1	BEFORE THE LAND USE BOARD OF APPEALS
2	OF THE STATE OF OREGON
3 4 5	ST. JOHNS NEIGHBORHOOD ASSN.,)
6 7	Petitioner,)
8 9	vs.
10 11	CITY OF PORTLAND,
12 13) LUBA No. 97-015 Respondent,)
14 15	and
	HOST DEVELOPMENT,
18 19	Intervenor-Respondent.)
20 21 22 23	ANTHONY BOUTARD and LAWRENCE) WATTERS,)
24	Petitioners,
25 26	vs.
27 28	CITY OF PORTLAND,
29 30	Respondent,) LUBA No. 97-020
31 32	and
	HOST DEVELOPMENT,
35 36 37) Intervenor-Respondent.)
38 39 40	Appeal from City of Portland.
41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52	Gregory P. Barton, Portland, filed a petition for review and argued on behalf of petitioner St. Johns Neighborhood Assn.
	Anthony Boutard and Lawrence Watters, Portland, filed a petition for review on their own behalf. Anthony Boutard and Lawrence Watters argued on their own behalf.
	Ruth Spetter, Senior Deputy City Attorney, Portland, filed response briefs and argued on behalf of respondent.
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Timothy V. Ramis, G. Frank Hammond, and D. Daniel Chandler, Portland, filed a response brief on behalf of 1 2 intervenor-respondent. With them on the brief was O'Donnell 3 4 Ramis Crew Corrigan & Bachrach. D. Daniel Chandler argued on 5 behalf of intervenor-respondent. 6 7 GUSTAFSON, Chief Administrative Law Judge; HANNA, Administrative Law Judge, participated in the decision. 8 9 01/15/98 10 AFFIRMED 11

You are entitled to judicial review of this Order. Judicial review is governed by the provisions of ORS 197.850.

14

1 Opinion by Gustafson.

2 NATURE OF THE DECISION

3 Petitioners in this consolidated case appeal the city's4 approval of a comprehensive plan amendment and zone change.

5 MOTION TO INTERVENE

6 Host Development (intervenor), the applicant below, moves 7 to intervene on the side of respondent. There is no 8 opposition to the motion, and it is allowed.

9 FACTS

Intervenor is a nonprofit organization that develops 10 11 owner-occupied, low-income housing. Intervenor approached the city with a proposal to develop a vacant tract of publicly-12 owned land in north Portland into a 103-lot subdivision. 13 The 14 tract is comprised of a vacant, five-acre lot owned by 15 Portland Public Schools (PPS) and a vacant, eight-acre lot 16 owned by the city. The five-acre lot is zoned R-5 (Residential, 5,000 square foot minimum), and the eight-acre 17 lot is zoned OS (Open Space). At one time the city had 18 19 planned to develop a neighborhood park and PPS had planned to build a school on their respective lots, but by the time of 20 this application, both public bodies considered their lots 21 22 surplus and not needed for those purposes.

After preliminary discussions with the city and interested parties, including petitioner St. Johns Neighborhood Association (SJNA), intervenor applied to the city for a comprehensive plan map and zoning map amendment to

1 change the zoning of both lots

to R-2 (Residential, 2,000 square foot minimum). In July
1996, a city hearings officer recommended approval.

The city council held hearings in September and December 3 1996. During the September 1996 hearings, Commissioner 4 Kafoury disclosed that her staff person, Sten, served on 5 intervenor's board of directors, that she had had a vague 6 7 briefing about the project months earlier when planning was in 8 the formative stages, but that she had not been contacted 9 about this specific application. In November 1996, Sten was elected city commissioner and resigned from intervenor's 10 11 board. At the commencement of the December 1996 hearing, Commissioner Sten announced that he would not be voting on the 12 application because he had not been involved in the earlier 13 14 hearings and because of his prior position on intervenor's 15 board. Commissioner Kafoury again disclosed that when 16 Commissioner Sten was a member of her staff, she had discussed intervenor's activities with him. She stated, however, that 17 18 she had not had any ex parte contacts regarding this 19 application, and did not consider her knowledge of intervenor to preclude her from participating in the proceedings. 20 No other commissioner disclosed any statement of interest or ex 21 22 parte contact.

Following additional public hearings, those city commissioners participating voted unanimously to approve the application.

26 This appeal followed.

1 FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR (SJNA)

SJNA alleges the city violated several procedural and 2 substantive standards required by Fasano v. Washington County, 3 264 Or 574, 507 P2d 23 (1973). However, that case provides no 4 substantive approval criteria for the challenged decision; nor 5 does it establish procedural requirements independent of those 6 7 required by state statute or local ordinance. See Neuberger 8 v. City of Portland, 288 Or 155, 170, 603 P2d 771 (1979); 9 Friends of Cedar Mills v. Washington County, 28 Or LUBA 477, SJNA cites no violations of any mandatory 10 485 (1995). 11 approval criteria to which this application is subject.

12 SJNA's first assignment of error is denied.

13 SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR (SJNA)

14 SJNA generally alleges violations of Statewide Planning 15 Goals 10 (Housing) and 14 (Urbanization). Petitioners' 16 superficial allegations regarding these goals do not merit 17 discussion. Goals 10 and 14 are inapplicable to approval of 18 this application.

19 SJNA's second assignment of error is denied.

20 THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR (SJNA)

SJNA alleges that because the city council did not consider the issue of whether the park property was surplus in conjunction with this application, the city's process violates petitioner's procedural rights required by <u>Fasano</u>, Goal 9 (citizen involvement) of the city's comprehensive plan, and the due process clause of the United States Constitution.

SJNA does not cite to any requirement that the city 1 consider whether the property is surplus at the same time it 2 considers the rezoning application. The issue of whether the 3 park property is surplus, an issue relevant to whether the 4 city should sell the property, was not part of the subject 5 application. SJNA's argument appears to be that the city's 6 decision to rezone the property predisposes it to consider the 7 8 property surplus, making that eventual decision, if it is ever 9 made, an empty procedural exercise, thus depriving SJNA of a meaningful opportunity to argue that the property is not 10 11 surplus.

As the city points out, nothing in the challenged decision to rezone the property forces the city to declare the property surplus or to sell it. SJNA's desire that the city consider the two independent issues at the same time does not establish that the city violated any procedural rights by its failure to do so.

18 SJNA's third assignment of error is denied.

19 FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR (SJNA)

SJNA alleges the city's decision violates the federal Fair Housing Act and the federal constitutional guarantee of equal protection. SJNA cites to statistical data attached to its petition for review, but not in the record, that SJNA claims will establish that the city and intervenor have a policy of building low-income housing in North Portland with the knowledge that doing so will cause minorities to live

1 there, creating, according to SJNA, segregated communities.

The city responds, first and dispositively, that the issues of whether the decision to rezone violates the federal Fair Housing Act or the equal protection clause were never raised below. The city argues that, under ORS 197.763(1), failure to raise those issues precludes their basis as an appeal to LUBA.¹

8 SJNA appears to concede that the issue of whether the 9 decision violates the law as alleged was never explicitly raised below. SJNA appears to argue, however, that the broad 10 11 issue of segregation was raised below, and that the city should have intuited thereby that its decision might implicate 12 the Fair Housing Act or the equal protection clause. 13 SJNA cites to complaints by neighbors that the proposed subdivision 14 would lead to more low-income residents, that the neighborhood 15 16 already had too many low-income residents, and that the project would cause "more crime and less English speaking 17 children" in schools. Record 775. 18

We agree with the city that comments of this type do not adequately raise the issue of unlawful segregation, much less

ORS 197.835(3) limits our review to those issues raised during the local proceedings as provided by ORS 197.763.

¹ORS 197.763(1) provides:

[&]quot;An issue which may be the basis for an appeal to the Land Use Board of Appeals shall be raised not later than the close of the record at or following the final evidentiary hearing on the proposal before the local government. Such issues shall be raised and accompanied by statements or evidence sufficient to afford the governing body, planning commission, hearings body or hearings officer, and the parties an adequate opportunity to respond to each issue."

that of whether the rezoning violates the Fair Housing Act and 1 the equal protection clause. ORS 197.763(1) requires that 2 issues be raised and accompanied by statements or evidence 3 sufficient to afford the city an adequate opportunity to 4 The comments, at most, express the speakers' own 5 respond. 6 biases and resentment against low-income and minority 7 residents. Such comments do not raise any issue that the city 8 could conceivably respond to, much less the particular issue 9 SJNA seeks to raise on appeal.

10

SJNA's fourth assignment of error is denied.

11 FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR (BOUTARD)

Petitioners Boutard and Watters (Boutard) argue that the 12 challenged zone change with respect to the eight-acre lot 13 14 zoned OS fails to preserve open space and thus is inconsistent with policies in the city's comprehensive plan (plan) that, 15 16 according to Boutard, mandate preservation of open spaces. Boutard interprets those policies as requiring that once a 17 property is zoned OS, it cannot be rezoned. 18

19 The decision states on this point:

20 "Mr. Boutard argued that the open space policies in the plan are absolute requirements that cannot be 21 balanced as required by the zoning code. 22 The 23 Council does not accept Mr. Boutard's interpretation. 24

25 "Mr. Boutard would have this Council agree that all 26 open space designations, once made, are locked in concrete forever after. But such an interpretation 27 28 is inconsistent with the plan's own recognition that its provisions and map designations are subject to 29 appropriate change as necessary over time. 30 We 31 interpret the plan as necessarily retaining elements of flexibility, lest it become irrelevant or inflict 32

hardship as circumstances change over time." Record
67.

3 The decision interprets PCC 33.810.050(A)(1) to permit the city council to balance comprehensive plan policies with 4 respect to open space and housing in determining whether a 5 proposed redesignation complies with the plan.² Record 67. 6 7 We are required to affirm the city's interpretation of its regulations unless that interpretation 8 land use is inconsistent with the express language, purpose or policies 9 underlving its plan or land regulations. 10 use ORS 197.829(1)(a)-(c). agree with intervenor that 11 We the 12 council's interpretation, permitting it to balance competing plan policies and thus change the OS designation, is not 13 14 inconsistent with the city's plan or land use regulations. Accordingly, we affirm that interpretation. 15

16

6 Boutard's first assignment of error is denied.

17 SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR (BOUTARD)

Boutard challenges the decision's finding that the area is adequately served by other parks and the property is not needed as park land, as not supported by substantial evidence.

The decision relies on evidence that Pier Park is three blocks away from the subject property, that the subject property is vacant and has not been developed or maintained as

²PCC 33.810.050(A)(1) provides:

[&]quot;The requested designation for the site has been evaluated against the relevant Comprehensive Plan policies and on balance has been found to be equally or more supportive of the plan as a whole than the old designation."

a park, and that the city Parks Bureau considers the property 1 to be surplus for parks purposes. Boutard cites to evidence 2 that the property has been considered a park at various times 3 in the past, and that it is suitable for a park. 4 The evidence upon which Boutard relies does not undermine the city's 5 6 conclusion that the area is adequately served by parks and the 7 property is not needed for park purposes. The city's finding 8 is supported by substantial evidence.

9 Boutard's second assignment of error is denied.

10 THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR (BOUTARD)

11 Boutard argues that the decision was made in a manner that was unfair and biased, because (1) Commissioner Sten made 12 a comment on the record about the proposed subdivision, 13 although he had recused himself from the 14 vote; (2) Commissioner Kafoury did not fully disclose discussions with 15 16 Sten about intervenor when Sten was on her staff, or recuse herself on that basis; and (3) Commissioner Hales expressed 17 for intervenor's proposed subdivision 18 support before 19 considering the application and was thus "predisposed" to approve the project.³ 20

21 With respect to Commissioner Sten's alleged

³Boutard at several places in his brief refers to the alleged impartiality of the three commissioners as constituting "personal interest." However, a "personal interest" in this context means a financial or similar interest in the outcome of the decision. <u>See 1000 Friends v. Wasco County Court</u>, 304 Or 76, 82-83, 742 P2d 39 (1987). Boutard does not allege that any of the commissioners has a financial interest in this application. To the extent Boutard argues that a <u>policy</u> interest in the subject of affordable housing disqualifies the three commissioners, Boutard is incorrect. 304 Or at 82-83.

participation, the record shows that, in response to a 1 statement by Commissioner Kafoury that she believes the 2 enhance the neighborhood, Commissioner Sten 3 project will "agreed that well-designed projects help a neighborhood." 4 Record 154. Both remarks were in response to a specific 5 request by a citizen that Commissioners Kafoury and Sten 6 7 address the development's impact on neighborhood livability. 8 Commissioner Sten did not make further remarks on the record 9 or participate in the voting.

decision finds that Commissioner 10 The Sten's "past 11 association with [intervenor] has not been and is not a factor in our decision." Record 75. Under these circumstances, we 12 conclude that Boutard has not established that Commissioner 13 14 Sten's noncommittal remark had any effect on the decision, much less that it resulted in a biased or partial decision. 15

With respect to Commissioner Kafoury, Boutard alleges that she received information about the project through an "ex parte" contact with Sten, who was then her staff member, and did not fully disclose that information or contact. During a September 1996 meeting, Commissioner Kafoury disclosed that:

21 "a member of her staff, Eric Sten, serves on the 22 HOST Board and she has worked with HOST on a number 23 of projects and had a vague briefing about this 24 months ago when planning was in the formative 25 stages. However she has not been contacted about 26 this specific proposal." Record 410.

However, communication between city staff and the governing body is, by definition, not an "ex parte" contact. ORS 227.180(4); <u>Holladay Investors Ltd. v. City of Portland</u>,

22 Or LUBA 90, 94 (1991). This is true even when the staff 1 member has a personal involvement in the subject 2 of а subsequent land use application. Nehoda v. Coos County, 29 Or 3 LUBA 251, 257 (1995) (conversation between commissioner and 4 intervenor, then a county compliance officer, about property 5 owned by intervenor that was later subject to a county 6 7 decision, did not constitute ex parte contact that the 8 commissioner was required to disclose). We conclude that 9 Commissioner Kafoury was not required to disclose any communication between her and Sten, and thus, if there was any 10 11 deficiency in her disclosure, it is not a basis for reversal 12 or remand.

With respect to Commissioner Hales' "predisposition" to 13 14 approve the project, Boutard cites a 1995 letter from the 15 Bureau director expressing his knowledge Parks that 16 Commissioner Hales (who oversees the Parks Bureau) is "very supportive" of intervenor's plans for the property. 17 Record 18 In August 1996, Commissioner Hales wrote a letter in 1230. 19 his capacity as Parks Bureau commissioner that expressed his 20 "complete support and approval" of the project. Record 488. Boutard argues from this evidence that Commissioner Hales had 21 22 "prejudged" the application and was incapable of making, and did not make, the decision by applying relevant standards 23 based on the evidence and argument presented. Jackman v. City 24 of Tillamook, 29 Or LUBA 391, 400 (1995); Knapp v. City of 25 26 Jacksonville, 20 Or LUBA 189, 206 (1990).

We disagree. Petitioner has the burden of establishing 1 personal bias in a decisionmaker in a "clear and unmistakable" 2 Knapp, 20 Or LUBA at 189 (quoting Schneider v. 3 manner. Umatilla County, 13 Or LUBA 281, 284 (1985)). The two letters 4 Boutard cites do not establish that Commissioner Hales was 5 incapable of reaching a decision based on the evidence and 6 7 argument. The city council held four separate hearings, 8 adopted 14 pages of supplemental findings addressing issues 9 raised by opponents, and found that its unanimous decision was based on "the preponderance of evidence in the record." 10 11 Record 75. The findings apply over 30 plan policies and numerous relevant provisions of the city code. Boutard has 12 not established either that Commissioner Hales had prejudged 13 14 the issue or that the city did not apply the relevant approval criteria and make the decision based on evidence and argument. 15

16 Boutard's third assignment of error is denied.

17 FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR (BOUTARD)

Boutard contends that the decision violates a "trust obligation" to protect sensitive public resources for the benefit of all citizens. Boutard argues that there is no legal framework or formal process for transforming publicly owned land into development sites, and without such framework any decision by the council is arbitrary and <u>ultra vires</u>.

Intervenor correctly responds that any such argument is, at best, premature, as the decision merely rezones the property, and has not disposed of it in any way. Even if it

had, the city is permitted to dispose of property not needed 1 for public use. ORS 271.310(1). In any case, it is not clear 2 3 that mere public ownership of land imposes any "public trust" obligations that would prevent the city from disposing of land 4 under these circumstances. Seafeldt v. Port of Astoria, 141 5 Or 418, 423, 16 P2d 943 (1933) (until property is put to 6 7 public use, no public trust is imposed). We agree with intervenor that Boutard has not established that any "public 8 9 trust" obligations exist with respect to the property, or that the decision violates them. 10

11 Boutard's fourth assignment of error is denied.

12 The city's decision is affirmed.