1	BEFORE THE LAND USE BOARD OF APPEALS
2	OF THE STATE OF OREGON
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4	DOUGLAS ZIRKER and VIVIANN ZIRKER,
5	Petitioners,
6	
7	VS.
8	CITELY OF DEATH
9	CITY OF BEND,
10	Respondent,
11 12	and
13	and
13 14	HOME FEDERAL BANK,
15	Intervenor-Respondent.
16	mervenor Respondent.
17	LUBA No. 2011-036
18	ORDER ON MOTION FOR
19	ATTORNEYS' FEES
20	Intervenor-respondent (intervenor) moves for an award of attorney fees pursuant to
21	ORS 197.830(15)(b), which provides:
22	"The board shall * * * award reasonable attorney fees and expenses to the
23	prevailing party against any other party who the board finds presented a
23 24	position without probable cause to believe the position was well-founded in
25	law or on factually supported information."
26	As we explained in Wolfgram v. Douglas County, 54 Or LUBA 775, 775-76 (2007):
20	As we explained in Wolfgram v. Douglas County, 54 Of LOBA 175, 175-70 (2007).
27	"Under ORS 197.830(15)(b), a position is presented 'without probable cause'
28	where 'no reasonable lawyer would conclude that any of the legal points
29	asserted on appeal possessed legal merit.' Contreras v. City of Philomath, 32
30	Or LUBA 465, 469 (1996). In applying the probable cause analysis LUBA
31	'will consider whether any of the issues raised [by a party] were open to
32	doubt, or subject to rational, reasonable, or honest discussion.' Id. The party
33	seeking an award of attorney fees under the probable cause standard must
34	clear a relatively high hurdle and that hurdle is not met by simply showing
35	that LUBA rejected all of a party's arguments on the merits. Brown v. City of
36	Ontario, 33 Or LUBA 803, 804 (1997)."
37	Thus, an award of attorney fees is warranted under ORS 197.830(15)(b) where the prevailing
38	party demonstrates that no reasonable lawyer would present any of the "positions" that the

losing party presented on appeal. Conversely, a party may avoid paying attorney fees if the party presented at least one position on appeal that satisfied the probable cause standard.

Petitioners' dispute with the city over a now-constructed triplex has resulted in four LUBA appeals. In the most recent appeal, petitioners alleged three assignments of error. We rejected all three assignments of error and affirmed the city's decision. Intervenor, who is the original applicants' successor in interest, moves for an award of attorney fees. Although it is a reasonably close question, we deny the motion.

We set out the relevant facts in our final decision:

"The subject property is zoned Residential Medium Density (RM) and has frontage on Steidl Road, an existing improved city street. The standard front yard setback in the RM zone is 10 feet, measured from the front lot line along the existing Steidl Road right-of-way. Bend Development Code (BDC) 2.1.300(C)(2)(a). The triplex complies with this requirement. Steidl Road has a 40-foot right-of-way and is improved with a 24-foot wide paved surface. Under the current BDC, a local street such as Steidl Road is required to have a 60 foot right-of-way and a 36-foot wide paved travel surface. circumstances where existing streets and rights of way are substandard, the BDC imposes three requirements that are relevant here. First, it imposes a special 30-foot setback and requires that the normal front yard setback in the applicable zone be measured from this 30-foot special setback instead of the edge of the existing right-of-way. BDC 3.4.200(J). In this case, that would require that the 10-foot standard front yard setback in the RM zone be measured from the special 30-foot setback instead of the edge of the existing right-of-way. The triplex intrudes into this setback. In this opinion we will refer to the additional setback that is required under BDC 3.4.200(J) as the Extra Setback. The BDC also requires that sufficient right-of-way be dedicated to bring the right-of-way up to current standard. BDC 3.4.200(N). In this case that would require dedication of an additional 10 feet of right-ofway along Steidl Road. Finally, the BDC requires a minimum pavement width of 36 feet. BDC 3.4.200 Table A. As previously mentioned, Steidl Road has a 24-foot wide pavement width." Zirker v. City of Bend, ____ Or LUBA ____ (August 31, 2011) slip op at 2-3 (footnotes omitted).

In a prior appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded that although the city engineer has authority under the BDC to waive right-of-way dedication and improvement requirements, the city engineer lacks authority under the BDC to waive the Extra Setback requirement. *Zirker v. City of Bend*, 233 Or App 601, 612-13, 227 P3d 1174 (2010). Following LUBA's

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reversal of an earlier city decision granting waivers and variances to the Extra Setback, right-of-way dedication and right-of-way improvement requirements, the city amended the BDC to authorize the planning department to grant waivers of the Extra Setback if certain standards are met. After intervenor submitted a new application seeking approval of waivers under the amended BDC, the city approved the requested waivers and granted site plan approval. Petitioners appealed.

In their first assignment of error, petitioners alleged the city violated the ORS 227.178(3) fixed goal post rule, by not applying the version of the city code that was in effect when the first application was filed. In their second assignment of error, petitioners argued the city should be barred from applying the amended version of the BDC that took effect shortly before the applicants resubmitted their application for site plan approval in this matter. We agree with intervenor that the arguments petitioners advanced under the first and second assignments of error are not arguments that a reasonable lawyer would believe possess legal merit. If petitioners' appeal had been limited to the first two assignments of error, an award of attorney fees would be warranted.

Turning to the third assignment of error, under the amended BDC, to grant the requested waivers of the requirements for Extra Setback, right-of-way dedication and right-of-way improvements, the city was required to find "that (1) the waiver or modification will not harm or will be beneficial to the public in general; [and] (2) the waiver and modification are not inconsistent with the general purpose of ensuring adequate public facilities[.]" BDC 3.4.150(B). As intervenor correctly notes, throughout petitioners' arguments under the third assignment of error, petitioners take the position that granting the requested Extra Setback waiver forecloses the possibility of ever widening the Steidl Road to a 60-foot right-of-way and widening the existing 24-foot paved surface to the 36-foot paved surface that would be required under current city standards. As we noted in our final opinion, that is simply not the case, and it is not clear to us whether petitioners ever realized their error in this regard. If

Steidl Road were widened to a 60-foot right of way and the paved surface was widened and side walks added, the right of way would be six feet from the triplex rather than the ten feet that would result if the triplex had been constructed in accordance with the Extra Setback. The waiver of the Extra Setback in no way precludes widening and improvement of Steidl Road; it simply means the triplex would be six feet from such a widened right of way rather than ten feet. However, as serious as this blind spot in petitioners' arguments under the third assignment of error is, we cannot say petitioners' entire presentation under the third assignment of error was one that was presented "without probable cause to believe the position was well-founded in law or on factually supported information."

The decision on appeal granted waivers of the Extra Setback, right-of-way dedication and right-of-way improvement requirements. In doing so, petitioners argued, among other things, that the city failed to give appropriate consideration to the demands that might be placed on Steidl Road if the area around the subject property is redeveloped with the higher densities that its current RM zoning would allow. Petitioners also argued that the city placed undue weight on the fact that Steidl Road currently has excess capacity. Although we rejected those arguments, we cannot say that they are arguments that were presented "without probable cause to believe the position was well-founded in law or on factually supported information."

As intervenor correctly notes, one response to petitioners' arguments is that if it turns out that surrounding properties are redeveloped at greater densities and capacity on Steidl Road is exhausted, the right of way could be widened and the roadway improved. However, as we noted above, in granting the requested waivers the city was required to find "that (1) the waiver or modification will not harm or will be beneficial to the public in general; [and] (2) the waiver and modification are not inconsistent with the general purpose of ensuring adequate public facilities[.]" BDC 3.4.150(B). Even if it might be possible to acquire additional right of way and widen Steidl Road, despite the disputed waivers, the waivers

1	would make such widening and improvement more difficult and leave the triplex only six
2	feet from the edge of the widened right of way. We cannot say that no reasonable lawyer
3	would argue that granting the waivers in these circumstances would not "be beneficial to the
4	public in general," or be consistent "with the general purpose of ensuring adequate public
5	facilities."
6	Intervenor's motion for attorney fees is denied.
7 8 9 10 11	Dated this 24th day of January, 2012.
12 13	Michael A. Holstun
14	Roard Member