# LAND USE BOARD OF APPEALS

1	BEFORE THE STATE OF OREGON AUG 7 4 11 PH'87
2	OF THE STATE OF OREGON
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4	GENE C. COPE, KEITH KRUCHECK ) and LYLE G. WELLS, )
5	Petitioners, ) LUBA No. 87-022
6	) FINAL OPINION VS. ) AND ORDER
7	THE CITY OF CANNON BEACH,
8	Respondent. )
9	
10	Appeal from City of Cannon Beach.
11	Kenneth M. Elliott, Portland, filed the petition for review and argued on behalf of petitioners. With him on the brief were O'Donnell, Ramis, Elliott & Crew.
12	Corinne Sherton, Salem, filed a response brief and argued
13	on behalf of Respondent City. With her on the brief were Mitchell, Lang & Smith.
14 15	Philip L. Nelson, Astoria, filed a response brief and argued on behalf of Respondent-Participant Harold Wall.
16	
	DuBAY, Chief Referee; BAGG, Referee; HOLSTUN, Referee; participated in the decision.
17	REMANDED 08/07/87
18	You are entitled to judicial review of this Order.
19	Judicial review is governed by the provisions of ORS 197.850.
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       Opinion by DuBay.
  NATURE OF DECISION
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       This is an appeal of a variance from an ordinance
   requirement that buildable lots must abut a street. The
  variance was granted for each of two lots.
   FACTS
       The applicant owns several lots created before the city
  adopted its zoning ordinance. After adoption of the zoning
  ordinance in 1984, the applicant requested exceptions from the
10 minimum lot size requirements for five lots. On August 23,
11 1984, the city planning commission granted the request to
^{12} reduce the minimum lot size from 10,000 feet to 5,000 feet for
13 all five lots.
       In October, 1986, applicant applied for a variance from the
15 following criterion in the City of Cannon Beach Zoning
16 Ordinance (CBZO) for two of the lots:
17
       "Every lot shall abut a street, other than an alley
       for at least 25 feet." CBZO Section 4.030.
18
  Petitioners opposed the variances before the planning
  commission and at the same time requested reconsideration of
20
  the 1984 decision to grant the lot size exceptions.
21
      The planning commission approved the variances on December
22
  23, 1986, and refused to reconsider the 1984 lot size
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  decision. Petitioners appealed the variance approval to the
  city council. On March 13, 1987, the city council affirmed the
  planning commission's decision. This appeal followed.
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FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
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       Petitioners allege the city erred by concluding the
 3
   application satisfies the first variance criterion in CBZO Sec.
   8.030:
 5
       "That a strict or literal interpretation and
       enforcement of the specified requirement would result
 6
       in practical difficulty or unnecessary hardship and would be inconsistent with the objectives of the
 7
       comprehensive plan..." CBZO Sec. 8.030(1)
8
   According to petitioners, the city bases its decision on the
9
   fact that lots 12 and 13 are developable only because of the
10
   1984 decision. Petitioners allege the 1984 lot size decision
11
   was void because procedural irregularities violated ordinance,
12
   statutory and constitutional norms. Petitioners' point appears
13
   to be that the invalidity of the prior decision means the two
14
   lots are too small to develop even with an access variance, and
15
   the lack of access cannot be grounds to satisfy the criterion
16
   in CZBO Section 8.030(1).
17
       Petitioners directly challenged the 1984 lot size reduction
18
   in Cope v. Cannon Beach, Or LUBA , (LUBA No. 87-023,
   August 7, 1987).
                     That appeal was dismissed on the ground that
20
   petitioners failed to exhaust available local remedies before
   filing an appeal to LUBA. Petitioners present challenge of the
   1984 decision, therefore, requests the Board to review that
   decision and declare it void in an appeal of a later decision
24
   by the city.
25
       We will not take the action petitioners request. Without
   reaching the question whether we have authority to declare a
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- prior decision void, the Board's authority to affirm,
- reverse or remand land use decisions extends only to those
- decisions appealed in accordance with ORS 197.830. Petitioners
- 4 challenge to the 1984 decision was not. Petitioners have cited
- 5 no authority for the proposition that they may challenge the
- 6 prior decision indirectly after their appeal of the decision
- 7 was dismissed. We decline to declare or to consider the
- $^{8}$  decision approving the lot size reduction void. $^{2}$
- The first assignment of error is denied.

## 10 SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

- Petitioners claim the decision does not satisfy the second
- 12 variance criterion:
- "That there are exceptional or extraordinary
- circumstances or conditions applicable to the property involved or to the intended use of the property which
- do not apply generally to other properties in the same zone; "CBZO Section 8.030(2).
- Without challenging particular findings, petitioners allege
- 17 "the applicant failed to meet his burden of proving compliance
- 18 with this criterion." Petition at 4.
- 19 The city's reasons for concluding the criteria is satisfied
- 20 can be summarized as follows:
- (1) Lots 12 and 13 lack street access unlike other buildable lots in the area.
- (2) The lots were platted before access from the beach was prohibited by the Supreme Court's decision in State ex rel Thornton v. Hay, 254 Or 584, 462 P2d 671 (1969) and subsequent state
- denial of use of the dry sand areas for access; and
- 26 (3) Refusing to grant a variance would be

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1
             inconsistent with zoning code provisions allowing
             residential development on lots meeting the lot
 2
             size reduction criteria in CBZO Section 4.150.
 3
        For the reasons set forth below, these findings do not set
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   forth facts and reasons showing the variance criterion is met.
 5
   The decision must be remanded.
 6
       Land use law relating to variances is not based on common
 7
    law. In a previous decision, we observed:
 8
        "[W]e note land use law, including the law pertaining
        to variance relief, is not a branch of common law, but
 9
        is rather based on particular statutes, ordinances and
       rules enacted by legislative and administrative
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                 Anderson v. Peden, 284 Or 313, 315, 587 P2d
       59 (1978). Thus, in cases of this sort, the focus of
11
       our inquiry must be on the actual language appearing
       in the controlling enactment." Fisher v. City of
12
       Gresham, 10 Or LUBA 283, 289 (1984)."
13
       CBZO Section 8.030(2) requires as a prerequisite to
14
   granting a variance, a finding of exceptional or extraordinary
15
   circumstances or conditions which do not apply generally to
   other properties in the same zone. This same language has been
16
   held to result in a very strict ordinance standard. Lovell v.
17
   Independence Planning Comm., 37 Or App 3, 586 P2d 99 (1978);
18
   Patzkowsky v. Klamath County, 8 Or LUBA 64 (1983). Other
19
   variance criteria may have less strict and more liberal
20
   prerequisites for granting variance relief. See e.g., 1000
21
22
   Friends v. Clackamas Co. Comm., 40 Or App 529, 595 p2d 1273
   (1979); Moore v. Bd of Clackamas County Comm'rs, 35 Or App 39,
23
   580 P2d 583 (1978); Fisher v. City of Gresham, 10 Or LUBA 283
24
25
   (1984).
       Where a strict interpretation of the variance criteria is
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- I indicated by the language of the controlling ordinance or
- 2 regulation, "extraordinary circumstances" must arise out of the
- 3 land itself. Lovell v. Independence Planning Comm., supra, at
- 4 6; Patzkowsky v. Klamath County, supra, at 70.
- 5 The city found the fact that Lots 12 and 13 are the only
- 6 buildable lots in the vicinity without access to a public
- 7 street, and this constitutes exceptional or extraordinary
- 8 circumstances. In essence, the city claims that because the
- 9 lots do not abut city streets there is an extraordinary
- 10 circumstance warranting relief from the city's requirement that
- 11 lots must abut streets to be buildable. The circularity of
- 12 this rationale is obvious.
- 13 Consistent with prior opinions of the Court of Appeals and
- 14 the Board, the language of CBZO Section 8.030(2) mandates a
- 15 strict standard for applying the variance criteria. The city's
- 16 finding about the lack of access to a public street does not
- 17 describe conditions inherent in the land required by
- application of the strict construction of variance standards.
- The second reason advanced by the city is also deficient.
- 20 Assuming access from the beach is prevented by state action as
- 21 petitioners allege, whether or not the lots have access from
- 22 the beach is irrelevant. Development is prohibited because
- neither Lot 12 nor 13 abuts a street. Even if access were
- 24 available from the beach, however, the zoning code would
- 25 prohibit development. The circumstances regarding access from
- 26 the beach do not affect the lots' location in relation to the

1 street. 2 The city's rationale that a variance is warranted because 3 the lots were excepted from the minimum lot size requirement is also rejected. The minimum lot size decision removed one restriction prohibiting development. That decision can not be a basis for removing a development restriction unrelated to 7 size. We particularly reject the city's interpretation that 8 granting the lot size reductions made the lots buildable and 9 thereby rendered other zoning code restrictions inconsistent 10 with that determination. The two development restrictions are 11 separate and unrelated. 12 This assignment of error is sustained. 13 THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 14 Petitioners allege the decision fails to show satisfaction 15 of the following criterion: 16 "That the granting of the variance will not be detrimental to the public health, safety, or welfare, 17 or materially injurious to properties or improvements in the near vicinity;" CBZO 8.030(3). 18 Petitioners assert two arguments. First, they complain 19 they were denied access to the property to permit their expert 20 witness to examine the site. Second, petitioners say the 21 findings include no explanation why the city chose to believe 22 testimony submitted by the applicant's expert rather than 23

Both arguments are rejected. The findings show the city

relied on the testimony of a registered geologist regarding 26

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expert testimony submitted by petitioners.

slope stability. Record at 19. Petitioners do not challenge the geologist's credibility. Neither do they cite authority for their position that inability to attain access to the site constitutes procedural error. Without stating a legal basis for their claim they were entitled to go upon the applicant's property to obtain rebuttal evidence, petitioners have not alleged error warranting reversal or remand.

Petitioners' second argument, that the city failed to
discuss evidence conflicting with the evidence relied upon by
the city, is also rejected. Findings need not explain how
conflicts in the evidence are resolved. Ash Creek Neighborhood
Association v. City of Portland, 12 Or LUBA 230 (1984).

This assignment of error is denied.

## 14 FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

Under the city code, approval of a variance requires a
determination that the variance supports comprehensive plan
policies. CBZO Section 8.030(4). Petitioners fault the
decision for not supporting three development policies as well
as two citizen involvement policies.

The first citizen involvement policy gives residents and property owners "the opportunity to be involved in all phases of the planning efforts of the city." Petitioners claim their inability to obtain an on site examination of the property violates this policy.

We disagree. Neither the generally-worded policy nor the city ordinances gives citizens the right to go upon private  $^{26}$ 

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property over the landowner's objection to gather information
    relevant to land use proceedings. Petitioners had
 3
    opportunities to present their case at two public hearings.
 4
    Their inability to present the evidence of their choice does
 5
    not indicate petitioners were excluded from the city's planning
 6
    efforts.
 7
        The second citizen involvement policy states that the
8
   city's committees concerned with land use matters "shall be
9
    representative of the wide diversity of views and interests in
10
    the community." Petitioners provide no explanation in support
11
   of their claim this policy is not supported by the decision.
12
   We will not speculate about the basis for petitioners' claim.
13
        Petitioners also allege the variance violates General
14
   Development Policy 8 of the city's comprehensive plan. This
15
   policy provides in relevant part:
16
        "Slope/density guidelines shall be followed in the
        administration of the Comprehensive Plan, Zoning
17
        Ordinance and Subdivision Ordinance. Slope/density
        guidelines may be modified by the Planning Commission
18
       upon a demonstration that a sites slope does not
        exceed 20% and a geologic site investigation
19
        determines that geologic hazards would not be
        increased as a result of higher densities."
20
       The slope/density guidelines limit density to four dwelling
21
   units per acre where slopes are 10-24 percent.
22
       Petitioners contend the slopes on the property exceed 20
23
   percent, and therefore only four dwelling units per acre are
24
   permissible.
25
       The city made findings addressing General Development
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1 Policy 8. The city found slopes on the property do not exceed
   20 percent and that a geologist's report concludes geologic
   hazards would not be increased as a result of the higher
   densities proposed. Record at 23.
 5
       These findings adequately explain the reasons for the
   city's conclusion that General Development Policy 8 is met.
 7 Petitioners' contrary claim is denied.
       Petitioners claim two other policies directed at land slide
 8
   hazards are violated. One is General Development Policy 9.
10 This policy requires site investigations by a registered
   geologist in area of potential landslide hazards and areas of
   potential coastal erosion hazard. The other policy applies
   only to the area where the property is located. It states:
14
       "Further development within the large active landslide
       on either side of Hemlock (Street) must be carefully
15
       planned and closely monitored." Area Specific Policy
       1, Comprehensive plan at 37.
16
       Petitioners allege the geologic report shows General
17
   Development Policy 9 is not met.<sup>3</sup>
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       Although the geologist's report does note that future
19
   downslope movement for this area can not be predicted nor
20
   prevented, no plan policy or ordinance provision has been cited
21
   that prohibits development on such slopes for this reason.4
22
   The report clearly states that geologic stability of the slopes
23
   will not be affected by development at the proposed densities
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   provided six precautions are observed. Record at 182. The six
25
   precautions were made part of the lot size reduction approval
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decision in 1984.

- The requirement for a geologist's site investigation in
- $^2$  General Development Policy 9 is satisfied by the submission of
- the report and testimony of geologist Paul D. See. His report
- 4 is substantial evidence supporting the city's conclusion that
- 5 geologic hazards have been adequately examined and that
- 6 residential construction on the affected property is feasible
- without increasing the geological hazards. The same findings
- $^{8}$  also disclose adequate consideration of Area Specific Policy
- 9 1. We deny petitioners' claims that the development authorized
- $^{10}$  by the variances will violate the cited plan policies.
- This assignment of error is denied.

### 12 FIFTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

- Petitioners say the 1984 lot size reduction approval is a
- 14 self created circumstance and that a variance is therefore
- 15 prohibited by the following ordinance provision:
- "Variances in accordance with this subsection should
- not ordinarily be granted if the special circumstances on which the applicant relies are a result of the
- actions of the applicant or owner, or previous
- owner." CBZO Section 8.030.
- 19 Petitioners allege lots 12 and 13 are developable only
- 20 because the applicant requested and obtained an order approving
- 21 exceptions to the minimum lot size standard in the zone.
- 22 Petitioners say the applicant cites the lot size decision as
- 23 the sole circumstance justifying the variance. According to
- 24 petitioners, the lot size reduction is a self-created
- 25 circumstance that precludes variance approval.

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We have some difficulty with the petitioners' argument.
  While the city apparently made some connection between the 1984
   lot size reducton decision and the "exceptional circumstances"
   criterion, we do not see the connection. The applicant faced
   two hurdles in securing building permits for these lots.
   lot size reduction removed one hurdle -- the minimum lot size.
  The access variance removed the second -- the requirement for
   road frontage. While it is true that there would be no need to
   address the access question had the lot size reduction not been
   granted, or vice versa for that matter, we do not believe the
  lot size reduction is an exceptional circumstance as that term
  is used in CBZO Section 8.030(2). See our discussion under
  Assignment of Error No. 2, supra.
14
       If we assume that the variance could properly be granted
  because the lot size reduction was an exceptional circumstance,
  petitioners' point would be well taken that the applicant
  initiated the circumstance. Under the provisions of many
  variance ordinances, this fact alone would be grounds to deny
  the variance. The Cannon Beach Ordinance, however, is not
  stated in absolute terms. By stating that variances should not
  ordinarily be granted in cases where the exceptional
22 circumstances are self created, the ordinance allows some
  discretion to approve variances where the circumstances or
  hardship is of the applicant's own making.
25
      The city interpreted the self-created circumstance
26 provision to have a narrow, limited meaning. The findings
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#### state:

- The Commission and Council conclude that this portion
- of the Zoning Ordinance was meant to prevent
- landowners from profiting from the result of the
- illegal action of themselves or their predecessors in interest." Record at 11.
- 5 Given the discretionary language of the ordinance, this
- 6 interpretation of its provisions is reasonable. Under this
- <sup>7</sup> interpretation, a self created exceptional circumstance does
- 8 not require denial of variance applications in all instances.
- $^{9}$  The city's finding that the provision does not warrant denial
- $^{10}$  in this case is within the city's authority. Accordingly, the
- 11 assignment of error is denied.

### 12 SIXTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

- Petitioners allege a planning commission member
- 14 participated in the variance proceedings in violation of the
- 15 zoning ordinance. The ordinance prohibits members of hearings
- 16 bodies from participating in quasi-judicial proceedings in
- 17 which they have a direct or financial interest. CBZO 10.062.
- 18 When the variance application came before the planning
- 19 commission, Commissioner Rekate stated she was acting as agent
- 20 for the applicant and left her chair as a planning commission
- 21 member. She joined the audience and spoke on behalf of the
- 22 applicant, and responded to questions concerning the proposal.
- 23 Record at 161.
- Petitioners' complaint is directed at Rekate's
- $^{25}$  participation in a meeting of the planning commission at a
- 26 later date when the commission reviewed the minutes of the

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October 23 hearing. The minutes of the November 20, 1986,
 2
    meeting state:
 3
        "APPROVAL OF THE MINUTES OF OCTOBER 23, 1986. Ms.
        Rekate suggested a number of modifications to the 2nd
 4
        paragraph of p. 3. She asked that it be inserted that
        Paul See prepared the geologic report, that the report
 5
        is on the record, and that the lot size reduction was
        approved. She noted that the Public Works Director
 6
        was quoted in the geologic report as stating there was
        no breakage to the water lines on the Wall' property,
 7
        but 'at the time of the slippage' was not part of the
                She also noted that reference to the
 8
        subsidence occuring primarily on Hemlock to the east,
        was stated in the geologic report." Record at 155.
 9
        At the same meeting Commissioner Rekate also participated
10
    in a discussion about the procedure in the 1984 lot size
11
    reduction matter, commenting that
12
        "there have been other relatively recent lot size
13
        reductions for which there were not hearings; Sue
        Jarvis Shields' property & property sold by a Mr.
14
        Vaughn." Record at 155.
15
        Petitioners say these comments comprise participation that
16
    violates CBZO Section 10.062, and the city council erred by not
17
    sending the matter back to the planning commission for further
18
   proceedings.
19
        In these circumstances, no error was made warranting
20
    reversal or remand. Assuming the comments of commission member
21
   Rekate at the November 20th meeting violated CBZO 10.062, the
22
   error was one of procedure. Although petitioners objected to
23
   Rekate's comments in their appeal to the city council,
24
   petitioners made no claim before the city council, and make no
25
   claim here, that the claimed error resulted in prejudice to
26
   petitioners' substantial rights. To obtain reversal or remand
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     14
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for procedural error, petitioners must specify how the error
 2
    has prejudiced their substantial rights. ORS
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     197.835(8)(a)(B).<sup>5</sup>
 4
         The assignment of error is denied.
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         The decision is remanded.
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#### FOOTNOTES

See ORS 197.825(4) providing that circuit courts of the state retain jurisdiction to issue declaratory judgements.

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Petitioners do not argue the city's findings on this criterion are defective. We express no opinion on whether the city's order satisfies this variance standard.

 $9 \frac{1}{3}$ 

The report states:

"Future owners of segments of this property should be apprised of the unstable nature of coastal sedimentary slopes, and of the geologic history of this slope, in particular. It is an unfortunate fact that the timing or extent of future downslope movement under such conditions can neither be predicted nor prevented." Record at 183.

The Cannon Beach Zoning Ordinance has extensive regulatory provisions concerning development on geologic hazard areas.

See, CBZO Section 4. 110. The zoning regulations require geologic site investigation reoports as a prerequisite to issuance of building permits in identified situations. In addition, the ordinance requires on the applicant to show proposed uses are not hazardous and that construction methods recommended in a site investigation report will either eliminate any hazard or minimize it to an "acceptable level." CBZO Section 4.110(4).

The ordinance provisions in CBZO 10.062 appear to reflect the basic right to an impartial tribunal articulated in Fasano v. Washington Co., 264 Or 574, 507 P2d 23 (1973). Petitioners do not claim, and we do not decide, that Rekate's comments violated petitioners' constitutional right to an impartial tribunal.