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BEFORE THE LAND USE BOARD OF APPEALS 20
                                                                 5 13 PM '67
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                            OF THE STATE OF OREGON
3
      HERMAN E. SCHNIDRIG,
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                Petitioner,
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           Vs.
                                              LUBA No. 87-053
6
      HOOD RIVER COUNTY,
                                                FINAL OPINION
                                                  AND ORDER
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                Respondent,
8
          and
      MERLE and HAZEL FAULKENDER,
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                Participants.
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          Appeal from Hood River County.
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          Corinne C. Sherton, Salem, filed a petition for review and
      argued on behalf of petitioner. With her on the brief were
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      Mitchell, Lang & Smith.
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          Sally A. Tebbett, Hood River, filed a response brief and
      argued on behalf of Respondent Hood River County.
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          BAGG, Referee; DuBAY, Chief Referee; HOLSTUN, Referee,
16
      participated in the decision.
17
               REMANDED
                                       10/28/87
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          You are entitled to judicial review of this Order.
      Judicial review is governed by the provisions of ORS 197.850.
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1 Opinion by Bagg.

## NATURE OF THE DECISION

Petitioner appeals a decision to allow placement of a 1961
Trailerama mobile home on a five acre parcel. Petitioner asks

5 that we reverse the decision.

## FACTS

The Trailerama mobile home has a single chassis with hitch
for towing and is transported in a single-width form. However,
it also includes a full length expansion area or tip-out which
can be utilized to provide additional living space. In its
single-width configuration, the trailer is approximately eight
feet wide and 50 feet long, and when expanded is about 16 feet
wide and 50 feet long.

In July 1986, participants asked for a permit for use of the Trailerama on a 57.26 acre agricultural parcel. This request was denied. The planning commission then heard the request on appeal, and it took up the issue of whether the Trailerama was a "double-wide" mobile home or a "single-wide" mobile home. The distinction is important because a double-wide mobile home used as a non-farm dwelling is a permitted use. A single-wide mobile home is not a permitted use.

The planning commission determined that the Trailerama was a double-wide mobile home. That decision was appealed to the county board of commissioners, and the board affirmed the planning commission's decision. This appeal followed.

Page

## ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

"Respondent improperly construed the applicable law and made a decision not supported by substantial evidence in the whole record in failing to address applicable legal criteria and to adopt adequate findings of fact in making its determination that the Trailerama meets the County definition of a double-wide mobile home."

This assignment of error rests on petitioner's view that the Hood River County Zoning Ordinance (HRCZO) defines "single-wide" mobile homes in such a manner as to preclude this approval. Section 16.05.B distinguishes between single-wide and double wide mobile homes as follows:

- "1. Single-Wide: Single chassis; approximately 14+ wide; length, 40-70 feet; can have "tip-outs" or expansion areas for living purposes; except for mobile home parks, single-wides are not permitted outright in any zoning district; they are not considered similar to conventional dwellings, nor are they allowed to replace conventional dwellings; single-wides require either approval by the County Planning Department or a County conditional use permit prior to being placed on a lot or parcel in Hood River County, and they must comply with the definitions in paragraph B. above.
- "2. Double-Wide: Is the result of the combination or joining of two or more chassis or sections; length, 40-70 feet; resembles a conventional house; affixed to real property by a continuous concrete wall foundation or other appropriate foundation; are permitted uses in Hood River County; are considered conventional dwellings and must comply with the definitions in paragraph B. above." HRCZO Section 16.05.B.(1), (2).

Section 16.05.B defines a mobile home to include mobile homes manufactured after May 1, 1972 which exhibit an Oregon Department of Commerce "insignia of compliance." The ordinance also defines mobile home to include mobile homes manufactured

Page

after June 5, 1976 exhibiting an Oregon Department of Commerce

2 insignia of compliance indicating conformity with federal

housing and urban development construction standards. The

Trailerama does not bear either insignia.

5 The county commission adopted the planning commission's order. The planning commission's order states:

"The Trailerama is a unique type of mobile home built in 1961 which is single-width when transported but which extends along its full length when installed on site to provide additional living area. The expansion is a full-width tip-out which converts the Trailerama into a double-wide mobile home. Record 8.

The planning commission then concluded that the Trailerama is a double-wide mobile home.

Petitioner claims the county is mistaken. Petitioner divides the argument into several parts. First, petitioner argues the ordinance definition specifies the single-wide mobile home must has a single chassis. According to petitioner, a double-wide mobile home is formed by joining two or more chassis. Petitioner argues we should accept Webster's Third International Dictionary definition of chassis as "the frame upon which is mounted the body...." Petitioner then argues that the county's order includes no finding specifying how many chassis make up the 1961 Trailerama, but petitioner notes that the Trailerama is a single-width when transported. These facts demonstrate to petitioner that the Trailerama has only one chassis.

Respondent notes testimony exists in the record before the

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1 planning commission that the Trailerama employs a chassis to 2 support each half. Respondent states the planning commission 3 correctly viewed the Trailerama as having two sections, each 4 with a chassis, which conveniently slid together for 5 transporation purposes." Respondent's Brief at 5. Respondent 6 goes on to argue the ordinance does not specify whether the 7 chassis should be counted when viewing the dwelling in its 8 transport state or in its expanded form on a site. 9 The ordinance does not define chassis. Respondent does not 10 cite to the testimony claimed to show that each half of the 11 Trailerama, when extended, is supported by its own 12 undercarriage or frame. The county commission members 13 discussed this issue, and to the extent the planning commissioners' discussion is evidence available to the county 14 commissisoners, we agree there is evidence stating each extended 15 16 half of the Trailerama is supported by its own chassis. Record 17 110-113. Under these circumstances, the interpretation is not contrary to the language of the ordinance and is reasonable. 18 We are therefore bound to sustain it. Alluis v. Marion Co., 64 19 Or App 428, 668 P2d 1242 (1983). 20 Petitioner next challenges the county's conclusion by 21 noting that part of the definition of a single-wide mobile home 22 lists the width of such structures as 14 or more feet. 23 24 Petitioner states the commission made no finding on the width of the Trailerama and it is therefore impossible to determine 25 whether respondent correctly applied this part of the 26 5

Page

definition of a single-wide mobile home. Petitioner states that when the Trailerama is extended, each section is eight feet in width making the total structure 16 feet in width.

Petitioner opines that a 16 foot width is much closer to the 14 foot width described in the definition of a single-width trailer than is "customary" of modern double-wide mobile homes which would equal some 28 feet in width.

Respondent notes the ordinance does not limit the width of double-wide mobile homes and leaves the issue of width measurement to the governing body. Respondent disputes petitioner's "unsubstantiated reference" to the "customary width of a modern double-wide mobile home."

Again we agree with respondent. Nothing in the ordinance suggests that the width of this particular structure meets or does not meet the definition of a single or double-wide mobile home. Further, we are cited to no evidence in the record illustrating "customary" mobile home widths.

Petitioner's next issue is the Trailerama's tip-out or expansion area. Petitioner notes that the ordinance provides a single-wide mobile home can have tip-outs or expansion areas for living purposes, but the ordinance includes no reference to such tip-out or expansion areas for double-wide mobile homes. Petitioner argues the county's conclusion that a full length tip-out converts Trailerama into a double-wide mobile home is contrary to the language of the ordinance Petitioner's argument is based on the notion that since the definition of single-wide

1 mobile homes includes tip outs, and there is no such reference in the definition of double-wide mobile homes, the Trailerama 2 3 fits within the county's definition of a single-wide mobile 4 home. 5 Respondent states the planning commission, when viewing all the circumstances of the case, determined that the Trailerama 6 7 was unique in that its expansion area is not simply for a portion of the mobile home, but for the entire length of the 8 mobile home. We understand respondent to state that the full 9 length tip out feature provides a method for constructing a 10 double-wide mobile home when on site. The fact that the 11 12 Trailerama uses a tip out rather than a separate unit to provide the double-wide characteristics should not some how 13 convert what is a double-wide mobile home on site to a 14 single-wide mobile home, according to respondent. 15 Nothing in the county's ordinance clearly describes the 16 full length tip-out found here. The county's order calls the 17 Trailerama unique in its tip-out feature, but includes no facts 18 to support this conclusion. Nonetheless, the county's view is 19 not contrary to the language of the ordinance. The county's 20 inclusion of the tip-out as one half of a double-wide mobile 21 home is perhaps somewhat strained in view of the ordinance 22 language, but not unreasonable. We are, therefore, bound to 23 uphold it. Alluis, supra. 24 Petitioner next challenges the county's definition on the 25 ground that the Trailerama does not resemble a conventional 26

Page

- 1 dwelling. The ordinance provides that single-wides "are not 2 considered similar to convention dwellings," but that a 3 double-wide "resembles a conventional house." Petitioner 4 argues the order does not include findings on whether the 5 Trailerama resembles or is similar to conventional dwellings. 6 It is therefore impossible, according to petitioner, to 7 determine whether or not respondent correctly applied this 8 aspect of its definition. Petitioner adds the record shows the 9 Trailerama includes stop lights, running lights and a five 10 gallon propane tank, items not consistent with a conventional 11 dwelling. See Record 48,163, 165. Petitioner cites to 12 photographs in the record showing a comparison of the 13 Trailerama and new double-wides. According to petitioner, 14 these photographs show the Trailerama looks much less like a 15 conventional dwelling than a new double-wide. 16 Respondent discounts the stops lights, running lights and propane tank, noting that they are only some of the attributes 17 18 of the Trailerama considered by the planning commission. Respondent notes the unit doubles in width when installed, has 19 cathedral ceilings and argues the photographs show the 20 Trailerama does indeed resemble a conventional dwelling and not 21 22 a single-wide mobile home. The county made no findings discussing this portion of its 23 24 The appearance of the structure was an issue definition. before the county, and we believe it necessary that the county 25 make findings explaining what the county believes about this 26

Page

criterion. This omission requires a remand.

Petitioner next argues the ordinance provides that a double-wide is "affixed to real property by a continuous concrete wall foundation or other appropriate foundation." ordinance lacks specifications for foundations of single-wide trailers. Petitioner claims the findings do not establish what foundation the Trailerama has had for the past 25 years, but petitioner arques it is clear from the record that the Trailerama is on its own wheels and cinder blocks. According to petitioner, these facts show the structure is not on a regular foundation.

Respondent argues a double-wide is required to be affixed to the property by a continuous foundation. Respondent claims the requirement of a foundation is a set-up requirement, not a feature defining whether a particular unit is a single-wide or a double-wide mobile home.

We agree with respondent. The foundation requirement is not a feature distinguishing one variety of manufactured dwelling from another.

Petitioner next notes the ordinance definitions of double-wide and single-wide mobile homes include a statement that each must "comply with the definitions in paragraph B above." Paragraph B defines a mobile home as a structure manufactured after May 1, 1972 and bearing an insignia of compliance by the Department of Commerce or one manufactured after June 5, 1976 and bearing a similar insignia of

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compliance. Because the Trailerama was built in 1961, the structure cannot comply with the provisions of Paragraph B, according to this view. We understand petitioner's argument to be that the Trailerama is not a "mobile home" within the definition of the ordinance and therefore is not entitled to double-wide mobile home status no matter what it looks like.

Respondent argues the planning commission, after hearing,

"made certain that owners of mobile homes manufactured prior to 1972 would receive full and fair consideration before the governing body."
Brief of Respondent at 8.

Respondent states this action was brought to the attention of the board of commissioners during the appeal of the planning commission action. One of the county commission members noted that when all the circumstances are considered, the Trailerama comes closer to satisfying the criteria for double-wide mobile homes than a single-wide. According to respondent, Section 4.00 of the ordinance allows the governing body to use its discretion to allow uses not otherwise provided for in the ordinance after a hearing. We understand respondent to argue that the county utilized this provision to find that the Trailerama is a similar use and therefore should be allowed.

Because the county ordinance restricts consideration of mobile homes to those made after 1972 or 1976, we agree with petitioner that the Trailerama does not fall within county ordinance provisions controlling mobile homes. We agree with respondent, however, that the structure may be treated as a

mobile home after proper application of Section 4.0 of the ordinance.

Section 4.00 of the ordinance provides as follows:

"No structure or lot shall hereafter be used or occupied and no structure or part thereof shall be erected, moved, reconstructed, extended, enlarged, or altered contrary to the provisions of this ordinance provided, however, that a proposed use or structure not expressly listed under "conditional uses" may be considered by the Planning Commission or Planning Director as a conditional use if said use or structure is consistent with the subject zone and/or with other conditional uses listed in the subject zone."

We understand this provision authorizes the planning commissioner/planning director to consider the proposed use as a conditional use. The county did not go through a conditional use procedure to arrive at the conclusion that the Trailerama was a double-wide mobile home, yet its ordinance appears to require such procedure be followed. We conclude that the county did not properly avail itself of Section 4.00 in this case. Therefore, the county's conclusion that the Trailerama is a mobile home under its ordinance is erroneous. This error requires a remand. OAR 661-10-070(1)(b)(C).

Lastly, petitioner complains ordinance definitions reflect a "long standing county policy of removing and phasing-out single-wide mobile homes." Record 77, 81-82, 146. Petitioner argues that because the logical application of this ordinance can only result in a determination that the Trailerama is a single-wide mobile home, we must reverse the decision.

We disagree. The county's interpretation of its ordinance

Page 11

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is, as we have noted, in some respects incomplete or incorrect,
      our ruling does not necessarily mean the county cannot
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      correctly apply its ordinance to approve the proposed use.
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           The decision of Hood River County is remanded.
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