE: Respondent Mitchell objects to this request as overbroad and as seeking information that is not reasonably likely to produce information that is generally relevant to this case. To his knowledge, Respondent Mitchell has never met Aggrieved Person #1 or #2, and there is no allegation that he had or attempted to have a romantic or sexual relationship with either of them. If the Agency narrows this request so that it relates to the allegations and claims regarding Aggrieved Person #1 or Aggrieved Person #2, Respondent will consider responding further.'

"Analysis and Ruling:

"See Analysis and Ruling as to Colburn Interrogatory No. 6, which is incorporated herein in its entirety.

"G. INTERROGATORIES FOR RESPONDENT JEFF STRUHAR

"Discovery Requested and Objection:

'INTERROGATORY NO. 3: When did you first learn about Aggrieved Person #1's employment, or alleged employment, at Stars-Beaverton?

'RESPONSE: Prior to the Agency's charge of discrimination, Respondent Mitchell had not had any discussion in which anyone contended that Aggrieved Person #2 was "employed" by Stars Cabaret & Steak House.'

"Analysis and Ruling:

"See Analysis and Ruling as to Kaiser Interrogatory No. 3, which is incorporated herein in its entirety.

"Discovery Requested and Objection:

'INTERROGATORY NO. 5: Describe the nature of your relationship with each named respondent, including but not limited to whether the relationship was business, romantic, and/or sexual?

'RESPONSE: Respondent Struhar objects to this request as overbroad and as seeking information that is not reasonably likely to produce information that is generally relevant to this case. If the Agency narrows this request so

that it relates to the allegations concerning conduct by Respondents toward Aggrieved Person #1 or Aggrieved Person #2, Respondent Struhar will consider responding further.'

"Analysis and Ruling:

"See Analysis and Ruling as to Colburn Interrogatory No. 5, which is incorporated herein in its entirety.

"Discovery Requested and Objection:

'INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Describe any and all romantic and/or sexual relationships that took place between you and any employee or independent contractor affiliated with Respondents, including the name of the individual, the dates of the relationship, and the individual's role in Respondents' business.

'RESPONSE: Respondent Struhar objects to this request as overbroad and as seeking information that is not reasonably likely to produce information that is generally relevant to this case. To his knowledge, Respondent Struhar has never met Aggrieved Person #1 or #2, and there is no allegation that he had or attempted to have a romantic or sexual relationship with either of them. If the Agency narrows this request so that it relates to the claims regarding conduct by Aggrieved Person #1 or Aggrieved Person #2, Respondent will consider responding further.'

"Analysis and Ruling:

"See Analysis and Ruling as to Colburn Interrogatory No. 6, which is incorporated herein in its entirety.

"H. REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS

"Discovery Requested and Objection:

'REQUEST NO. 2: Admit that Respondents made no changes in policy or procedure with regard to verifying the age of dancers, at any other club than the Beaverton club, after they learned of Aggrieved Person #2's abuse in the Stars-Beaverton.

'RESPONSE: Respondents object to this request as not reasonably likely to produce information that is generally relevant to the case insofar as the request seeks age-based information; the Formal Charges allege only sex discrimination, include no claim for age discrimination or any other claim for which age is a material element, and do not allege any unlawful employment practices that occurred after they learned Aggrieved Person #2's true age. Respondents further object that Frehoo operates no clubs other than Stars

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Cabaret & Steak House in Beaverton, and Stars Cabaret & Steak House is the only club where any events relevant to the Formal Charges are alleged to have occurred. For these reasons and based on these objections, Respondents decline to respond to this RFA.'

"Analysis and Ruling:

"The Agency asserts that this request is relevant because it has 'alleged the sexual harassment of two minors in Respondents' workplace' and age verification is relevant. Respondents object to providing responses as to 'establishments other than those where the Aggrieved Persons allegedly worked.' acknowledge that there were other establishments with adult entertainment that included the name 'Stars' and there was some common ownership. However, the record does not contain sufficient information about the relationship between Freehoo/Beaverton and other Stars-named businesses to help the forum understand whether they all operate under the same policies with the same leadership and/or management. Accordingly, the record does not establish that an answer to this request for admission is 'reasonably likely to produce information that is generally relevant to the case.'

"Discovery Requested and Objection:

'REQUEST NO. 25: Admit Respondent Jeff Struhar has acted in a managerial capacity inside a Stars establishment while intoxicated or under the influence of illegal drugs.

'RESPONSE: Respondents object to this request as not reasonably likely to produce information that is generally relevant to the case. Respondents further object to this request as seeking information outside of the Agency's jurisdiction; the Oregon Liquor License Commission and criminal prosecutors, not the Bureau of Labor and Industries, have jurisdiction over such matters. If the Agency narrows this request so that it relates to the claims and allegations regarding Aggrieved Person #1 or Aggrieved Person #2. Respondent Struhar—who was not alleged to have been present inside Stars Cabaret & Steak House during any of the alleged events involving either aggrieved person, and who generally does not exercise managerial responsibility at Stars Cabaret & Steak House-will consider responding further.'

"Analysis and Ruling:

"For the reasons stated above in the ruling on Request for Admission No. 2, the record does not establish that an answer regarding locations other than Freehoo/Beaverton is 'reasonably likely to produce information that is generally relevant to the case.' However, if Respondent Struhar was intoxicated or under the influence of illegal drugs while acting in a managerial capacity in

Freehoo/Beaverton, that may be evidence of the workplace culture and management oversight. Accordingly, he is directed to provide a response for any such instances in the years 2012-2014.

"Discovery Requested and Objection:

'REQUEST NO. 28: Admit Respondent Todd Mitchell has acted in a managerial capacity inside a Stars establishment while intoxicated or under the influence of illegal drugs.

'RESPONSE: Respondents object to this request as not reasonably likely to produce information that is generally relevant to the case. Respondents further object to this request as seeking information outside of the Agency's jurisdiction; the Oregon Liquor License Commission and criminal prosecutors, not the Bureau of Labor and Industries, have jurisdiction over such matters. If the Agency narrows this request so that it relates to the claims and allegations regarding Aggrieved Person #1 or Aggrieved Person #2, Respondent Mitchell—who was not alleged to have been present inside Stars Cabaret & Steak House during any of the alleged

events involving either aggrieved person—will consider responding further.'

"Analysis and Ruling:

"See Analysis and Ruling as to Request for Admission No. 25, which is incorporated herein in its entirety.

"Discovery Requested and Objection:

'REQUEST NO. 31: Admit Respondent Randy Kaiser has acted in a managerial capacity inside a Stars establishment while intoxicated or under the influence of illegal drugs.

'RESPONSE: Respondents object to this request as not reasonably likely to produce information that is generally relevant to the case. Respondents further object to this request as seeking information outside of the Agency's jurisdiction; the Oregon Liquor License Commission and criminal prosecutors, not the Bureau of Labor and Industries, have jurisdiction over such matters. If the Agency narrows this request so that it relates to the claims and allegations regarding Aggrieved Person #1 or Aggrieved Person #2, Respondent Kaiser—who was not alleged to have been present inside Stars Cabaret & Steak House during any of the alleged events involving either aggrieved person—will consider responding further.'

"Analysis and Ruling:

"See Analysis and Ruling as to Request for Admission No. 25, which is incorporated herein in its entirety."

"I. REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION

"Discovery Requested and Objection:

'REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 9: All documents or electronic records regarding the bylaws for Respondent Frehoo, Inc. and all akas.

'RESPONSE: Respondents object to this request as not reasonably likely to produce information that is generally relevant to the case. Respondents object this request to the extent that it seeks information about any entity other than Frehoo, Inc. dba Stars Cabaret & Steak House, as Frehoo does not do business under any name other than Stars Cabaret & Steak House, and the other listed entities are separate companies that are not parties to this case. Subject to and without waiving this objection, Respondents will produce the bylaws of Frehoo, Inc.'

"Analysis and Ruling:

"It appears that Respondents provided the bylaws for Freehoo/Beaverton to the Agency on August 19, 2016. Accordingly, this request is moot.

"Discovery Requested and Objection:

'REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 13: All documents or electronic records prepared during the regular course of business as a result of the settlement agreement entered into with the City of Beaverton, executed by Jeff Struhar on April 30, 2015 and Dennis Doyle on May 5, 2015.

'RESPONSE: Respondents object to this request as overbroad, failing to describe the information sought with sufficient specificity to allow for a meaningful response, and not reasonably likely to produce information that is generally relevant to the case. Respondents further object to this request as seeking attorney-client privileged and/or, to the extent work-product protections apply in this Forum, attorney work product information. Respondents further object to this request as seeking evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations. If Complainant can narrow this request and explain its relevance and admissibility, Respondents will consider responding further.'

"The Agency contends that '[w]hether or not Respondents have kept records related to age verification and records related to their alleged "zero sex trafficking" policy, as required by the Beaverton Settlement Agreement, is relevant to the Agency's case.' Respondents argue, among other things, that this request seeks records after the time period of the alleged events in the Formal Charges. The agreement was executed on May 5, 2015 and as of July 30, 2016, Freehoo/Beaverton is no longer in operation. Aggrieved Person #1 last danced at Freehoo/Beaverton in 2012, and Aggrieved Person No. 2 last danced at Freehoo/Beaverton on August 30, 2014.

"The Settlement Agreement makes reference to 'maintain[ing] its zero-tolerance policy regarding sex trafficking and prostitution, as set forth in Exhibit A.' Exhibit 4 to Respondents Response, p. 3. Exhibit A is a picture of a poster stating that 'Stars Cabaret maintains a zero tolerance policy for prostitution and/or sex trafficking.' *Id.* at 18. This information referenced in Section 4 of the Settlement Agreement is 'reasonably likely to produce information that is generally relevant to' the Agency requests for alternative relief on page 20 of the Formal Charges. Accordingly, those records should be produced.

"The Agency has not sustained its burden to establish the relevance of the other records sought with this request and, thus, the remainder of the request is DENIED.

"Discovery Requested and Objection:

'REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 14: Any and all communications, including but not limited to emails, text messages, correspondence, etc., between any of the named respondents regarding the facts alleged or the aggrieved persons mentioned in the Formal Charges.

'RESPONSE: Respondents object to this request as seeking attorney-client privileged and/or, to the extent work-product protections apply in this Forum, attorney work product information. Respondents further object to this request as overbroad, unduly burdensome, and as failing to describe the information sought with sufficient specificity to allow for a meaningful response. Subject to and without waiving these objections, Respondents incorporate by reference the responses to Interrogatory No. 1 and Interrogatory No. 2 directed at each of the Individual Respondents. If Complainant can narrow this request, Respondents will consider responding further.'

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"It does not appear that Respondents addressed this request in their response [to the Agency's motion]. 39 Accordingly, Respondents must provide the requested information, but may withhold documents which are covered by the attorney-client or work product privileges.

"Discovery Requested and Objection:

'REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 15: Any and all communications, including but not limited to emails, text messages, correspondence, etc., between any of the named respondents and other individuals, outside the protection of attorney-client privilege, regarding the facts alleged or the aggrieved persons mentioned in the Formal Charges.

'RESPONSE: Respondents incorporate by reference their response to Request No. 14.'

"Analysis and Ruling:

"It does not appear that Respondents addressed this request in their response [to the Agency's motion]. Accordingly, Respondents must provide the requested information, but may withhold documents which are covered by the attorney-client or work product privileges.

"Discovery Requested and Objection:

'REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 17: Any and all names or identities used by all named respondents on social media, including but not limited to Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, LinkedIn, Snap Chat, XOTICSPOT.

'RESPONSE: This request does not request any specific document or group of documents, and Respondents therefore treat it as an interrogatory. Respondents object to this request as overbroad and not reasonably likely to produce information that is generally relevant to the case. Respondents further object to this request as seeking attorney-client privileged and/or, to the extent work-product protections apply in this Forum, attorney work product information. Subject to and without waiving these objections, Respondents state that Stars Cabaret & Steak House uses the following social media accounts: Facebook—"Starsbeaverton"; Twitter—"stars Beaverton."

³⁹ The 39-page response submitted by Respondents did not track the order of the requests in the Agency's motion, making it challenging and time consuming to attempt to locate Respondents' responses to particular requests in the voluminous document. If Respondents believe an argument regarding this request was overlooked, they may notify the ALJ, with a copy to the Agency, by email.

"Respondents assert that they have produced all social media posts as to Freehoo/Beaverton and that postings made by other Stars-named business are irrelevant. The Agency contends that it has reason to believe that Respondents use other methods of social media to promote the "Stars" business, collectively.' For the reasons stated above, Respondents are not required to respond as to postings made by other Stars-named businesses. However, if any postings were made which promoted the Stars-named businesses 'collectively' -- as opposed to a posting advertising an individual location other than Freehoo/Beaverton -- then that information must be produced.

"Discovery Requested and Objection:

'REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 18: Any and all social media posts, including but not limited to Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, LinkedIn, SnapChat, XOTICSPOT, by any named respondent regarding any of the facts alleged or the aggrieved persons mentioned in the Formal Charges.

'RESPONSE: Respondents object to this request as overbroad and not reasonably likely to produce information that is generally relevant to the case. Subject to and without waiving these objections, Respondents will produce social media posts from the accounts listed in Respondents' response to Request No. 17 that refer to either aggrieved person—and Respondents are not presently aware of any such posts—or to Respondents' anti-sex-trafficking efforts.'

"Analysis and Ruling:

"It does not appear that Respondents objected to this request in its response [to the Agency's motion]. However, it appears from the response above that any material would already be produced in response to Request No. 17. Accordingly, [no] further response is required.

"Discovery Requested and Objection:

'REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 19: Any and all social media posts, including but not limited to Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, LinkedIn, SnapChat, XOTICSPOT, by any named respondent regarding 'naughty school girl' nights at Stars.

'RESPONSE: Respondents object to this request's use of the term "Stars" because each Stars-branded club is owned and operated by separate corporate entities, and none of the events regarding either aggrieved person is alleged to have occurred at any club other than Stars Cabaret & Steak House in Beaverton, Oregon. Respondents further object to this request as

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overbroad and failing to describe the information sought with sufficient specificity to allow for a meaningful response. Respondents further object to this request as not reasonably likely to produce information that is generally relevant to the case, insofar as there is no allegation that Aggrieved Person #1 or #2 ever participated in any event at Stars Cabaret & Steak House relating to the theme of "naughty school girl" nor do the Formal Charges contend that either Aggrieved Person experienced harassment as a result of Stars Cabaret & Steak House hosting such an event. Respondents further object to this request as seeking information regarding activities that Oregon's Supreme Court has declared to be constitutionally-protected free expression. Respondents also object to this request as overbroad insofar as it seeks age-based information, because the Formal Charges allege only sex discrimination and include no claim for age discrimination or any other claim for which age is a material element. Without waiving and subject to these objections, Respondents state that although this is a common "theme" night for gentlemen's clubs (and various other non-adult clubs), Stars Cabaret & Steak House has not had any schoolgirl-themed nights or events since at least 2010, and certainly did not host any such events during or after the alleged events involving Aggrieved Person No. 1 and Aggrieved Person No. 2 (I.e., between 2012 and the present).

Respondents therefore have no relevant documents responsive to this request.'

"Analysis and Ruling:

"Respondents assert that they have produced all social media posts as to Freehoo/Beaverton and that postings made by other Stars-named business are irrelevant. For the reasons stated above, Respondents are not required to respond as to postings made by other Stars-named businesses. However, if any postings were made which promoted the Stars-named businesses 'collectively' -- as opposed to a posting advertising an individual location other than Freehoo/Beaverton -- then that information must be produced.

"Discovery Requested and Objection:

'REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 20: All documents or electronic records regarding advertising or promotion of 'naughty school girl' nights at Stars.

'RESPONSE: Respondents object to this request's use of the term "Stars" because each Stars-branded club is owned and operated by separate corporate entities, and none of the events regarding either aggrieved person is alleged to have occurred at any club other than Stars Cabaret & Steak House in Beaverton, Oregon. Respondents further object to this request as

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overbroad and failing to describe the information sought with sufficient specificity to allow for a meaningful response. Respondents further object to this request as not reasonably likely to produce information that is generally relevant to the case, insofar as there is no allegation that Aggrieved Person #1 or #2 ever participated in any event at Stars Cabaret & Steak House relating to the theme of 'naughty school girl' nor do the Formal Charges contend that either Aggrieved Person experienced harassment as a result of Stars Cabaret & Steak House hosting such an event. Respondents further object to this request as seeking information regarding activities that Oregon's Supreme Court has declared to be constitutionally-protected free expression. Respondents also object to this request as overbroad insofar as it seeks age-based information, because the Formal Charges allege only sex discrimination and include no claim for age discrimination or any other claim for which age is a material element. Without waiving and subject to these objections, Respondents state that although this is a common "theme" night for gentlemen's clubs (and various other non-adult clubs). Stars Cabaret & Steak House has not had any schoolgirl-themed nights or events since at least 2010, and certainly did not host any such events during or after the alleged events involving Aggrieved Person No. I and Aggrieved Person No. 2 (i.e., between 2012 and the present).

Respondents therefore have no relevant documents responsive to this request.'

"Analysis and Ruling:

"Respondents assert that advertisements produced by other Stars-named business[es] are irrelevant. For the reasons stated above, Respondents are not required to respond with documents produced by other Stars-named businesses. However, if there are any responsive documents which promoted the Stars-named businesses 'collectively' -- as opposed to * * * an individual location other than Freehoo/Beaverton -- then that information must be produced.

"Discovery Requested and Objection:

'REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 24: All documents and electronic records, not previously provided to the Agency, sufficient to provide the following information for all comments received via the Stars website at any time during the past five years:

- 'a. All content submitted with each comment, including but not limited to sender's name and email address:
- b. URL of the webpage used for submitting the comment;
- c. Email address(es) designated for receiving the comments;
- d. Identities of all Stars personnel able to access the comments;

'RESPONSE: Respondents object this request to the extent that it seeks information about any entity other than Frehoo, Inc. dba Stars Cabaret & Steak House, as Frehoo does not do business under any name other than Stars Cabaret & Steak House, and the other listed entities are separate companies that are not parties to this case. Respondents further object to this request as overbroad, unduly burdensome, failing to describe the information sought with sufficient specificity to allow for a meaningful response, and not reasonably likely to produce information that is generally relevant to the case. Subject to and without waiving these objections, will produce any comments that satisfy all of the following criteria: comments that (1) are from the website for Stars Cabaret & Steak House; (2) were submitted during the time periods that the aggrieved persons allegedly were present at Stars Cabaret & Steak House; and (3) reference sexual harassment or either aggrieved person. At this time, Respondents are not aware of any responsive documents.'

"Analysis and Ruling:

"It does not appear that Respondents objected to this request in its response. The response above indicates that there are no responsive documents for the time periods that the Aggrieved Persons were present or that reference either Aggrieved Person. Respondents are also required to produce additional responsive documents at Freehoo/Beaverton between the years 2012-2014, if such documents exist.

"Discovery Requested and Objection:

'REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 28: Copies of any and all manager logs from August 2012 through October 2014.

'RESPONSE: Respondents object to this request as overbroad and not reasonably likely to produce information that is generally relevant to the case to the extent it seeks documents covering dates on which neither aggrieved person is alleged to have been present at Stars Cabaret & Steak House. Subject to and without waiving these objections, Respondents state that they already provided the Agency with this information when it was requested from Respondents during the Agency's investigation, and that to the best of Respondents' knowledge, no additional responsive documents exist that are within their possession, custody, or control.'

"Analysis and Ruling:

"The Agency argues that Respondents should produce additional responsive material dating back to 2010. However, the Agency only requested

information beginning with August 2012. Accordingly, Respondents' response was sufficient.

"Discovery Requested and Objection:

'REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 32: All documents, logs, notes, or electronic records of Respondents' compliance officer(s) for the past five years.

'RESPONSE: Respondents object to this request as overbroad, vague in that it fails to specify who the term "compliance officer" refers to, failing to describe the information sought with sufficient specificity to allow for a meaningful response, and not reasonably likely to produce information that is generally relevant to the case. To the extent that this request refers to documents relating to Frehoo's settlement with the City of Beaverton, Respondents further object to this request as seeking evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations. If Complainant can narrow this request and explain its relevance and admissibility, Respondents will consider responding further.'

"Analysis and Ruling:

"For the reasons stated above regarding Request for Production No. 13, these records do not need to be produced.

"Discovery Requested and Objection:

'REQUEST NO. 37: All images, digital or otherwise, within the custody or control of any named Respondent of the VIP area of the Beaverton Stars between 2012 and the present

'RESPONSE: Respondents object to this request as vague, as there is no area of Stars Cabaret & Steak House that is designated as a "VIP area." Respondents further object to this request as overbroad and not reasonably likely to produce information that is generally relevant to the case. If Respondents can clarify this request and explain its relevance, Respondents will consider responding further.'

"Analysis and Ruling:

"In its motion, the Agency clarified that it was seeking images of an area on the floorplan of the Beaverton location with a raised floor called 'VIP Seating.' Respondents contend that the request is overbroad because it would encompass pictures of individuals dancing who are not parties to this case. A photograph of this seating area is reasonably likely to produce information generally relevant to the case as it will help the forum understand the environment in which the

Aggrieved Persons performed. However, Respondents raised valid concerns. Accordingly, if Respondents have 'images, digital or otherwise' of the VIP Seating area that do not contain images of dancing or patrons, then those must be produced.

"Agency's 2nd Informal Request for Discovery

"A. INTERROGATORIES

"Discovery Requested and Objection:

'Interrogatory No. 12: Aside from Aggrieved Person #1 and Aggrieved Person #2, describe all instances in which a person under the age of 18 was present at Stars Cabaret-Bridgeport.

'Response No. 12: Frehoo objects to this interrogatory on multiple grounds. First, insofar as this interrogatory seeks information regarding underage individuals at properties or businesses other than the one (Stars Cabaret & Steak House) in which the Agency claims Aggrieved Persons #1 or #2 allegedly worked, it is not reasonably likely to produce information that is generally relevant to the case because: (1) Stars Cabaret-Bridgeport is owned and operated by corporate entities that are not parties to this proceeding; (2) none of the unlawful conduct alleged to have been experienced by either Aggrieved Person occurred at Stars Cabaret-Bridgeport; and (3) Respondents are unaware of any allegation that either Aggrieved Person ever worked at Stars Cabaret-Bridgeport. Moreover, because the Formal Charges allege only sex discrimination and include no claim for age discrimination or any other claim for which age is a material element, this interrogatory seeks information that is not reasonably likely to produce information that is generally relevant to the case. Respondents will consider responding further if the Agency will explain the relevance of the request.'

"Analysis and Ruling:

"For the reasons stated above in the ruling on Request for Admission No. 2, the record does not establish that an answer regarding locations other than Freehoo/Beaverton is 'reasonably likely to produce information that is generally relevant to the case.' Therefore, this request is DENIED.

"Discovery Requested and Objection:

'Interrogatory No. 13: Aside from Aggrieved Person #1 and Aggrieved Person #2, describe all instances in which a person under the age of 18 was present at Stars Cabaret...At the Capitol.

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'Response No. 13: Frehoo objects to this interrogatory on multiple grounds. First, insofar as this interrogatory seeks information regarding underage individuals at properties or businesses other than the one (Stars Cabaret & Steak House) in which the Agency claims Aggrieved Persons #1 or #2 allegedly worked, it is not reasonably likely to produce information that is generally relevant to the case because: (1) Stars Cabaret...At the Capitol is owned and operated by corporate entities that are not parties to this proceeding; (2) none of the unlawful conduct alleged to have been experienced by either Aggrieved Person occurred at Stars Cabaret...At the Capitol: and (3) Respondents are unaware of any allegation that either Aggrieved Person ever worked at Stars Cabaret... At the Capitol. Moreover, because the Formal Charges allege only sex discrimination and include no claim for age discrimination or any other claim for which age is a material element, this interrogatory seeks information that is not reasonably likely to produce information that is generally relevant to the case. Respondents will consider responding further if the Agency will explain the relevance of the request.'

"Analysis and Ruling:

"For the reasons stated above in the ruling on Request for Admission No. 2, the record does not establish that an answer regarding locations other than Freehoo/Beaverton is 'reasonably likely to produce information that is generally relevant to the case.' Therefore, this request is DENIED.

"Discovery Requested and Objection:

'Interrogatory No. 14: Aside from Aggrieved Person #1 and Aggrieved Person #2, describe all instances in which a person under the age of 18 was present at Stars Cabaret...In the Cascades.

'Response No. 14: Frehoo objects to this interrogatory on multiple grounds. First, insofar as this interrogatory seeks information regarding underage individuals at properties or businesses other than the one (Stars Cabaret & Steak House) in which the Agency claims Aggrieved Persons #1 or #2 allegedly worked, it is not reasonably likely to produce information that is generally relevant to the case because: (1) Stars Cabaret...In the Cascades is owned and operated by corporate entities that are not parties to this proceeding; (2) none of the unlawful conduct alleged to have been experienced by either Aggrieved Person occurred at Stars Cabaret...In the Cascades; and (3) Respondents are unaware of any allegation that either Aggrieved Person ever worked at Stars Cabaret...In the Cascades. Moreover, because the Formal Charges allege only sex discrimination and include no claim for age discrimination or any other claim for which age is a material element, this interrogatory seeks information that is not reasonably likely to produce information that is generally relevant to the case.

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Respondents will consider responding further if the Agency will explain the relevance of the request.'

"Analysis and Ruling:

"For the reasons stated above in the ruling on Request for Admission No. 2, the record does not establish that an answer regarding locations other than Freehoo/Beaverton is 'reasonably likely to produce information that is generally relevant to the case.' Therefore, this request is DENIED.

"Discovery Requested and Objection:

'Interrogatory No. 16: Describe any and all circumstances, including promotional or event appearances, in which Stars Cabaret-Bridgeport operates business activities outside of the Stars Cabaret-Bridgeport facility in Bridgeport.

'Response No. 16: Frehoo objects to this request as not reasonably likely to produce information that is generally relevant to the case because: (1) Stars Cabaret-Bridgeport is owned and operated by corporate entities that are not parties to this proceeding; (2) none of the unlawful conduct alleged to have been experienced by either Aggrieved Person occurred at Stars Cabaret-Bridgeport, (3) Respondents are unaware of any allegation that either Aggrieved Person ever worked at Stars Cabaret-Bridgeport; and (4) there is no allegation that Aggrieved Person #1 or #2 ever participated in any promotional or event appearance outside of the Stars Cabaret-Bridgeport facility in Bridgeport, nor do the Formal Charges contend that either Aggrieved Person experienced harassment as a result of Stars Cabaret-Bridgeport operating business activities outside of the Stars Cabaret-Bridgeport facility in Bridgeport. Frehoo further objects to this request as seeking information regarding activities that Oregon's Supreme Court has declared to be constitutionally protected free expression. Respondents will consider responding further if the Agency will explain the relevance of the request.'

"Analysis and Ruling:

"For the reasons stated above in the ruling on Request for Admission No. 2, the record does not establish that an answer regarding locations other than Freehoo/Beaverton is 'reasonably likely to produce information that is generally relevant to the case.' Therefore, this request is DENIED.

"Discovery Requested and Objection:

'Interrogatory No. 17: Describe any and all circumstances, including promotional or event appearances, in which Stars Cabaret.. in the Capitol

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operates business activities outside of the Stars Cabaret...In the Capitol facility in Salem.

'Response No. 17: Frehoo objects to this request as not reasonably likely to produce information that is generally relevant to the case because: (1) Stars Cabaret...In the Capitol is owned and operated by corporate entities that are not parties to this proceeding; (2) none of the unlawful conduct alleged to have been experienced by either Aggrieved Person occurred at Stars Cabaret...In the Capitol; (3) Respondents are unaware of any allegation that either Aggrieved Person ever worked at Stars Cabaret...In the Capitol; and (4) there is no allegation that Aggrieved Person #1 or #2 ever participated in any promotional or event appearance outside of the Stars Cabaret...In the Capitol facility in Salem, nor do the Formal Charges contend that either Aggrieved Person experienced harassment as a result of Stars Cabaret...In the Capitol operating business activities outside of the Stars Cabaret...In the Capitol facility in Salem. Frehoo further objects to this request as seeking information regarding activities that Oregon's Supreme Court has declared to be constitutionally protected free expression. Respondents will consider responding further if the Agency will explain the relevance of the request.'

"Analysis and Ruling:

"For the reasons stated above in the ruling on Request for Admission No. 2, the record does not establish that an answer regarding locations other than Freehoo/Beaverton is 'reasonably likely to produce information that is generally relevant to the case.' Therefore, this request is DENIED.

"Discovery Requested and Objection:

'Interrogatory No. 18: Describe any and all circumstances, including promotional or event appearances, in which Stars Cabaret...In the Cascades operates business activities outside of the Stars Cabaret...In the Cascades facility in Bend.

'Response No. 18: Frehoo objects to this request as not reasonably likely to produce information that is generally relevant to the case because: (1) Stars Cabaret...In the Cascades is owned and operated by corporate entities that are not parties to this proceeding; (2) none of the unlawful conduct alleged to have been experienced by either Aggrieved Person occurred at Stars Cabaret...In the Cascades; (3) Respondents are unaware of any allegation that either Aggrieved Person ever worked at Stars Cabaret...In the Cascades; and (4) there is no allegation that Aggrieved Person #1 or #2 ever participated in any promotional or event appearance outside of the Stars Cabaret...In the Cascades facility in Bend, nor do the Formal Charges contend that either Aggrieved Person experienced

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harassment as a result of Stars Cabaret...In the Cascades operating business activities outside of the Stars Cabaret...In the Cascades facility in Bend. Frehoo further objects to this request as seeking information regarding activities that Oregon's Supreme Court has declared to be constitutionally protected free expression. Respondents will consider responding further if the Agency will explain the relevance of the request.'

"Analysis and Ruling:

"For the reasons stated above in the ruling on Request for Admission No. 2, the record does not establish that an answer regarding locations other than Freehoo/Beaverton is 'reasonably likely to produce information that is generally relevant to the case.' Therefore, this request is DENIED.

B. REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION

"Discovery Requested and Objection:

'REQUEST NO. 40: Copies of any and all advertising and/or promotional material pertaining to 'naughty school girl' theme nights, events, or parties at Stars Cabaret & Steak House, Stars Cabaret Bridgeport, Stars Cabaret...At the Capitol, and Stars Cabaret...In the Cascades.

'RESPONSE: Respondents object to this request on multiple grounds. First, insofar as this request seeks information regarding advertising and/or promotional material pertaining to "naughty school girl" theme nights, events, or parties at properties or businesses other than the one (Stars Cabaret & Steak House) where the Agency claims Aggrieved Persons #1 or #2 worked, it is not reasonably likely to produce information that is generally relevant to the case because: (1) Stars-Bridgeport, Stars Cabaret...At the Capitol, and Stars Cabaret...In the Cascades are owned and operated by corporate entities that are not parties to this proceeding; (2) none of the unlawful conduct alleged to have been experienced by either Aggrieved Person #1 or #2 occurred at Stars-Bridgeport, Stars Cabaret...At the Capitol, or Stars Cabaret...In the Cascades; and (3) Respondents are unaware of any allegation that either Aggrieved Person #1 or #2 ever worked at Stars-Bridgeport, Stars Cabaret...At the Capitol, or Stars Cabaret...In the Cascades. Respondents further object to this request as not reasonably likely to produce information that is generally relevant to the case, insofar as there is no allegation that Aggrieved Person #1 or #2 ever participated in any event at Stars Cabaret & Steak House relating to the theme of "naughty school girl," nor do the Formal Charges contend that either Aggrieved Person experienced harassment as a result of Stars Cabaret & Steak House hosting such an event. Respondents further object to this request as seeking information regarding activities that Oregon's Supreme Court has declared to be constitutionally-protected free expression. Respondents also object to this request as overbroad insofar

as it seeks age-based information, because the Formal Charges allege only sex discrimination and include no claim for age discrimination or any other claim for which age is a material element. Finally, Respondents object to this request as overbroad insofar as it seeks information regarding advertising and/or promotional material pertaining to "naughty school girl" theme nights, events, or parties outside of times material to this matter. Without waiving and subject to said objections, Respondents state that there are no documents to produce in response to this request, as Stars Cabaret & Steak House did not host any "naughty school girl" theme nights, events, or parties at any time between January 1, 2012 and September 31, 2014, which (viewed expansively), is the relevant time period relating to this action.'

"Analysis and Ruling:

"For the reasons stated above in the ruling on Request for Admission No. 2, the record does not establish that an answer regarding locations other than Freehoo/Beaverton is 'reasonably likely to produce information that is generally relevant to the case.' Therefore, this request is DENIED.

"Information obtained via Subpoenas issued by Respondents

"The Agency requests that Respondents produce information relevant to this case pursuant to subpoenas issued with response times beyond the informal discovery and discovery motion deadlines. The Agency further asks that if Respondents contend documents received in response to subpoenas are not relevant, that those documents be submitted to the ALJ for an *in camera* review and relevancy determination. It does not appear that Respondents objected to this motion. Accordingly, the Agency's request is granted.

"SUMMARY OF RULINGS REQUIRING ACTION FROM RESPONDENTS

"Respondents are directed to do the following by September 12, 2016:40

"Interrogatories

- Freehoo/Beaverton is directed to answer Interrogatory No. 3 in the Agency's First Informal Request for Discovery, but may limit its response to Freehoo/Beaverton.
- Respondents Colburn, Heinzman-Myers, Herkenrath, Kaiser and Mitchell

⁴⁰ The parties may agree to modify this date. If there is a mutual agreement, the parties may simply email the ALJ with the agreed date for production and the ALJ will issue an interim order approving that date. If there is a disagreement as to the production date, the parties can request a prehearing telephone conference to address that.

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are directed to answer Interrogatory No. 6 of the Agency's First Informal Request for Discovery, but may limit the answer to whether he/she had a romantic or sexual relationship with an employee or independent contractor at Freehoo/Beaverton in the years 2012-2014.

"Requests for Admission

 Respondents are directed to respond to Requests for Admission 25, 28 and 31 to admit or deny whether there were any such instances while acting in a managerial capacity in Freehoo/Beaverton in the years 2012-2014.

"Requests for Production

- Provide copies of the information referenced in Section 4 of the Settlement Agreement with the City of Beaverton to the Agency. Since those documents may include names of individuals who are not parties to these proceedings, the documents may be produced subject to the terms of the interim protective order in this case.
- Respondents must provide the information requested in Request for Production No14 and 15, but may withhold documents that are covered by the attorney-client or work product privileges.
- In response to Request for Production Nos. 17, 19 and 20, if any documents or postings were made which promoted the Stars-named businesses 'collectively' -- as opposed to a posting advertising an individual location other than Freehoo/Beaverton -- then Respondents must produce that information.
- In response to Request for Production No. 24, Respondents must produce additional responsive documents for Freehoo/Beaverton between the years 2012-2014, if such documents exist.
- If Respondents have 'images, digital or otherwise' of the VIP Seating area in Freehoo/Beaverton that do not contain images of dancing or patrons, then those must be produced to the Agency.
- Respondents must provide copies of documents received in response to subpoenas that were issued to the Agency. If subpoena responses are received after the date of this interim order, Respondents must provide copies of the responses to the Agency within seven days after receiving the subpoena responses. If Respondents contend documents received in response to subpoenas are not relevant, those documents should be submitted to the ALJ for an in camera review and relevancy determination."

(Exs. X64, X75, X83)

31) Respondents filed a Motion to Compel discovery on August 15, 2016. The Agency responded to the motion on August 22, 2016. On September 7, 2016, an interim order was issued ruling on the motion which stated, in pertinent part:

"LEGAL STANDARD

"* * * * *

'Any discovery request must be reasonably likely to produce information that is generally relevant to the case.' OAR 839-050-0200(7). * * *

"ANALYSIS OF RESPONDENTS' MOTION

"Discovery Related to Aggrieved Person # 2

"A. Interrogatories the Agency Did Not Respond to Individually

"Discovery Requested and Objection:

"Respondents assert that the Agency asserted a 'global objection as to form' to the following interrogatories:

'INTERROGATORY NO. 94: Describe all specific employment actions or decisions by any of the Individual Respondents or any other Stars Cabaret and Steak House owner, officer, manager, employee, or agent that the Agency contends constituted or contributed to an unlawful employment practice with regard to Aggrieved Person #2.'

'INTERROGATORY NO. 95: With respect to Complainant's response to Interrogatory No. 62, identify any individual manager of Frehoo, who told her she was required "to dance nude for customers" and Aggrieved Person #2's response, including whether she stated that she did not wish to dance or wished to leave and to whom Aggrieved Person #2 communicated this information.'

'INTERROGATORY NO. 102: With respect to Complainant's denial of Requested Admission No. 27 ("that Aggrieved Person #2 was located by authorities as a result of notification by Stars to criminal authorities"), describe the factual basis of this denial.'

"INTERROGATORY NO. 103: With respect to Complainant's denial of Requested Admission No. 28 ('that Jon Herkenrath testified in a grand jury proceeding whereby Washington County District Attorney sought to charge Anthony Curry with criminal misconduct'), describe the factual basis of this denial."

'INTERROGATORY NO. 105: With respect to Complainant's denial of Requested Admission No. 30 ("that Anthony Curry does not have a personal relationship with any manager, employee, or owner of Stars"), describe the factual basis of this denial, including any relationship that the Agency contends existed between Curry and any owner, officer, manager, employee, or agent of Stars Cabaret & Steak House.'

'INTERROGATORY NO. 106: With respect to Complainant's denial of Requested Admission No. 37 ("that while Aggrieved Person #2 worked at Stars, she received the shifts she requested"), describe the factual basis of this denial.'

"The Agency objected to all of these requests, asserting that they had multiple discreet subparts and did not comply with OAR 839-050-0200(6).

"Analysis and Ruling:

"For the same reasons set forth above regarding Interrogatory Nos. 77, 78, 79, 82, 84, 85, 86, 87, 89, 90 and 91, the Agency is also directed to answer Interrogatory Nos. 94, 95, 102, 103, 105 and 106.

"B. Alleged Improper Objections or Improper Answers to Interrogatories

"Discovery Requested and Objection:

'INTERROGATORY NO. 59: Identify and describe any and all other adult entertainment, gentlemen's club, or similar establishment where Aggrieved Person #2 worked as a dancer, whether before or after she worked at Stars' Beaverton location, and identify further whether she presented the same identification at any other club where she worked.'

'RESPONSE: Agency objects as this interrogatory is overbroad and irrelevant to the charges against Respondents.'

'INTERROGATORY NO. 60: If Aggrieved Person #2 did not work at any other club, specify whether she previously gained entry to any other similar establishment. If so, did she present the same identification she used at Stars?'

'RESPONSE: Agency objects as this interrogatory is overbroad and irrelevant to the charges against Respondents.'

"Analysis and Ruling:

"At the present time it is unclear whether these interrogatories are 'reasonably likely to produce information that is generally relevant to' whether there

was negligence in verifying forms of identification. However, these interrogatories are likely to produce information generally relevant to emotional distress damages. Accordingly, the Agency must answer Interrogatories 59 and 60.

"Discovery Requested and Objection:

'INTERROGATORY NO. 61: Identify and describe any communications between any employee or manager of Stars and Anthony Curry, including whether Aggrieved Person #2 participated in that communication, the circumstances, any witnesses or other participants in such communications, and the purpose of the communication.'

'RESPONSE: The Agency objects to this interrogatory as the information is outside of the Agency's possession or control. The Agency does know that Aggrieved Person #2 spoke with Respondent Herkenrath verbally on the phone regarding scheduling for work. Aggrieved Person #2 stated these contacts occurred on a cell phone provided to her by Anthony Curry.'

"Analysis and Ruling:

"In the Agency's response to the motion to compel, it supplemented its answer to this interrogatory to provide further detail, but the Agency should include that additional detail in an amended interrogatory signed under oath in accordance with OAR 839-050-0200.

"Discovery Requested and Objection:

'INTERROGATORY NO. 64: Attached as Exhibit A is a list of "Rules of Conduct," "Entertainer Lessee Operating Guidelines," and related documents. Identify the person who asked Aggrieved Person #2 to sign these documents and describe whether, during the days that Aggrieved Person #2 worked at Stars, she ever violated any of these Rules of Conduct or Operating Guidelines. If so, describe in detail the facts and circumstances surrounding any violation, including Aggrieved Person #2's motivation for engaging in the violation, and any witnesses to any violation.'

'RESPONSE: Aggrieved Person #2 indicated that the documents looked familiar to her but she wasn't sure if they were the exact same documents. She stated she was given them on the day she auditioned, by the unidentified manager, and was asked to fill them out. She stated Respondents did not provide her a copy. Aggrieved Person #2 stated most of the rules were not followed and she saw dancers violating them all the time, with no action by management or other employees.'

"Analysis and Ruling:

"In its response, the Agency points out that its response to a subsequent interrogatory provided more detail. Given the additional detail provided later, no further response is needed.

"Discovery Requested and Objection:

'INTERROGATORY NO. 65: During the days Aggrieved Person #2 worked at Stars, describe whether she did or said anything inconsistent with the age as represented on the identification she used to gain entry to Stars, including all details about such comments, statements, or actions, including the circumstances, any witnesses to such comments or actions, and her purpose in engaging in such conduct.'

ORIGINAL RESPONSE: 'The Agency objects to this interrogatory as overbroad and vague. The Agency also objects as to standing.'

SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE: 'The Agency objects to this interrogatory as overbroad and vague. The Agency further asserts that this interrogatory is very poorly written and is a compound question containing multiple subparts Respondents make no attempt to define what actions or conduct would be "inconsistent with the age as represented on the identification [Aggrieved Person #2] used" and the Agency refuses to speculate as to Respondents' meaning.'

"Analysis and Ruling:

"Respondents are correct that this interrogatory may be relevant to whether Respondents 'knew of should have known' Aggrieved Person #2 was underage. However, as worded, it is overbroad and vague. Accordingly, the Agency should amend its response to indicate what actions, if any, Aggrieved Person #2 did to conceal the fact that she was underage, but need not respond further.

"Discovery Requested and Objection:

'INTERROGATORY NO. 66: During the days Aggrieved Person #2 allegedly worked at Stars, does the Agency have evidence that anyone had sex or engaged in sexual acts on the Stars premises? If so, describe the circumstances, the identity of the persons involved, any other witnesses, and the location.'

'RESPONSE: According to witnesses, it was not uncommon for dancers to engage in sexual acts on Respondents' premises. During the course of the Agency's investigation dancers, customers, and Respondents' club manager acknowledged that this was a systemic problem at Respondents'

establishments. Respondents have not produced any evidence to prove that they addressed or corrected the systemic problems of sexual acts on the club's premises. Aggrieved Person #2 suffered from sexual abuse and harassment as a result of Respondents' acts or omissions. These witnesses are named in the previously provided discovery and include but are not limited to Nathan Wheeler, Steve Toth, the Aggrieved Persons, and unidentified customers. The Agency relies upon the discovery previously provided, including but not limited to Bates No. 00034, 000035, and 001134-001265.'

"Analysis and Ruling:

"The Agency should amend its response to indicate whether any sexual acts occurred on the premises of Freehoo/Stars during the days Aggrieved Person #2 allegedly worked at Freehoo/Stars.

"Discovery Requested and Objection:

'INTERROGATORY NO. 127: Identify and describe with specificity, including but not limited to the particular Bates numbers of documents, all evidence or information in the Agency's possession or knowledge that the Agency contends supports the Agency's denial that "Aggrieved Person #2 did not engage in prostitution at Stars Cabaret & Steak House," as stated in Request for Admission No. 81.'

'RESPONSE: The Agency objects to this Interrogatory on the basis that it is vague and Respondents failed to define what they meant by "prostitution." Notwithstanding that objection, to the extent that "prostitution" may include "sexually explicit conduct" within ORS 163.665(3), the Agency asserts that Aggrieved Person #2 was engaged in unlawful sexually explicit conduct during the entire course of her employment at Stars Cabaret and Steak House.'

"Analysis and Ruling:

"In the Agency's response to the motion to compel, it supplemented its answer to this interrogatory to provide further detail, but the Agency should include that additional detail in an amended interrogatory signed under oath in accordance with OAR 839-050-0200.

"Discovery Requested and Objection:

'INTERROGATORY NO. 128: Identify and describe with specificity, including but not limited to the particular Bates numbers of documents, all evidence or information in the Agency's possession or knowledge that demonstrates or tends to show that, at the time that Aggrieved Person #2

sought work at Stars, any of the Individual Respondents had any personal knowledge of any shortcomings that existed in the age verification process.'

'RESPONSE: Respondents knew or should have known of any shortcomings that existed in the age verification process based on their lack of records and their inadequate vetting process. Evidence supporting this response includes, but is not limited to, Bates Nos. 000028-000029, 000034, and 005407-016998.'

"Analysis and Ruling:

"In the Agency's response to the motion to compel, it supplemented its answer to this interrogatory to provide further detail, but the Agency should include that additional detail in an amended interrogatory signed under oath in accordance with OAR 839-050-0200. Additionally, the response should indicate which clubs it contends Respondents Kaiser, Mitchell and Struhar had 'particular control over.'

"Discovery Requested and Objection:

'INTERROGATORY NO. 129: Identify and describe with specificity, including but not limited to the particular Bates numbers of documents, all evidence or information in the Agency's possession or knowledge that demonstrates or tends to show that any person who the Agency contends was an owner, manager, representative, or agent of Stars Cabaret & Steak House was aware at the time Frehoo retained Aggrieved Person #2 to work as an exotic dancer that she had been "groomed by a sex offender" to seek employment as a nude dancer.'

'RESPONSE: The Agency objects to this interrogatory on the basis of relevance. Whether Respondents knew Aggrieved Person #2 had been groomed by a sex offender to dance nude on stage is irrelevant to Respondents' liability for their unlawful conduct.'

"Analysis and Ruling:

"Respondents note that the Agency denied Request for Admission No. 85 ('that BOLI has no evidence to suggest that Freehoo was aware at the time it retained Aggrieve Person #2 to work as an exotic danger that she had been 'groomed by a sex offender' to seek employment as a nude dancer'). Since this request was denied, one must assume that some evidence on that point exists. Such information is relevant to whether Respondents 'knew or should have known' of the age of Aggrieved Person #2, and her willingness to work as a nude dancer, which would assist the forum in understanding how reasonable person in complainant's circumstances would have perceived the workplace conduct. Accordingly, the Agency must respond.

subparts and did not comply with OAR 839-050-0200(6).

"Analysis and Ruling:

"For the same reasons set forth above regarding Interrogatory Nos. 77, 78, 79, 82, 84, 85, 86, 87, 89, 90 and 91, the Agency is also directed to answer Interrogatory 107.

"Discovery Requested and Objection:

'INTERROGATORY NO. 122: Identify and describe with specificity, including but not limited to the particular Bates numbers of documents, all evidence or information in the Agency's possession or knowledge that demonstrates or tends to show that any of the Respondents authorized or knowingly allowed prostitution to occur at Stars Cabaret & Steak House. (Ex. G at 5).'

'RESPONSE: The Agency objects to this request as unduly repetitive and previously asked and answered. The Agency incorporates its previous responses to the above interrogatories here by reference. The Agency notes that the mental element to the unlawful conduct in this case is known or should have known.'

"Analysis and Ruling:

"The Agency provided information showing a number of interrogatories already answered on these topics. Accordingly, the objection that this is unduly repetitive is sustained, and no further answer is required.

"Discovery Requested and Objection:

'INTERROGATORY NO. 135: Describe all verbal communications between either of the Aggrieved Persons and any employee of the Agency-including the Commissioner-between 2012 and the present regarding or referring to the possibility that the Aggrieved Persons would file any civil or administrative action. The description should include the date, persons present, and the substance of the conversation. (Ex. I at 3).'

'RESPONSE: The Agency objects to this interrogatory as to form because it contains multiple subparts.

(a) Aggrieved Person #1: The Agency objects to this request as it is overbroad, vague and requests information not generally relevant to the factual matters alleged in this case. The Agency objects to this request to the extent it requests information subject to work-product and/or attorney-client information.

(b) Aggrieved Person #2: The Agency objects to this request as it is overbroad, vague and requests information not generally relevant to the factual matters alleged in this case. The Agency objects to this request to the extent it requests information subject to work-product and/or attorney-client information.'

and

'INTERROGATORY NO. 139: Describe all verbal communications between either of the Aggrieved Persons and any employee of the Agency—including the Commissioner—between 2012 and the present regarding any of Respondents, exotic dancing, or any other matters potentially relevant to their alleged claims. The description should include the date, persons present, and the substance of the conversation.'

'RESPONSE: The Agency objects to this interrogatory as to form because it contains multiple subparts. The Agency objects to these requests as they are overbroad and vague. The Agency objects to these requests to the extent they request information subject to work-product and/or attorney-client information. Without waiving and subject to these objections, the Agency offers the following responses:

- (a) Pertaining to Aggrieved Person #1, the Agency has already provided its investigative interview, Bates No. 001021-001025. This interview took place on August 18, 2015. Present were BOLI employees Rafael Colin and Chris Lynch.
- (b) Pertaining to Aggrieved Person #2, the Agency has provided Bates No. 001026-001028. This investigative interview was conducted by Agency employee Maria Perez and took place on May 5, 2015, by phone. The Agency has additionally provided Bates No. 001032-001041, a summary of an interview of Aggrieved Person #2 that took place on December 12, 2015. Present were Agency employees Chris Lynch and Jessica Ponaman.'

"Analysis and Ruling:

"The interrogatories are extremely broadly worded and are not focused on information that is 'reasonably likely to produce information that is generally relevant to the case.' The Agency's objection that these requests are overbroad is sustained and no further response to these interrogatories is required.

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"Discovery Requested and Objection:

"The Agency objected to several requests on the grounds that 'the work product of the Agency's administrative prosecutors is irrelevant to the facts at issue in the contested cases.' The requests and objections made were as follows:

'Request for Production No. 3: Communications relating to the Aggrieved Persons' initial interviews with BOLL'

'RESPONSE: All documents, not subject to privilege or work product protection, regarding communications relating to the Aggrieved Persons' initial interviews with BOLI have been provided in discovery.'

'Request for Production No. 10: All documents and electronically stored information that refer to, relate to or comprise any and all statements from any person or persons having any information or knowledge relating in any way to the allegations in the Complaint.'

'RESPONSE: Any information responsive to this request, and not subject to privilege or work product protection, has been provided in the Agency's discovery that was previously provided to Respondents. Any subsequently acquired discovery will be provided as soon as possible.'

'Request for Production No. 11: All statements obtained by or on behalf of the Agency from others, or made by the Aggrieved Persons or employees or officers of the Agency, concerning this action or its subject matter.'

'RESPONSE: Any information responsive to this request, and not subject to privilege or work product protection, has been provided in the Agency's discovery that was previously provided to Respondents. Any subsequently acquired discovery will be provided as soon as possible.'

'Request for Production No. 12: All videotapes, audiotapes, photographs or other recordings and electronically stored information that relate in any way to the claims or to any work allegedly performed by the Aggrieved Persons at Stars.'

'RESPONSE: Any information responsive to this request, and not subject to privilege or work product protection, has been provided in the Agency's discovery that was previously provided to Respondents. Any subsequently acquired discovery will be provided as soon as possible. The Agency does not have access to information within Respondents' control that it has, thus far, refused to provide.'

'Request for Production No. 25: Documentation of any and all communications relating to any false identification either of the Aggrieved Persons used to gain entry to or secure work at Stars.'

'RESPONSE: The Agency has provided all materials responsive to this request, and not subject to privilege or work product protection, as part of the discovery previously provided to Respondents.'

'Request for Production No. 37: All documents relating to, describing, evidencing, or constituting communications between any employee, representative, official, or agent of the Oregon Bureau of Labor & Industries (BOLI) and the Oregon Department of Human Services (DHS) regarding or relating to any of the Respondents, Steven Toth, Aggrieved Person #1, or Aggrieved Person #2.'

'RESPONSE: The Agency objects to this request to the extent that it requests information that would be protected work product. Without waiving its objection, the Agency has previously provided this information, including but not limited to Bates Nos. 001712, 001742-001749, and 001752-001756.'

"Respondents also sought to compel documents responsive to the following additional requests in this section of their argument, but the Agency did not specifically respond or insert a copy of their objections into their response:

'Request for Production No. 38: All documents relating to, describing, evidencing, or constituting communications between any employee, representative, official, or agent of BOLI and the Washington County District Attorney 's Office regarding or relating to any of respondents, Steven Toth, Aggrieved Person #1, or Aggrieved Person #2. (Id. at 8).

'Request for Production No. 39: All documents relating to, describing, evidencing, or constituting communications between any employee, representative, official, or agent of BOLI and the Oregon Liquor Control Commission (OLCC) regarding or relating to any of respondents, Steven Toth, Aggrieved Person # 1 or Aggrieved Person #2. (Id.)

'Request for Production No. 40: All documents relating to, describing, evidencing, or constituting communications between any employee, representative, official, or agent of BOLI and the Beaverton Police Department regarding or relating to any of respondents, Steven Toth, Aggrieved Person #1, or Aggrieved Person #2. (Id.)'

"Although the Agency did not initially object to all of these requests on the basis of relevancy, the ALJ is nevertheless required to make a determination as to whether the request is 'reasonably likely to produce information that is generally relevant to the case.' OAR 839-050-0200(7); see also OAR 839-050-0200(1) (describing the role of the ALJ in authorizing discovery). As with many of Respondents' interrogatories, these requests for production are extremely broadly worded and are not focused on information that is 'reasonably likely to produce information that is generally relevant to the case.' Additionally, the Agency indicates that some information has already been produced in response to some of the requests. Accordingly, no further response to these requests for production is required.

"Discovery Requested and Objection:

'Request for Production No. 4: Any testimony the Aggrieved Persons provided in any other proceeding, criminal or civil.'

'RESPONSE: The Agency objects to this request for production as overbroad and on the basis of relevance. The Agency has provided all testimony of the Aggrieved Persons in any relevant proceedings that are within the Agency's possession or control.'

"Analysis and Ruling:

"This request is overbroad, to the extent it requests information that is not related to the allegations in the Formal Charges. Since the Agency indicates it has produced all documents 'it could reasonably obtain and that bore some relevance to this proceeding,' no further response is required.

"Discovery Requested and Objection:

'Request for Production No. 15: All documents and electronically stored information that concern, refer or relate to any charge or complaint against Stars that the Aggrieved Persons filed or contemplated filing with any governmental or administrative agency including, without limitation, the U.S. Department of Labor ("DOL"), the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB"), the Oregon Department of Consumer and Business Services, Occupational Health and Safety Division ("OR-OSHA"), and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA").'

'RESPONSE: The Agency objects to this request as overbroad and irrelevant. The Agency also objects on the basis of privileged communications and protected work product.'

and

'Request for Production No. 22: All documents and electronically stored information that evidence, memorialize, refer to, relate to or concern possible legal action by the Aggrieved Persons against Stars that created prior to the point when: (a) the Agency began informally or formally investigating this matter; and/or (b) the Aggrieved Persons retained counsel or sought legal advice.'

RESPONSE: 'The Agency objects to this request as overbroad, irrelevant, and seeking protected and privileged information.'

"Analysis and Ruling:

"These requests for production are extremely broadly worded and are not focused on information that is 'reasonably likely to produce information that is generally relevant to the case.' No further response to these requests for production is required.

"Discovery Requested and Objection:

'Request for Production No. 16: All documents and electronically stored information relating to any legal proceeding or threatened legal proceeding to which the Aggrieved Persons have been a party including, without limitation, all documents relating to any lawsuits the Aggrieved Persons have filed or threatened to file.'

RESPONSE: 'The Agency objects to this request as overbroad and irrelevant. The Agency also objects on the basis of privileged communications and protected work product.'

"Analysis and Ruling:

"This request is overbroad, to the extent it requests information that is not related to the allegations in the Formal Charges. Since the Agency indicates it has produced all documents 'it could reasonably obtain and that bore some relevance to this proceeding,' no further response is required.

"Discovery Requested and Objection:

'Request for Production No. 19: All social media postings, communications, blog entries, comments or other written material concerning or referring to Stars that the Aggrieved Persons posted, uploaded or otherwise published or communicated on any Internet-based communication of any kind including, but not limited to, Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat, or other platforms.'

RESPONSE: 'The Agency does not have anything responsive to this request within its possession. Any further information will be provided as soon as possible, once it's received.'

"Analysis and Ruling:

"The Agency's response is insufficient in that it does not indicate whether the Aggrieved Persons attempted to locate responsive information on their social media accounts. The Agency is directed to respond to this request by obtaining responsive information from the Aggrieved Persons, regardless of whether responsive information is currently 'within [the Agency's] possession.' See In the Matter of Melissa and Aaron Klein dba Sweetcakes by Melissa, 34 BOLI 102, 144 (2015), appeal pending (a respondent may request a discovery order to obtain documents from a complainant through the Agency that are discoverable under OAR 839-050-0020(7)).

"Discovery Requested and Objection:

'Request for Production No. 20 [amended]: All social media postings, communications, blog entries, comments or other written material concerning or referring to any activities by the Aggrieved Persons that either of the Aggrieved Persons posted, uploaded or otherwise published or communicated on any Internet-based communication of any kind including, but not limited to, Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat or other platforms.

'Respondents will agree to narrow the relevant time period of this request to 2012 to the present.'

'RESPONSE: The Agency objects to this request as overbroad and irrelevant to the extent that it requests "all social media postings, communications, blog entries, comments or other written material concerning or referring to any activities by the Aggrieved Persons posted, uploaded or otherwise published or communicated on any Internet-based communication of any kind." If Respondents can narrow this request to information relevant to this case, the Agency may consider responding further.'

"Analysis and Ruling:

"Respondents assert that this request is relevant to determining 'possible other causes of emotional distress.' Based on that limitation and the amendment limiting the time period from 2012 to the present), the Agency is directed to respond to this request by obtaining responsive information from the Aggrieved Persons with any social media postings describing other causes of emotional distress from 2012 to the present time.

"Discovery Related to Alleged Damages

"Discovery Requested and Objection:

"Respondents moved to compel answers to Interrogatory Nos. 36 and 42. Since the Agency responded to those on August 30, 3016, no further response is necessary.

"Discovery Requested and Objection:

'INTERROGATORY NO. 37: If the Agency contends that any of Respondents is [sic] responsible for emotional distress damages, identify each physician or health care professional who was consulted— whether by the Agency, Aggrieved Person #2, or persons acting on their behalf—with respect to emotional distress damages or other non-economic damages Aggrieved Person #2 allegedly sustained as a result of any action by any of the Respondents.'

'INTERROGATORY NO. 38: With respect to each condition of Aggrieved Person #2 state the physician or health care provide [sic] who provided treatment or assessment for any condition relating to the alleged emotional distress.'

'INTERROGATORY NO. 39: With respect to each condition of Aggrieved Person #2 state the date(s) of any treatment for any condition relating to the alleged emotional distress.'

'INTERROGATORY NO. 40: With respect to each condition of Aggrieved Person #2 state any diagnosis or treatment plan, or recommendations for future treatment relating to the allegations in this case for any condition relating to the alleged emotional distress.'

"It does not appear that the Agency objects to this request, but rather that it has not yet received medical records from the attorney of Aggrieved Person #2.

"Analysis and Ruling:

"It is not clear why there has been a delay in the Agency obtaining the requested documents from Aggrieved Person #2. However, given the rapidly approaching hearing date, this information must be provided without further delay.

"Discovery Requested and Objection:

'INTERROGATORY NO. 20: Identify and describe any and all complaints that Aggrieved Person #2 made to anyone regarding their alleged experience(s) at Stars, including to whom the complaint(s) was made,

whether the complaint(s) was verbal or written, the circumstances, any witnesses, the location where the interaction(s) took place, and any response(s) received.'

'RESPONSE: Aggrieved Person #2 first verbally reported her abuse and harassment to Detective Chad Optiz, of the Beaverton Police Department, during the course of the criminal investigation into Anthony Curry. These reports occurred on or about September 6, 2014.

'During the course of the criminal investigation, Aggrieved Person #2 also made a verbal report to **REDACTED**, of **REDACTED**, in Portland, Oregon, on or about October 2, 2014. **REDACTED** is a medical program set up to assess, treat and prevent of child abuse.

'Aggrieved Person #2 also stated that she made a verbal disclosure pursuant to a therapy session. Those records will be requested and provided as soon as possible, once received.

'Aggrieved Person #2 subsequently verbally reported her abuse and harassment to a Grand Jury, the date of which is unknown, and in open court, on June 4, 2015, in Washington County, Oregon. The criminal defendant was found guilty of his crimes against Aggrieved Person #2 and sent to prison.

'Aggrieved Person #2 gradually verbally complained to her mother about her treatment at Respondents' Stars-Beaverton location. She indicated it took a long time to tell her about it.'

"Analysis and Ruling:

"Respondents request an order for the production of documents. However, this is not a request for documents, and the Agency is already required to produce information in response to Request for Production No. 37-40 regarding medical treatment. Accordingly, no further response to this interrogatory is required.

"Discovery Requested and Objection:

'Request for Production No. 17: All documents and electronically stored information that describe, refer, relate to, substantiate or evidence any and all economic damages for which the Agency alleges any of Respondents is responsible.'

'Response: The Agency has provided all information within its possession and control, and not subject to privilege or work product protection, that relates to any damages sought by the Agency. (Ex. B at 40).'

and 1 'REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 18: All documents and electronically 2 stored information that describe, refer, relate to, substantiate or evidence any and all non-economic damages for which the Agency alleges Stars is 3 responsible.' 4 'Response: The Agency has provided all information currently within its 5 possession, and not subject to privilege or work product protection, that relates to any damages sought by the Agency. Any further information will be provided as soon as possible, once it's received. (Id.)' 6 7 and 'REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 24: To the extent not already 8 produced in response to the preceding requests, all documents and electronically stored information that concern, support or substantiate, or 9 relate to any alleged loss or damage allegedly sustained as a result of the 10 matters set forth in the Complaint.' 11 'Response: The Agency has provided all materials responsive to this request, and not subject to privilege or work product protection, as part of the discovery previously provided to Respondents. (Ex. B at 42).' 12 13 "Analysis and Ruling: 14 "Since the Agency is not seeking economic damages from Respondents, it need not respond further to Request for Production No. 17. 15 "With regard to Request for Production No. 18, it is not clear why there has been a delay in the Agency obtaining the requested documents from Aggrieved 16 Person #2. However, given the rapidly approaching hearing date, this information must be provided without further delay. 17 "With respect to Request for Production No. 24, the Agency indicates it has 18 produced responsive documents within its possession and it is unclear how this request differs from Request for Production No. 18. Since the Agency must 19 produce additional information in response to Request for Production No. 18, no 20 further response to this request is required. 21 "Discovery Requested and Objection: 22 'Request for Production No. 21: All medical and counseling records for the Aggrieved Persons from 2000 to the present from any institution, physician, physician's assistant, nurse, chiropractor, psychiatrist, psychologist, health 23 care professional, alternative or religious health practitioner, mental health

professional, employee assistance program or in-home nursing service by whom the Aggrieved Persons have been examined or treated, or with whom the Aggrieved Persons or someone on their behalf consulted. (Respondents make this request to the extent that the documents are in their possession or of any other person cooperating with the Agency or acting or purporting to act on the Agency's behalf. To the extent that these documents are not in the Agency's immediate possession or control or in the immediate possession or control of another state body but rather in the possession of health care providers, the provision of a signed authorization to obtain medical or counseling records and the identity of the health care providers shall be treated as compliance with this request. If a signed authorization is provided please identify any providers of care for physical or mental health by name of institution, address and telephone number, patient number, and dates of employment.)'

'Response: The Agency objects to this request as overbroad. The Agency will provide the relevant medical records within its possession.'

"Analysis and Ruling:

"The Agency objects to overbreadth, in particular because the request seeks records dating back to the year 2000 when the Aggrieved Persons would have been just one year old. For purposes of this case and due to the ages of the Aggrieved Persons, the forum finds that Respondents are entitled to responses within the time period of one year prior to the events in the Formal Charges up until present day.

"Discovery Requested and Objection:

'INTERROGATORY NO. 92: With respect to Complainant's denial of Requested Admission No. 22 ("that Aggrieved Person #1 has not sustained any economic damages"), describe the factual basis of this denial and identify the nature of economic damages incurred.'

'Response: The Agency's Formal Charges do not seek economic damages on behalf of Aggrieved Person #1, nor does the Agency intend to ask for economic damages on behalf of Aggrieved Person #1.'

"Analysis and Ruling:

"The Agency has confirmed that it is not seeking economic damages on behalf of either of the Aggrieved Persons and, thus, need not respond further to this interrogatory. 'Request for Production No. 13: All calendars, diaries, journals, e-mail correspondence, or any personal records or notes that the Aggrieved Persons or any other witnesses created or maintained, including but not limited to any electronically stored information, at any time from 2000 to the present.

'Response: The Agency objects to this response as overbroad.'

"Analysis and Ruling:

"The Agency is correct that this request is overbroad. Respondents request that the forum limit the time frame from 2010 to the present, and the scope to include anything related to Respondents, to the mental or emotional [state] of the Aggrieved Persons, or to other sources of emotional distress.

"Responsive records regarding Respondents and emotional distress are relevant, but any other responsive material does not meet the forum's relevancy standard.

"With respect to time frame, for purposes of this case and due to the ages of the Aggrieved Persons, the forum finds that Respondents are entitled to responses within the time period of one year prior to the events in the Formal Charges up until present day.

"Discovery Regarding Issues of Due Process

"Respondents issued several discovery requests seeking communications between various BOLI employees. Respondents assert that these requests are related to the issues of due process and decision-maker bias. Those include Request for Production Nos. 5-8, 32-35, and 41, and Interrogatory Nos. 73-76, and 109. The interrogatories are extremely broadly worded and are not focused on information that is 'reasonably likely to produce information that is generally relevant to the case.' Given that the forum has previously ruled that Respondents have not sustained their burden in showing decision-maker bias, it is unclear how any of this information relates to the case. Accordingly, no further responses to these requests for production and interrogatories are required.

"Allegations of Inconsistent Responses

"Finally, Respondents ask the Agency to 'correct inconsistencies' in some of the discovery responses. The Agency contends that perceived inconsistencies can be created if the Agency 'view[s] evidence one way' and an Aggrieved Person views it differently. Respondents' argument appears to be more of an attack on the credibility of witnesses, rather than insufficient answers to discovery requests.

Respondents will have the opportunity to point out any inconsistencies during the hearing. The motion to 'correct inconsistencies' is DENIED.

"SUMMARY OF RULINGS REQUIRING ACTION FROM THE AGENCY

"The Agency is directed to do the following by September 15, 2016:

Interrogatories

- Answer Interrogatory Nos. 37-40, 44, 59, 60, 77, 78, 79, 82, 84, 85, 86, 87, 89, 90, 91, 94, 95, 102, 103, 105, 106, 107, 121, 129, and 138.
- Supplement the answer to Interrogatory No. 24 to answer whether a Freehoo/Beaverton manager expressed a 'expressed a desire to have sex with Aggrieved Person #2.'
- In response to Interrogatory No. 43, if Aggrieved Person #1 has copies
 of photo identifications used from 2012 to the present time within her
 possession, custody or control, copies should be produced.
- Amend the response to Interrogatory No. 110 to either (1) identify more specific Bates Nos. within 005407-016998 or, alternatively, (2) provide a written explanation as to why this large grouping of documents (005407-016998) demonstrates or tends to support its denial that, 'with regard to the alleged employment of Aggrieved Person #1, Stars Cabaret and Steak House did not follow its regular hiring process for exotic dancers.'
- Amend the answers to Interrogatories 113 and 115 to answer whether 'any person who the Agency contends was an owner, manager, representative or agent' of Freehoo/Beaverton knew of Toth's actions.
- Amend the response to Interrogatory No. 117 to indicate whether Aggrieved Person #1 made tips at Freehoo/Beaverton that she shared with other individuals at the club, such as DJs and security guards.
- Amend the answers to Interrogatory No. 61, 118 and 127 to include the additional detail contained in the Agency's response to the motion to compel, signed under oath in accordance with OAR 839-050-0200.
- Amend the answer to Interrogatory No. 128 to include the additional detail contained in the Agency's response to the motion to compel, and indicate which clubs it contends Respondents Kaiser, Mitchell and Struhar had 'particular control over.'

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- Amend the answer to Interrogatory No. 65 to indicate what actions, if any, Aggrieved Person #2 did to conceal the fact that she was underage, but the Agency need not respond further.
- Amend the answer to Interrogatory No. 66 to indicate whether any sexual acts occurred on the premises of Freehoo/Stars during the days Aggrieved Person #2 allegedly worked at Freehoo/Stars.

Requests for Production

- The Agency must provide documents responsive to Request for Production No. 13, but may limit its response to documents referencing Respondents and/or emotional distress within the time period of one year prior to the events in the Formal Charges up until present day.
- The Agency must provide documents responsive to Request for Production Nos. 16, 18 and 19.
- The Agency is directed to respond to Request for Production No. 20 by obtaining responsive information from the Aggrieved Persons with any social media postings describing other causes of emotional distress from 2012 to the present time.
- The Agency must provide documents responsive to Request for Production No. 21, but may limit its response to records within the time period of one year prior to the events in the Formal Charges up until present day."

(Exs. X66, X78, X85)

- 32) After receiving an email from the parties indicating a joint agreement to revise the case schedule, the following deadlines were reset in an interim order dated September 8, 2016:
 - The deadline for the Agency and Respondents to produce responsive information/documents to one another in response to rulings made regarding the Agency's and Respondents' motions to compel was moved to September 15, 2016.
 - The deadline for filing dispositive motions was moved to September 22, 2016.
 - The deadline for filing responses to dispositive motions was moved to October 13, 2016.

(Exs. X84, X86)

33) On August 8, 2016, Respondents filed Motions to Strike, to Make More Definite and Certain, and Motions to Dismiss. The Agency filed a response to the motion on August 22, 2016. An interim order was issued on September 14, 2016, which stated, in pertinent part:

"The majority of Respondents' motions assert that the Formal Charges lack sufficient specificity to provide Respondents with a more detailed notice to prepare its defense. Adequate notice of an agency action must include a 'short and plain statement of the matters asserted or charged.' ORS 183.415(3)(d); see also OAR 839-050-0060(1)(b) (a charging document must contain a 'short and concise statement of the matters that constitute the violation'). Formal Charges alleging a civil rights violation must also 'specify the allegations of the complaint to which the respondent will be required to make response.' ORS 659A.845(1).

"A violation can be found based on evidence 'reasonably related' to the allegations in the Formal Charges if the evidence either corroborates the Formal Charges or is 'included as a fact underlying a specific charge.' *In the Matter of Melissa and Aaron Klein dba Sweetcakes by Melissa*, 34 BOLI 102, 120 (2015), appeal pending.

"As indicated below, the current motions are not the appropriate procedure for addressing most of the alleged deficiencies that Respondents find with the Formal Charges. Instead, many of the motions (1) raise questions that could be answered through the discovery process or (2) prematurely raise concerns that violations will be found against Respondents based on alleged inadequate notice in the Formal Charges.

"A. Motion to Strike and/or Delete Other Corporate Entities from the Case Caption/Alternative Motion to Make More Definite and Certain (Respondents' 'Motion One')

"1. Motion to Strike

Respondents move to strike the 'AKA entities' from the case caption. The caption in this case lists only one corporate Respondent: Freehoo, Inc. dba Stars Cabaret & Steak House ('Freehoo'). Following the identification of Freehoo as a party, numerous entities are listed, all preceded by the acronym 'aka.' Respondents assert that the 'AKA entities' should be removed from the caption since they are not named as parties. In response, the Agency argues that the Formal Charges 'very clearly identify Freehoo, Inc. as the only corporate entity respondent,' and that the other entities are ones 'through which Freehoo, Inc. conducts its business.'

"The forum has previously granted motions to strike when a pleading contains allegations that are irrelevant or not at issue before the forum. See, e.g. Mountain Forestry, Inc., 29 BOLI 10, 24 (2007), aff'd without opinion, Mountain Forestry, Inc. v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 229 Or App 504, 213 P3d 590

(2009). The Agency indicates it will be attempting to argue that the named corporate Respondent, Freehoo, 'conducted business as the' other corporate entities. At the pleading stage of the case -- which essentially requires adequate notice of what statutes or rules a Respondent is accused of violating -- the forum is not convinced that the 'AKA entities' are irrelevant or not at issue before the forum. Accordingly, Respondents' motion is DENIED.

"2. Alternative Motion to Make More Definite and Certain

In the alternative, Respondents move to require the Agency to amend the Formal Charges to 'state with specificity how the AKA entities are responsible for unlawful employment practices and, if they can do so properly given BOLI's jurisdictional requirements, to name the appropriate entities as parties.' If the 'AKA entities' were parties, then the Agency would be required to meet the pleading standard set forth in ORS 183.415(3)(d) and ORS 659A.845(1) as to those entities. However, since the Agency has confirmed that the Freehoo is the only corporate Respondent, it need not state how other non-party entities are 'responsible' for any unlawful conduct. Therefore, this motion is also DENIED.

"B. <u>Motions to Make More Definite and Certain Allegations Against the</u> Individual Respondents (Respondents' 'Motion Two')

"Respondents request that the Agency specify what statute or administrative rule each Respondent is alleged to have violated, and to identify the alleged acts by each Respondent that the Agency believes to constitute the violations.

"OAR 839-050-0060(1) requires that a charging document issued by the Agency contain:

- 'a) A reference to the particular statutes or administrative rules involved in the violation;
- '(b) A short and concise statement of the matters that constitute the violation; and
- '(c) A statement of the remedies sought and, when appropriate, the penalty imposed.'

"The Formal Charges adequately meet the due process requirements of OAR 839-050-0060(1)(a), and motions to make more definite and certain are not the correct procedural tool for obtaining the information sought by Respondents. See, e.g. Blachana, LLC, 32 BOLI 220, 223 (2013), aff'd Blachana, LLC v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 273 Or App 806 (2015), 359 P3d 574 (2015) (discovery was the appropriate procedure for ascertaining additional information needed to defend the case); see also Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife, 16 BOLI 263, 264 (1998). Therefore, this motion is DENIED.

"C. <u>Motion to Strike Paragraph 16/Alternative Motion to Make More Definite and Certain (Respondents' 'Motion Three')</u>

"Respondents argue that allegations in paragraph 16 of the Formal Charges which have no apparent connection to either Aggrieved Person or the underlying Amended Complaint' should be stricken or, alternatively, the forum should require the Agency to make those allegations more definite and certain. Paragraph 16 states as follows:

'During the course of the Agency's investigation, multiple witnesses described the systematic practice of sexual harassment by Respondents in their workplace, including but not limited to the following:

- "a. Witnesses stated that dancers engaged in sex acts both inside and outside of the club. These acts were sometime engaged in as part of an individual private dance for money; or occurred after a dancer was 'bought off the floor,' a practice which involved a customer paying the club a specific amount of money to be permitted to take the dance out of the stage rotation, or to have a waitress go off the clock. Witnesses reported that dancers who were 'bought off the floor' were sometimes taken off-site to engage in sexual activities with the purchasing customer.
- "b. Steven Toth stated, under oath, that while he was employed as a manager for Respondents, he arranged for dancers to engage in prostitution with customers. Steven Toth stated Respondent Todd Mitchell was present during one of these incidents.
- "c. Witnesses described dancers being groped by managers and also engaging in sex acts with managers in order to secure better shifts or other work benefits. Steven Toth also reported that Respondent Jeff Struhar engaged in sex acts with employee-dancers both at the club and off site.'

'Respondents specifically take issue with the reference to a "systematic practice of sexual harassment by Respondents in the workplace." The Agency argues that the allegations are reasonably related to the commissioner's complaint and, also, that the facts in Paragraph 16 support the remedies sought in the Formal Charges. Based on the Agency's explanation, the forum is not convinced that the facts in Paragraph 16 are irrelevant. Accordingly, the motions to strike Paragraph 16 and/or make more definite and certain are DENIED.

"D. <u>Motion to Require the Agency to Make Paragraphs 22 and 23 More Definite and Certain (Respondents' 'Motion Four')</u>

"Respondents request that the forum require the Agency to clarify the means or manner by which Respondents allegedly discriminated against the Aggrieved Persons, as alleged in Paragraphs 22 and 23 of the Formal Charges. Respondents assert that they are 'entitled to know the form that the alleged discrimination took, and [each Respondent's] alleged role in it * * *.' Paragraphs 22 and 23 state as follows:

- '22. On, about or between September 2012 to December 2012, Respondents, because of Aggrieved Person #1's sex, discriminated against her in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment, in violation of ORS 659A.030(1)(b), former and current OAR 839-005-0021(1), (2) and former and current OAR 839-005-0030.
- '23. On, about or between August 14, 2014 to September 18, 2014, Respondents, because of Aggrieved Person #2's sex, discriminated against her in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment, in violation of ORS 659A.030(1)(b), former and current OAR 839-005-0021(1), (2) and former and current OAR 839-005-0030.'

"Although the Agency did not specifically address the sufficiency of the allegations in Paragraphs 22 and 23 in its response, the Agency's response generally argues that the Formal Charges comply with the Oregon's Administrative Procedures Act and BOLI's Contested Case Rules. The Agency contends that Respondents request 'additional information beyond the basic requirements' and 'offer no actual legal argument to support their suggested new standard of pleading.' Th[is] is similar to Respondents' 'Motion Two.' The Formal Charges adequately meet the due process requirements of OAR 839-050-0060(1)(a), and motions to make more definite and certain are not the correct procedural tool for obtaining the information sought by Respondents. Accordingly, this motion is also DENIED."

(Exs. X55, X77, X87)

- 34) Based on an email request received from the parties indicating a joint agreement to revise the case schedule and a prehearing telephone conference held on September 15, 2016, the following deadlines were revised in an interim order dated September 16, 2016:
 - The deadline for the Agency and Respondents to produce responsive information/documents to one another in response to rulings made regarding the Agency's and Respondents' motions to compel was changed to September 16, 2016. Medical records of Aggrieved Person #2 that were not available on that date were required to be produced the following week after they are received by the

Agency and the Agency has the opportunity to make redactions in accordance with the time periods in the interim order of September 8, 2016.

- The deadline for filing dispositive motions was moved to September 23, 2016.
- The deadline for filing responses to dispositive motions was moved to October 14, 2016.

(Ex. X88)

35) On August 8, 2016, Respondents filed a Motion to Amend Answer and Defenses to Formal Charges and Notice of Hearing. The Agency filed a response to the motion on August 19, 2016. The ALJ issued an interim order ruling on the motion on September 19, 2016, which stated in pertinent part:

"For good cause shown to the administrative law judge, a party may amend its answer at any time before the hearing commences." OAR 839-050-0140(3). All of the proposed amendments concern affirmative defenses. Respondents seek to amend two existing defenses and insert two new affirmative defenses. The forum recently summarized its precedent on the issue of what is or is not an appropriate affirmative defense as follows:

'In general, an affirmative defense is a defense setting up new matter that provides a defense against the Agency's case, assuming all the facts in the complaint to be true. See, e.g. Pacificorp v. Union Pacific Railroad, 118 Or App 712, 717, 848 P2d 1249 (1993). A few examples of affirmative defenses previously recognized by this forum include statute of limitations, claim and issue preclusion, bona fide occupational requirement, undue hardship, laches, and unclean hands. Some other affirmative defenses recognized by Oregon courts include discharge in bankruptcy, duress, fraud, payment, release, statute of frauds, unconstitutionality, and waiver. ORCP 19B. In contrast, a defense that admits or denies facts constituting elements of the Agency's prima facie case that are alleged in the Agency's charging document is not an affirmative defense.'

In the Matter of Melissa and Aaron Klein dba Sweetcakes by Melissa, 34 BOLI 102, 161 n. 33 (2015), appeal pending. The forum has also rejected affirmative defenses that raise matters not at issue before the forum or have no basis in fact. See, e.g. Mountain Forestry, Inc., 29 BOLI 10, 23-24 (2007), aff'd without opinion, Mountain Forestry, Inc. v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 229 Or App 504, 213 P3d 590 (2009).

"ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS

"A. Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due Process

"Respondents seek to add language to paragraph 13 of Section VIII.A of their Answer as follows:⁴¹

'The convoluted statutory and regulatory scheme that governs proceedings stemming from Commissioner's complaints, and the Commissioner's ability to enter a final order in this proceeding, the lack of impartiality on the part of the ultimate decision maker(s) including the Commissioner and/or the Deputy Commissioner, the appearance of the Contested Case Coordinator as a witness in this matter, and the associated ex parte communications deprive Respondents of their Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights.'

Respondents raised these issues in two separate motions before the forum. Their arguments were rejected because Respondents lacked evidence to establish that the decision maker in this case, the Deputy Commissioner, was personally biased against Respondents. See Interim Orders dated 5/31/2016 and 8/25/2016. Since the requested amendments 'ha[ve] no basis in fact,' the motion to insert this language is DENIED. *Mountain Forestry*, 29 BOLI at 23.

"B. <u>Equitable Estoppel</u>

"Respondents request that they be permitted to add the following affirmative defense to section VII. C of their Answer:

'17. Aggrieved Person #2, knowing that she was underage, falsely represented that she was 21 years old with the intention that Stars would permit her to dance at the club. Respondents had no knowledge that Aggrieved Person #2 was not the age that she represented herself to be. Stars acted in reliance on Aggrieved Person #2's false representation, to Respondents' detriment. Any claims related to damages allegedly suffered by Aggrieved Person # 2 are barred due to the principles of equitable estoppel.'

The forum recently described the doctrine of equitable estoppel as follows:

'Estoppel is a legal doctrine whereby one party is foreclosed from proceeding against another when one party has made "a false

⁴¹ Throughout this interim order, the text of Respondents' proposed additions will be underlined and proposed deletions will be crossed out.

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representation, (1) of which the other party was ignorant, (2) made with the knowledge of the facts, (3) made with the intention that it would induce action by the other party, and (4) that induced the other party to act upon it." State ex rel. State Offices for Services to Children and Families v. Dennis, 173 Or App 604, 611, 25 P3d 341 (2001), citing Keppinger v. Hanson Crushing, Inc., 161 Or App 424, 428, 983 P.2d 1084 (1999). In order to establish estoppel against a state agency, a party must have relied on the agency's representations and the party's reliance must have been reasonable. Id., citing Dept. of Transportation v. Hewett Professional Group, 321 Or 118, 126, 895 P2d 755 (1995).'

Sweetcakes, 34 BOLI at 171 (emphasis in original). Respondents' proposed defense does not establish the elements of equitable estoppel for several reasons.

"First, the doctrine of equitable estoppel does not fit the procedural posture of this case which is a state agency action brought on behalf of a complainant, the Commissioner. There is no allegation that the Agency made a misrepresentation to Respondents. Accordingly, the allegations do not support the use of equitable estoppel against the Agency.

"Second, Respondents have not alleged that their reliance on a misrepresentation was 'reasonable,' which is a requirement for asserting such a defense. Sweetcakes, 34 BOLI at 171, citing Dept. of Transportation, 321 Or at 126.

"Finally, the facts alleged in this proposed defense more appropriately appear to be a denial of the allegations in Paragraph 20 of the Formal Charges, which alleges that Respondents 'fail[ed] to adequately vet forms of identification, and * * * knew or should have known that minors had been or eventually would be employed in Respondents' establishments and subjected to sexual harassment in the workplace.' A statement which denies an element of the Agency's case is viewed as a denial, rather than an affirmative defense. Sweetcakes, 34 BOLI at 161.

"Therefore, the request to add equitable estoppel as an affirmative defense is DENIED.

"C. Constitutional Right to a Jury Trial

"Respondents also seek to add the following affirmative defense:

Forcing Respondents to defend against the Formal Charges in this forum violates Respondents' right to a jury trial pursuant to Article I, § 17 of the Oregon Constitution.'

"This argument was previously raised by Respondents and addressed by

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the forum. For the reasons set forth in detail in the interim order of August 25, 2016, there is no constitutional entitlement to a jury trial as to the claims under ORS chapter 659A alleged in the Formal Charges. Accordingly, the request to add this defense is also DENIED.

(Exs. X56, X72, X91)

- 36) On September 22, 2016, Respondents filed an Amended Answer and Defenses to Formal Charges and Notice of Hearing. (Ex. X93)
- 37) On October 4, 2016, a prehearing telephone conference was held at the request of Respondents to discuss a dispute between the parties regarding redactions made to medical records produced by the Agency to Respondents in response to the forum's interim order of September 8, 2016. After the Agency and Respondents were provided with the opportunity to address the issues, the Agency was ordered to submit copies of the medical records in dispute (both redacted and unredacted) to the ALJ for an *in camera* review determine whether the redactions were consistent with the interim order of September 8, 2016. (Ex. X103)
- 38) Respondents filed Respondents' Motion to Amend Protective Order to Include Identifying Information for Non-Party Witnesses Requesting Confidentiality of Their Identities on September 22, 2016. Respondents requested that the Interim Protective Order of April 27, 2016, be amended to include the following:
 - "1. PII [Personal Identifying Information] of Respondents Colburn, Heinzman-Myers, Kaiser, Mitchell, and Struhar as it relates to their responses to the Agency's Interrogatory No. 6; and
 - "2. PII of any witness who testifies or submits declarations about private or personal matters as described above, including employment at the Club that the witness seeks to keep private."
- The Agency filed a response to the motion on September 30, 2016, asserting that the information that Respondents seek to protect is too broad and "would have the effect of essentially protecting the entire hearing from public disclosure." The Agency further argued that "there is no legal basis for protecting all witnesses to the degree requested by Respondents." On October 13, 2016, the ALJ issued an interim order which stated, in pertinent part:
 - "Respondents seek to add two categories of information to the Interim Protective Order.
 - "First, Respondents seek to protect the responses of the individual Respondents to the Agency's Interrogatory No. 6. Interrogatory No. 6 requested

'Describe any and all romantic and/or sexual relationships that took place between you and any employee or independent contractor affiliated with Respondents, including the name of the individual, the dates of the relationship, and the individual's role in Respondents' business.'

"The individual Respondents were ordered to 'answer whether [he or she] had a romantic or sexual relationship with an employee or independent contractor at Freehoo in the years 2012-2014.' The forum has previously protected private or personal information of the employees of a respondent employer, such as drug screen reports and medical records. See In the Matter of Logan International, Ltd., 26 BOLI 254, 259 (2005); In the Matter of Sharon Kaye Price, 21 BOLI 78, 80-81 (2000). The forum has also previously issued a protective order preventing the public disclosure of the legal names of aggrieved persons who requested that their names be kept private. See Blachana, LLC, 32 BOLI 220, 224 (2013), aff'd Blachana, LLC v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 273 Or App 806 (2015), ____ P3d ___ (2015). Accordingly, because Interrogatory No. 6 requests private and intimate information about individuals who are not parties to this case, it would be appropriate to limit the disclosure of the names of the individuals who are named in Respondents' answers to Interrogatory No. 6.

"Second, Respondents seek to protect the disclosure of the PII 'of any witness who testifies or submits declarations about private or personal matters as described above, including employment at the Club that the witness seeks to keep private.' The Agency asserts that this request is too broad. The forum agrees that the request extends beyond any protective order that appears to have ever been issued by the forum and, indeed, may not be consistent with Oregon's Public Records Law. However, as indicated above, the forum has previously limited the disclosure of private or personal information about individuals who were employed by a respondent employer. Accordingly, if a party submits a declaration signed by a current or former employee who is not a Respondent in this case, that declaration must be filed under seal in accordance with the terms of the Interim Protective Order. This directive applies to all prehearing filings. The treatment of the names of witnesses who testify at hearing will be discussed with the parties at a later date in advance of the hearing.

"Accordingly, Respondents' Motion to Amend Protective Order is hereby GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as explained above."

"SUMMARY OF RULING

"The interim order of April 27, 2016, is hereby amended to include the following:

PII also includes:

- (1) The names of individuals identified in Respondents' responses to the Agency's Interrogatory No. 6, and
- (2) The names of any non-party current or former employees of a Stars' establishment who have signed a declaration filed with the forum.

When the participants file documents with the PII described above, the original document should be submitted for filing under seal. Additionally, a copy with redactions removing the names of individuals described above should also be filed with the Contested Case Coordinator."

In response to a question sent by email from Respondents, the ALJ clarified that the interim order includes individuals that are considered to be either employees or independent contractors. (Exs. X94, X102, X107, X109)

- 39) Respondents filed motions for summary judgment on behalf of all Respondents on September 23, 2016. The Agency filed a response to the motions on October 13, 2016. (Exs. X99, X100, X108)
- 40) Amended Formal Charges were filed on October 19, 2016, removing references to "AKA entities" in the case caption and identifying Frehoo as the only corporate Respondent. (Ex. X112)
- 41) On October 11, 2016, Respondents filed a document with the following motions:
 - 1. Motion to postpone the hearing scheduled for November 8, 2016;
 - 2. Motion to postpone the ruling on Respondents' motions for summary judgment;
 - 3. Motion to reopen and extend the period for informal discovery so that Respondents "have the opportunity to discover information necessary to assess the truthfulness and reliability of the remaining BOLI investigator interview accounts"; and
 - 4. Motion to permit Respondents to file a reply brief in response to the Agency's response to Respondents' motion for summary judgment.

Respondents asserted that the motions were based on their "discovery of falsified and misleading information in [BOLI] interview notes [which] occurred almost simultaneously with the discovery that the Agency inappropriately redacted plainly discoverable information from the Aggrieved Person's medical records." Respondents also asked that the forum "conduct a fact-finding process to assess the validity of the record in this case to determine whether it contains additional falsified or misleading materials." Finally, Respondents requested expedited consideration of their motions, a prehearing telephone conference and a shortening of the Agency's time for responding to the motion. The Agency filed a response to the motion on October 18, 2016, requesting that the forum

deny Respondents' motions and order Respondents to produce individuals who have signed declarations at hearing so that they can be cross examined pursuant to OAR 839-050-0260(9). Respondents also filed a "supplemental" motion on October 18, 2016, with an additional witness declaration. On October 19, 2016, the ALJ issued an interim order ruling on Respondents' motions which stated, in pertinent part:

"First, Respondents contend that they recently discovered that some of the witness interview statements from BOLI investigators 'contain false and/or misleading statements.' Respondents refer to notes from interviews of witnesses named Megan * * *, Hayli * * * and Laurel * * *, and compare information in the interview notes to declarations from those witnesses which appear to contradict some of the statements contained in the interview notes. Respondents assert that the Agency should not rely on the investigation notes from those witness interviews when responding to Respondents' summary judgment motion because those notes are 'unreliable, misleading, and even falsified.' In reviewing the Agency's response to Respondents' motion for summary judgment, it does not appear that the Agency has submitted the notes from the interviews of [Megan], [Hayli] and [Laurel] with its summary judgment response. Accordingly, it does not appear that any action needs to be taken prior to ruling on Respondents' motion for summary judgment.

"Secondly, the fact that BOLI interview notes differ from statements in declarations made by witnesses can be pointed out and discussed at the hearing in this matter. There is no prehearing procedure to 'conduct a fact-finding process to assess the validity of the record in this case to determine whether it contains additional falsified or misleading materials.' Respondents' counsel will have the opportunity to cross-examine all of the Agency's witnesses and can point out any discrepancies in documents.

"Finally, Respondents have not provided a reason why the motion was filed at this date, instead of at an earlier time prior to the deadline. There is nothing to suggest that the alleged 'false and/or misleading statements' were not contained in documents produced to Respondents at the beginning of this case. Respondents' motions do not explain why there is an urgency at this late date to conduct additional discovery that could have been conducted earlier in the case.⁴²

⁴² In support of their motion, Respondents reference redactions made to medical records that Respondents contend are not consistent with the forum's discovery order. However, it is unclear how the redactions relate to information in the notes of BOLI's investigators, which are the subject matter of these motions. Additionally, Respondents' request to engage in discovery as to who made redactions to medical records does not appear to be reasonably likely to produce information that is generally relevant to the case as required by OAR 839-050-0200(7).

"For all of those reasons, Respondents' request for an expedited ruling on their motions is DENIED. However, as indicated above, Respondents may address issues regarding the reliability and accuracy of documents produced by the Agency at the hearing in this matter.

"AGENCY'S REQUEST TO CROSS EXAMINE DECLARANTS

"Respondents have submitted three declarations with its motions and supplemental motions. In its response to the motions, the Agency requested the opportunity to cross examine the witnesses at hearing, pursuant to OAR 839-050-0260(9). The Agency's request is GRANTED. Respondents' declarations will not be received into evidence unless the witnesses appear at hearing so that they can be subject to cross examination."

(Exs. X106, X110, X111, X113)

42) On October 27, 2016, Respondents filed a motion to extend the time for filing their case summary materials by one day, until October 26, 2016. In response to an email from the ALJ requesting copies of documents which supported the representations in Respondents' motion, supplemental materials were submitted by Respondents on October 28, 2016. The Agency filed a response opposing the motion on October 28, 2016. The ALJ issued an interim order ruling on Respondents' motion on November 1, 2016, which stated, in pertinent part:

"The administrative law judge may disregard any document that is filed with the Forum beyond the established number of days for filing." OAR 839-050-0050(1). It is undisputed that Respondents' case summary and exhibits were filed one day late on October 26, 2016, the date of the postmark from the U.S. Postal Service. OAR 839-050-0040(1). OAR 839-050-0050(3) provides that 'the administrative law judge may grant [an] extension of time only in situations where the requesting participant shows good cause for the need for more time or where no other participant opposes the request." Under OAR 839-050-0020(16), '[g]ood cause means, unless otherwise specifically stated, that a participant failed to perform a required act due to an excusable mistake or a circumstance over which the participant had no control. "Good cause" does not include a lack of knowledge of the law, including these rules.'

"This forum has recently summarized the good cause standard as follows:

'To show good cause, Respondents must demonstrate an excusable mistake or a circumstance over which Respondents had no control. The excusable mistake or circumstances over Respondents had no control means "there must be a superseding or intervening event which prevents timely compliance." In the Matter of Ashlanders Senior Foster Care, Inc., 14 BOLI 54, 61-62 (1996), citing In the Matter of City of Umatilla, 9 BOLI 91 (1990), affirmed without opinion, City of Umatilla v. Bureau of Labor and

Industries, 110 151, 821 P2d 1134 (1991). The mistaken act or failure to act is excusable if a party mistakenly acts or fails to act due to being misled by facts or circumstances that would mislead a reasonable person under similar circumstances. Ashlanders, citing In the Matter of 60 Minute Tune, 9 BOLI 191 (1991), affirmed without opinion, Nida v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 119 Or App 174, 822 P2d 974 (1993).'

In the Matter of Melissa and Aaron Klein dba Sweetcakes by Melissa, 34 BOLI 102, 203 (2015), appeal pending. The forum has only found 'good cause' to exist on rare occasions, which generally include a showing that a party took reasonable measures to meet a deadline, but an unforeseen circumstance arose. For example, the forum found 'good cause' to exist when a respondent relied on their attorney to file an answer and an 'electronic glitch' in the attorney's new computer docketing system failed to flag the due date. In the Matter of Glenn Walters Nursery, Inc., 11 BOLI 32, 34-35 (1992).

"After reviewing the sequence of events described in great detail by Respondents, the forum concludes that Respondents took reasonable steps to meet the case summary deadline, but were faced with unexpected delays caused by third party printing vendors. Respondents hired attorneys to defend this case and prepare its case summary filing. Respondents' counsel assigned [a paralegal] to arrange for the printing of the exhibits.⁴³ When [the paralegal] learned of a printing delay from the first vendor, she immediately contacted another vendor and engaged the help of others in the office to assist with copying and driving to multiple post offices.⁴⁴ Unlike past cases before the forum, Respondents' counsel and counsel's staff not only made initial efforts to meet the filing deadline, but then proceeded to take multiple additional steps late into the night to attempt to file the case summary on time. Therefore, Respondents have demonstrated 'good cause' and their motion for a one-day extension is GRANTED."

(Exs. X116-X124, X128)

43) The Agency filed its case summary on October 25, 2016, and filed an addendum to the case summary on November 4, 2016. (Exs. X114, X145)

⁴³ The Agency asserts that Respondents should not have waited until the date of filing to contact a printing vendor. However, that does not appear unreasonable in light of the fact that multiple vendors accepted the work after being informed of the deadline.

⁴⁴ To be clear, the forum does not consider a misinterpretation of post office hours to support "good cause" for an extension. See Green Thumb Landscape & Maintenance, Inc., 32 BOLI 185, 189 (2013) (finding no "good cause" when envelope was mailed to the wrong address with insufficient postage). Rather, the problems with third party printing vendors coupled with the totality of the efforts taken after learning of printing delays/errors support a finding of "good cause."

45) On November 1, 2016, Respondents sent an email to the ALJ and the parties with a copy of Respondents' Motion to Exclude Agency Case Summary, which was subsequently filed with the forum. Respondents' moved to exclude the Agency's case summary filing, asserting that they were prejudiced because the Agency's case summary documents were sent by "media mail" and did not arrive at the office of Respondents' counsel until October 31, 2016, six days after the case summary deadline. On November 2, 2016, the ALJ entered an interim order requiring the Agency to file and serve its response to Respondents' motion no later than noon, November 3, 2016, because Respondents' motion required an expedited ruling prior to the hearing scheduled to begin on November 8, 2016. The ALJ further required the parties to file and serve all documents by hand delivery. On November 3, 2016, the Agency filed a response to Respondents' motion. The ALJ issued an interim order on November 4, 2016, which denied Respondents' motion, but provided that Respondents may raise objections regarding individual exhibits or witnesses if they believed they were prejudiced by the delay caused by the "media mail" postage on the service copy of the Agency's case summary. (Exs. X114, X130, X131, X141, X146-X148, X150)

46) Both the Agency and Respondents filed motions to cross examine authors of declarations and individuals who were interviewed by investigators. The ALJ denied the motions in an interim order issued on November 4, 2016, but noted that the forum would likely give greater weight to the statements of individuals who testify at hearing and are subject to cross examination. (Exs. X115, X133, X138, X150)

47) On October 28, 2016, the Agency filed a motion in limine to exclude the testimony of a witness identified in Respondents' case summary, a family member who had allegedly abused AP2 in 2010. Respondents filed a response to the motion on November 2, 2016. The ALJ granted the Agency's motion in an interim order issued on November 4, 2016. (Exs. X119, X134, X150)

Respondents filed a motion to exclude the testimony of the Agency's expert for failing to comply with OAR 839-050-0260(1)(b). After Respondents filed their motion, the Agency indicated that it would file an addendum to its case summary with supplemental information about the expert. On November 4, 2016, the ALJ issued an interim order denying Respondents' motion as moot, but stated the Respondents could raise the issue again if the supplemental information provided by the Agency was insufficient under BOLI's contested case rules. (Exs. X132, X150)

49) On October 31, 2016, a prehearing telephone conference was held. The conference was originally scheduled to discuss a number of issues in preparation for the hearing set for November 8, 2016. Immediately prior to the hearing, Respondents' counsel sent an email to the ALJ and all of the parties which stated that Respondent Frehoo, Inc. "filed for protection under the US Bankruptcy Code in the District of Oregon

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at approximately 0900 today" and that "the automatic stay under 11 USC 362 is now in effect and precludes post-petition action against the debtor which could have been maintained prior to the filing." The Agency responded, stating: "The Oregon Department of Justice has indicated that the automatic stay does not apply to our proceeding and that we can move forward with our November 8th hearing. Given the different viewpoints on this issue, the Agency requests that Respondents be required to make a formal filing and the Agency be given the opportunity to respond."

The ALJ informed the parties by email that no action would be taken until a written document was filed with the forum. During the prehearing telephone conference, Respondents were informed that a formal written document should be filed with the forum. Following the conference, Respondents filed a Notice of Bankruptcy with the forum and the Agency filed a response to the Notice on November 2, 2016. On November 3, 2016, the Agency notified the ALJ that a hearing was scheduled in bankruptcy court on November 7, 2016, to address whether the BOLI proceeding was covered by the bankruptcy automatic stay provision.

On November 8, 2016, the bankruptcy court entered an order stating that the pending BOLI proceeding was "exempt from the operation of the automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) as an exercise of the state's police power which satisfies the pecuniary purpose test." The bankruptcy court order further stated that the exemption did not allow for collection or enforcement, and that BOLI should not take any collection or enforcement action against Frehoo beyond filing a proof of claim in the bankruptcy court without further order of the bankruptcy court. (Exs. X125, X126, X129, X144, X157)

- Over due to the pending bankruptcy hearing. The Agency indicated by email that it did not oppose the motion. On November 4, 2016, the ALJ entered an interim order setting the case over for one day, and the hearing was scheduled to begin November 9, 2016. (Exs. X135, X142, X150, X154)
- 51) In an interim order issued on November 4, 2016, the parties were informed that the ALJ would be granting Respondents' motions for summary judgment to dismiss Respondents Pamela Colburn and Lisa Heinzman-Myers, and would be denying the remainder of the motions. The forum issued an interim order on November 8, 2016, ruling on Respondents' motions for summary judgment, which stated, in pertinent part:

"INTRODUCTION

"On March 31, 2016, the Agency issued Formal Charges against Respondents. Amended Formal Charges were filed on October 19, 2016, removing references to 'AKA entities' in the case caption. Respondent filed an answer to the Formal Charges on April 20, 2016, and filed an Amended Answer on September 22, 2016. The Amended Formal Charges allege that Respondents discriminated against both Aggrieved Persons in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment, in violation of ORS 659A.030(1)(b), former

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⁴⁵ The interim order of May 16, 2016, extended the deadline for responding to motions to 14 days.

and current OAR 839-005-0021(1), (2) and former and current OAR 839-005-0030. ORS 659A.030(1)(b) states, in pertinent part, that it is an unlawful employment practice '[f]or an employer, because of an individual's * * * sex * * * to discriminate against the individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.' The Amended Formal Charges also allege that all of the individual Respondents 'aided, abetted, incited, compelled and/or coerced acts forbidden under ORS chapter 659A, specifically the unlawful practices alleged here, and [are] individually liable for violations alleged herein as an aider and abettor pursuant to ORS 659A.030(1)(g).'

Respondents filed motions for summary judgment on behalf of all Respondents on September 23, 2016. The Agency filed a timely response to the motions on October 13, 2016.⁴⁵

"SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

"A motion for summary judgment may be granted where no genuine issue as to any material fact exists and a participant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, as to all or any part of the proceedings. OAR 839-050-0150(4)(B). The standard for determining if a genuine issue of material fact exists and the evidentiary burden on the participants is as follows:

'*** No genuine issue as to a material fact exists if, based upon the record before the court viewed in a manner most favorable to the adverse party, no objectively reasonable juror could return a verdict for the adverse party on the matter that is the subject of the motion for summary judgment. The adverse party has the burden of producing evidence on any issue raised in the motion as to which the adverse party would have the burden of persuasion at [hearing].'

ORCP 47C.

"The record considered by the forum in deciding this motion consists of: (1) the Agency's Amended Formal Charges; (2) Respondents' Amended Answer; (3) Respondents' argument made in support of its motions and the exhibits submitted with Respondents' motions, and (4) the Agency's argument opposing Respondents' motions, and the exhibits submitted with the Agency's response.

"DISCUSSION

"Respondents raised the follow[ing] motions for summary judgment:

1. Respondent Frehoo, Inc. dba Stars Cabaret & Steak House ('Frehoo') should be granted summary judgment as to Aggrieved Person #2's claim of sexual harassment because Frehoo did not know nor should it have known of her 'alleged touching by a patron, which she did not report.'

2. Respondent Frehoo should be granted summary judgment regarding Aggrieved Person #2's 'claim in so far as it is based on taking her clothes

off or being looked at by a supervisor.'

 Respondent Frehoo should be granted summary judgment as to claims concerning Aggrieved Person #1 because Frehoo was not her 'employer' under ORS 659A.001(4).

4. Respondent Frehoo should be granted summary judgment as to the agency's request for injunctive relief because the business is closed.

5. The forum should grant summary judgment to the extent that any of the claims or relief sought relate to corporate entities other than Frehoo.

6. The forum should dismiss the claims seeking damages for the Aggrieved Persons because they are not 'Complainants.'

7. All of the individual Respondents are entitled to summary judgment as to the charges of aiding and abetting.

"Following is a discussion and analysis of each of Respondents' motions.

"A. Aggrieved Person #2's Claim of Sexual Harassment Due to Alleged Touching by a Patron

"Respondents move for summary judgment as to the claims of Aggrieved Person #2 because 'the harassment claim appears to be based on a few instances of alleged unwelcome touching by a customer, * * * which it is undisputed that [Aggrieved Person #2] failed to report.' In response, the Agency argues that 'asking a child to take off her clothes, for the entertainment of adult customers, whether it involves overt sex acts or "simply" the lewd exhibition of body parts' meets the criteria for sexual harassment. The Agency further states that a child cannot consent to a sex act, citing ORS 163.315(1).

"'Sexual harassment' is defined as follows:

- '(1) Sexual harassment is unlawful discrimination on the basis of sex and includes the following types of conduct:
 - '(a) Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or other conduct of a sexual nature when such conduct is directed toward an individual because of that individual's sex and:
 - '(A) Submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of employment; or

'(B) Submission to or rejection of such conduct is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting that individual.

'(b) Any unwelcome verbal or physical conduct that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to have the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with work performance or creating a hostile, intimidating or offensive working environment.'

OAR 839-005-0030. In this case, there is evidence that Aggrieved Person #2 had to submit to 'conduct of a sexual nature when such conduct is directed toward an individual because of [her] sex' when she performed nude dancing for the purpose of entertaining adults at Frehoo. Accordingly, the forum must determine whether that conduct was 'unwelcome.'

"When the Agency argues that Aggrieved Person #2 was incapable of consenting to sexual acts under ORS 163.315(1),46 the Agency is essentially arguing that the conduct was 'unwelcome.' Courts that have considered this issue have held that 'the age of consent in the state in which [an individual] is employed' determines whether sexual conduct was 'welcome.' *EEOC v Finish Line, Inc*, 915 F Supp 2d 904, 917 (MD Tenn 2013), *quoting Doe v. Oberweis Dairy*, 456 F.3d 704, 713 (7th Cir 2006). These cases are consistent with an Oregon Court of Appeals opinion which held that 'a person's incapacity to consent under ORS 163.315(1) extends to civil cases.' *Wilson v Tobiassen*, 97 Or App 527, 534, 777 P2d 1379, 1384 (1989), *rev den*, 308 Or 500 (1989). Accordingly, it is reasonable to extend the age of consent in ORS 163.315(1) to this administrative proceeding, which would render any sexual conduct involving Aggrieved Person #2 as 'unwelcome.' Therefore, Respondents have not demonstrated that, as a matter of law, Aggrieved Person #2 was not subjected to sexual harassment.

"Respondents also assert that Frehoo did not know, nor should it have known, of any sexual harassment of Aggrieved Person # 2. An employer can be held liable for harassment if the employer knew or should have known of the conduct and fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective action. *In the Matter of Murrayhill Thriftway, Inc.*, 20 BOLI 130, 153 (2000).⁴⁷ There is a disputed issue of fact in this case as to whether Respondents should have taken greater care in checking the identification presented by Aggrieved Person #2 to determine whether she was over the age of 18 and eligible to dance nude for entertainment purposes. Therefore, this motion is DENIED.

⁴⁶ Under Oregon law, a person under the age of 18 is "incapable of consenting to a sexual act." ORS 163.315(1)(a). As well, it is illegal to use a person who is less than 18 years of age in a display of sexually explicit conduct. ORS 163.670(1); 163.665(1). The definition of "sexually explicit conduct" includes "actual or simulated * * * [I]ewd exhibit of sexual or other intimate parts." ORS 163.665(3)(f). Oregon also prohibits exhibiting an obscene performance to a minor. ORS 167.075(1).

⁴⁷ If the harassment is from a supervisor, there is a presumption that the employer should have known of the harassment, but there is no presumption if the harassment was from a non-employee. *Id.*

"B. Aggrieved Person #2's Claim 'Based on Taking Her Clothes Off or Being Looked at By a Supervisor'

"Respondents assert that Aggrieved Person # 2 cannot base her sexual harassment claim on the fact that she took her clothes off or was watched by a supervisor while dancing nude because those things were an integral part of her work as a dancer. As previously stated, Aggrieved Person #2 was under the age of 18 when she danced nude at Frehoo in front of adults for entertainment purposes, and there is a disputed fact as to whether Respondents knew or should have known that she was underage. Therefore, Respondents have not demonstrated that they are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law and this motion is also DENIED.

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"D. Agency's Request for Injunctive Relief

"In the Amended Formal Charges, the Agency seeks an injunction against 'Respondents, their agents, employees and successors' pursuant to ORS 659A.030(1)(b), OAR 839-005-0021 and OAR 839-005-0030. Respondents request summary judgment on behalf of Frehoo, its 'agents,' and 'employees' because Frehoo ceased operations on July 31, 2016. Respondents argue that because the purpose of an injunction is to prevent future harm, the need for injunctive relief as 'set forth on page 20, paragraph 3 of the Formal Charges' is moot due to the closure of the business. In response, the Agency produced evidence that there are indications that, as of September 28, 2016, the Frehoo location in Beaverton was still set up as a business and 'could resume operations at that location with little or no delay.' ⁴⁹ (Agency Ex. C, Lynch Decl., ¶ 7) More specifically, Lynch observed:

- Seating, privacy curtains, glassware and bottles of alcohol appeared ready for use.
- Sound equipment in the DJ booth was powered on and appeared ready for use
- Pilot lights were burning on a gas range in the kitchen.
- In an office, a video monitoring system and a computer were powered on.

Id. As well, Frehoo is listed as an active business with the Corporation Division of Oregon's Secretary of State. (Agency Ex. H)

⁴⁸ This section related to claims involving AP1. All of those claims have since been resolved by the parties.

⁴⁹The Agency also made an argument based on ORS 659A.850(4) which is not cited on page 20, paragraph 3 of the Amended Formal Charges and, thus, was not considered when ruling on Respondents' motion.

'[T]he nonmonetary remedies sought by the Agency would be a futile exercise of the forum's authority, given that Respondent MBI is no longer doing business in Oregon and that there is no indication in the record that MBI has any intention of resuming business in Oregon in the future.'

In the Matter of Maltby Biocontrol, Inc, 2014 BOLI 121, 157 (2014) (emphasis added). By contrast, in this case there is evidence on the record in the Lynch Declaration, as described above, which creates a question of fact as to whether there is 'an intention [to] resum[e] business in Oregon in the future.' Accordingly, Respondents' Fifth Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

"E. Claims Related to Corporate Entities Other Than Frehoo

"Respondents request that the forum 'grant summary judgment to the extent that any of the claims or relief sought related to corporate entities other than Frehoo.' This argument was based on the caption in the original Formal Charges which named Frehoo as the only corporate Respondent. The identification of Frehoo as a party was followed by the listing of numerous other corporate entities, which were preceded by the acronym 'aka.' The Agency did not object to Respondents' argument in its response and recently filed Amended Formal Charges which 'remove[d] the "aka" entities.' Accordingly, because the 'AKA entities' have been removed from the caption and there are no claims made against any corporate entities other than Frehoo, Respondents' motion is DENIED AS MOOT.

"F. <u>Damage Claims on Behalf of Aggrieved Persons who are not Complainants</u>

"The Agency seeks damages for each Aggrieved Person in the amount of \$4,000,000 under ORS 659A.850. Respondents assert that the forum has no authority to award damages because the Aggrieved Persons are not complainants and ORS 659A.850(4)(b) refers to 'paying award of actual damages suffered by the *complainant*.' (Emphasis added). In response, the Agency points out that the language in ORS 659A.850(4)(b) referencing 'damages suffered by the complainant' is preceded by the phrase 'including but not limited to * * *.' The Agency also cites to past cases awarding damages to an aggrieved person and legislative history. See, e.g. Blachana, LLC, 32 BOLI 220 (2013), aff'd Blachana, LLC v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 273 Or App 806 (2015), 359 P3d 574 (2015), opinion adh'd to as modified on recons sub nom. Blachana, LLC v. Oregon Bureau of Labor & Indus., 275 Or App 46 (2015).

"A BOLI Final Order 'may require that the respondent:

- '(a) Perform an act or series of acts designated * * * that are reasonably calculated to:
 - '(A) Carry out the purposes of [ORS chapter 659A];
 - '(B) Eliminate the effects of the unlawful practice that the respondent is found to have engaged in, *including but not limited to* paying an award of actual damages suffered by the complainant and complying with injunctive or other equitable relief; and
 - '(C) Protect the rights of the complainant and other persons similarly situated * * * * *'

ORS 659A.850(4) (emphasis added). The Oregon Supreme Court recently stated that the phrases 'includes' and 'including but not limited to' indicate that 'the legislature likely intended a nonexclusive meaning.' Sather v. SAIF Corp, 357 Or 122, 134, 347 P3d 326 (2015). In other words, the reference to 'actual damages suffered by the complainant' does not mean 'that the specific examples constitute the universe of items to which the general term refers; rather, it means only that our interpretation of the general term includes consideration of those specific examples.' Schmidt v. Mt Angel Abbey, 347 Or 389, 404, 223 P3d 399 (2009). Accordingly, the reference in ORS 659A.850(4)(b) to 'damages suffered by complainant' includes that specific example, but does not exclude an award of damages to an aggrieved person. Thus, BOLI's interpretation is consistent with how the Supreme Court has interpreted similar phrases in Sather and Schmidt. Therefore, Respondents' motion to dismiss the claims requesting damages on behalf of the Aggrieved Persons is DENIED.

"G. Aiding and Abetting Allegations against the Individual Respondents

"ORS 659A.030(1)(g) provides that it is an unlawful employment practice '[f]or any person, whether an employer or an employee, to aid, abet * * * the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this chapter or to attempt to do so.' 'Person' includes 'individuals.' ORS 659A.001(9)(a). 'Aiding and abetting, in the context of an unlawful employment practice, means to help, assist, or facilitate the commission of an unlawful employment practice, promote the accomplishment thereof, help in advancing or bring it about, or encourage, counsel or incite as to its commission.' *Maltby*, 33 BOLI at 151 (internal citations omitted). 'A corporate officer and owner who commits acts rendering the corporation liable for an unlawful employment practice may be found to have aided and abetted the corporation's unlawful employment practice.' *Hey Beautiful Enterprises, Ltd.*, 34 BOLI 80, 97 (2015). See also In the Matter of Crystal Springs Landscapes, Inc., 32 BOLI 144, 166-67 (2012); In the Matter of Dr. Andrew Engel, DMD, PC, 32 BOLI 94, 137 (2012); In the Matter of Cyber Center, Inc., 32 BOLI 11, 35 (2012). Aiding and

abetting, in the context of an unlawful employment practice, means 'to help, assist, or facilitate the commission of an unlawful employment practice, promote the accomplishment thereof, help in advancing or bring it about, or encourage, counsel or incite as to its commission.' *Hey Beautiful*, 80 BOLI at 97.

"Respondents assert that aiding and abetting requires active participation in an unlawful act, and Respondents cannot be liable simply because of their ownership interests or positions in the organization. In response, the Agency asserts that the individual Respondents can be liable for '[t]heir complete indifference and inaction to monitor and remedy the situation.'

"1. Facts Regarding the Individual Respondents

"Following is a summary of the facts regarding each individual Respondent. 50

"Colburn and Heinzman-Myers

"Colburn and Heinzman-Myers own interests in corporations that own NPC Concepts ('NPC'). NPC holds a 100% ownership stake in Frehoo. Colburn and Heinzman-Myers both live in Colorado. Heinzman-Myers has not visited Oregon since 1976. These individuals are not involved in recordkeeping for Frehoo and have no knowledge of, or responsibility for, creating or enforcing policies. These individuals did not know of any conduct involving the Aggrieved Persons until after suspects were arrested. The Agency has admitted that it has no 'evidence or information in [its] possession or knowledge that demonstrates or tends to show that either' Colburn or Heinzman-Myers 'has ever played an active role in the management of [Frehoo] or in the development of any of its employment policies.' (Resp. Ex. 20, Interrogatory Response #32)

"Herkenrath

"Herkenrath began working for Frehoo in December 2010, and performed on-site management duties beginning in 2012. During the time Aggrieved Person #1 was allegedly at the club, Herkenrath worked part-time as a manager on the day shift, and also worked as a security person. He recalls seeing Aggrieved Person #1 with Toth on one occasion. Herkenrath has known Toth since Herkenrath was ten years old. Toth told Herkenrath about the initial job opportunity to work for Frehoo.

⁵⁰ For purposes of this summary judgment motion, the facts are presented in the light most favorable to the Agency, the nonmoving party. Accordingly, not all facts Respondents discussed in their motions are included.

"Herkenrath was present when Aggrieved Person #2 applied for a position at Frehoo, but he was not the manager on duty.

"Kaiser

"Kaiser holds an ownership in Frehoo through his interest in RKG Holdings, Inc. During the events at issue in this case, Kaiser was responsible for overseeing the management of Stars Cabaret in Bend, Oregon, where he lives. He also generally oversees the financial, corporate and legal matters that affect for clubs in Oregon, including Frehoo. He was not generally involved in the day-to-day management of Frehoo. Kaiser never had any contact with the Aggrieved Persons.

"Mitchell

"Mitchell has an ownership interest in Frehoo through his interest in SHM Holdings, Inc. He is the corporate secretary of Frehoo. He was the corporate officer designated to oversee the management of Frehoo. In 2012, prior to the time that Aggrieved Person #1 was allegedly on Frehoo's premises, Frehoo hired an investigator to determine whether entertainers were engaging in prostitution, and to ensure the security was doing its job. At the time that Toth was arrested, Mitchell had never received any complaints that Toth sexually harassed anyone. The last communication Mitchell had with Toth was to send him a letter terminating his employment with Stars-Bridgeport, the location where Toth worked at the time of his arrest.

"Mitchell never had any contact with Aggrieved Person #2. During 2012 through 2014, Mitchell had a romantic/sexual relationship with a woman who worked as an entertainer at Frehoo.

"Struhar

"Struhar has an ownership interest in Frehoo through his interest in JMS Holdings, Inc., and is the corporate president of Frehoo. He has the ability to exercise management control at Frehoo, and has a romantic or sexual relationship with a Stars entertainer. Lynch Decl., p. 4.

"2. Analysis and Ruling

"The forum agrees with the Agency that sometimes the failure to take action can support a claim for aiding and abetting. See, e.g. Alch v Superior Court, 122 Cal App 4th 339, 389, 19 Cal Rptr 3d 29, 67 (2004) (under California law, talent agency could be liable for aiding and abetting an employer's age discrimination violation if talent agency gave 'substantial assistance or encouragement' to the employer); Hurley v Atl City Police Dep't, 174 F3d 95, 126 (3d Cir 1999) (under New Jersey law, 'inaction can form the basis of aiding and abetting liability if it rises

to the level of providing substantial assistance or encouragement'); Chapin v. Univ. of Mass., 977 F Supp 72, 78 (D.Mass.1997) (holding that the inaction of a supervisor who is aware of sexual harassment is aiding and abetting in violation of Massachusetts law).

"With respect to Respondents Herkenrath, Kaiser, Mitchell and Struhar, there is evidence that they had management control over Frehoo and may have failed to take action to prevent conduct at Frehoo which led to the events involving the Aggrieved Persons. However, there is no evidence to demonstrate that Colburn and Heinzman-Myers (who both reside in Colorado) had any involvement with Frehoo other than financial interests. Accordingly, Respondents' motion to dismiss Colburn and Heinzman-Myers is GRANTED, and the motion as to the remaining individual Respondents is DENIED."

(Exs. X150, X156) The ALJ's ruling on Respondents' motion for summary judgment is hereby CONFIRMED.

- 52) At the start of the hearing on November 9, 2016, the ALJ orally advised the Agency and Respondents of the issues to be addressed, the matters to be proved, and the procedures governing the conduct of the hearing. (Hearing Record)
- 53) To comply with the terms of the interim protective orders, throughout the hearing the aggrieved persons were referred to as AP1 and AP2 instead of their actual names. However, when AP1 and AP2 testified, their actual first names were used, but were not included in the transcript. With the exception of the named Respondents, Frehoo's employees and alleged independent contractors were referred to by their first names. When the medical records of AP1 and AP2 were discussed, any hearing observers who had not certified that they had read and agreed to the terms of the interim protective orders were asked to leave the room. (Hearing Record)
- 54) On November 14, 2016, the parties submitted a Joint Stipulation of Exhibits identifying exhibits that all the parties agreed should be admitted into evidence. (Ex. X158)
- 55) During the hearing, the ALJ sustained Respondents' objections to the audio recording of the BOLI interview of Nathan Wheeler (Ex. A28) because it contained material that was irrelevant, immaterial, repetitious and unreliable. Additionally, because Wheeler did not testify in person, Respondents did not have an opportunity to cross examine the witness. (Hearing Record)
- 56) The Agency attempted to offer evidence of sexual harassment at the Stars Salem location through the testimony of Chris Lynch. Respondents objected to this evidence on the basis of relevancy. The ALJ permitted Lynch to testify as to this evidence

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through an offer of proof. At the conclusion of the offer of proof, the ALJ sustained Respondents' objection because there was insufficient evidence on the record as to when the incident happened and how the management of the Salem club related to Frehoo. (Hearing Record)

57) On November 23, 2016, the ALJ issued an interim order which stated:

"INTRODUCTION

"The following summarizes rulings made during the hearing, as well as additional directives that will apply to the case when the hearing resumes.

"HEARING DATES

"The hearing in this case began on November [9], 2016, and went into recess before noon on November 18, 2016, after the Agency indicated it had no additional witnesses available to testify that day. The hearing will resume at <u>9:00 a.m. on Tuesday, November 29, 2016, and will continue until December 7, 2016.</u> At this time, the hearing facility is not available after December 7, 2016. The parties were informed that they needed to work towards December 7, 2016, as the ending date for the presentation of witness testimony and evidence. If necessary, the ALJ will arrange for closing arguments to be made on another date at another location.

"At 4:00 p.m. on Monday, November 28, 2016, the parties will have access to the hearing room to set up for hearing the next day.

"WITNESS TESTIMONY

"The Agency has indicated that it will call its expert witness to testify on November 29, 2016, and that this testimony (including direct, cross examination and re-direct) will last the entire day. Respondents have asserted that it seems unlikely that this testimony will last the entire day, and have requested that the Agency be prepared to have additional witnesses lined up. The Agency was instructed to disclose any additional witnesses to Respondents by noon on Monday, November 28, 2016.

"Furthermore, this hearing has progressed much slower than anticipated by the parties. Accordingly, the following procedures will be implemented going forward to help move the case along more expeditiously:

 When presenting their respective cases, both the Agency and Respondents should fill the entire day with witness testimony and avoid 'dead spots,' except for the usual mid-morning, lunch and mid-afternoon breaks. The parties will be expected to have additional witnesses ready in the event the testimony of a witness proceeds more quickly than anticipated. If a party

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does not have a witness lined up, they should be prepared to explain why there is 'good cause' for the lack of a witness.

- In order to avoid 'unduly repetitious evidence' under OAR 839-050-0260(2), the parties will be discouraged from asking testifying witnesses to summarize statements made by other witnesses who will also be testifying at the hearing. In other words, in most circumstances information should be presented with live testimony, rather than by having one witness read a lengthy summary statement of another witness who will also be coming in to testify.
- When the hearing resumes after the lunch hour break each day at approximately 1:00 p.m., the parties will be asked to identify the witnesses they intend to call the following day.
- On the morning of November 29, 2016, the Agency will be asked to provide an updated estimate as to when its case-in-chief will be complete, and Respondents will be asked for an estimation of how long its case will take.

"STRICKEN TESTIMONY OF DET. OPITZ

"After the conclusion of the Agency's direct examination of Beaverton Police Det. Chad Opitz, Lauren Mehrtens, an attorney from the Beaverton City Attorney's Office, appeared and asked to be heard. Ms. Mehrtens stated that she would be instructing Det. Opitz not to answer any questions regarding a pending criminal investigation. The Agency had asked some questions about this investigation in its direct examination of Det. Opitz and, thus, Respondents were effectively prevented from having an opportunity to conduct cross examination on that subject. Accordingly, the portion of the direct testimony of Det. Opitz on that topic was stricken from the record. The court reporter provided the forum with a transcript of that testimony, and copies of the transcript were provided to the Agency, Respondents, and Ms. Mehrtens.

"The Agency was provided with the opportunity to file a legal brief or motion as to why the stricken testimony should be admitted. The brief must be emailed to Respondents, Ms. Mehrtens and the ALJ by 5:00 p.m. on Monday, November 28, 2016. The original, hard copy for the forum file may be delivered to the ALJ on the morning of November 29, 2016.

"Respondents and the Beaverton City Attorney may file responses to the Agency's briefing. Responses must be emailed to the Agency, the Beaverton City Attorney's office and the ALJ by noon on Thursday, December 1, 2016. The original, hard copy for the forum file may be delivered to the ALJ on the morning of December 2, 2016."

(Exs. X159, X160)

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- 58) The Agency filed a Motion to Allow Evidence of Third Party Minor Dancer on November 28, 2016. Respondents and the City of Beaverton filed responses to the Agency's motion on December 1, 2016. On December 6, 2016, the ALJ announced on the record that the Agency's motion was denied because there was no way to predict whether Det. Opitz would need to rely on records which were determined to be exempt from disclosure under ORS 192.501 to 192.505 to answer questions on cross examination, in violation of the public officer privilege of ORS 40.270. If he could not answer questions due to privilege, then Respondents would not have the opportunity to fully and completely cross examine the witness. (Exs. X161, X162, X163; Hearing Record)
- 59) Throughout its case-in-chief, Respondents attempted to offer the testimony of witnesses who were not listed on their case summary and the Agency objected. Respondents were unable to establish that the witnesses met the standard for an "impeachment" witness. However, the ALJ allowed the witnesses to testify when Respondents established that the Agency offered witness testimony that differed from what was provided in discovery and, thus, Respondents would not have had advance notice of the need to list the "impeachment" witnesses in their case summary. (Hearing Record)
- 60) During the hearing, the Agency requested copies of email communications between Kaiser and Herkenrath. Respondents asserted that the emails were protected by attorney client and work product privileges. At the ALJ's request, Respondents produced copies of the emails for *in camera* inspection. The ALJ ruled that one email was covered by attorney client privilege and need not be produced. With respect to an email subject to the work product privilege, which is not absolute, the ALJ did not find a substantial need for the document to be produced. (Hearing Record)
- 61) At the conclusion of the evidentiary portion of the hearing, the ALJ and the parties discussed the filing of post-hearing briefs on matters which arose during the hearing, including motions made by Respondents at the conclusion of the Agency's case-in-chief. On December 12, 2016, the parties were provided with a copy of an excerpt from the proceedings on December 1, 2016, which included discussion of the issues. On December 13, 2016, the ALJ issued an interim order allowing the parties to file briefs regarding cases cited in the hearing by Respondents and the offer of proof regarding witness Alexa/"Satine" no later than December 19, 2016. The Agency and Respondents filed post-hearing briefs on December 19, 2016. (Exs. X164 X166)
- 62) In response to a question from the Agency, the ALJ sent an email to the parties on December 19, 2016, which lifted the requirement that documents had to be filed and served by hand delivery. (Ex. X167)
- 63) On December 19, 2016, the ALJ sent an email to the parties which stated, in pertinent part:

"As discussed at the end of the evidentiary portion of the hearing in this matter, closing arguments will take place at BOLI's Portland office at the address below on <u>Wednesday</u>, <u>December 21, 2016</u>. The proceedings will begin at <u>9:00 a.m.</u> (note that this is a half hour change from what was previously discussed). The parties may access the hearing room after 8:00 a.m. to set up their materials.

"Each side's closing arguments will be limited to 90 minutes, and the Agency will have 15 minutes at the end for rebuttal closing arguments.

"If the parties intend to make any video or PowerPoint presentations, they should be prepared with their own equipment and should bring copies of any materials that are presented on screen."

(Ex. X168)

64) On December 20, 2016, the ALJ sent an email to the parties which stated, in pertinent part:

"Following are the forum's interim rulings after reviewing the parties' post-hearing briefs:

- "1. Respondents' motions for judgment as a matter of law are DENIED. The issues raised in the motions will be addressed in the Proposed and Final Orders.
- "2. The testimony of witness Alexa/Satine' is not admitted into evidence. This witness was not identified in Respondents' case summary and was labeled as an 'impeachment' witness. Impeachment by extrinsic evidence, e.g. testimony of a witness or by introduction of an exhibit, can be used to show bias, interest, prejudice, improper motive, a witness's ability to perceive or remember, prior inconsistent conduct and prior inconsistent statements directly related to a relevant issue, and conviction of a crime as set out in OEC 609. Respondents did not demonstrate that this witness testimony met any of the categories of 'impeachment' evidence set forth in OEC 609.

"Respondents also asserted that this witness was first named in the hearing testimony of Steve Toth and was not disclosed in response to discovery requests. The ALJ has the authority to take appropriate remedial action when relevant information is not produced in response to a discovery order. See, e.g. In the Matter of Columbia Components, Inc., 32 BOLI 257, 263-64 (2013). However, in this circumstance, although the Agency was asked to identify the names of any witnesses, there is no information to indicate that the Agency knew of the name of this witness prior to Toth's testimony

and failed to disclose it. Accordingly, the witness testimony cannot be admitted due to an alleged failure on the part of the Agency to respond to a discovery request.

"This testimony is not admitted into evidence but will remain in the record as an offer of proof.

"Additionally, the Agency's motion for the forum to take judicial notice of the final order of the OLCC (Ex. A25) is DENIED. Ex. A25 is a Stipulated Settlement Agreement for Entry into Final Order. The agreement, as well as any 'statements made in compromise negotiations' are inadmissible under OEC 408. See also In the Matter of Ruston, Christopher and Christine Stahler, 34 BOLI 56, 66 (2015)."

(Ex. X169)

- 65) The ALJ issued an interim order on February 2, 2017, inviting the parties to submit briefing on the issue of damages. The Agency filed its brief on February 10, 2017, and Respondents filed their briefing on December 21, 2017. (Exs. X171, X172, X173)
- 66) On January 5, 2017, the Agency filed a request for hearing transcript and Respondents sent an email also requesting a copy of the transcript. With the ALJ's interim order of February 2, 2017, the parties were provided with copies of draft transcripts of the testimony of AP1 and AP2 to be reviewed for the purpose of determining which portions should be subject to the interim protective orders in this matter. The parties were encouraged to confer and notify the ALJ if they were able to reach a stipulation. After the parties informed the ALJ that they could not reach an agreement regarding the testimony, a telephone conference was scheduled for February 27, 2017, to discuss the matter. After the parties discussed their general positions regarding the treatment of the transcripts, a briefing schedule was set forth in an interim order issued on March 1, 2017 so that the parties could explain their respective positions in writing.

In response to the forum's interim order of March 1, 2017, the parties submitted briefs outlining their respective positions as to which portions of the draft transcripts of the testimony of AP1 and AP2 should be redacted to remove information subject to the interim protective orders. On March 15, 2017, the ALJ issued an interim order specifying the particular portions of the transcript that should be redacted to remove "[i]nformation of a personal nature such as but not limited to that kept in a personal, medical or similar file" pursuant to ORS 192.502(2). (Exs. X170, X171, X176, X177, X179, X180)

67) During the February 27, 2017, telephone conference, the Agency and Respondents requested 45 days to file exceptions to the Proposed Order to allow time to review the transcript of the hearing. The ALJ granted the oral request to deviate from the forum's typical 10-day exceptions period, and indicated that the Exceptions Notice in the Proposed Order would reflect the revised time period. (Post-Hearing Record)

68) The ALJ issued an interim order on February 22, 2017, requesting that the Agency file a brief addressing the issue of adequate notice in the Amended Formal Charges no later than March 1, 2017. Respondents were permitted to file responsive briefing no later than March 8, 2017. The Agency filed its brief on March 1, 2017, and Respondents filed their brief on March 8, 2017. On March 15, 2017, the ALJ issued an interim order which stated as follows:

"Introduction

"The parties submitted briefing on the issue of the adequacy of notice in the Amended Formal Charges with respect to particular sections of OAR 839-005-0030 in response to the forum's interim order issued February 22, 2017.

"The Agency argued that all sections of OAR 839-005-0030 – including the proxy liability theory set forth in OAR 839-005-0030(3) – were relevant at the time the charges were issued. The Agency asserted that the allegations in the Amended Formal Charges are sufficient, but moved 'for leave to issue Second Amended Formal Charges to further clarify that each subsection applies and specifically allege that Steven Toth and Respondents' other managers acted as a proxy for Respondent Frehoo, Inc., during times material.' (Agency's Post-Hearing Brief, p. 4)

"Respondents asserted that they 'did and reasonably could have understood that the Agency was proceeding based only on sections (5) ('Harassment by Supervisor, No Tangible Employment Action') and (7) ('Harassment by Non-Employees') of OAR 839-005-0030, and not on the basis of proxy liability.' (Resp's Post-Hearing Brief, p. 11) (emphasis in original). Respondents further argue that they would be substantially prejudiced if the Agency could add the theory of proxy liability to the Amended Formal Charges. Additionally, Respondents asserted that if the Agency is permitted to amend, then Respondents should be granted leave to amend their Answer and the record should be reopened to allow Respondents to offer evidence to defend against proxy liability allegations.

"RULING

"The Agency mentioned the proxy liability theory for the first time during closing arguments. OAR 839-050-0140(4) does not apply because the Agency did not move to amend the Amended Formal Charges before the close of the evidentiary portion of the hearing. Under OAR 839-050-0140(5), the ALJ may allow pleadings to be amended to conform to evidence when (1) the Agency has shown good cause for not including the new matter in its charging document and (2) Respondents are not able to show substantial prejudice from the amendment. The ALJ may grant a continuance to allow the objecting party to produce additional evidence.

"As set forth in the rule, if the forum found there was good cause and permitted the Agency to add the proxy liability theory, the record would need to be reopened to allow Respondents to present additional evidence to respond to the new allegation. Because the evidentiary record in this case closed on December 7, 2016, the forum declines to permit the Agency to amend and add the proxy liability allegations.

"As indicated above, Respondents expected to defend against charges of harassment by supervisor, no tangible employment action, under OAR 839-005-0030(5) and harassment by non-employees under OAR 839-005-0030(7). The Amended Formal Charges and the Amended Answer also included allegations and defenses related to the definition and standard for determining sexual harassment as set forth in OAR 839-005-0030 (1) and (2). The Amended Formal Charges did not mention the theories set forth in OAR 839-005-0030(3) (employer proxy), OAR 839-005-0030(4) (harassment by supervisor plus tangible employment action), OAR 839-005-0030(8) (withdrawn consent), OAR 839-005-0030(9) (opportunities/benefits granted).

"Accordingly, the forum GRANTS the Agency's request to amend the Amended Formal Charges to specifically cite to OAR 839-005-0030(1), (2), (5) and (7). The request to add additional sections of OAR 839-005-0030 to the Amended Formal Charges is DENIED."

(Exs. X174, X175, X178, X181)

69) On May 1, 2017, the Agency submitted a Notification of Settlement of Charges as to AP1 and Joint Request for Transcript. The ALJ issued an interim order on May 10, 2017, which stated:

"Notification of Settlement

"On May 1, 2017, the Agency filed a document notifying the forum that the parties reached an agreement in settlement of the charges concerning Aggrieved Person #1 and that a fully executed settlement document would be submitted to the forum within the coming weeks. The parties are hereby ordered to submit a fully executed settlement agreement or, alternatively, a status report with an estimate as to when an agreement will likely be filed no later than May 19, 2017.

"After the settlement is finalized according to the procedures set forth in OAR 839-050-0220, a Proposed Order will be issued which contains the facts necessary to make proposed findings regarding the charges concerning Aggrieved Person #2.

"Request for Transcript

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"The parties also jointly requested a copy of the hearing transcript "as soon as practicable and prior to the issuance of the Proposed Order." Under normal circumstances, the forum does not receive a transcript of the hearing until after a Final Order is issued and a Notice of Appeal is filed. See OAR 839-050-0350(3). However, this case involves several unique circumstances, which are as follows:

- The hearing lasted for 15 days, including closing arguments.
- A court reporter was present throughout the entirety of the hearing to transcribe the testimony, arguments and objections made by the parties, and statements of the ALJ.
- Over 40 witnesses testified and there were significant factual disputes.
- The ALJ had access to a draft transcript when preparing the Proposed Order.

Given the totality of these circumstances, the ALJ exercises discretion pursuant to OAR 839-050-0240 and finds that distribution of the transcript to the parties will likely result in a more efficient process for reviewing the Proposed Order and drafting any potential Exceptions that may be filed.

"The final, certified transcript will be provided to the ALJ by the court reporter within the next few days. The ALJ will then instruct the Contested Case Coordinator to make hard copies of the transcript and provide them to the parties at the same time and on the same day, subject to the following conditions:

- The parties may use the transcript solely for the purpose of reviewing the Proposed Order and filing Exceptions (or, thereafter, for appellate purposes).
- The parties may not scan or make electronic copies of the transcript.
- The parties may only make and distribute hard copies of the transcript to attorneys and staff who are involved in reviewing the Proposed Order and filing Exceptions (or, thereafter, for appellate purposes).
- The parties are bound by all interim protective orders that have been issued in this matter.

IT IS SO ORDERED"

(Exs. X182, X183)

70) On May 12, 2017, Respondents filed a request for clarification regarding the use of the transcript, and the Agency responded on May 15, 2017. After reviewing the issues and concerns raised by the parties, the ALJ issued an interim order on May 17, 2017, which stated, in pertinent part:

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"After reviewing the issues and concerns raised by the parties, the interim order of May 10, 2017, is hereby supplemented as follows:

- Electronic copies of the transcript may be made for the purposes described in the interim order of May 10, 2017. However, any electronic copies must be secured with a password or some other means of restricting access only to those individuals permitted to review the transcript under the terms of the May 10, 2017, interim order.
- The forum will release copies of the transcript to the Agency, Respondents' counsel and counsel for AP2. The Contested Case Coordinator will contact the parties when the transcript is available to be picked up from BOLI's Portland office. The forum will not be providing a copy of the transcript to counsel for AP1, because the parties notified the forum that an agreement was reached to resolve the claims involving AP1.
- No one is permitted to copy or use the transcript for purposes other than for the reasons set forth in the May 10, 2017, interim order.⁵¹
- The restrictions set forth above and in the interim order of May 10, 2017, shall remain in place until a Notice of Appeal is filed with the Oregon Court of Appeals (unless this ruling is modified by a subsequent interim order or by the Deputy Commissioner in the Final Order).

"Record Clarification as to Volume 9

"The index at the beginning of Volume 9 indicates that page 1873 was removed and saved in a sealed envelope. However, that particular page is not subject to the interim protective orders and was not removed and placed in a sealed envelope.

IT IS SO ORDERED"

(Exs. X184 - X186)

71) Telephone conferences with the parties were held on May 19, 2017, and May 26, 2017, to discuss the status of the settlement documents regarding AP1. After requests were received for a Final Order of Informal Disposition ("FOID") as to the claims involving AP1, the ALJ issued a FOID on June 15, 2017, disposing of the claims related to AP1. (Exs. X187 - X189, X191, X192)

⁵¹ This forum only has jurisdiction over the matters alleged in the Amended Formal Charges. Any additional concerns regarding access to the transcript for purposes of fairness in the civil proceeding are not properly directed to the forum and could be raised with the court.

72) On June 14, 2017, Respondents filed motion to remove the restrictions on the use of the hearing transcript. The Agency filed a response to Respondents' motion on June 16, 2017. Respondents' motion is DENIED. (Exs. X190, X193)

73) The ALJ issued a proposed order on July 18, 2017, that notified the participants they were entitled to file exceptions to the proposed order within 45 days of its issuance. The Agency and Respondents timely filed exceptions on September 1, 2017. The exceptions are addressed following the Opinion section of the Final Order.

