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1
                BEFORE THE LAND USE BOARD OF APPEALS
                       OF THE STATE OF OREGON
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   ROBERT WEEKS, ELVA WEEKS,
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    BILL BECK, and ELZA BECK,
                                     )
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 7
              Petitioners,
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 9
         vs.
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                                             LUBA No. 91-110
11
    CITY OF TILLAMOOK,
12
                                              FINAL OPINION
                                                 AND ORDER
13
              Respondent,
                                     )
14
15
         and
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    COMMUNITY ACTION TEAM, Inc.,
    an Oregon nonprofit corporation,
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                                                     )
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              Intervenor-Respondent.
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         Appeal from City of Tillamook.
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         Phillip E. Grillo, Portland, represented petitioners.
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         Douglas E. Kaufman, Tillamook, represented respondent.
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         Neal C. Lemery, Rockaway Beach, represented intervenor-
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    respondent.
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         KELLINGTON, Referee; HOLSTUN, Chief Referee; SHERTON,
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    Referee, participated in the decision.
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              TRANSFERRED
                                     02/19/92
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37
         You are entitled to judicial review of this Order.
    Judicial review is governed by the provisions of
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    197.850.
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1 Opinion by Kellington.

## NATURE OF THE DECISION

- 3 Petitioners appeal the following statement in the
- 4 minutes of a city council meeting: "[i]t was the consensus
- 5 of Council that the conditional use permit is still valid."
- 6 Record 28.

## 7 **FACTS**

- 8 This is the third time an appeal involving these
- 9 parties and the subject property is before this Board. In
- 10 Beck v. City of Tillamook, 18 Or LUBA 587 (1990) (Beck I),
- 11 we remanded a city decision approving a conditional use
- 12 permit for a homeless shelter on the subject "Central
- 13 Commercial" zoned property on the basis that the city
- 14 improperly reversed the burden of proof in the proceedings
- 15 below. We also determined that certain standards relating
- 16 to parking and landscaping were apparently met.
- 17 Beck v. City of Tillamook, \_\_\_ Or LUBA \_\_\_ (LUBA
- 18 No. 90-056, October 25, 1990) (Beck II), was an appeal of
- 19 the city's second decision approving the conditional use
- 20 permit for the homeless shelter. We affirmed the city's
- 21 second decision approving the conditional use permit.
- 22 Petitioners appealed our decision to the Court of
- 23 Appeals, and the court affirmed our decision. Beck v. City
- 24 of Tillamook, 105 Or App 276, 805 P2d 144 (1991).
- 25 Petitioners petitioned for review by the Supreme Court, and
- 26 the Supreme Court accepted review of the Court of Appeals'

- 1 decision. Beck v. City of Tillamook, 311 Or 432, 812 P2d
- 2 827 (1991).
- 3 Tillamook City Zoning Ordinance (TCZO) section 34
- 4 provides that if conditional use permits are not "used"
- 5 within one year of the "date of approval," they expire. It
- 6 further provides:
- 7 "[A conditional use permit] shall not be deemed
- 8 used until the applicant has actually obtained a
- 9 building permit, and commenced construction
- 10 thereunder. \* \* \* "
- 11 One year after the date the city approved the
- 12 conditional use permit appealed in Beck II, petitioners
- 13 submitted a request to the city that it declare the
- 14 conditional use permit void, on the basis of TCZO section
- 15 34. That request was in the form of a proposed city
- 16 resolution. The requested resolution was placed on the city
- 17 council's agenda. The minutes of the city council's June 3,
- 18 1991 meeting indicate the following occurred:
- 19 "LEGISLATIVE:
- 20 "1. C.A.T. Shelter Home:
- 21 "Prior to possible adjournment to Executive
- 22 Session to discuss the C.A.T. shelter home, [one
- of the city council members] said he wished to
- 24 state a potential conflict of interest. He said
- 25 he had been approached by one of the parties
- 26 involved who wished to buy property. [That
- council member] added that he did not feel that it
- would influence his vote in any way.
- "The City attorney advised that he could not give
- any opinion without further information.
- 31 "[2.] Executive Session:

- "[The mayor] adjourned to executive session, under
- ORS 192.660(H), Litigation, at 8:11 p.m.
- 3 "[3.] Reconvene:
- 4 "The regular meeting was reconvened at 9:01 p.m.
- 5 "[4.] Discussion:
- 6 "It was the consensus of Council that the
- 7 conditional use permit is still valid." Record
- 8 28.
- 9 This appeal followed.

## 10 MOTIONS TO DISMISS

- Respondent and intervenor-respondent (respondents) move
- 12 to dismiss this appeal on the basis that the challenged
- 13 statement is no more than an advisory opinion, and is not a
- 14 final land use decision over which this Board has
- 15 jurisdiction under ORS 197.825(1) and ORS 197.015(10).1
- 16 Respondents point out the city has no procedure for the
- 17 issuance of declaratory rulings and that no motion, vote or
- 18 decision was made concerning whether the conditional use
- 19 permit is valid under TCZO 34.
- 20 Petitioners argue they submitted an application for a
- 21 determination of whether the conditional use permit is

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>ORS 197.825(1) provides, in relevant part,:

<sup>&</sup>quot;[The Land Use Board of Appeals] shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review any land use decision \* \* \*."

ORS 197.015(10) defines land use decision, in relevant part, as follows:

<sup>&</sup>quot;A final decision or determination made by a local government \* \* \*."

1 valid. Petitioners also argue the tapes of the council 2 meeting establish that after the council adjourned from 3 executive session, the mayor requested each of the council 4 members to take a position concerning whether the conditional use permit is valid. Petitioners maintain that 5 the mayor then summarized the city council members' 6 responses by stating the "consensus" of the council was that 7 8 the conditional use permit is valid.<sup>2</sup> According to petitioners, this summary constitutes a land use decision 10 subject to our jurisdiction. Petitioners argue that under 11 Sauvie Island Agricultural v. GGS (Hawaii), Inc., 107 Or App 12 1, 810 P2d 856 (1991) (Sauvie Island Agricultural), once an 13 application is submitted to a local government requesting revocation of a conditional use permit, by a person with 14 standing, 3 the city is required to make a land use decision 15 regarding such an application, which land use decision is 16 17 appealable to LUBA.

First, we do not read <u>Sauvie Island Agricultural</u> to establish as broad a legal principle as petitioners contend.

Under <u>Sauvie Island Agricultural</u>, a circuit court lacks the authority to grant a declaratory judgment concerning whether

 $<sup>^2</sup>$ There is no dispute concerning petitioners' description of the June 3, 1991 city council meeting. For purposes of this opinion we assume petitioners' relation of what the tapes reflect is accurate.

 $<sup>^3</sup>$ There is no issue presented in this case concerning whether petitioners had "standing" below to request a determination regarding the conditional use permit.

- 1 a conditional use permit has expired. In Sauvie Island
- 2 Agricultural, the Court of Appeals stated a determination of
- 3 whether a conditional use permit has expired requires the
- 4 making of a land use decision, something the circuit court
- 5 cannot do.4 However, we do not believe that Sauvie Island
- 6 Agricultural converts what is otherwise not a land use
- 7 decision, into a land use decision.<sup>5</sup>
- 8 Under ORS 197.015(10), "land use decisions" over which
- 9 this Board has jurisdiction, must be "final" decisions.6
- 10 This Board has recently stated relevant legal principles
- 11 applicable to determining whether a particular action of a
- 12 local government is a final decision. We discuss them
- 13 briefly below.
- In Hollywood Neighborhood Assoc. v. City of Portland,
- 15 \_\_\_ Or LUBA \_\_\_\_ (LUBA No. 91-063, July 12, 1991), slip op
- 16 5, LUBA stated the following regarding when a local
- 17 government interpretation of plan or land use regulation
- 18 provisions is a final decision subject to its review:

 $<sup>^4</sup>$ The Court of Appeals went on to state that the proper entity to make that land use decision in the first instance is the local government.

 $<sup>^5</sup>$ In <u>Sauvie Island Agricultural</u>, the petitioners did not request that the circuit court order the local government to make a decision on the validity of the conditional use permit.

 $<sup>^6</sup>$ The requirement that a land use decision be a final decision is also an inherent part of the "significant impact test," an alternative basis for identifying land use decisions subject to this Board's jurisdiction. Flowers v. Klamath County, 17 Or LUBA 1078, 1085 (1989); CBH Company v. City of Tualatin, 16 Or LUBA 399, 405 n 7 (1988).

"When a local government interprets existing comprehensive plan or land use regulation provisions without amending or adopting plan or land use regulation provisions or granting or denying development permit or other land use approval, such a decision is a final decision if it is issued pursuant to an established local process for issuing binding declaratory rulings."

In <u>Hollywood</u>, the city had a formal procedure in its code for issuing final, binding interpretations of its zoning ordinance. However, the decision at issue in <u>Hollywood</u> (a letter by a city planner) had not been rendered pursuant to that city procedure and, on that basis, LUBA concluded the challenged letter was not a <u>final</u> decision subject to its review.

In Townsend v. City of Newport, \_\_\_ Or LUBA \_\_\_\_ (LUBA 16 17 No. 90-157, June 13, 1991) (Townsend), the city council voted to approve a motion determining that (1) a previously 18 19 approved conditional use permit to be valid, and (2) if the holder of the conditional use permit applied for a building 20 21 permit, one would be issued. In Townsend, this Board 22 recognized that even though a local determination in the nature of a declaratory ruling is not adopted pursuant to a 23 particular process codified in a local code, 24 25 determination may still result in a land use decision where the determination is made pursuant to a motion and vote of 26

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 $<sup>^7 {\</sup>rm In} \ {\rm \underline{Townsend}}$ , the appealed decision was reflected in both the minutes of the city council, and in a subsequent letter from the city planning director expressing the city council's decision.

1 the governing body and results in the last local

2 determination concerning land use standards applicable to a

3 pending application.

4 Here, nothing indicates any motion was made concerning 5 petitioners' request that the conditional use permit be revoked, or that any vote was taken on that request. 6 7 Petitioners' summary of the tapes of the city council 8 meeting reflect that individual councillors gave their impression of the validity of the conditional use permit, 9 and that the mayor articulated the "consensus" of the 10 council concerning the conditional use permit. The minutes 11 reflect the "consensus" of the council. However, neither 12 13 the minutes nor the summary of the tape establishes the city 14 final determination concerning whether the made а conditional use permit should be revoked.8 Rather, the 15 minutes and the summary of the tape of the June 3, 1991 16 council meeting indicate that only an advisory opinion was 17 given that did not bind the city to take any particular 18 course of action concerning whether the conditional use 19 20 permit was valid. See Owen Development Corp. v. City of Gearhart \_\_\_ Or LUBA \_\_\_ (LUBA Nos. 91-107 and 91-123, 21 December 6, 1991). This "consensus" of the city council is 22

not a final land use decision and, therefore, is not a land

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>Similarly, we do not believe a decision not to make a decision on petitioners' request is itself a land use decision subject to our review, as petitioners suggest.

1 use decision subject to LUBA review.9

2 ORS 19.230(4) provides that if a decision appealed to LUBA "is not reviewable as a land use decision," the notice 3 of intent to appeal "shall be transferred to the circuit 4 court and treated as a petition for writ of review." 5 However, our rules provide that this Board will dismiss 6 7 appeals of decisions found not to be be reviewable as land use decisions, rather than transfer such appeals to circuit 8 court, unless a party moves to transfer the appeal. 9 10 Southwood Homeowners v. City of Philomath, \_\_\_ Or LUBA \_\_\_\_ (LUBA No. 90-103, November 15, 1990), slip op 3 n 1, rev'd 11 106 Or App 21 (1991). 12 13 OAR 661-10-075(10)(a) provides that any party may move 14 to transfer an appeal to the circuit court of the county in which the appealed decision was made pursuant to ORS 19.230, 15 if the Board determines the challenged decision is not a 16 land use decision. However, OAR 661-10-075(10)(b) provides 17 18 that a motion to transfer an appealed decision to the 19 circuit court must be made "no later than ten days after the 20 date respondent's brief is due \* \* \*." Here, respondent's brief has been filed. Consequently, the time 21 for filing a motion to transfer has not yet expired. Under 22 23 these circumstances, we must transfer this appeal to the

 $<sup>^9{\</sup>rm In}$  view of our disposition of this appeal, no purpose is served in reviewing petitioners' motions for evidentiary hearing, depositions or consolidation with Weeks v. City of Tillamook, LUBA No. 92-025.

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1 Tillamook County Circuit Court, as required by ORS 19.230.
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2 This appeal is transferred.

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