8 42 AM '82

1	BEFORE THE LAND USE BOARD OF APPEALS JUN 14
2	OF THE STATE OF OREGON
3	STEPHEN SIEGEL, ) THERESA SCHLEGEL, )
4	RONALD SHAFFER, )
5	Petitioners, ) LUBA No. 82-008
6	vs. ) FINAL OPINION ) AND ORDER
7	JOSEPHINE COUNTY, ) and PAUL GRANCELL, )
8	Respondents. )
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10	Appeal from Josephine County.
11 12	Stephen Siegel, Theresa Schlegel, Ronald Shaffer, Grants Pass, filed the Petition for Review and argued the cause on their own behalf.
13	Daniel F. Hughes, Grants Pass, filed the brief and argued the cause on behalf of Respondent Paul Grancell.
14	No appearance by Josephine County.
15 16	REYNOLDS, Chief Referee; COX, Referee; BAGG, Referee; participated in this decision.
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18	AFFIRMED 6/14/82
19	You are entitled to judicial review of this Order.
20	Judicial review is governed by the provisions of Oregon Laws 1979, ch 772, sec 6(a).
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REYNOLDS, Chief Referee. 1 INTRODUCTION 2 Petitioners appeal Josephine County's decision which allows 3 a second dwelling on a lot subject to conditions. The county's decision was pursuant to the "special provisions" section of 5 the county's zoning ordinance which provides that the county may permit "A second dwelling on a lot, subject to the 8 following conditions: "a. The second dwelling must be occupied by parent, grandparent, brother, sister, son or 10 daughter of the record owner. Other relationships may be allowed by the planning 11 commission when individual circumstances warrant such action. 12 "b. The circumstances relating to the 1.3 necessity for the second dwelling must establish either a health condition necessitating constant 14 attention by the record owner, or in the case of a son or daughter, an economic hardship, in which 15 event, the permit shall not exceed nine (9) months in duration. The fact that someone has 16 attained the age to retire from active work is not a sufficient justification for applying for 17 this provision. 18 "c. The property owner must enter into an agreement with the county verifying the facts, 19 acknowledging the conditions of approval, and promising immediate removal of the second 20 dwelling unit upon termination of the circumstances justifying approval." Josephine 21 County Zoning Regulations, Section 22(1)(k). 22 The application for a second dwelling unit was submitted by Mr. 23 Paul Grancell who, with his wife, resides on a 4.35 acre parcel 24 in Josephine County. He requested the second dwelling unit so 25

that his daughter and son-in-law could move onto the property

- 1 to care for him. He believed care by these relatives was
- 2 needed because he was legally blind.
- 3 Petitioners challenge the county's decision approving the
- 4 second dwelling unit on the basis that the findings in support
- 5 of the county's decision are inadequate as a matter of law, and
- 6 there is not substantial evidence in the record to support the
- 7 county's findings. We affirm the county's decision.

## 8 FACTS

- 9 Respondent Grancell received approval from the Josephine
- 10 County planning director for placement of a second dwelling
- unit on respondent's property. The planning director's
- 12 approval was reviewed by the zoning commission and affirmed.
- 13 Thereafter, petitioner Rachel Siegel requested that the zoning
- 14 commission conduct a public hearing and review its decision.
- 15 The zoning commission held a public hearing and heard testimony
- 16 from numerous witnesses. At the close of the public hearing,
- 17 the zoning commission adopted findings of fact but took no
- 18 formal action. Notwithstanding the zoning commission's
- 19 inaction, the matter was appealed to the Board of
- 20 Commissioners. The Board of Commissioners, by a two to one
- 21 vote, affirmed the planning director's approval of the second
- 22 dwelling unit. Two of the commissioners voted to adopt those
- 23 findings of the planning commission which were in support of
- 24 the approval. These two commissioners also adopted additional
- 25 findings in support of the approval.
- 26 As part of the hearings process before the county planning

- director or zoning commission, respondent Grancell submitted a
- 2 form medical certificate filled in and signed by his doctor.
- 3 The form certificate, with portions filled in by respondent
- 4 Grancell's doctor emphasized, was as follows:
- 5 "This certifies that Grancell, Paul is my patient/outpatient and that the condition of health described below requires this person to have constant care or supervision by a relative or friend, and that inability to obtain this care would necessitate institutionalized care.
- The condition of health requiring care is: macular

  generation.
- The treatment administered consists of: (medication, surgery, therapy, etc.)

## Periodic follow-ups."

- The form medical certificate was supplied by the county to be
  used for purposes of administration of Section 22(k) of the
  county's zoning ordinance. It was pursuant to Section 22(k)
  that respondent Grancell made his application. Respondent
  Grancell also submitted a certificate of blindness from the
  State of Oregon Commission For The Blind stating that he was
  legally blind. The certificate defines "blind individual" as
- "An individual whose central visual acuity does not exceed 20/200 in the better eye with correcting lenses, or whose visual acuity is greater than 20/200 but is accompanied by a limitation in the fields of vision such that the widest diameter of the visual field subtends an angle no greater than 20 degrees."
- 23 At the hearing before the zoning commission, Mr. Anderson,
- 24 Mr. Grancell, Mr. Cunningham, Mr. Spandri, Mr. Vahrenwald and
- 25 Mr. Pangburn testified in support of approving the second
- 26 dwelling unit. Mr. Anderson testified that Mr. Grancell was

- chairman of the Elks Lodge National Foundation and that Mr.
- 2 Anderson was his assistant. Mr. Anderson said that Mr.
- 3 Grancell could not see well enough to do the job he was
- 4 appointed to do, so Mr. Anderson did a majority of the work for
- 5 Mr. Grancell. Mr. Anderson also testified that Mr. Grancell
- 6 could not read letters 3/8ths of an inch high, and that when he
- y went to dinner with Mr. Grancell, if the lighting were not
- 8 sufficient, Mr. Grancell could not see what was on his plate.
- 9 Mr. Anderson stated that Mr. Grancell's condition was
- 10 deteriorating.
- Mr. Grancell testified that he has a severe eyesight
- 12 problem and that he is under a doctor's care. His main
- 13 problems are dizzy-spells and flashing lights. He testified
- that he could operate a rototiller in his yard for 15 to 30
- minutes at a time, then would have to sit down for 15 minutes.
- Mr. Cunningham testified that he lived directly across the
- 17 street from Mr. Grancell and had the opportunity to observe
- 18 his deteriorating condition. Mr. Cunningham noted that  $i\,\mathbf{f}$
- 19 opponents who had testified Mr. Grancell kept his property well
- 20 maintained looked closely they would find there were "quite a
- 21 few weeds." He testified that he had seen Mr. and Mrs. Spandri
- 22 operating the rototiller in addition to Mr. Grancell.
- Mr. Spandri, Mr. Grancell's son-in-law, testified that Mr.
- 24 Grancell's rototiller was very easy to operate and could be
- 25 controlled with one finger. Mr. Spandri's 10 year old son
- 26 often operated the rototiller for Mr. Grancell. Mr. Grancell

- 1 could not, according to Mr. Spandri, operate any other kind of
- 2 rototiller. Mr. Spandri concluded his testimony by noting that
- 3 Mr. Grancell had been an active person all his life and that if
- 4 he did not have someone on the property to assist him he would
- 5 attempt to do whatever needed to be done all by himself.
- 6 Mr. Vahrenwald noted that Mr. Grancell could no longer
- 7 identify him from a distance of between 25 to 50 feet. Mr.
- 8 Pangburn said, based on his experience, that just because
- 9 Mr. Grancell's wife was at home did not necessarily mean that
- 10 she would be able to provide "constant care" for him.
- Mr. and Mrs. Siegel, Mr. Longhurst, Mr. Shaffer and Mr.
- 12 Axtail testified before the zoning commission in opposition to
- 13 the approval. Both Mr. and Mrs. Siegel testified to the
- 14 numerous times they had observed Mr. Grancell operating his
- 15 rototiller in his garden as well as doing other gardening
- 16 tasks. They both questioned whether someone who was capable of
- 17 performing these activities was in need of constant care or
- 18 supervision within the meaning of the county zoning ordinance.
- 19 Mrs. Siegel asked the commission why a second dwelling unit was
- 20 necessary on the property "when his wife is there and in good
- 21 health and he certainly appears to be himself at this time."
- 22 Mr. Siegel testified he thought it significant that not once
- 23 had Mr. Grancell ever indicated to him that he required
- 24 constant care and supervision or that failure to obtain such
- 25 care would require him to be placed in a convalescent home or
- 26 other constant care facility. Mr. Siegel also did not believe

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Mr. Grancell had ever in the proceeding claimed he needed help
    caring for himself; the only claim made was that Mr. Grancell
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    needed help caring for his garden. Mr. Siegel testified that
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    Mr. Grancell's daughter and her family had not spent any
    significant amount of time on the property in the last two
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    months. Mr. Siegel did not understand how Mr. Grancell could
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    do all this work if he was in need of constant care and
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    supervision. Mr. Siegel did not believe that blindness was a
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    sufficient criterion to justify a conclusion a person needs
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    constant care and supervision, noting that five totally blind
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    people had recently climbed Mt. Rainier. Mr. Siegel testified
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    that "no medical information was presented to substantiate the
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    claim that Mr. Grancell is essentially an invalid. Even Mr.
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    Grancell did not claim this, but this is the only valid reason
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    for approval."
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        Mr. Longhurst testifed concerning Mr. Grancell's constant
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    rototilling and said he did not believe that anyone who "spent
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    the amount of time Mr. Grancell did in maintaining his property
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    needed to be institutionalized." He also said he did not
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    understand why Mrs. Grancell could not provide the care needed
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    by Mr. Grancell. Mr. Shaffer stated he concurred with
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    petitioner Siegel's comments. He also stressed the amount of
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    time Mr. Grancell devoted to his garden and that he did a very
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              The minutes reflect Mr. Axtail, former zoning
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    commission member, testified that the request had first come
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   before the commission when he was a member. He subsequently
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- 1 decided the medical information was not adequate to enable the
- 2 commission to make a decision.
- 3 In response to the Siegel's questions about whether Mrs.
- 4 Grancell was able to take care of Mr. Grancell, Mr. Grancell
- 5 said that his wife was 66 years old and that while she did her
- 6 best to care for him, "his doctor felt it would be better if a
- 7 younger person was there to assist him."
- In addition to the above, Dr. Apostol supplemented his
- 9 earlier medical certification in a letter responding to a
- 10 request for more information from the county's permit
- 11 administrator. Dr. Apostol's letter stated:
- "Mr. Grancell was last examined May 1981 at which time his visual acuity was 20/count fingers, right eye; 20/400 in the left."
- 14 After listening to the foregoing testimony, "dissenting"
- 15 zoning commission members Herman, Faine, Hickson and Mootz made
- 16 certain findings. Among them they found:
- 17 (1) Mr. Grancell was legally blind, and that even with corrective lenses his vision was 20/200 which was very poor.
- 19 (2) Mr. Grancell's condition had deteriorated over the past year, which indicated further deterioration could occur;
- 21 (3) Mr. Grancell required constant care or supervision which could not feasibly be provided by Mrs. Grancell;
- 23 (4) Mr. Grancell's parcel was one of the larger parcels in the area;
- (5) A second dwelling unit would not adversely impact adjoining property owners because the same size family would be occupying the mobile home as had lived there before.

1 The public hearing before the Board of Commissioners on appeal from the zoning commission's "action" consisted mainly 3 of repeating the testimony given before the zoning commission 4 and argument concerning that testimony. By a vote of two to one, the Board of Commissioners upheld the planning director's 6 approval of the second dwelling permit. The Board adopted the 7 findings of the dissenting zoning commission members set forth 8 The Board of Commissioners also stated the following in above. the "findings, reasons and conclusions" section of the order: 10 "Commissioner Haugen cited the testimony incorporated in the Staff Report concerning the 11 progressive deterioration of Mr. Grancell's condition in addition to the testimony given by Messrs. Delbert 12 Anderson, Paul Cunningham, Andrew Vahrenwald, Walter

"Commissioners Haugen and Ford cited the Certification of Health Condition signed by Dr. John G. Apostol, certifying that the condition of Mr. Grancell's health required constant care or supervision by a relative or friend; further, that inability to obtain this care would necessitate institutionalized care.

Spandri and in particular Marvin Pangburn's

testimony. Commissioner Ford concurred.

"Commissioner Ford cited the State of Oregon Certificate of Blindness dated December 16, 1980, certifying that Paul Grancell was blind within the legal definition.

"Noting testimony concerning the physical appearance of the applicant, Commissioner Haugen believed this was irrelevant and had no bearing on the medical hardship attested to by Dr. Apostol; namely macular degeneration, which posed some problem. Commissioner Ford concurred.

"Commissioners Haugen and Ford cited the reasons given by Messrs. Faine, Hickson, Herman and Mootz and adopted said reasons by reference."

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## OPINION 1 Jurisdiction. 2 1. Respondent Grancell raises two issues which must be dealt 3 with preliminarily. The first issue is that this Board lacks 4 jurisdiction over the county's decision. Respondent's argument 5 is that petitioners have failed to allege a violation of any 6 statewide planning goals and that without such alleged 7 violations we lack jurisdiction. Respondent cites two recent 8 Court of Appeals opinions: Fisher v Colwell, 51 Or App 301, 9 625 P2d 1333 (1981), and Montmore Homeowners Association v 10 Brydon, 55 Or App 242, \_\_\_ P2d \_\_\_ (1981). 11 The cases cited by respondent are distinguishable from the 12 present case. It is true that in both of those cases, the 13 Court of Appeals ruled that we lacked jurisdiction in the 14 absence of alleged violations of statewide planning goals. 15 in those cases the petitioners had only alleged violations of 16 Those ordinances did not implement a 17 local ordinances. comprehensive plan because the City of Portland had no 18 comprehensive plan. Under 1979 Oregon Laws, ch 772, sec 3 19 (1981 Replacement Part), in effect when the above cases were 20 decided, LUBA had jurisdiction over land use decisions. A land 21 use decision was defined, in pertinent part, as: 22 "A final decision or determination...that 23 concerns the adoption, amendment or application of: 24 "(A) The statewide planning goals; 25 "(B) A comprehensive plan provision; or 26

"(C) A zoning, subdivision or other ordinance that implements a comprehensive plan;..."

In the two Court of Appeals cases, petitioners did not allege before LUBA that the decision violated statewide planning goals or a comprehensive plan provision. The ordinance of the City of Portland allegedly violated was not one which implemented a comprehensive plan because the City of Portland did not have a comprehensive plan. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals concluded the city's decisions in both cases were not "land use decisions" over which LUBA had jurisdiction.

In the present case petitioners, as in the above cases, have alleged a violation of a local ordinance. However, there is no assertion in this case that the ordinance which petitioners allege to have been violated does not implement the county's comprehensive plan. In fact, the ordinance which is alleged to have been violated in this appeal is the zoning ordinance for Josephine County which states, in Section 14.020 "Purpose," that it is the purpose of the zoning ordinance to "provide for the orderly implementation of the comprehensive plan for Josephine County." Accordingly, we conclude petitioners have alleged the county made a decision involving application of an ordinance which implements the county's comprehensive plan, and that this Board, therefore, has jurisdiction under 1979 Oregon Laws, ch 772, (4), as amended by 1981 Oregon Laws, ch 748.

2. Standing. 1 The second preliminary issue involves respondent Grancell's 2 3 challenge to petitioners' standing to appeal. Respondent contests standing because petitioners have failed to allege how 4 5 their interests were adversely affected or how they were 6 aggrieved by the county's decision. The standing section of petitioners' brief asserts that all three petitioners received notice of the hearings before the Josephine County Zoning 8 Commission and Board of Commissioners. Petitioner Siegel 10 appealed the decision of the Zoning Commission to the Board of Commissioners. All three petitioners appeared before the Board 11 12 of Commissioners. 13 The petitioner alleges 14 "All three Petitioners are aggrieved by the decision of the Board and assert that their interests as property owners are adversely affected." 15 1979 Oregon Laws, ch 772, sec 4, subsection 3, as amended 16 17 by 1981 Oregon Laws, ch 748 provides: 18 "Any person who has filed a notice of intent to appeal as provided in subsection (4) of this section 19 may petition the Board for review of a quasi-judicial land use decision if the person: 20 "(a) Appeared before the local government or 21 special district governing body or state agency orally or in writing; and 22 "(b) Was a person entitled as of right to notice 23 and hearing prior to the decision to be reviewed or was a person whose interests are adversely affected or was aggrieved by the decision." 24 25 Petitioners' claim that their interests are adversely 26

- affected and that they are aggrieved by the county's decision
- 2 is a conclusional statement without facts explaining how the
- 3 decision affects them. Petitioners are required to set forth
- 4 the facts in their petition for review which establish their
- 5 standing. 1979 Or Laws, ch 772, sec 4(6), as amended by 1981
- 6 Or Laws, ch 748. Parsons v Josephine County, 2 Or LUBA 343
- 7 (1981); Citizens for Planned Development v The Dalles, 2 Or
- 8 LUBA 359 (1981).
- A person need not, to establish standing to appeal a
- 10 quasi-judicial decision, set forth the facts showing how his or
- 11 her interest are adversely affected or how s/he is aggrieved by
- 12 a decision if the person can show s/he was entitled as of right
- 13 to notice and hearing prior to the decision and s/he appeared
- 14 orally or in writing in the proceedings. Here, all petitioners
- 15 alleged they received notice but have not alleged they were
- 16 entitled as of right to notice. It is the entitlement to
- 17 notice which satisfies the requirement for standing in our
- 18 statute, not the mere receipt of notice. The only person who
- 19 has alleged facts showing he was entitled to receive notice is
- 20 petitioner Siegel. He alleged that he appealed the Zoning
- 21 Commission's decision to the Board of Comissioners and, as
- 22 such, has alleged facts which show his entitlement to notice.
- 23 See: 1000 Friends of Oregon v Benton County, 2 Or LUBA 324
- 24 (1981); Clemens v Lane County, 4 Or LUBA 63 (1981).
- 25 Petitioner Siegel has alleged facts showing that he was
- 26 entitled as of right to notice and hearing prior to the

- county's decision and that he appeared before the Board of
- 2 Commissioners. Petitioner Siegel has standing to bring the
- 3 present appeal. Petitioners Shaffer and Schlegel, however,
- 4 have failed to allege facts showing they were entitled as of
- 5 right to notice and hearing prior to the county's decision or
- 6 showing their interests were adversely affected or they were
- 7 aggrieved. They do not have standing to participate in this
- 8 appeal.
- 3. Assignments of Error.
- 10 Petitioners' first assignment of error challenges the
- sufficiency of the evidence to support the county's findings,
- 12 and the third assignment of error challenges the adequacy of
- 13 those findings. We will discuss first petitioners' contention
- 14 with respect to the adequacy of the county's findings.
- 15 Petitioners make two objections to the adequacy of the
- 16 findings. The first is that the findings merely summarize
- 17 portions of the evidence and ignore the remainder of the
- 18 record. We agree with petitioners' contention, at least in
- 19 part. First, we should note the county's findings are somewhat
- 20 unorthodox in their form. Instead of having the findings set
- 21 out as those of the Board of Commissioners, the findings made
- 22 by each member of the Board of Commissioners are set forth
- 23 separately. We have not been asked to pass upon the propriety
- 24 of the county's procedure and do not do so. The form used by
- 25 the county does, however, create some confusion as to exactly
- 26 what findings the Board of Commissioners did make.

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Second, the findings, listed under each commissioner are,
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- 2 with one very important exception, mere recitations of the
- 3 evidence or statements that evidence was introduced on a
- 4 particular point. For example, Commissioner Haugen did not
- 5 find that Mr. Grancell's condition had deteriorated. Rather,
- 6 he "cited the testimony incorporated in the Staff Report
- 7 concerning the progressive deterioration of Mr. Grancell's
- 8 condition... It is probable that Commissioner Haugen did
- 9 believe the evidence concerning deterioration of Mr. Grancell's
- 10 condition and would, based upon that evidence, have found that
- 11 Mr. Grancell's condition was deteriorating. However, the
- 12 "finding" contained in the county's order is not phrased as a
- 13 finding of fact. See: Norvell v Portland Metro Area Local
- 14 Government Boundary Commission, 43 Or App 849, 604 P2d 896
- 15 (1979). We are not permitted, based on this recitation of the
- 16 evidence alone, to speculate as to whether Commissioner Haugen
- 17 believed the testimony concerning Mr. Grancell's condition and
- 18 believed Mr. Grancell's condition was deteriorating.
- 19 However, when the statements of the individual
- 20 commissioners are read in connection with that portion of the
- 21 order which states that they adopt by reference the findings of
- 22 the zoning commission, it does become clear commissioners
- 23 Haugen and Ford did "find" Mr. Grancell is legally blind and
- 24 his condition is deteriorating. They also found or concluded
- 25 he is in need of constant care and supervision and Mrs.
- 26 Grancell is unable to provide that constant care and

- 1 supervision. Therefore, although some statements in the
- 2 county's order are merely references to or recitations of the
- 3 evidence, it is permissible to read these statements not as
- 4 findings of fact but as citations to evidence relied upon by
- 5 the commissioners in making their findings of fact and
- 6 conclusions. Accordingly, we find no error in the county's
- 7 findings based on the contention they are mere recitations of
- 8 the evidence.
- 9 Petitioners' second disagreement with the adequacy of the
- 10 findings concerns the findings' alleged failure to explain why
- 11 the county commissioners believed the standards for granting a
- 12 second dwelling permit had been met. Petitioners cite our
- 13 recent decision in Krause v Josephine County, 4 Or LUBA 143
- 14 (1981), in which we said:
- 15 . "Where conflicting evidence exists on a material
- fact in issue, it is incumbent upon the county to not
- only state what it found the facts to be but explain why it found as it did." [Citing cases]. 4 Or LUBA
- 17 143 at 146. (Emphasis added).
- 18 We take petitioners' challenge to be one directed at the
- 19 county's determination that Mr. Grancell was in need of
- 20 constant care and supervision and that Mrs. Grancell could not
- 21 provide the needed care and supervision. Petitioners believe
- 22 there was conflicting evidence on these questions, and it was
- 23 incumbent upon the county to explain why the county accepted
- 24 the proponents' evidence and rejected the evidence submitted by
- 25 petitioners and others. We do not believe the rule expressed
- 26 in Krause v Josephine County, supra, is applicable given the

- 1 evidence in this case. The rule is only applicable if there is
- 2 conflicting evidence which is competent, relevant and
- 3 material. As will be discussed more fully in the discussion on
- 4 petitioners' first assignment of error, we do not believe the
- 5 evidence in the record in this case was such that we can say
- 6 there was conflicting evidence material to the issue of Mr.
- 7 Grancell's need to have constant care and supervision or
- 8 competent as to the issue of Mrs. Grancell's ability to care
- 9 for him. As such, we do not believe the county was under a
- 10 duty to explain, in its findings, why it believed certain
- 11 evidence over other evidence.
- 12 Petitioners' first assignment of error is that there was
- 13 not substantial evidence to support the county's findings. The
- 14 focus of petitioners' appeal is that Mr. Grancell is not in
- 15 need of constant care or supervision, the absence of which
- 16 would require his institutionalization. The basis for
- 17 petitioners' belief that Mr. Grancell is not in need of
- 18 constant care or supervision is the contention that he is able
- 19 to rototill his garden and do yard work.
- We note at the outset there was conflicting evidence
- 21 presented as to Mr. Grancell's ability to take care of his
- 22 garden. Even if the evidence showed Mr. Grancell could take
- 23 care of his garden, this evidence is, standing alone, not
- 24 material to the question of whether he is in need of constant
- 25 care and supervision, the standard under the ordinance for
- 26 granting a second dwelling permit. The inquiry under the

- ordinance is not whether the individual's property is in need
- of care or supervision. Direct evidence was submitted by Mr.
- 3 Grancell's physician, Dr. Apostol, that Mr. Grancell was in
- 4 need of constant care and supervision by reason of macular
- 5 degeneration. While Dr. Apostol did not define the term
- 6 macular degeneration, it is apparent from the record that
- 7 "macular degeneration" is an eye condition which has left Mr.
- 8 Grancell legally blind. Other unrefuted testimony in the
- 9 record is that Mr. Grancell cannot read print under 3/8ths of
- 10 an inch in height, that he cannot even read print of that size
- in poor light, and that he suffers or has suffered from
- 12 fainting and dizzy spells.
- 13 The foregoing evidence, in particular that supplied by Dr.
- 14 Apostol, is sufficient to support a determination that Mr.
- 15 Grancell is in need of constant care and supervision. 3 There
- 16 is no material evidence to the contrary.
- 17 The other issue raised by petitioners is whether
- 18 substantial evidence exists in the record to support the
- 19 county's determination that Mrs. Grancell cannot provide the
- 20 care and supervision which Mr. Grancell requires. While this
- 21 question is more difficult than the previous question, again we
- 22 conclude substantial evidence exists in the record to support
- 23 the county's determination, and no believable evidence exists
- 24 to the contrary. Mr. Grancell testified that his doctor
- 25 believed a younger person would be better able to provide the
- 26 care and supervision which Mr. Grancell required. There was

- also evidence that at least on one occasion Mrs. Grancell was
- 2 unable to assist Mr. Grancell when he collapsed on his way to
- 3 the kitchen. Mr. Grancell's daughter and son-in-law for whom
- 4 the second dwelling permit is intended would seem to meet the
- 5 younger person requirement.
- 6 While Mrs. Grancell may well be able to provide some of the
- 7 care and supervision which Mr. Grancell may require, we believe
- g the record contains sufficient evidence including that
- q referenced above to support a determination that she cannot, by
- 10 herself, provide the kind of constant care and supervision
- needed by Mr. Grancell. Primarily petitioners below only
- 12 challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
- 13 determination that Mrs. Grancell could not provide the care and
- 14 supervision required. 4 Petitioner Siegel also expressed the
- opinion that Mrs. Grancell could provide the care and
- 16 supervision which Mr. Grancell may require. Petitioner Siegel
- 17 testified before the zoning commission that "Mrs. Grancell is
- 18 completely capable of providing such care as is required." The
- 19 testimony of Mr. Siegel concerning Mrs. Grancell's ability to
- 20 care for her husband is opinion evidence. However, Mr.
- 21 Siegel's qualifications to give such an opinion have not been
- 22 established by any facts in the record. We believe that
- 23 without such qualifications being established Mr. Siegel's
- 24 opinion is not competent, and the county had no duty to explain
- 25 why his opinion was disbelieved.
- 26 Petitioners' first assignment of error is, accordingly,

Petitioners' second assignment of error is that: 2 "The Board erred in finding that Applicant met 3 the criterion referred to as 'impacts,' which requires evidence as to why property owners should bear the burden of introducing the proposal into their area." 5 Petitioners, in essence, argue that the Board of Commissioners' finding that the second dwelling would not create any adverse 7 impacts is not supported by substantial evidence. 8 Whether the Board of Commissioners' finding was or was not supported by substantial evidence is immaterial, in our view. 10 There is no requirement in Section 22(k) of the county's zoning 11 ordinance or anywhere else in the zoning ordinance to which we 12 have been directed that requires a determination that a second 13 dwelling permit will not create adverse impacts. The county's 14 finding concerning adverse impacts is mere surplusage and must 15 be disregarded for purposes of determining the validity on 16 review of the county's order. 17 Josephine County's order allowing a second dwelling unit on 18 respondent Grancell's property is affirmed. 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

denied.

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## FOOTNOTES

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3 4	According to the minutes, Mr. Pangburn testified he had previously
5	"worked for ambulance companies in the city of
6	Grants Pass and performed volunteer work at the hospitals as an emergency technician and found
7	that just because an individual had a spouse at home to care for them did not necessarily mean they could provide 'constant care.'"
8	they could provide constant care.
9	2 We note that 1070 On Your at 772
10	We note that 1979 Or Laws, ch 772, sec 3 which was interpreted in Fisher v Colwell, supra, and Montmore Homeowners
11	Association v Brydon, supra, was repealed by 1981 Or Laws, ch 748. However, the definition of "land use decision" which previously appeared in 1979 Or Laws, ch 772, sec 3 was modified
12	and now appears in ORS 197.015(10). The definition of land use decision as it appears in ORS 197.015(10) is basically
13	unchanged from that which appeared in sec 3 of 1979 Or Laws, ch 772 and is as follows:
14	"'Land Use Decision' means:
15	"(a) A final decision or determination made by a
16	local government or special district that concerns the adoption, amendment or
17	application of:
18	"(A) The goals;
19	"(B) A comprehensive plan provision; or
20	"(C) A land use regulation;"
21	"'Land use regulation' is defined in ORS 197.015(11) as:
22	"Any local government zoning ordinance, land
23	division ordinance adopted under ORS 92.044 or 92.046 or similar general ordinances establishing
24	standards for implementing a comprehensive plan. 'Land Use Regulation' does not include small
25	tract zoning map amendments, conditional use permits, individual subdivision, partitioning or
26	a planned unit development approvals or denials,

annexations, variances, building permits and similar administrative-type decisions."

Respondent acknowledges the change in the definition of "land use decision" and asserts that the definition in 1979 Or Laws, ch 772, sec 3 is applicable in this appeal because the county's decision was made September 29, 1981, before the revised definition took effect. We do not think it matters which definition of "land use decision" is applicable as under either definition petitioners have appealed a land use decision.

Petitioners have argued that we should give little or no weight to Dr. Apostol's medicial certification concerning Mr. Grancell's condition. The reason for this advanced by petitioners is that his letter supplementing the certification was not responsive to a direct question asked of him by the planning director as to whether Mr. Grancell's condition was such that it was necessary for the daughter and son-in-law to be on the property to care for Mr. Grancell. Petitioners state their argument as follows:

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"Applicant's physician failed to respond to a direct inquiry from the Planning Office concerning Applicant's medical circumstances relating to the criteria. That inquiry specifically addressed the need for a second family. (Record at 35 & 36). Applicant presented no corroboration of any kind before the Commission or the Board in support of the 'constant care requirement.' Applicant's wife was at the hearing but did not testify.

"Petitioners testified to major discrepancies between the physician's first letter and his failure to respond to the Planning Office concerns. No evidence was presented in support of the first certification of need; neither the applicant nor the Board made any attempt to answer the concern raised by Petitioners about the physician's apparent reversal of his earlier medical opinion." Petition for Review at pp. 16, 17.

Petitioners' concern has to do with an interpretation of 24 the letter from the Planning Office directed to Dr. Apostol asking for additional information. The letter, in its 25 entirety, is as follows:

"Dear Doctor Apostle [sic]:

"On May 21, 1981, the application for Mr. Paul Grancell was presented for affirmation to the Josephine County Zoning Commission. The Zoning Commission is composed of laypersons and a question arose from the audience as to Mr. Grancell's need to have his daughter and son-in-law, Susan and Walter Spandri, on the parcel to care for him.

"The applicant stated that he was legally blind on the agreement with the County. Please understand that the Zoning COmmission is not questioning your expertise in any way. They would like to have a clarification in layman's terms of 'Macular Degeneration' and specifically if that term would signify if Mr. Grancell is legally blind.

"We would very much appreciate hearing from you as soon as possible in order that a determination can be made by the Zoning Commission as to whether it is necessary for the daughter and son-in-law to be there or whether the presence of Mr. Grancell's wife would suffice for his care. We would appreciate your response in helping us arrive at a decision." (Emphasis added).

We do not interpret the above letter as asking Dr. Apostol for his opinion as to whether the presence of Mr. Grancell's daughter and son-in-law on the premises is necessary. We interpret the letter, as we believe did Dr. Apostol, as only asking for clarification of the term "macular degeneration" and "if that term would signify Mr. Grancell is legally blind." By not offering his opinion as to the necessity of Mr. Grancell's daughter and son-in-law being on the premises, we do not believe Dr. Apostol in any way avoided answering a question

asked of him. The basis, therefore, for petitioners' attack on Dr. Apostol's medical certification is mistaken.

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Granted, it would be easier for us to review the county's
determination if there were more evidence in the record as to
exactly what kind of care and supervision Mr. Grancell might
require and what Mrs. Grancell's capabilities were in providing
that care and supervision. We do not believe, however, that
the absence of more detailed information requires us to remand
this case to the county.