

1                   BEFORE THE LAND USE BOARD OF APPEALS  
2                   OF THE STATE OF OREGON  
3

4           BOB CATTOCHE, ANNABELLE STREET, WILL ALKIN, ANNA  
5           ALKIN, ANDREA TURNER, STEPHEN TURNER, BILL BARNETT,  
6           CHANTAL GABORIAU, KIM HOME, JON LEVY, JANIE THOMAS,  
7           JIM CLARKSON, MELODY CLARKSON, NORM PHILLIPS,  
8           DEBBIE PHILLIPS, and MAX WILBERT,  
9                   *Petitioners,*

10  
11                   vs.

12  
13           LANE COUNTY,  
14                   *Respondent,*

15  
16                   and

17  
18           GIMPL HILL PROPERTIES LLC,  
19                   *Intervenor-Respondent.*

20  
21                   LUBA No. 2018-109

22  
23                   FINAL OPINION  
24                   AND ORDER

25  
26           Appeal from Lane County.

27  
28           Sean T. Malone, Eugene, filed the petition for review and argued on behalf  
29 of petitioners.

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31           No appearance by Lane County.

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33           Michael Gelardi, Eugene, filed the response brief and argued on behalf of  
34 intervenor-respondent. With him on the brief was Hershner Hunter LLP.

35  
36           RUDD, Board Member; RYAN, Board Chair; ZAMUDIO, Board  
37 Member, participated in the decision.

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REMANDED

05/22/2019

You are entitled to judicial review of this Order. Judicial review is governed by the provisions of ORS 197.850.

**NATURE OF THE DECISION**

Petitioners appeal a county board of commissioners’ decision changing a 131.55-acre property’s comprehensive plan designation from Forestry to Non-resource, and zoning designation from Impacted Forest Land (F-2) to Rural Residential (RR-5).

**MOTION TO FILE A REPLY BRIEF**

Petitioners submitted a motion to file a reply brief. Intervenor-respondent (intervenor) opposes the motion. Petitioners’ appeal was filed in 2018. LUBA amended its rules in 2019. Petitioners’ appeal is subject to LUBA’s 2017 rules, which provide that reply briefs are limited to new matters raised in the response brief. OAR 661-010-0039 (2017). Intervenor argues that petitioners’ reply brief does not address new matters because the reply brief addresses review of local government interpretations under *Siporen v. City of Medford*, 349 Or 247, 266, 243 P3d 776 (2010) and petitioners raised *Siporen* in their petition for review. Response to Motion to File Reply Brief 2.

Petitioners argue in their petition for review that the county’s interpretation of state law and local law “is not entitled to the deferential standard of review under *Siporen*” and that LUBA has nothing to defer to “[w]hen there is no reviewable express or implied interpretation.” Petition for Review 13. The first part of petitioners’ reply brief focuses on whether the county findings include an implicit or explicit local interpretation of (1) OAR 660-025-0040(2), or (2) the

1 peripheral big game density standard in the county’s development code. The  
2 second part of the reply brief focuses on whether *Siporen* deference applies if  
3 there is a local interpretation.

4 A reply brief making surrebuttal to argument in the response brief is not  
5 allowed. *Willamette Oaks, LLC v. City of Eugene*, 67 Or LUBA 351, *aff’d*, 258  
6 Or App 534, 311 P3d 527 (2013). The reply brief does not respond to a new  
7 matter raised in the response brief, but rather to intervenor’s response to  
8 arguments first raised by petitioners regarding deference and interpretation. The  
9 reply brief is not allowed.

## 10 **FACTS**

11 The 131.55-acre property that is the subject of this appeal (the subject  
12 property) was previously part of the Haffner tract, a 171-acre property owned by  
13 the Haffners. The 171-acre property was the subject of Measure 37 and Measure  
14 49 claims.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> We have outlined the history of Measures 37 and 49 previously and repeat the summary here:

“In 2004, the voters approved Ballot Measure 37, which allowed the state and local governments facing a claim for compensation for loss of property value from restrictions on the use of property to waive certain land use regulations, to allow the owner to use property for a use permitted when the owner acquired the property.\* \* \*”

“In 2007, the legislature enacted Oregon Laws 2007, chapter 424. That legislation was referred to the voters in the next election as

1           Following the passage of Measure 37, the Haffners filed a claim for relief  
2 pursuant to its provisions. Following the passage of Measure 49, the Haffners  
3 pursued a Measure 49 claim and the Oregon Department of Land Conservation  
4 (DLCD) approved the creation of nine additional homesites on the Haffner tract.  
5 Intervenor developed the nine Measure 49 homesites as a residential subdivision  
6 named the Vineyards at Gimpl Hill. Consistent with its vineyard theme, a portion  
7 of the remainder property was rented to a local vintner at the rate of \$1 per year  
8 for the planting and management of a seven-acre vineyard. The nine Measure 49  
9 lots were sold and intervenor filed the application that is the subject of this appeal  
10 to facilitate development of the remaining 131.55 acres of land, the subject  
11 property. As we discuss in more detail below, the subject property is located  
12 within a larger area designated in the county’s comprehensive plan provisions  
13 that implement Statewide Planning Goal 5 (Natural Resources, Scenic and  
14 Historic Areas, and Open Spaces), as Peripheral Big Game Range and as  
15 groundwater limited for both quality and quantity.

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Ballot Measure 49 and the voters approved it. Measure 49 superseded Measure 37. \* \* \* Measure 49 extinguished Measure 37 waivers and allowed a Measure 37 claimant to pursue one of three alternative ‘pathways’ under Measure 49. \* \* \* Under Measure 49, a Measure 37 claimant could elect to seek a limited number of dwellings on newly created lots or could pursue a ‘vested rights’ claim for the full relief previously sought under Measure 37.” *Friends of Yamhill County v. Yamhill County*, 74 Or LUBA 268, 271 (2016).

1           The planning commission was the initial review body for intervenor's  
2 proposal and was tasked with developing a recommendation for final action by  
3 the board of commissioners. The application considered by the planning  
4 commission identified the creation of 14 new residential lots as the anticipated  
5 future development on the subject property. The planning commission  
6 recommended the board of commissioners deny the submitted application.

7           Before the board of commissioners, intervenor sought the same  
8 comprehensive plan and zone changes (to Non-Resource and RR-5), but  
9 proposed future development be restricted to residential use on two new 40-acre  
10 lots (Lots 11 and 12), open space use on four new lots (Lots 14-17) and vineyard  
11 use on one lot (Lot 13). Record 138. The existing residence would be located on  
12 a reconfigured 7-acre Lot 10 of the original subdivision. *Id.*

13           Property to the north and east of the subject property is zoned Impacted  
14 Forest (F-2). Property to the south is zoned Exclusive Farm Use (EFU). Concerns  
15 raised during the hearing process included the character of the subject property  
16 as agricultural or forest land and potential disruption to designated Peripheral Big  
17 Game Range and groundwater quantity.

18           The board of commissioners ultimately approved intervenor's request to  
19 change the subject property's comprehensive plan designation from Forest to  
20 Nonresource and zoning designation from Impacted Forest to Rural Residential  
21 (RR-5). Petition for Review 2. As we discuss in more detail below, the board of  
22 commissioners also (1) applied a site review (SR) suffix to provide a monitoring

1 system for future development of the property, and (2) required recording of  
2 covenants limiting future development as a condition of approval “as part of any  
3 owner’s subsequent division application enacting this approval.” Record 4. This  
4 appeal followed.

5 **OVERVIEW OF GOALS 3, 4 AND 5**

6 Statewide Planning Goal 3 (Agricultural Lands) is “[t]o preserve and  
7 maintain agricultural lands.” OAR 660-015-0000(3). “Agricultural lands shall be  
8 preserved and maintained for farm use, consistent with existing and future needs  
9 for agricultural products, forest and open space and with the state’s agricultural  
10 land use policy expressed in ORS 215.243 and 215.700.” *Id.* Petitioners argue in  
11 their third assignment of error that the subject property is properly characterized  
12 and preserved as agricultural land.

13 Statewide Planning Goal 4 (Forest Lands) is  
14 “[t]o conserve forest lands by maintaining the forest land base and  
15 to protect the state’s forest economy by making possible  
16 economically efficient forest practices that assure the continuous  
17 growing and harvesting of forest tree species as the leading use on  
18 forest land consistent with sound management of soil, air, water and  
19 fish and wildlife resources and to provide for recreational  
20 opportunities and agriculture.” OAR 660-015-0000(4).

21 Petitioners argue in their fourth assignment of error that the property should be  
22 characterized as forest land and managed to protect resources.

23 Goal 5 is “[t]o protect natural resources and conserve scenic and historic  
24 areas and open spaces.” OAR 660-015-0000(5). In order to implement Goal 5,

1 local governments are required to “adopt programs that will protect natural  
2 resources.” *Id.* When a new use is introduced into an area, the jurisdiction is  
3 required to determine whether the new use will conflict with a protected Goal 5  
4 resource and, if a conflict will occur, is required to perform an economic, social,  
5 environmental and energy (ESEE) analysis. OAR 660-023-0040. Petitioners  
6 argue in their second assignment of error that the county failed to conduct the  
7 necessary ESEE analysis.

8 Petitioners’ first assignment of error, however, is that the findings are  
9 overly broad and inconsistent and require remand for adoption of new findings.  
10 We begin our review there.

11 **FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR**

12 Findings supporting a decision must “(1) identify the relevant approval  
13 standards, (2) set out the facts which are believed and relied upon, and (3) explain  
14 how those fact lead to the decision on compliance with the approval standards.”  
15 *Heiller v. Josephine County*, 23 Or LUBA 551, 556 (1992). Petitioners argue that  
16 the county’s findings are impermissibly vague with respect to documents  
17 incorporated by reference, and incorporate inconsistent documents. Petition for  
18 Review 8.

19 Petitioners first assert that the county findings are invalid because they are  
20 impermissibly vague. The county’s decision includes a statement that the  
21 findings incorporate “[a]dditional findings and material in support of Board’s  
22 approval \* \* \* in the record, [including] the Applicant’ ESEE analysis, the



1 Applicant’s supplemental narratives and reports from qualified professionals.”  
2 Record 68. Petitioners argue that the decision should be remanded “because it is  
3 impossible to know \* \* \* which documents have been incorporated across the  
4 3700+ page record.” Petition for Review 9.

5         If the local government fails to adequately identify a document as findings,  
6 the local government may not rely on that document to support the decision. *Hess*  
7 *v. City of Corvallis*, 70 Or LUBA 283, 290 (2014). Findings lacking specificity  
8 as to documents the decision maker wishes to incorporate by reference do not,  
9 however, necessarily provide a basis for reversal or remand. Rather, they serve  
10 to limit the documents that may be relied upon to defend the decision on appeal.  
11 The purported incorporation of documents not clearly identified in the findings  
12 fails, and the local government may not rely on the documents to defend a specific  
13 adequate findings challenge. *Id.* at 290-291. In reviewing subsequent  
14 assignments of error, we will consider whether documents intervenor relies upon  
15 as support for the approval are identified with sufficient specificity in the  
16 findings. Standing alone, however, a general assignment of error that the findings  
17 include some ambiguity as to the incorporated documents is not a basis for  
18 reversal or remand.

19         Petitioners also point out specific inconsistencies in the record, alleging,  
20 for example, that there are inconsistent ESEE studies and staff reports and  
21 statements that the subject property does and does not have wetlands. Petition for  
22 Review 11, 12.

1           In support of their request for remand, petitioners cite *Larmer Warehouse*  
2 *Co. v. City of Salem*, 43 Or LUBA 53 (2002). In *Larmer*, the city decision was  
3 remanded when a city incorporated as findings both a staff report supporting  
4 denial and a staff report supporting approval. *Larmer* is not comparable to the  
5 present case, because the alleged conflicts before us relate to an ESEE study and  
6 staff report for the initial development plan proposal. We will not reverse or  
7 remand a decision based on inconsistent findings where the applicable findings  
8 are clear. As we held in *Central Bethany Dev. Co. v. Washington County*, 33 Or  
9 LUBA 463 (1997), “[n]o purpose would be served by remanding to allow the  
10 county to make explicit what is already obvious.” The challenged findings in  
11 *Central Bethany* clearly related to an earlier proposal and did not nullify the  
12 relevant findings. To the extent the conflicting findings here relate to the proposal  
13 considered and rejected by the planning commission, they are clearly not  
14 applicable to the proposal as approved by the board, and erroneous inclusion in  
15 the findings is not a basis for reversal or remand. With respect to items in the  
16 ESEE study or staff reports relating to two different proposals, petitioners have  
17 not established a basis for remand.

18           Petitioners next argue that the decision contains inconsistent findings  
19 regarding the presence of wetlands. With respect to the presence of wetlands,  
20 petitioners have not established that this reflects a meaningful inconsistency. The  
21 section of the findings describing the location of the property generally includes  
22 a sentence stating that the property does not contain wetlands on the National

1 Wetlands Inventory. Record 24. Later in the findings, the county engages in a  
2 significantly more detailed discussion of wetland resources and criteria  
3 compliance, and notes that the National Wetlands Inventory mapping for Lane  
4 County shows three distinct wetlands on the subject property. Record 41. “ORS  
5 197.835(11)(b) provides limited authority for LUBA to overlook minor  
6 discrepancies in findings.”<sup>2</sup> *Pinnacle Alliance Group, LLC v. City of Sisters*, 73  
7 Or LUBA 169, 180-81 (2016). Accordingly, we will overlook minor errors.  
8 Petitioners do not point to a substantive discussion of wetlands that both states  
9 there are no wetlands on the property and applies legal standards to the property  
10 based on that presumption. Thus, an alleged inconsistency in the record  
11 concerning the presence of wetlands on the property is not grounds for reversal  
12 or remand. The adopted findings clearly find that wetlands exist on the subject  
13 property, and include a wetland protection discussion. Record 47-48.

14 The first assignment of error is denied.

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<sup>2</sup> ORS 197.835(11)(b) provides:

“Whenever the findings are defective because of failure to recite adequate facts or legal conclusions or failure to adequately identify the standards of their relation to the facts, but the parties identify relevant evidence in the record which clearly supports the decision or a part of the decision, the board shall affirm the decision or part of the decision supported by the record and remand the remainder to the local government, with direction indicating appropriate remedial action.”

1 **SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR**

2 As noted, Goal 5 is “[t]o protect natural resources and conserve scenic and  
3 historic areas and open spaces.” OAR 660-015-0000(5). The subject property  
4 contains identified Goal 5 resources in the form of Peripheral Big Game Range  
5 and Groundwater Quantity limited. Petition for Review 18-19. Protection of Goal  
6 5 resources is achieved in part by identifying uses which may conflict with a  
7 protected resource. OAR 660-023-0040(2). To identify conflicting uses, a local  
8 government must “examine land uses allowed outright or conditionally within  
9 the zones applied to the resource site and in its impact area.” *Id.* A determination  
10 that there are no conflicting uses must be based on the applicable zoning, rather  
11 than ownership of the site. Local governments are not required to consider  
12 allowed uses that would be unlikely to occur in the impact area because existing  
13 permanent uses occupy the site. *Id.* If the local government determines that a use  
14 may conflict with a protected Goal 5 resource, the county is required to “analyze  
15 the ESEE consequences that could result from decisions to allow, limit, or  
16 prohibit a conflicting use.” OAR 660-023-0040(4).

17 **A. Peripheral Big Game Range**

18 The county did not compare other uses allowed outright or conditionally  
19 in the RR-5 zone with uses allowed outright or conditionally in the F-2 zone with  
20 respect to potential conflicts with big game habitat. The county identified the  
21 “primary conflict” as residential use above the Oregon Department of Fish and  
22 Wildlife’s (ODFW) recommended one dwelling per 40 acres. Record 42.

1                   **1.     Uses**

2                   Petitioners argue that the county failed to evaluate, pursuant to OAR 660-  
3 023-0040, the expanded uses and residential densities in the RR-5 zone that could  
4 conflict with Peripheral Big Game Range as a result of the rezoning to RR-5.  
5 Petition for Review 23-24. Intervenor responds that the county was not required  
6 to evaluate uses other than the proposed residential development, stating:

7                   “LUBA has held repeatedly that it is appropriate for a local  
8 government to consider proposed or likely development resulting  
9 from a zone change as opposed to the ‘worst case’ or most intensive  
10 development that could theoretically result from the zone change.”  
11 Response 20-21.

12 In support, intervenor cites three decisions concerning the adequacy of public  
13 facilities. *Id.* For the reasons we explain below, all of those cases are inapposite.

14                   In *Santiam Water Control District v. City of Stayton*, 54 Or LUBA 553,  
15 557 (2007) we observed “that local governments have some latitude in assuming  
16 what uses will occur on properties subject to a zone change *for purposes of*  
17 *assessing the capacity of public facilities* to serve those uses.” (Emphasis added.)  
18 *Bothman v. City of Eugene*, 51 Or LUBA 426, 432-34 (2006) also addressed  
19 public facilities. In *Bothman*, we upheld a planning commission determination  
20 that the local code did not require traffic study consideration of uses that could  
21 not practicably be sited on the property, particularly where additional review  
22 would be triggered if more than a given level of trips were generated by  
23 development. In *Rickreall Community Water Assoc. v. Polk County*, 53 Or  
24 LUBA 76, 109-10 (2008) we similarly held that the transportation planning rule

1 does not require consideration of “the maximum theoretically possible *intensity*  
2 of the most traffic-intensive allowed use,” but that the focus is on the allowed  
3 uses in the new zone and not necessarily the proposed use. *Id.* (emphasis in  
4 original). We have therefore held that a local government may consider likely  
5 development when considering the adequacy of public facilities.

6 This assignment of error, however, challenges the county’s findings  
7 regarding the impacts of potential new uses on protected Goal 5 resources, and  
8 does not involve consideration of the impacts of future development on public  
9 facilities under Goals 11 or 12. In *Welch v. City of Portland*, 28 Or LUBA 439,  
10 443 (1994), when initially zoning the property, the city considered the uses  
11 allowed in the base zone and then applied an environmental conservation (EC)  
12 overlay to protect Goal 5 resources. We held that a later city decision rezoning  
13 the property to a different base zone had to identify conflicting uses potentially  
14 allowable under the new base zoning and then determine a means of protection.

15 We concluded:

16 “The city may ultimately decide the EC overlay is the appropriate  
17 resource protection program for the [property]. However, it may not  
18 assume the EC overlay as currently applied is adequate to satisfy  
19 Goal 5, without following the Goal 5 planning process based on the  
20 proposed new plan designation and the consequent allowable uses  
21 of the [property].” *Id.* at. 444.

22 We agree with petitioners that the county erred in failing to evaluate  
23 whether the change in zoning from a forest designation to a rural residential  
24 designation would introduce the potential for new uses which might conflict with

1 the Peripheral Big Game Range. For example, it appears that the RR-5 zoning  
2 district allows a number of non-residential uses and/or uses that are accessory to  
3 residential uses, including without limitation fire stations, schools, churches,  
4 home occupations, commercial and non-commercial kennels, private parks,  
5 playgrounds, and golf courses. Lane Code (LC) 16.231. On remand, the county  
6 must review the evidence and determine whether development with single family  
7 dwellings represents the most likely potential conflict under either forest or  
8 residential zoning. The county must also evaluate whether other uses allowed  
9 either outright or conditionally in the RR-5 zone would conflict with the  
10 Peripheral Big Game Range. The county must adopt findings explaining how  
11 protections based on avoiding impacts from single family residential  
12 development and other uses allowed in the RR-5 zone will also avoid potential  
13 conflicts to Peripheral Big Game Range. In any event, the county is required to  
14 show its work. Part of the work is analyzing whether the uses allowed in RR-5  
15 zone could, in this case, create a conflict regarding big game habitat and  
16 groundwater. OAR 660-023-0040(2).<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> OAR 660-023-0040(2) provides, in part:

“Identify conflicting uses. Local governments shall identify conflicting uses that exist, or could occur, with regard to significant Goal 5 resource sites. To identify these uses, local governments *shall examine land uses allowed outright or conditionally within the zones* applied to the resource site and in its impact area. Local

1                   **2. Density**

2                   As discussed below, as part of its program to achieve Goal 5, the county  
3 has adopted a standard of no more than one dwelling per 40-acres to protect  
4 Peripheral Big Game Range (Residential Density Standard). That standard is  
5 found in the Flora & Fauna March 1992 Lane County Comprehensive Plan  
6 Working Paper Revisions document (Flora and Fauna Working Paper), found  
7 beginning at Record 2843.<sup>4</sup> The Flora and Fauna Working Paper indicates that

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governments are not required to consider allowed uses that would be unlikely to occur in the impact area because existing permanent uses occupy the site. The following shall also apply in the identification of conflicting uses:

“(a) If no uses conflict with a significant resource site, acknowledged policies and land use regulations may be considered sufficient to protect the resource site. *The determination that there are no conflicting uses must be based on the applicable zoning rather than ownership of the site.* (Therefore, public ownership of a site does not by itself support a conclusion that there are no conflicting uses.)” (Emphases added.)

<sup>4</sup> The parties agree that the Flora and Fauna Working Paper policies provide applicable criteria in the designated Peripheral Big Game Range. The Flora and Fauna Working Paper discusses potential impacts related to agricultural and forest uses and states that the primary conflict to big game is residential density. *Id.* at 2866. After identifying residential use as the primary conflict to big game habitat, the Flora and Fauna Work Paper explains:

“ODFW has recommended overall residential densities for Peripheral Big Game Range at one dwelling unit per 40 acres \* \* \* to restate the conflict: overall residential density greater than one



1 the initial intent was to preserve the 40-acre standard through *zoning*. However,  
2 the county’s inclusion of the subject property in the Peripheral Big Game Range  
3 inventory is geographical and is not tied to or dependent on the current F-2  
4 zoning.<sup>5</sup> The challenged decision does not purport to remove the subject property  
5 from the Peripheral Big Game Range inventory and associated habitat  
6 protections, including the limitation of one dwelling per 40 acres.

7 The county determined that rezoning the subject property to RR-5 did not  
8 conflict with the Residential Density Standard because the approval, as  
9 conditioned, limits future residential development to three houses on the entirety  
10 of the 131.55-acre subject property and thus satisfies the Residential Density  
11 Standard. Record 42.

12 Petitioners assert that the county’s analysis with respect to Peripheral Big  
13 Game Range improperly applied this Residential Density Standard. Petitioners  
14 argue that the housing developed as part of the Measure 49 Vineyard at Gimpl

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dwelling unit/40 acres in Peripheral Range \* \* \* conflicts with habitat for big game.” *Id.* at 2865.

<sup>5</sup> The county explained the Goal 5 big game inventory as follows:

“**Big Game Range:** The inventory of this Goal Five resource divides the entire county into three categories of Big Game Range using the ODFW classifications: Major, Peripheral and Impacted. ODFW defines Big Game Range generally as ‘[a] geographic area occupied by deer, elk, cougar, black bear, mountain sheep, mountain goat, moose, silver gray squirrel or antelope, often on a seasonal basis.’ OAR 635-405-0005 (5). The Subject Property appears in the County inventory as Peripheral Big Game Range.” Record 2200.

1 Hill subdivision should be included in the density calculation, and if the existing  
2 subdivision housing is included, the 40-acre density standard is violated and an  
3 ESEE analysis is required. Petition for Review 28.

4 Intervenor responds that the county adopted an implied interpretation of  
5 the Residential Density Standard as requiring only consideration of the subject  
6 property, citing the findings at Record 42, set out above. Response Brief 18.  
7 Intervenor argues that because the Residential Density Standard is a “local  
8 standard,” LUBA’s standard of review of the county’s interpretation of it is set  
9 out in ORS 197.829(1). *Matiaco v. Columbia County*, 42 Or LUBA 277, *aff’d*,  
10 183 Or App 581, 54 P3d 636 (2002) (affirming the county’s interpretation of its  
11 residential density standard under ORS 197.829(1)). We agree with intervenor  
12 that the Residential Density Standard is a local standard and that accordingly, the  
13 question here is whether the county governing body’s interpretation of the  
14 Residential Density Standard is not inconsistent with all of the express language  
15 relevant to the interpretation, or the purposes and policies underpinning the  
16 regulation.

17 Petitioners do not identify any provision of the county’s land use  
18 regulations or comprehensive plan that the county’s findings are inconsistent  
19 with. The Flora and Fauna Working Paper the county incorporated into its  
20 findings explains that the Big Game Range protection:

21 “premise is to work overall density figures into minimum lot size  
22 recommendations for regions of the County, rather than postponing  
23 the issue by referrals to ODFW for every land division application.

1 The anticipated result is to base zoning by region on the overall  
2 residential densities or ODFW minimum parcel size  
3 recommendations, thereby creating no conflict with Goal 5.” Record  
4 2865-66.

5 The Flora and Fauna Working Paper states that the county will be divided into  
6 regions<sup>6</sup> and the county will determine the number of existing residences and the:

7 “additional number of residences allowable to still fall within the  
8 overall density level. Built upon and committed areas are subtracted  
9 out, as they are treated as Impacted Range. From the figure of  
10 remaining residences and acreage, a residential carrying capacity  
11 will be determined. This figure, or the ODFW figure of 40 \* \* \*  
12 acres, whichever is lesser, will be recommended in the region for  
13 residential density for big game purposes.

14 “\* \* \* \* \*

15 “If this figure is ever exceeded, it constitutes a conflict with Big  
16 Game Range.” Record 2867.

17 The body of the Flora and Fauna Working Paper therefore states that the  
18 lesser of this figure or the county’s 40-acre figure will be “recommended in the  
19 region for residential density for big game purposes.” *Id.* If this figure is  
20 exceeded, there is a conflict and an ESEE analysis is required. *Id.* Ultimately,  
21 however, the Flora and Fauna Working Paper identified as its selected strategy  
22 that “ODFW recommendations on overall residential density with Peripheral and

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<sup>6</sup> The Flora and Fauna Working Paper explains that “[t]he County will be divided into regions convenient for planning purposes. These have not yet been determined, but will probably result in 10-20 regions in the County.” Record 2866.

1 Major Big Game Range shall be a determinant in minimum parcel size for regions  
2 of the County.” Record 2875.

3 In the challenged decision, the county did not identify the level of  
4 residential density allowed in the F-2 zone or compare that density to the level of  
5 residential density allowed in the RR-5 zone. On appeal, no party identifies the  
6 level of residential density allowed in the F-2 zone. However, petitioners argue  
7 that “[i]t is undisputed that the RR-5 zone allows a greater density than one  
8 dwelling unit per 40 acres” and that “the allowance for dwellings and residential  
9 homes at the density allowed in the RR-5 zone is vastly different than a template  
10 dwelling in the F-2 zone.” Petition for Review 25, 24.

11 We observe that the F-2 zone does not provide a general residential density  
12 standard. The use table for impacted forest zones lists six types of dwellings  
13 allowed in the F-2 zone. LC Table 16.211-1, 2.1–2.6. Those dwellings include:  
14 (1) caretaker residence for public parks and public fish hatcheries, (2) large tract  
15 forest dwelling, (3) lot of record dwelling, (4) template dwelling, (5) replacement  
16 dwelling, (6) temporary hardship dwelling. *Id.* A large tract forest dwelling may  
17 be allowed in the F-2 zone on a tract that is “at least 160 contiguous acres or 200  
18 acres in one ownership that are not contiguous but are in Lane County or adjacent  
19 counties and zoned for forest use.” LC 16.211(3)(a)(ii). The remaining five types  
20 of dwellings do not require a particular minimum lot or parcel size. LC 16.211(3).  
21 The minimum lot or parcel size for new or adjusted lots or parcels in the F-2 zone  
22 is 80 acres. LC 6.211(7); *see also* ORS 215.780 (providing generally applicable

1 80-acre minimum requirement); OAR 660-006-0026 (same). However, the F-2  
2 zoning indicates that predominant land ownerships are 80 acres or less.  
3 Accordingly, as we understand it, the county did not quantify a residential density  
4 allowed in the F-2 zone to compare to the residential density allowed in the RR-  
5 5 zone, and instead used the ODFW 40-acre standard for areas inventoried as  
6 Peripheral Big Game Range.

7 State law affords local governments fairly broad discretion in identifying  
8 and managing Goal 5 resources. However, after a local government has identified  
9 (*i.e.*, inventoried or listed) a Goal 5 resource, state law requires local governments  
10 to follow prescribed procedures to ensure measured consideration of  
11 consequences to inventoried Goal 5 resources from planning and development.

12 This case involves a post-acknowledgement plan amendment (PAPA) changing  
13 the subject property comprehensive plan designation from forest land to  
14 nonresource land and rezoning the property from impacted forest (F-2) to rural  
15 residential, five acre (RR-5). Local governments are required to apply Goal 5 in  
16 consideration of a PAPA if the PAPA affects a Goal 5 resource. A PAPA affects  
17 a Goal 5 resource if it “allows new uses that could be conflicting uses with a Goal  
18 5 resource site \* \* \*.” OAR 660-023-0250; *see also Nicita v. City of Oregon City*,

19 \_\_\_ Or LUBA \_\_\_ (LUBA No 2018-102, Jan 3, 2019) (slip op at 7), *aff’d*, 297 Or  
20 App 192, \_\_\_ P3d \_\_\_ (2019) (observing that the initial evaluation under OAR 660-  
21 023-0250 presents a fairly low threshold for what “could be” conflicting uses  
22 with respect to a particular Goal 5 resource site); *Id.* (“On its face, a zone change

1 that significantly increases the volume or intensity of development impacts on a  
2 natural resource compared to development under the existing zoning almost  
3 certainly would, without more, exceed that low threshold, by allowing uses that  
4 ‘could be’ conflicting uses.”).

5 The local government applies Goal 5 to a PAPA through the ESEE analysis  
6 prescribed in OAR 660-023-0040. Again, the local government has some latitude  
7 in applying the ESEE analysis. OAR 660-023-0040(1) (“The ESEE analysis need  
8 not be lengthy or complex, but should enable reviewers to gain a clear  
9 understanding of the conflicts and the consequences to be expected.”). The first  
10 step in the ESEE process is to identify conflicting uses. OAR 660-023-  
11 0040(1)(a). Whether a specific use conflicts is determined by the applicable  
12 zoning, not the ownership of the site, limitations in specific proposed  
13 development, or limitations imposed in the PAPA approval. *See* OAR 660-023-  
14 0040(2) (“To identify [conflicting] uses, local governments shall examine land  
15 uses allowed outright or conditionally within the zones applied to the resource  
16 site and in its impact area.”); OAR 660-023-0040(2)(a) (“The determination that  
17 there are no conflicting uses must be based on the applicable zoning rather than  
18 ownership of the site.”).

19 After the local government has identified the conflicting use and  
20 determined the impact area, the local government must “analyze the ESEE  
21 consequences that could result from decisions to allow, limit, or prohibit a  
22 conflicting use.” OAR 660-023-0040(4). “A decision to allow some or all

1 conflicting uses for a particular site may also be consistent with Goal 5, provided  
2 it is supported by the ESEE analysis.” OAR 660-023-0040(5). However, the  
3 ESEE process compels the local government to complete an analysis and make a  
4 determination. For example, “[a] local government may decide that both the  
5 resource site and the conflicting uses are important compared to each other, and,  
6 based on the ESEE analysis, the conflicting uses should be allowed in a limited  
7 way that protects the resource site to a desired extent.” OAR 660-023-0040(5)(b).

8 In this case, with respect to big game habitat, an inventoried Goal 5  
9 resource, the county avoided the ESEE analysis process entirely by determining  
10 that residential uses otherwise allowed outright in the RR-5 zone did not  
11 constitute a conflicting use with big game habitat because “the Applicant’s  
12 revised development plan limits residential development to [two] additional  
13 Residential Lots (Lots 11 and 12) that are each forty (40) acres in size which  
14 establishes the overall density of the Subject Property at full development to be  
15 less than ODFW’s 40-acre minimum (three Residential Lots on 131 acres).”  
16 Record 42. That approach is inconsistent with the ESEE rule, which requires that  
17 conflicting uses be examined with respect to the “land uses allowed outright or  
18 conditionally within the zones applied to the resource site and in its impact area.”  
19 OAR 660-023-0040(2).

20 Residential density allowed outright in the RR-5 zone at one dwelling per  
21 five acres is a land use that conflicts with the big game habitat inventory,  
22 protection of which is ensured by residential density limited to one dwelling per

1 40 acres. The county may have decided that, because the PAPA does not affect  
2 the big game habitat inventory, existing regulations will prohibit the more  
3 intensive development otherwise allowed in the RR-5 zone. *See Nicita, \_\_\_ Or*  
4 *LUBA at \_\_\_ (LUBA No 2018-102, Jan 3, 2019) (slip op at 7) (“a local*  
5 *government can avoid further analysis under OAR 660-023 only if it concludes,*  
6 *supported by substantial evidence, that existing regulations that protect the*  
7 *resource are sufficient to ‘eliminate the possibility of conflicts’ from more*  
8 *intensive development allowed under the proposed zoning.”)* The county may  
9 also decide to limit the impact of conflicting uses by imposing conditions of  
10 approval that would potentially limit development on the subject property,  
11 despite the RR-5 zoning. Indeed, it appears that the county intended that result in  
12 the challenged decision. However, the county could not avoid the ESEE analysis  
13 by relying on limitations in the application or subsequently imposed conditions  
14 of approval. Instead, the county was required to follow the ESEE analysis  
15 required by OAR 660-023-0250 and prescribed in OAR 660-023-0040. This  
16 subassignment of error is sustained.

17 **B. Groundwater Limited**

18 The Water Resources Working Paper conflict resolution section provides:

19 “For a quantity limited aquifer otherwise acceptable development  
20 should be allowed if an adequate showing is made that water will be  
21 available for a foreseeable period in the future, and that the  
22 additional withdrawal will not negatively impact surrounding  
23 users.”Record 3179.



1           Petitioners argue that the findings fail to adequately address the potential  
2 impact of new development on existing water users. Petition for Review 29. The  
3 Water Resources Working Paper referenced in the findings is part of the record.  
4 Record 43, 3168. The parties agree that the Water Resources Working Paper  
5 provides the relevant approval standard.

6           As petitioners observe, the findings consider only the first part of the  
7 provision, stating, “[w]ith respect to quantity, the plan resolves that residential  
8 development and other uses requiring groundwater should be allowed if a  
9 showing is made that the water will be available for the foreseeable future.”  
10 Record 43. The findings do not consider whether “the additional withdrawal will  
11 not negatively impact surrounding water users.” Record 1264; 43-45.

12           The findings discuss LC 13.050(13)(c)(i) which provides that aquifer tests  
13 are not required for proposed lots greater than twenty acres in size. Record 44.  
14 The county concluded that although the intervenor consultant’s aquifer report  
15 was not required pursuant to LC 13.050, the aquifer study provided by intervenor  
16 was substantial evidence of sufficient groundwater for the subject property.  
17 Record 45. However, the findings that address OAR 660-023-0040 do not  
18 address groundwater quantity impacts on surrounding lands or explain how the  
19 LC will protect existing users.

20           Intervenor argues that other findings for other applicable criteria conclude  
21 that existing water users will not be adversely impacted. Response 23. The  
22 findings discuss Rural Comprehensive Plan Policy 19, which provides in part that

1 rural residential designations for non-resource lands shall be one residence per  
2 five or ten acres. Record 124. “Domestic water supply availability” is one of the  
3 Policy 19 approval criteria. *Id.* The Policy 19 findings conclude that intervenor’s  
4 Aquifer Analysis provides a thorough analysis of water availability for the new  
5 lots as well as the existing subdivision lots, noting that the original 10 lots will  
6 be served by the community water system and the new residential lots, 11 and  
7 12, will have individual wells. *Id.* at 56-57. Based on the analysis, the county  
8 found that the domestic water supply for the subject property was suitable under  
9 Policy 19.

10 Intervenor also points to evidence in the record that existing water users  
11 will not be impacted by the proposed development. ORS 197.835(11)(b) provides  
12 that

13 “[w]henver the findings are defective because of failure to recite  
14 adequate facts or legal conclusions or failure to adequately identify  
15 the standards or their relation to the facts, but the parties identify  
16 relevant evidence in the record which clearly supports the decision  
17 or a part of the decision, the board shall affirm the decision or the  
18 part of the decision supported by the record and remand the  
19 remainder to the local government with direction indicating  
20 appropriate remedial action.”

21 The “clearly supports” standard provided by ORS 197.835(11)(b) is high and is  
22 not met where there is conflicting evidence in the record. *Doob v. City of Grants*  
23 *Pass*, 34 Or LUBA 480, 484 (1998). Petitioners submitted a report from  
24 groundwater consultant Mark Yinger. Record 294-98. The material cited by  
25 intervenor supports a finding of adequate water to serve existing domestic users

1 within the subdivision, but it fails to cure the county's findings problem. The  
2 county findings do not address the criticisms in the Yinger report or the testimony  
3 from neighbors concerning their water supply. This subassignment of error is  
4 sustained.

5 On remand, the county must address whether the change in zoning  
6 potentially introduces the potential for new conflicting uses for Peripheral Big  
7 Game Range on the subject property and if so, conduct the requisite ESEE  
8 analysis. If the county adopts conditions of approval to avoid conflicts with  
9 Peripheral Big Game Range, the county must explain how those conditions  
10 effectively avoid the conflict. The county must also address the adequacy of  
11 water for existing users and address the competing evidence concerning the  
12 groundwater quantity issue.

13 This assignment of error is sustained.

14 **THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR**

15 OAR 660-033-0020 sets forth measures by which land may be classified  
16 as agricultural in character. Petitioners argue that the subject property is properly  
17 classified as agricultural because it is classified that way under a general Lane  
18 County report. Petitioners also argue that the county improperly relied upon a  
19 site-specific study of soil classifications on the subject property. Petitioners next  
20 argue that the county should not consider encumbered lands when evaluating the  
21 percentage of the subject property properly classified as agricultural. Lastly,  
22 petitioners argue that the property is properly considered agricultural because

1 there is evidence the property is amenable to farm use alone or in conjunction  
2 with other properties.

3 **A. Site Specific Study**

4 OAR 660-033-0020(1) defines agricultural land as including “[l]ands  
5 classified by the U.S. National Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) as  
6 predominately Class I-IV soils in Western Oregon and I-VI soils in Eastern  
7 Oregon.” Petitioners rely on the Lane County Soil Rating for Agriculture, Lane  
8 County Land Management Division, August 1997 for the conclusion the property  
9 has predominately I-IV soils. Petition for Review 36-37. OAR 660-033-0030(5)  
10 provides that agricultural land may, however, be identified using a more detailed  
11 soil study. Intervenor submitted a site-specific study of soils to DLCD for its  
12 review consistent with OAR 660-033-0045. DLCD had the report reviewed by  
13 an outside consultant and the DLCD consultant reported some concerns with the  
14 initial report. Petition for Review 37. Following various communications  
15 concerning the DLCD consultant’s concerns regarding the initial report, DLCD  
16 reported that its consultant was satisfied with the final site-specific report. Record  
17 1575.

18 Petitioners argue that not all concerns initially raised by the DLCD  
19 consultant were reflected in changes to the final report so the county should not  
20 have relied upon the final report. Petition for Review 38. Petitioners conclude  
21 that “[b]ecause the findings fail to respond to the issues raised by Gallagher  
22 regarding the 43E complex, the findings are inadequate. Similarly, because, there

1 is no explanation for delineating 43E complex without further investigation, the  
2 findings of predominance are not supported by substantial evidence.” Petition for  
3 Review 41. As intervenor observes, the county findings state:

4 “The soils assessment concluded that the soils within the Subject  
5 Property did meet the criteria for Non-resource designation\* \* \*. \*  
6 \* \*

7 “We adopt as findings in support of this conclusion entire report of  
8 Mr. Rabe and [the consulting company employing Mr. Rabe.]  
9 Additionally, that report has been reviewed and approved by  
10 [DLCD]. DLCD independently retained a third-party consulting soil  
11 scientist to review the CES report. The consulting soil scientist  
12 concurred with CES methodology, analysis and findings.\* \* \*

13 “The [consulting firm’s study] conclusions\* \* \* demonstrate that the  
14 Subject Property is not Agricultural Land as defined by Goal 3  
15 because less than fifty percent (50%) of the Subject Property is  
16 Class I-IV soil classifications.”<sup>7</sup> Record 30.

17 The findings must be supported by substantial evidence, that is evidence  
18 upon which a reasonable person would rely. *Dodd v. Hood River County*, 317 Or  
19 172, 179, 855 P2d 608 (1993); *Younger v. City of Portland*, 305 Or 346, 351-52,  
20 752 P2d 262 (1988). The ultimate conclusion of the expert retained by DLCD is  
21 evidence a reasonable person would rely on to make a decision that the concerns  
22 raised as part of the initial review by a DLCD consultant were adequately  
23 resolved and is therefore substantial evidence. Petitioners reference numerous

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<sup>7</sup> The county expressly adopted the Rabe, and his consulting firm’s report as findings. Record at 30.

1 concerns the DLCD consultant raised concerning the initial report but do not  
2 address the fact that DLCD's consultant ultimately found "the revised soils  
3 assessment to be soundly and scientifically based." Record 1575. This  
4 subassignment of error is denied.

5 Petitioners also argue that "[f]indings fail to demonstrate the 131.55-acre  
6 property consisting of 42% class I-IV soils is not land that consists predominately  
7 of class I-IV soils" because the property already has use restrictions on parts of  
8 the property as a result of the presence of features such as a Bonneville Power  
9 Administration easement and wetlands. Petition for Review 41. Petitioners  
10 provide no legal support for their argument that some lands should be excluded  
11 from the analysis and therefore provide no basis for reversal or remand.  
12 *Deschutes Development Company v. Deschutes County*, 5 Or LUBA 218 (1982).

13 This subassignment of error is denied.

14 **B. Suitability for Farm Use**

15 In addition to classifying land as agricultural based on soil quality,  
16 agricultural land is defined to include land suitable for farm use taking into  
17 consideration soil fertility, suitability for grazing and other crops, climatic  
18 conditions, irrigation water, existing land use patterns, technology and energy  
19 inputs required, and accepted farm practices. OAR 660-033-0020(1)(a)(B). The  
20 county ultimately concludes that "[o]verall, the Subject Property is not land that  
21 is suitable for farm use considering the above-discussed factors. Such use would  
22 be impractical, inefficient and economically not possible." Record 33.

1 Stephen Caruna, an agronomist retained by intervenor addressed the seven  
2 factors in OAR 660-033-0020(1)(a)(B) in detail in his report. This report is  
3 clearly part of the findings as the county states “[t]hese seven factors were  
4 addressed in detail by Stephen Caruana, a qualified agronomist retained by the  
5 Applicant, *in two separate reports that we hereby adopt as findings* in support of  
6 the general conclusion that the Subject Property is not suitable for farm use  
7 considering all of the factors set forth in the rule and addressed by Mr. Caruana  
8 with regard to the Subject Property.” Record 31 (emphasis added). These findings  
9 specifically address suitability of the site for activities such as grazing, yet  
10 petitioners do not address these findings in their petition for review or show why  
11 they are inadequate with respect to “the raising, harvesting and selling of crops,  
12 the feeding, breeding, management and sale of livestock, poultry and honeybees;  
13 animal husbandry; and the stabling and training of equines.” Petition for Review  
14 44. Petitioners’ failure to address the county’s findings results in a failure to  
15 provide a basis for reversal or remand. *Deumling v. City of Salem*, 76 Or LUBA  
16 99, 109 (2017). We have also held that a county is not required “to consider  
17 whether the property is suitable for farm use based on the cultivation of marijuana  
18 (or any other crop) in ways that are entirely removed from the agricultural  
19 qualities of the land.” *Landwatch Lane County v. Lane County*, 77 Or LUBA 368,  
20 373, *aff’d*, 294 Or App 415, 421 P3d 432 (2018). Petitioners do not explain how  
21 the cultivation of honeybees is not removed from the agricultural qualities of the  
22 land.

1           Petitioners also argue that the property is properly considered agricultural  
2 land “because it is adjacent to or intermingled with lands in capability classes I-  
3 IV within a farm unit.” Petition for Review 44; OAR 660-033-0020(1)(b).  
4 Petitioners base this argument on the fact that the portion of Phase 1 of the Gimpl  
5 Hill Vineyard subdivision planted with grapes as part of a vineyard theme was  
6 operated by the owner of an adjacent vineyard. Petition for Review 45. Petitioners  
7 argue that the property should be considered farmland because intervenor did not  
8 demonstrate [by substantial evidence] that the subject property is not suitable for  
9 any farm use independently or in combination with other property, and that the  
10 findings improperly disregard evidence and statements that the property is  
11 currently and has previously been used for farm use.

12           Petitioners argue that the findings disregard evidence and statements by  
13 intervenor and neighbors that the property is in farm use in the form of vineyards.  
14 Petition for Review 43. The county findings state that the prior owner, Dr.  
15 Haffner, had a “hobby farm” on the property and the developer leased land to a  
16 vineyard operator with facilities on nearby property for \$1 per year as a  
17 landscaping feature supportive of the subdivision’s vineyard theme. Record 30-  
18 31. OAR 660-033-0020(1)(a)(C) treats as agricultural land, “[l]and that is  
19 necessary to permit farm practices to be undertaken on adjacent or nearby  
20 agricultural lands.” As the county explained:

21           “The presence of the vineyards is the result of the Applicant’s desire  
22           to establish a theme for the subdivision. The vineyards on the  
23           Subject Property will remain, not as a ‘farm unit’, but rather as a



1 unique circumstance in which a small portion of a generally  
2 unproductive parcel can be maintained as a vineyards/landscaping  
3 feature solely because the land costs for the vineyards are subsidized  
4 by the Applicant.” Record 34.

5 In determining whether a land use is a “farm practice,” a local government  
6 may consider whether a reasonable farmer would be motivated to put the land to  
7 agricultural use “for the primary purpose of obtaining a profit in money.” 77 Or  
8 LUBA 368, 371. Neither of the hobby farm or vineyard uses reflected a use of  
9 the property for farming for the primary purpose of obtaining a profit in money.  
10 Record 30-31. The county properly determined that the vineyard is not  
11 agricultural land. Accordingly, the subject property is not necessary to permit any  
12 farm practices in the vineyard and the subject property is not “agricultural land.”

13 This subassignment of error is denied.

14 This assignment of error is denied.

#### 15 **FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR**

16 OAR 660-015-0000(4) provides that in the context of a plan amendment  
17 involving forest lands, “forest land shall include lands which are suitable for  
18 commercial forest uses including adjacent and nearby lands which are necessary  
19 to permit forest operations or practices and other forested lands that maintain soil,  
20 air, water and fish and wildlife resources.” Petitioners argue that the county  
21 misconstrued applicable law and made findings not supported by substantial  
22 evidence because the county failed to demonstrate that the subject property is not  
23 “other forested land that maintains soil, air, water and fish and wildlife  
24 resources.” Petition for Review 46. Petitioners argue that the county misconstrues

1 “the phrase ‘other forested lands’ to require a redundant determination of whether  
2 soils are predominately forested lands.” Petition for Review 47.

3 The county’s findings begin by concluding that a baseline for considering  
4 this factor is whether the subject property is predominately forested. Record 38.  
5 Predominately forested is not, however, part of the test for whether property  
6 constitutes other forested lands necessary to protect identified resources.

7 The Forest Productivity Analysis provided substantial evidence “that the  
8 Property has only isolated areas that contain evergreen trees and that tree growth  
9 is constrained and limited by the condition of the Property.” Response Brief 35.  
10 There are small stands of timber on the property. Record 1515. The county held  
11 that the trees are at best isolated on the subject property and constrained “by  
12 shallow soils, steep slopes and wet conditions.” Record 38. Large portions of the  
13 site are grassland with thin soil and exposed rock. *Id.* Brush present on the  
14 property includes “blackberry, scotch broom, poison oak, rose, hazel and vine  
15 maple.” Record 1515. The county reasonably concluded that the subject property  
16 is not predominately forest land. This is not, however, the end of the inquiry.

17 LUBA has held that “[t]he mere presence of trees on the property is not  
18 itself sufficient” to establish that the property constitutes other forested lands that  
19 maintain soil, air, water and fish and wildlife resources. *Doob v. Josephine*  
20 *County*, 48 Or LUBA 227, 243 (2004). In *Doob*, the county found that the  
21 property at issue was not other forested land because it was not within a wildlife

1 habitat, or fisheries habitat area, was not needed to protect the watershed or to  
2 preserve wetland, urban buffers or open space. We held:

3 “Absent some reason to believe that the subject property must  
4 remain in forest zoning in order to maintain soil, air, water and fish  
5 and wildlife resources, something petitioner has not established, the  
6 county’s findings that the property is not ‘other forested lands’ are  
7 adequate and supported by substantial evidence.” *Id.* at 243-44.

8 The county’s findings with respect to this criterion do not address whether  
9 the property must remain in forest zoning in order to maintain soil, air, water and  
10 fish and wildlife resources. As we noted above, the county first concludes that  
11 the property must be predominately forested. We agree with petitioners that this  
12 is not the correct standard for this prong of the test. The county goes on to state:

13 “Beyond this basic test, the identified resource of this criterion (soil,  
14 air, water and fish and wildlife resources) are either not present or  
15 are not relevant or unique to the Subject Property under this section  
16 of the rule. No permanent water feature or fish habitat exists on the  
17 property. \* \* \* There is no evidence of any kind of wildlife  
18 population most likely because of the extensive rural residential  
19 developments that border the property. That same development  
20 further demonstrates that air resources will not be affected if this  
21 amendment is approved.” Record 38.

22 The findings do not explain why a water feature must be permanent in  
23 order to be considered. In addition, the record is clear that the subject property  
24 contains wetlands. Intervenor argues in its response that the findings recognize  
25 that federal and state environmental laws will require a permit to develop  
26 wetlands. Response 35. This finding in another part of the county decision does  
27 not, however, address maintaining the water feature. Intervenor argues that the

1 county found that the proposed development will not impact wetlands because  
2 “the Applicant is committed to development of the property without any  
3 disturbance to wetlands” but does not clarify how the decision ensures no  
4 disturbance to wetlands. Record 41.

5 The findings do not respond to the testimony from area residents  
6 concerning the presence of wildlife, instead concluding that there is no evidence  
7 of wildlife, likely because of the neighboring development. Record 38. Neighbors  
8 testified that they in fact observed wildlife in the area and an ODFW staff member  
9 noted that he had not seen wildlife on the subject property but would expect such  
10 wildlife to exist. Petition for Review 41. Findings must address and respond to  
11 specific issues relevant to compliance with applicable approval standards that  
12 were raised in the proceedings below. *Norvell v. Portland Metropolitan Area*  
13 *Local Government Boundary Com.*, 43 Or App 849, 853, 604 P2d 896 (1979).  
14 Rather than doing so, the county adopted broad findings that wildlife is not  
15 observed in the area, likely due to the neighboring development, and that there  
16 are no permanent water features. On remand, the county must address the other  
17 forested areas prong of the test and evaluate whether the property must remain in  
18 forest zoning in order to protect the listed features.

19 This assignment of error is sustained.

20 The county’s decision is remanded.