1	BEFORE THE LAND USE BOARD OF APPEALS
2	OF THE STATE OF OREGON
3	
4	MICHAEL KIMBRELL,
5	Petitioner,
6	
7	VS.
8	
9	CITY OF LINCOLN CITY,
10	Respondent,
11	
12	and
13	
14	LEE HULLINGER,
15	Intervenor-Respondent.
16	V V D A V V 2010 055
17	LUBA No. 2019-077
18	ODDED
19	ORDER
20	MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES
21	On January 22, 2020, petitioner filed a cost bill and motion for attorney
22	fees against the city and intervenor-respondent (intervenor) (collectively
23	respondents). On February 4, 2020, the city filed its response to petitioner's

fees against the city and intervenor-respondent (intervenor) (collectively respondents). On February 4, 2020, the city filed its response to petitioner's motion. On February 5, 2020, intervenor filed his response to petitioner's motion.

LUBA is required to award reasonable attorney fees and expenses to prevailing parties against any other party who "presented a position without probable cause to believe the position was well-founded in law or on factually supported information." ORS 197.830(15)(b). There are three requirements for an award of attorney fees. First, the movant must be the prevailing party. Second, the party against whom attorney fees are sought must have presented a position

- 1 in the appeal. Third, that party's position must have been presented without
- 2 probable cause to believe it was legally or factually well-founded. It is undisputed
- 3 that petitioner is the prevailing party. The question is therefore whether the city
- 4 and intervenor "presented a position" and, if so, whether any of those positions
- 5 were presented "without probable cause." Because we conclude that respondents
- 6 did not present a position, the motion for attorney fees is denied.

A. Background

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8 Petitioner appealed a city council decision approving a geological hazard 9 report as part of intervenor's efforts to develop a single-family dwelling on 10 property located in ocean bluff and coastal erosion hazard areas. Kimbrell v. City of Lincoln City, ___ Or LUBA ___, ___ (LUBA No 2019-077, Jan. 8, 2020) (slip 11 12 op at 2). The development plan included excavating 10 feet of the existing bluff 13 prior to construction of the dwelling. *Id.* Under the Lincoln City Code (LCC), 14 most "development" within coastal erosion hazard areas must be supported by a geological hazard report prepared at the applicant's expense. LCC 17.47.020(B). 15 16 In addition, "new structure[s]" in ocean bluff areas must be set back from the 17 bluff by a distance of at least 60 times the annual erosion rate. LCC 17.47.020(D). 18 For this purpose, the location of the bluff is determined by the city based on 19 certain photos, data, and maps, while the annual erosion rate is determined by the applicant's geological hazard report. Kimbrell, Or LUBA ____, ___ (slip op 20 21 at 6-8). However, if the city is unable to locate the bluff, it may rely on the

applicant's geological hazard report to determine an appropriate site for the new structure, if one exists. *Id.* (slip op at 11-12).

In approving intervenor's geological hazard report, the city council measured the setback from where the bluff would be located after the 10-foot excavation, as determined by the geological hazard report itself. *Id.* (slip op at 5-7). This enabled the dwelling to be located closer to the ocean than would have been possible if the setback were measured from the pre-excavation bluff. *Id.* The city council concluded that this interpretation of LCC 17.47.020(D) was permissible because that provision neither prohibits measurement of the setback from the post-excavation bluff nor requires that it be measured from the pre-excavation bluff, and because it allows the city to refer to an applicant's geological hazard report to determine an appropriate site for new structures. *Id.* (slip op at 6-7, 11-12).

On September 3, 2019, petitioner filed his notice of intent to appeal. On September 18, 2019, intervenor filed his motion to intervene. On September 26, 2019, the city transmitted the record. On October 31, 2019, petitioner filed his petition for review. On November 19, 2019, intervenor filed a pleading titled "Intervenor-Respondent's Answer to Petitioner's Brief" (November 19, 2019 submittal). On November 20, 2019, we issued an order identifying the ways in which intervenor's November 19, 2019 submittal failed to comply with LUBA's rules, and instructing intervenor to file an amended response brief within seven days. *Kimbrell v. City of Lincoln City*, ____ Or LUBA ____, ___ (LUBA No 2019-

1 077, Order, Nov 20, 2019). On December 4, 2019, we issued another order 2 explaining that, because intervenor failed to file a compliant brief, we would 3 neither consider his November 19, 2019 submittal nor allow him to present oral argument. Kimbrell v. City of Lincoln City, ___ Or LUBA ___, ___ (LUBA No 4 5 2019-077, Order, Dec 4, 2019). 6 On the merits, we agreed with petitioner that the city council's 7 interpretation of LCC 17.47.020(D) was inconsistent with the express language 8 of that provision since the documents on which it requires the city to rely in 9 locating the bluff reflect existing conditions rather than hypothetical future 10 conditions, and since that provision only allows the city to rely on the applicant's 11 geological hazard report for siting purposes if the city is *unable* to locate the bluff. Kimbrell, ___ Or LUBA ___, ___ (LUBA No 2019-077, Jan 8, 2020) (slip op at 12 13 7-8, 11-12). We also agreed with petitioner that the city council's interpretation 14 of LCC 17.47.020(D) was inconsistent with that provision's context—namely 15 other LCC sections which, among other things, exempt only specific types of 16 excavation from the setback requirement and do not support the conclusion that 17 the city may sever construction from site preparation for purposes of determining 18 whether a setback is required. *Id.* (slip op at 8-9). We also agreed with petitioner 19 that the city erred in approving a geological hazard report depicting the 20 cantilevered portion of the home and at least one footing as encroaching into the 21 setback. *Id.* (slip op at 15).

B. Fees Against the City

In his motion for attorney fees, petitioner argues the city's position was without merit because the city made no appearance on appeal and because the record contains evidence that the city attorney expressed disagreement with the city council's interpretation during the proceedings below. The city, apparently assuming that it presented a position by transmitting the record, argues that its position was not without probable cause. We disagree with both parties that the city presented a position in this appeal. We have held that, "[w]here a local government 'files the local record [but] does not file or join in a brief or other document at LUBA defending its decision,' the local government does not present a position" for purposes of awarding attorney fees. *Stevens v. City of Island City*, 71 Or LUBA 430 (2015) (quoting *Hearne v. Baker County*, 35 Or LUBA 768, 770 (1998), *aff'd*, 158 Or App 246, 972 P2d 1233 (1999)). Because the city did not defend its decision at LUBA, it is not subject to an award of attorney fees.

Petitioner's motion for attorney fees against the city is denied.

C. Fees Against Intervenor

While acknowledging that we did not consider intervenor's November 19, 2019 submittal, petitioner nonetheless argues that intervenor presented a position for purposes of awarding attorney fees and that, because his submittal "made no attempt to address any point of law or fact raised by petitioner on appeal," his position was without probable cause. Motion for Attorney Fees 5. Intervenor

responds that he presented no position at all because merely filing a motion to intervene does not qualify as presenting a position for purposes of awarding attorney fees, and his November 19, 2019 submittal was not considered by LUBA. Intervenor further argues that, because we did not consider his submittal, we would have no way of knowing whether the submittal did in fact present a

We have repeatedly held that a party's presentation for purposes of awarding attorney fees is limited to their arguments on the merits and on jurisdictional issues. *Martin v. City of Central* Point, 76 Or LUBA 463, 466 (2017) (citing *Fechtig v. City of Albany*, 150 Or App 10, 24, 946 P2d 280 (1997); *Lewelling Neighborhood Dist. v. City of* Milwaukie, 35 Or LUBA 764, 766 (1998)). Thus, intervenor did not present a position merely by filing a motion to intervene.

We also conclude that intervenor's November 19, 2019 submittal in response to the petition for review did not present a position for purposes of an award of attorney fees. We have previously held that, where a petitioner submits a letter that is intended to be a petition for review but that is so noncompliant with LUBA's rules and "so grossly deficient that we did not even recognize it as a petition for review," but where the local government nonetheless files a response brief and a motion to dismiss, the local government is entitled to recover attorney fees. *Gallagher v. City of Myrtle Point*, 50 Or LUBA 769, 771 (2005). In *Gallagher*, the city filed a motion to dismiss the appeal or compel petitioner to

position.

- 1 comply with the requirements for a petition for review because petitioner's filing
- 2 was so grossly noncompliant that no petition for review had been filed at all.
- 3 Gallagher v. City of Myrtle Point, 50 Or LUBA 303, 309 (2005). As a
- 4 precautionary measure, the city also filed a response brief attempting to respond
- 5 to petitioner's filing; we ultimately awarded attorney fees. We do not award
- 6 attorney fees here because the facts of this case differ from *Gallagher* in material
- 7 respects.
- First, *Gallagher* involved the filing of a noncompliant brief by the petitioner. The petition for review is required to set forth each assignment of error. OAR 661-010-0030(4)(d). Failure to file a petition for review within the time required will result in dismissal of an appeal. OAR 661-010-0030(1). Unlike the city the respondent in *Gallagher* petitioner here bore the burden of
- 12 the etty the respondent in Samagner pentioner here sole the statem of
- presenting his case in the first instance and if he elected to have representation
- by an attorney, would necessarily incur related fees.
- Second, we notified the parties in this case that intervenor's submittal was
- 16 noncompliant on November 20. 2019, the day after it was submitted and
- 17 instructed intervenor to file a compliant response brief within seven days.
- 18 Intervenor failed to file a compliant brief and we issued an order on December 4,
- 19 2019, advising the parties that we would not consider the initial filing or allow
- 20 intervenor to participate in the December 11, 2019 oral argument. Therefore,
- 21 unlike the city in Gallagher, which was not apprised that LUBA would not
- 22 consider the petitioner's letter as a petition for review until after the city prepared

and filed its response brief, here petitioner received notice in advance of our final 1 opinion, that we would not consider intervenor's deficient submittal. We 2 3 understand that petitioner incurred some fees related to intervenor's 4 noncompliant filing. In Gallagher, however, respondent reasonably filed a 5 precautionary response brief. No precautionary response was required here. Given these circumstances, intervenor's deficient submittal did not present a 6 7 position for purposes of awarding attorney fees. 8 Petitioner's motion for attorney fees against intervenor is denied. 9 COSTS 10 Petitioner filed a cost bill pursuant to OAR 661-010-0075(1), requesting a 11 return of its \$200 deposit for costs and an award of the cost of the \$200 filing fee. 12 As the prevailing party, petitioner is awarded the cost of the \$200 filing fee, to 13 be paid by the city and intervenor. The board shall return petitioner's \$200 deposit for costs. 14 Dated this day of March 2020. 15 16 17 18 19 Michelle Gates Rudd 20 21 **Board Chair**