

1 BEFORE THE LAND USE BOARD OF APPEALS

2 OF THE STATE OF OREGON

3
4 CONSTANTIN SAMOILOV,)
5)
6 Petitioner,) LUBA No. 91-131
7)
8 vs.) FINAL OPINION
9) AND ORDER
10 CLACKAMAS COUNTY,)
11)
12 Respondent.)

13
14
15 Appeal from Clackamas County.

16
17 Wallace W. Lien, Salem, filed the petition for review
18 and argued on behalf of petitioner.

19
20 Michael E. Judd, Oregon City, filed the response brief
21 and argued on behalf of respondent.

22
23 KELLINGTON, Referee; HOLSTUN, Chief Referee; SHERTON,
24 Referee, participated in the decision.

25
26 AFFIRMED 12/12/91

27
28 You are entitled to judicial review of this Order.
29 Judicial review is governed by the provisions of ORS
30 197.850.

1 Opinion by Kellington.

2 **NATURE OF THE DECISION**

3 Petitioner appeals an order denying his application for
4 a nonforest dwelling on land zoned General Timber (GT-40).

5 **FACTS**

6 The subject parcel is unimproved and consists
7 of 3.73 acres. The soils on the subject parcel are Aspaugh
8 clay loam with 2 to 8% slope. This soil type is "suited to
9 the production of Douglas-fir." Record 45. Cedar Creek
10 runs through the parcel. Surrounding parcels are also zoned
11 GT-40.

12 The county planning department administratively denied
13 the subject application for a nonforest dwelling, and
14 petitioner appealed to the hearings officer. The county
15 hearings officer denied the application, and this appeal
16 followed.

17 **SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR**

18 "Respondent improperly interpreted the applicable
19 law by requiring the subject property be
20 aggregated [with] adjacent properties."

21 Clackamas County Zoning and Development Ordinance
22 (ZDO) 405.05(A)(4) provides that to approve a proposed
23 nonforest use in the GT-40 zone, the county must determine
24 the use:

25 "[i]s situated upon generally unsuitable land for
26 the production of farm and forest products,
27 considering the terrain, adverse soil or land
28 conditions, drainage and flooding, vegetation,
29 location and size of the tract[.]"

1 The hearings officer adopted the following findings
2 that the proposed nonforest dwelling does not satisfy this
3 standard:

4 "* * * The subject property is located immediately
5 adjacent to properties which could utilize the
6 subject property in their farm or forest
7 production activities.

8 "The size of the property is a limiting
9 characteristic. 3.73 acres is not large enough to
10 be managed separately for forest production, or
11 for most farm uses which require larger amounts of
12 farm land. However, the property can be combined
13 with adjacent property, also suitable for farm or
14 forest production, and incorporated into the
15 management plan of the larger parcel. Properties
16 to the east, south and west have a uniformity of
17 soils and slopes with the subject property, making
18 aggregation particularly appropriate." Record 3-
19 4.

20 Petitioner argues it is improper to determine that the
21 subject property is not unsuitable for the production of
22 farm or forest products solely because it can be combined
23 with other properties to reasonably be managed for farm or
24 forest use. Petitioner contends there is no requirement in
25 the county's code that the subject parcel be combined with
26 other land which is suitable for farm or forest uses so that
27 the subject parcel may be made suitable for such uses.

28 In Rutherford v. Armstrong, 31 Or App 1319, 572 P2d
29 1331 (1977), rev den 281 Or 431 (1978), the Court of Appeals
30 construed a generally unsuitable standard similar to
31 ZDO 405.05(A)(4), governing approval of nonfarm dwellings.
32 In Rutherford, the Court of Appeals determined that small

1 parcel size alone was an inadequate justification for
2 determining a parcel to be generally unsuitable for the
3 production of farm crops and livestock. Under the
4 Rutherford principle, if a small parcel could be put to farm
5 use if combined with other resource parcels, then the small
6 parcel is not generally unsuitable for farm use. Similarly,
7 here the county determined under ZDO 405.05(A)(4), that the
8 subject parcel is not generally unsuitable for forest use
9 because it can be combined with other resource parcels in
10 the area and be managed for forest use. We believe the
11 Rutherford interpretation of the "generally unsuitable"
12 standard relating to farm uses is equally applicable to the
13 ZDO 405.05(A)(4) "generally unsuitable" standard relating to
14 forest uses. Sabin v. Clackamas County, ____ Or LUBA ____
15 (LUBA No. 90-077, September 19, 1990), slip op 20-23.
16 Accordingly, the county did not improperly apply the
17 generally unsuitable standard of ZDO 405.05(A)(4) to the
18 subject application for a nonforest dwelling.

19 According to petitioner, even if the Rutherford
20 analysis is properly considered in applying ZDO
21 405.05(A)(4), the subject parcel is nevertheless generally
22 unsuitable for forest use regardless of parcel size. See
23 Stefan v. Yamhill County, 18 Or LUBA 820 (1990).

24 The findings state the subject parcel is suitable for
25 farm or forest uses, and if combined with other resource
26 parcels in the area, can reasonably be managed for the

1 production of farm or forest products. Consequently, the
2 findings are adequate to establish the subject parcel is not
3 generally unsuitable for farm or forest uses. We address
4 the evidentiary support for the county's findings concerning
5 the parcel's suitability for farm or forest uses below.

6 The second assignment of error is denied.

7 **FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR**

8 "Respondent's decision is not supported by
9 substantial evidence in the record."

10 Petitioner argues the county's finding that "* * * the
11 subject property is located adjacent to properties which
12 could utilize the subject property in their farm or forest
13 production activities," is not supported by substantial
14 evidence in the whole record.¹

15 In order to overturn on evidentiary grounds a local
16 government's determination that an applicable approval
17 criterion is not met, it is not sufficient for petitioner to
18 show there is substantial evidence in the record to support
19 his position. Rather, the "evidence must be such that a
20 reasonable trier of fact could only say petitioner['s]
21 evidence should be believed." Morley v. Marion County, 16
22 Or LUBA 385, 393 (1988); McCoy v. Marion County, 16 Or LUBA
23 284, 286 (1987); Weyerhauser v. Lane County, 7 Or LUBA 42,

¹We interpret the challenged finding to determine the subject parcel could reasonably be managed for farm or forest uses in conjunction with adjacent parcels suitable for farm or forest uses.

1 46 (1982). In other words, petitioner must demonstrate that
2 he sustained his burden of proof of compliance with
3 applicable criteria as a matter of law. Jurgenson v. Union
4 County Court, 42 Or App 505, 600 P2d 1241 (1979);
5 Consolidated Rock Products v. Clackamas County, 17 Or LUBA
6 609, 619 (1989).

7 Petitioner first argues the evidence in the record
8 establishes that the adjacent properties are not currently
9 managed for the production of farm or forest products. We
10 assume for purposes of resolving this assignment of error
11 that the adjacent parcels are not currently managed for the
12 production of farm or forest products. However, whether
13 adjacent parcels are currently in farm or forest production
14 is only indirectly relevant in determining whether such
15 properties are suitable for farm or forest use. Reed v.
16 Lane County, ___ Or LUBA ____ (LUBA No. 90-006, June 21,
17 1990) (whether a particular farmer can make a profit during
18 a particular period of time, on a particular piece of farm
19 land, is at best indirect evidence of whether the land
20 itself is suitable for the production of farm crops and
21 livestock). The relevant question is whether the adjacent
22 properties are suitable for farm or forest uses. Here,
23 respondent cites undisputed evidence in the record which
24 establishes that the adjacent properties are suitable for
25 farm or forest uses. Record 16.

26 Petitioner next argues there is no evidence in the

1 record to support a finding that the subject parcel may be
2 combined with these adjacent resource parcels and managed
3 for farm or forest uses.

4 Petitioner has the burden of establishing that his
5 application for a nonforest dwelling meets each applicable
6 approval standard, including the generally unsuitable
7 standard of ZDO 405.05(A)(4). Once the county determines
8 the evidence supports a determination that adjacent parcels
9 are suited for farm or forest uses, it is reasonable and
10 appropriate (in the absence of evidence to the contrary) for
11 the county to infer the subject parcel could be combined
12 with such adjacent parcels and managed for farm or forest
13 uses.

14 Petitioner argues there is evidence in the record which
15 establishes that the subject parcel cannot be combined with
16 adjacent parcels. Specifically, petitioner argues the
17 record shows he attempted to sell the subject parcel for a
18 number of years and no one, including the adjacent
19 landowners, has offered to purchase it. However, petitioner
20 cites no evidence that the subject parcel was listed at a
21 price typical for farm or forest parcels, or whether it was
22 listed at its value as a home site. Without such evidence,
23 petitioner's attempts to sell the parcel for a number of
24 years is not sufficient evidence to establish as a matter of
25 law that the parcel cannot be combined with adjacent

1 properties suitable for farm or forest uses.²

2 The fourth assignment of error is denied.

3 **FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR**

4 "The notice of public hearing is deficient by
5 failing to state the approval criteria applied by
6 the hearings officer to this application."

7 **THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR**

8 "The county's decision erroneously construes Goal
9 4 and Forest Policy No. 4.0 as mandatory approval
10 criteria."

11 In these assignments of error, petitioner presents
12 arguments concerning the adequacy of the county's notice of
13 hearing and the applicability of Statewide Planning Goal 4
14 and the county comprehensive plan, which the county applied
15 in denying the subject application.

16 We must sustain a denial decision if we determine that
17 one applicable approval criterion is not met. Garre v.
18 Clackamas County, 18 Or LUBA 877, aff'd 102 Or App 123
19 (1990). We uphold, supra, the county's determination that
20 the proposed nonforest dwelling does not comply with ZDO
21 405.05(A)(4).³ We therefore do not consider whether the
22 county erred in applying Goal 4 and provisions of its
23 comprehensive plan.

24 The first and third assignments of error are denied.

²Further, there is no evidence that the subject parcel cannot be leased for use with adjacent properties.

³Petitioner does not contend the notice of public hearing failed to identify ZDO 405.05(A)(4) as an approval criterion.

1 The county's decision is affirmed.

2